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Bible Encyclopedias
Primacy
Cyclopedia of Biblical, Theological and Ecclesiastical Literature
or is the office held
(1) by him who is the pope of Rome, and therefore highest in the Christian Church, according to those who accept the assertions of the papacy; and
(2) by him who is next in rank to the patriarch (1. 5.). (See PRIMATE). The primacy of Peter, as the pope's office is sometimes styled, Romanists claim to be of divine appointment. They assert that the apostle Peter, by Christ's authority, had a primacy or sovereign authority and jurisdiction over the other apostles. Since the Godman Jesus the Christ, they say, has himself willed the continuance of the Church and her fundamental unity, Peter and his successors were also established by the will of God. The power to bind and to loose, (See KEYS, POWER OF THE), was given to the apostles in a body (Matthew 18:8); but, in order to preserve their power and unity, Peter was put at their head and endowed with higher honors (Matthew 16:16-18; Matthew 17:4, etc.). He became the primus inter pares, not so much for his own sake as for a precedent; "for it would be unreasonable," says Sauter, "to consider the primacy he held to have died with him, in view of the end for which Christ had appointed him to it. It appears, on the contrary, that Christ instituted the primacy more in view of the future than to meet the requirements of the apostolic times, when the personal purity of each of the apostles rendered such a measure less necessary" (Fundamenta juris ecclesiastici Catholicorum [3(1 ed. Rotwile, 1825], § 62; see also Zeitschrift fü r Phil. und kath. Theologie [Cologne, 1832], 4:121, 122).
By the example of Peter, Christ showed, in a general way, that some one of the bishops was always to be considered as primate by the others; but, add those who put a liberal interpretation on the Romish assertion of supremacy, it is by no means clear from the writings of the primitive fathers that the primacy was attached to a particular bishopric. Circumstances favored Rome, whose bishop was acknowledged by the other bishops as the successor of Peter (in the primacy). The bishops of Rome cannot have the primacy by divine appointment, but in a mediate manner, so that, when the good of the Church demands it, it can be transferred to another of the bishops (Sauter, § 63, 64). But the Ultramontanes maintain that by the same authority by which Peter was set apart for the supremacy his own successors were also established. Peter, it is true, founded different communities and provided them with bishops, yet no other can be considered as his true successor than he who succeeded him after his death, and this is the bishop of Rome. The Roman bishop had, by his Roman episcopal dignity, a right similar to that in virtue of which the next relation succeeds in worldly principalities, and the Ultramontanes assert that Peter himself chose for his successor, in all his dignities, the same Linus mentioned by Paul in his Second Epistle to Timothy, 4:21 (Phillips, Kirchenrecht, 1, 146).
This system of ideas, so simple in appearance, has only by degrees developed itself and obtained dogmatical sanction in the Latin Church. It is based on facts which have been variously appreciated, and on decisions which have by no means received the same interpretation at all hands. The whole deduction is founded on arbitrary declarations, inasmuch as the bishops were, and are still, party and judge in the same cause; they, whose title is in question, claim the exclusive right of explaining words and facts, and consider any one who doubts their assertions as being disobedient to Christ and to God. Impartial thinkers of the Roman Church itself cannot help acknowledging that before the middle of the 3rd century there was no primacy perceptible in the Church (see Mohler, Die Einhteit der Kirche, oder das Principe des Katholicismmus, dargestellt im Geiste der Kirchenvelfaissung der drei ersten Jahrhunlderte [2nd ed. Tü bingen, 1843]); while others, by arbitrary arrangement of historical facts, arrive at the conclusion "that the Roman bishops not only claimed the highest authority in all ecclesiastical matters since the first times of Christianity, but that these pretensions, founded on Christ's declarations were acknowledged by the whole Church, especially by the episcopate" (see Phillips, Kirchenrecht, p. 156). This is not the place to show, by the history of the Roman bishops of the first centuries, how indefensible such an assumption must appear: we must leave this to the special articles of this work, contenting ourselves with calling the attention of the reader to the principal features of the development of the primacy.
Among the numerous works written on the subject, we mention in favor of it: Bibliotheca maximan Pontificica, in qua authores melioris notce qui hactenus pro S. Romanall Sede scripserunt, fere omnes continentur, promovente Fr. H. Tom. de Roceaberti (Romae, 1689. 21 vols. fol.); A. Daude, Majestas Hierarchicea cul. Sulmmi Pontificis (Bamb. 1761, 2 vols. 4to); Peter Ballerini, De Tiac Ratione Primatuus, etc. (Augsb. 1770, 2 vols. 4to; ed. nov. by Westhoff); J. Roskovany, De Primatu Romani Pontficis ejusque Juribus (ibid. 1834, 8vo); Rothensee, Der Primat des Papsles in allen Jahrhunderten, herausgegeben von Rä ss und Weiss (Mainz, 1836, 4 vols. 8vo). Against it: Ellendorf, Der Primlat der romischen Pä pste (Darmst. 1841 and 1846, 2 vols. 8vo); Barrel, Du Pape et ses Droits religieux (Paris, 1803); Le Maistre, Du Pope (ibid. 1820); Gosselin, Pouvoir due Pape au Moyen Age (Louvain, 1845, 2 vols. 8vo). These and other works have been extensively used by Phillips in his Canon Law, the fifth volume of which (Ratisbon, 1857) is entirely devoted to the subject of primacy.
Generally the testimony of Irenaeus (d. 202) and of Cyprian (d. 258) are specially invoked to show that the primacy of the Roman bishops was accepted in the 21 century. But the former (Adversus Haeres. lib. 3, cap. 3), in order to demonstrate the truth of the Catholic doctrine, appeals to the tradition of all the sees founded by the apostles; for Italy and the West, he names especially Rome as being the only Occidental see of undisputed apostolic foundation. The potior principalitas mentioned by Irenieus designates the political situation of the city, which could not fail to enhance its ecclesiastical importance. In the same way, Constantinople, at a later period, took the second place in the hierarchy, as being a second Rome (Concil. Constantinop. ann. 381, Song of Solomon 3; comp. Bickell, Geschichte des Kirchenrechts, 1, 209 sq.). The ideas of Cyprian about the unity of the Church logically led to primacy, yet the relations lie himself maintained to the Roman bishop do not imply the acknowledgment of a prerogative like that which is supposed to be advocated in his book De Unitate Ecclesiae, and in his letters in favor of Rome. Its foundation by an apostle, and the authority of the first metropolis of the Roman Empire, gave at an early period a great importance to the see of Rome; but the same importance is attributed to the bishop of Alexandria and of Antioch, in the 3rd canon of the Council of Nice, in 325. At that council the Roman bishop did not exercise a higher authority than the other bishops. This is clearly shown by the acts of the council, signed by two presbyters, "instead of our pope," i.e. bishop (see Analecta Nicceana— fragments relating to the Council of Nice-by Harris Cowpers [London and Edinburgh, 1857]). It was at a later period attempted to give Song of Solomon 6 Nic. Cone., another form than the primitive by adding at the beginning the words "Quod ecclesia Romana semper habuit primatum" (see Gieseler, Kirchengeschichte, 1, § 91).
The struggle for the maintenance of the orthodox doctrine o as extremely advantageous to the bishops of Rome, and the Council of Sardica (343) emphasized most decidedly the pre-eminence of the Roman see in the Western Church: the Oriental bishops on that occasion protested and left the assembly. lThe resolutions of Sardica were not at once accepted even in the Western Church. At the request of the bishop Damasus, and of a Roman synod of 378, the emperor Gratian issued a rescript in favor of Rome (Gieseler, 1. c. § 92, n. 1). In 445 an edict of Valentinian III proclaims the primacy of the bishop of Rome over the whole Church— a primacy which, besides the higher rank over the bishops, includes a supreme ecclesiastical legislation and jurisdiction. The emperor founds this preference on the primacy of Peter ("sedis apostolicee primatum, sancti Petri meritum, qui princeps est episcopalis coronae"), on the political importance of Rome ("Romanae dignitas civitatis"), and on the Synod of Sardica ("sacrae synodi auctoritas") (comp. Richter, Kirchenrecht [6th ed.], § 22, n. 3). But the Church of the East was by no means subordinated to the Roman see; the Council of Chalcedon, 451, in can. 28, declares that the see of Constantinople has the same privileges in the Eastern Church which in the Western Church belong to Rome (τὰ ἴσα πρεσβεῖα ἀπέμειναν τῷ τῆς νέας ῾Ρώμης ἁγιωτάτῳ θρόνῳ ). If, in later times, the first place in the Roman empire is acknowledged to belong to Rome (c. 7, pr. c. 8, C. de Summa Trinitate [1, 1]; Justinian, a. 533, No. 9, 131, c. 2, a. 535, 545, etc.), this was only a distinction of honor without any practical consequences; for the patriarch of Constantinople was also the highest instance (c. 29, C. de Episcop. Audientia [1, 4], a. 530, No. 137, c. 5, a. 564, etc.). The ecclesiastical authority of Rome was not contested after that, but its relation to the worldly powers passed through many vicissitudes. Its connection with the newly founded Germanic churches was at first prevented by their Arianism, but became the closer after their conversion to the orthodox faith. The Roman principles about the relations of the Church to the apostolic see prevailed in the Frankish empire by the exertions of Boniface, although their practical consequences were impeded by the independent exercise of the rights of the State in Church matters.
With Charlemagne the pope was nothing but the first metropolitan, over whom the emperor had jurisdiction. The king is the supreme judge and legislator, a protector and ruler given to the Church by God, who corrects or approves the resolutions of the synods, and issues himself ecclesiastical ordinances, after taking the advice of the clergy. The proof of this is afforded by a large number of capitularies. Under the weak successors of the great emperor there was a change, which the decretals of Pseudo- Isidore turned to the advantage of Rome. It was in conformity with these principles that Nicholas I administered the Church (from 858). The German kings of the house of Saxony regained the lost power, and the Roman bishops were again reduced to the primacy of honor. We see the German bishops, under Otto I, appointed by the emperor himself, governing their dioceses independently, and the episcopate, in their synods, presided over by the emperor, exercise jurisdiction over the Roman bishop (deposition of John XII, in 963, by the Roman council). These principles were in force until the middle of the 11th century. The bishop of Rome was then subordinated to the emperor and to the body of the episcopate (in 1046, at the Synod of Sutri, by which Benedict VIII, Sylvester III, and Gregory VI were deposed). Under Gregory VII a reaction took place, and the papacy was enabled to obtain the whole extent of authority which Pseudo-Isidore claimed as its own.
The hierarchical system of papacy was completed by this Gregory and his successors-Alexander III (1159-1181), Innocent III (1198-1216), Gregory IX (1227-1241), Innocent IV (1243-1254), and Boniface VIII (1294-1303). The so-called Dictatus Hildebrandini, the authenticity of which is proved by the regests of Gregory VII (comp. Gieseler, Kirchengesch. II 1, § 47, n. d; Giesebrecht, De Gregorii VII registro emendando [Regimont. 1858], p. 5), and the decretals of the popes mentioned, contain the propositions peculiar to this system, the most essential of which are: The bishop of Rome is the vicar of Christ on earth ("Romanus Pontifex vicarius Jesu Christi, quod non puri hominis, sed veri Dei vicem gerit in terris" [Innoc. III, in c. 2, 3, 10:De Translat. Episcop. 1, 7]), the universal bishop ("solus universalis" [Gregorii Dict. No. 2]), to whom alone belongs the title of pope ("quod unicum est nomen in mundo" [ibid. c. 11]). He is possessed of full powers, and he grants parts of them to the rest of the clergy, as his assistants ("Quia diversitatem corporum diversitas saepe sequitur animorum, ne plenitude ecclesiasticae jurisdictionis in plures dispensata vilesceret, sed in uno potius collata vigeret, apostolicae sedi Dominus in B. Petro universam ecclesiarum et cunctorum Christi fidelium magistrium contulit et primatum, quae, retenta sibi plenitudine potestatis, ad implendum laudabilius officium pastorale, quod omnibus eam constituit debitricem, multos in partem sollicitudinis evocavit, sic suum dispensans onus et honorem in alios, ut nihil suo juri subtraheret, nec jurisdictionem suam in aliquo minoraret" [Innoc. III, in c. 5, 10: De Concess. Praebendae, 3, 8]). It is, of course, his own business how he chooses his assistants; the rights of appointing, deposing, permuting bishops belong to him exclusively; he can draw every cause before the apostolic see, judge it himself, or take it back from the judge he had appointed, and give it to another one, especially to his personal lieutenant, a legate, who, of course, has pre-eminence over all other dignitaries (‘ Quod ille solus possit deponere episcopos vel reconciliare. — Quod legatus ejus omnibus episcopis preesit in concilio, etiam inferioris gradus, et adversus eos sententiam depositionis possit dare. — Quod illi liceat de sede ad sedem necessitate cogente episcopos transmutare.Quod de omni ecclesia, quacunque voluerit, clericum valeat ordinare. — Quod majores causue cujuscunque ecclesiae ad sedem apostolicam referri debeant" [Dictatus Gregorii VII, Nos. 3, 4, 13, 14, 21, 25, etc.]). The Roman bishop is the legislator of the Church ("Quod illi soli licet pro temporis necessitate novas leges condere," etc. [1. c. No. 7]). Without his consent, no synod can take place ("Quod nulla synodus absque praecepto ejus debet generalis vocari" [1. c. 16]). He is infallible, and decides what is true ("Quod nullum capitulum nullusque liber canonicus habeatur absque illius auctoritate. — Quod Romana ecclesia nunquam erravit, nec in perpetuum, scriptura testante, errabit" [1. c. 17, 22]). He recognizes no authority, while all are subordinated to his authority ("Quod sententia illius a nullo debeat retractari, et ipse omnium solus retractare possit.Quod a nemine ipse judicari debeat. — Quod nullus audeat condemnare apostolicam sedem appellantem" El. c. 18-20]).
The papal system, a product of feudalism, according to which all authority rests in the sovereign, involves, in its last consequence, the political domination. The Dictatus Gregorii contain the following declarations: "Quod solus Papa possit uti imperialibus insigniis" (No. 8); "Quod solius Papae pedes omnes principes deosculentur (No. 9); "Quod illi libeat imperatores deponere" (No. 12); "Quod a fidelitate iniquorum subjectos possit absolvere" (No. 27). Boniface VIII, trying to act up to these principles, involved himself in a terrible conflict with France, which ended in the defeat of the Roman see. Now people began to bethink themselves again of the principles which had prevailed before Gregory VII, on the relations of the Church, and the council which represents her, to the bishop of Rome, and the old principles were reinstated in vigor. The result of the war which has since been waged, with many interruptions and vicissitudes, between the pope and the bishops is a modification and practical attenuation of the strict papal or curial system; yet the latter has been victorious, and is now generally acknowledged. The consequences of this system in regard to the relations of the Roman Catholic Church to the State, the right of granting royal titles (Phillips, 1. c. 5, 684 sq.), and other prerogatives, by which the rights of sovereigns were limited or even denied, have long disappeared from practice; yet the pope never retracted the principle, and never failed to avail himself of such circumstances as allowed him to proclaim it and to apply it to special cases (see A. de Roskovany, Monunmenta Catholica pro Independentia Potestatis Ecclesiasticae ab Imperio Civili [Quinque Ecclesiis, 1847], vol. 2). The Austrian Concordat of Aug. 18, 1855, art. 2, says: "Cum Romanus pontifex primatum tam honoris quam jurisdictionis in universam, qua late patet, ecclesiam jure divine obtineat, episcoporum, cleri, et populi mutuo cum Sancta Sede communicatio in rebus spiritualibus et negotiis ecclesiasticis nulli placetum regium obtinendi necessitas suberit, sed prorsus libera erit;" and the allocution of Pius IX, at the publication of the Concordat, says: "Cum Romanus pontifex Christi his in terris vicarius et beatissimi apostolorum principis successor primatum . . . divino obtineat jure, tumr Catholicum hoc dogma in ipsa conventione luculentissimis fuit verbis expressum, ac propterea simul de medio sublata et radicitus evulsa peccatusque deleta falsa perversa illa et funestissima opinio eidem divino primatui ejusque juribus plane adversa et ab hac Apostolica Sede semper damnata atque proscripta, de habenda scilicet a civili gubernio venia, vel executione eorum, quee res spirituales et ecclesiastica negotia respiciunt." The principle is also saved in those cases where it is allowed to the State, only in consideration of the circumstances (temporum tratione habita). to decide by worldly procedure, in merely civil affairs of the clergy, or even in criminal matters in which they are involved (Austr. Conc. art. 12:etc.).
The papal rights relate to the supreme government of the Roman Catholic Church, and to the honors derived from it. Distinction is made between rights essential to the existence of the primacy (jura essentialia, primigenia, natulalia) and those which have been gradually added to the others, but are not absolutely indispensable to the primacy (jura accidentalia, acquisita, secundaria) (Sauter, § 466; Droste-Hiilshoff, Grundsistze des gemeinen Kirchenrechts, 2, pt. 1, § 132 sq.; Eichhorn, Kirchenrecht, 1, 579 sq.; Roskovany, De Primatut Pontiflcis Romani [Augustae Vindelicor. 1834]. § 44 sq.; § 54 sq.). As essentials we find, first, the primacy of honor and of jurisdiction, of the highest consideration and of general government, including discipline, the right of legislation, devolution, and protection. Among the additional rights or privileges are the jurisdiction in causae arduae ac majores, the decision in last resort of the reserved cases, etc. The primacy of the papal jurisdiction comprises
(1.) The Representation of the Roman Catholic Church. — As the representative head, the pope has, partly in proper person, partly in co- operation with the cardinals, to defend the general interests and special concerns of the Church with the exterior powers. He has to make conventions with the different states concerning the clerical institutions existing in them and directly subordinated to the papal see.
(2.) The Supreme Ecclesiastical Legislation. — The pope issues decrees as well about subjects of discipline as of doctrine, and secures the approbation of the Church by the convocation of a council or by other means. The necessity of the approbation of the council is not recognized by the pope. As the pope, speaking ex cathedra, cannot err according to the doctrine of the Church, all members of the Catholic Church are bound in such case to submit to the decision of the sovereign pontiff. This principle was solemnly recognized at the proclamation of the dogma of the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary. But the papal infallibility does not extend to matters of fact. Bellarmine himself says (De Romano Pontifice, lib. 4, cap. 2), "Conveniunt omnes posse Pontificem, et cum ccetu consiliorum vel cum generali concilio, errare in controversiis facti particularibus, quue ex informatione testimoniisque hominum pruecipue pendent." Appeals from Pontifice male informnato ad melius imfoirmnandum have always been in use. In virtue of his legislative powers, the pope can dispensate and authentically interpret; and in virtue of the same he orders the resolutions of the provincial synods to be re-examined and approved by the Congregatio Concilii (Benedict XIV, De Synodo Dioecesana, lib. 13:cap. 3, No. 6).
(3.) The Highest Ecclesiastical Supervision. — Reports from all dioceses are regularly sent to the pope. The bishops, by the oath they have to take before their consecration, are bound to appear in person ("Limina apostolorum singulis annis aut per me aut per certum nuntium visitabo, nisiabsolvar"); but the visitatio liminum can be replaced by a relatio status diceceseos, which must take place in conformity with an instruction of Benedict XIV (De Synodo Diaecesana, lib. 13, cap. 7 sq.).
(4.) The Highest Ecclesiastical Administration (Regimen Ecclesiae). — It comprises the decision in the causae arduce ac majores. To these belong the causae episcopoani— namely, the confirmation of elected, the admission of postulated bishops; the consecration, permutation, deposition; acceptation of resignations; appointment of coadjutors; foundation, division, fusion of dioceses; collation of the pallium; confirmation and suppression of clerical orders and ecclesiastical institutions; beatification and canonization; the acknowledgment of relics; the establishment and abrogation of general religious feasts; the right of decision in reserved cases. In virtue of his supremacy, the pope has also a right, in case of insufficient, faulty administration of the clerical dignitaries, to take the government in his own hands, and do everywhere what is wanted. On the right of administration is also founded the right of imposing ecclesiastical taxes.
I. Primacy of Honor. —
(1.) The pope has not only preeminence over the clerical dignitaries, but is traditionally recognized even by the worldly powers. The political authorities, in their conventions with him, allow his name to stand first.
(2.) The title and the qualifications connected with it underwent some changes. The name of pope belongs, since Gregory VII's time, exclusively to the bishop of Rome; likewise the designation of Summus Pontifex. Pontifex Maximus was only at a later period reserved for him. Gregory I declined the title of Patriarcha Universalis (see cap. 4, 5, (list. 99), and preferred being called Servus Servorum Dei, a designation which has since become official (comp. Thomassin, Vetus ec Nova Ecclesie Disciplina, lib. 1, pt. 1, cap. 4, 50. No. 14; Ferraris, Bibliotheca Canonica, s.v.; Papa, art. 2, No. 33-35; Phillips, 1. c. 5. 599 sq.). The qualification of sanctus is also, in early times, specially applied to the Roman bishops. In the Dictatus Greqorii VII, No. 23, we read, "Quod Romanus Pontifex, si canonice fuerit ordinatus, meritis B. Petri indubitanter efficitur sanctus, testante S. Ennodio Papiensi Episcopo, ei multis SS. Patribus faventibus. sicut in decretis B. Svmmachi P. continetur." Therefore the usual address is "sanctissime pater" (holy father). (For the homage formerly paid him and his pastoral ensigns, (See POPE); for the supremacy of the pope over councils, (See SUPREMACY); for the relation of the papacy to temporal possessions, (See TEMPORAL POWER OF THE POPE); (See ROMANISM). )
In answer to the Roman Catholic doctrine of the primacy we here subjoin the heads of Barrow's famous argument against it in his treatise On the Supremacy (Works [Lond. 1841], vol. 3). He says there may be "a primacy of worth or personal excellency; a primacy of reputation; a primacy of order or bare dignity and precedence; a primacy of power and jurisdiction.
1. The first — a primacy of worth — we may well grant to Peter, for probably he did exceed the rest of his brethren in personal endowments and capacities.
2. A primacy of repute, which Paul means when he speaks of those who had a special reputation, of those who seemed to be pillars of the supereminent apostles (Galatians 2:6; Galatians 2:9; 2 Corinthians 11:5; 2 Corinthians 12:11). [This advantage cannot be refused him, being a necessary consequence of those eminent qualities resplendent in him, and of the illustrious performances achieved by him beyond the rest. This may be inferred from that renown which he has had from the beginning; and likewise from his being so constantly ranked in the first place before the rest of his brethren.]
3. As to a primacy of order or bare dignity, importing that commonly, in all meetings and proceedings, the other apostles did yield him the precedence, it may be questioned; for this does not seem suitable to the gravity of such persons, or their condition and circumstances, to stand upon ceremonies of respect; for our Lord's rules seem to exclude all semblance of ambition, all kind of inequality and distance between his apostles. [But yet this primacy may be granted as probable upon divers accounts of use and convenience; it might be useful to preserve order, and to promote expedition, or to prevent confusion, distraction, and dilatory obstruction in the management of things.]
4. As to a primacy importing a superiority in command, power, or jurisdiction, this we have great reason to deny upon the following considerations:
(1.) For such a power it was needful that a commission from God, its founder, should be granted in absolute and perspicuous terms; but no such commission is extant in Scripture.
(2.) If so illustrious an office was instituted by our Savior, it is strange that nowhere in the evangelical or apostolical history there should be any express mention of that institution.
(3.) If Peter had been instituted sovereign of the apostolical senate, his office and state had been in nature and kind very distinct from the common office of the other apostles, as the office of a king from the office of any subject [and probably would have been dignified by some distinct name, as that of arch-apostle, arch-pastor, the vicar of Christ, or the like; but no such name or title was assumed by him, or was by the rest attributed to him].
(4.) There was no office above that of an apostle known to the apostles or primitive Church (Ephesians 4:11; 1 Corinthians 12:28).
(5.) Our Lord himself declared against this kind of primacy, prohibiting his apostles to affect, to seek, to assume, or admit a superiority of power, one above another (Luke 22:14-24; Mark 9:35).
(6.) We do not find any peculiar administration committed to Peter, nor any privilege conferred on him which was not also granted to the other apostles (Matthew 20:23; Mark 16:15).
(7.) When Peter wrote two catholic epistles, there does not appear in either of them any intimation or any pretence to this arch-apostolical power.
(8.) In all relations which occur in Scripture about controversies incident to doctrine or practice, there is no appeal made to Peter's judgment or allegation of it as decisive, no argument is built on his authority.
(9.) Peter nowhere appears intermeddling as a judge or governor paramount in such cases [yet where he does himself deal with heretics and disorderly persons, he proceeds not as a pope, decreeing, but as an apostle, warning, arguing, and persuading against them].
(10.) The consideration of the apostles proceeding in the conversion of people, in the foundation of churches, and in administration of their spiritual affairs will exclude any probability of Peter's jurisdiction over them. [They went about their business, not by order or license from Peter, but according to special direction of God's Spirit.]
(11.) The nature of the apostolic ministry-their not being fixed in one place of residence, but continually moving about the world-the state of things at that time, and the manner of Peter's life, render it unlikely that he had such a jurisdiction over the apostles as some assign him.
(12.) It was indeed most requisite that every apostle should have a complete, absolute, independent authority in managing the duties and concerns of the office, that he might not anywise be obstructed in the discharge of them, not clogged with a need to consult others, not hampered with orders from those who were at a distance.
(13.) The discourse and behavior of Paul towards Peter are evidence that he did not acknowledge any dependence on him, or any subjection to him (Galatians 2:11).
(14.) If Peter had been appointed sovereign of the Church, it seems that it should have been requisite that he should have outlived all the apostles; for otherwise the Church would have wanted a head, or there must have been an inextricable controversy who that head was. But Peter died long before John, as all agree, and perhaps before divers others of the apostles."
From these arguments we must see what little ground the Church of Rome has to derive the supremacy of the pope from the supposed primacy of Peter. (See POPE).
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McClintock, John. Strong, James. Entry for 'Primacy'. Cyclopedia of Biblical, Theological and Ecclesiastical Literature. https://www.studylight.org/encyclopedias/eng/tce/p/primacy.html. Harper & Brothers. New York. 1870.
