Bible Encyclopedias
Dogmatic Theology

The Catholic Encyclopedia

Search for…

Enter query below:

or

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Prev Entry
Dogmatic Facts

Next Entry
Doliche

Resource Toolbox

Print Article

Additional Links

Dictionaries
1910 New Catholic Dictionary
• Theology, Dogmatic
• Dogmatic Theology
Encyclopedias
1911 Encyclopedia Britannica
• Dogmatic Theology
McClintock and Strong's Bible Encyclopedia
• Dogmatic Theology
• Theology, Dogmatical.
The Catholic Encyclopedia
• Dogmatic Theology
• History of Dogmatic Theology

Dogmatic theology is that part of theology which treats of the theoretical truths of faith concerning God and His works (dogmata fidei), whereas moral theology has for its subject-matter the practical truths of morality (dogmata morum). At times, apologetics or fundamental theology is called "general dogmatic theology", dogmatic theology proper being distinguished from it as "special dogmatic theology". However, according to present-day usage, apologetics is no longer treated as part of dogmatic theology but has attained the rank of an independent science, being generally regarded as the introduction to and foundation of dogmatic theology. The present article shall deal first with those questions which are fundamental to dogmatic theology and then briefly review its historical development due to the acumen and indefatigable industry with which the theologians of every civilized country and of every century have cultivated and promoted this science.

Definition and nature of dogmatic theology

To define dogmatic theology, it will be best to start from the general notion of theology. Considered etymologically, theology (Gr. Theologia, i.e. peri Theou logos) means objectively the science treating of God, subjectively, the scientific knowledge of God and Divine things. If defined as the science concerning God (doctrina de Deo), the name of theology applies as well to the philosophical knowledge of God, which is cast into scientific form in natural theology or theodicy. However, unless theodicy is free from errors, it cannot lay claim to the name of theology. For this reason, pagan mythology and pagan doctrines about the gods, must at once be set aside as false theology. The theology of heretics also, so far as it contains grave errors, must be excluded. In a higher and more perfect sense we call theology that science of God and Divine things which, objectively, is based on supernatural revelation, and subjectively, is viewed in the light of Christian faith. Theology thus broadens out into Christian doctrine (doctrina fidei) and embraces not only the particular doctrines of God's existence, essence, and triune personality, but all the truths revealed by God. The Patristic era did not, as a rule, take theology in this wide sense. For the earlier Fathers, strictly limiting the term theology to doctrine about God, distinguished it from the doctrine of His external activity, especially from the Incarnation and Redemption, which they included under the name of the "Divine economy". Now, if God is not only the primary object but also the first principle of Christian theology, then its ultimate end likewise must be God; that is to say it must teach, effect, and promote union with God through religion Consequently, it lies in the very essence of theology to be the doctrine not only of God and of faith, but also of religion (doctrina religionis). It is this triple function which gave rise to the old adage of the School: Theologia Deum docet, a Deo docetur, ad Deum ducit (Theology teaches of God, is taught by God, and leads to God).

However, neither supernatural theology in general nor dogmatic theology in particular is sufficiently specified by its material object or its end, since natural theology also treats of God and Divine things and shows that union with God is a religious duty. What essentially distinguishes the two sciences is the so-called formal principle or formal object. Supernatural theology considers God and Divine things solely in the supernatural light of external revelation and internal faith, analyzes them scientifically, proves them and penetrates as far as possible into their meaning. From this it follows that theology comprehends all those and only those doctrines which are to be found in the sources of faith, namely Scripture and Tradition, and which the infallible Church proposes to us. Now, among these revealed truths there are many which reason, by its own natural power, can discover, comprehend, and demonstrate, especially those that pertain to natural theology and ethics. These truths, however accessible to unaided reason, receive a theological colouring only by being at the same time supernaturally revealed and accepted on the ground of God's infallible authority. The act of faith being nothing else than the unconditional surrender of human reason to the sovereign authority of the self-revealing God, it is plain that Catholic theology is not a purely philosophical science like mathematics or metaphysics; it must rather, of its very nature be an authoritative science, basing its teachings, especially of the mysteries of faith, on the authority of Divine revelation and the infallible Church established by Christ; for it is the Divine mission of the Church to preserve intact the entire deposit of faith (depositum fidei), to preach and explain it authoritatively. There are, it is true, many non-Catholics and even some Catholics who are irritated at seeing Catholic theology bow before an external authority. They take offence at conciliar decrees, papal decisions ex cathedra, the censure of theological opinions, the index of forbidden books, the Syllabus, the oath against Modernism. Yet all these ecclesiastical regulations flow naturally and logically from the formal principle of Christian theology: the existence of Divine revelation and the right of the Church to demand, in the name of Christ, an unwavering belief in certain truths concerning faith and morals. To reject the authority of the Church would be equivalent to abandoning supernatural revelation, and contemning God himself, who can neither deceive nor be deceived, since He is Truth itself, and who speaks through the mouth of the Church. Consequently, theology as a science, if it would avoid the danger of error, must ever remain under the tutelage and guidance of the Church. To a Catholic, theology without the Church is as absurd as theology without God. Dogmatic theology, then, may be defined as the scientific exposition of the entire theoretical doctrine concerning God Himself and His external activity, based on the dogmas of the Church.

Dogmatic theology as a science

Considering that theology depends essentially on the Church, a serious difficulty arises at once. How, one may ask, can theology claim to be a science in the genuine sense of the word? If the aim and result of theological investigation is settled in advance by an authority that attributes to itself infallibility and will brook no contradiction, if the line of march is, as it were, clearly mapped out and strictly prescribed, how can there be any question of true science or of scientific freedom? Are not the dogmatic proofs, supposed to demonstrate an infallible dogma, after all mere dialectical play, sham science, reasoning made to order? Prejudice against Catholic theology, prevalent in the world at large, is beginning to bear fruit; in many countries the theological faculties, still existing in the state universities, are looked upon as so much useless ballast, and the demand is being made to relegate them to the episcopal seminaries, where they can no longer injure the intellectual freedom of the people. The downright unfairness of this attitude is obvious when one considers that the universities sprang up and developed in the shadow of the Church and of Catholic theology; and that, moreover, the exaggeration of scientific freedom may prove fatal to the profane sciences as well. Unless it presuppose certain truths, which can no more be demonstrated than many mysteries of faith, science can achieve nothing; and unless it recognize the limits that are set to investigation, the boasted freedom will degenerate into lawless and arbitrary anarchy. As the logician starts from notions, the jurist from legal texts, the historian from facts, the chemist from material substances as things which demand no proof in his case, so the theologian receives his material from the hands of the Church and deals with it according to the rules which the scientist applies in his own branch.

The view, moreover, that scientific research is absolutely free and independent of all authority is fanciful and distorted. To the freedom of science, the authority of the individual conscience, and of human society as well, sets an impassable limit. Even the civil power would have to exercise its authority in the form of punishment if a university professor, presuming on the freedom of scientific thought and research, should teach openly that burglary, murder, adultery, revolution, and anarchy are permissible. We may concede that the Catholic theologian, being subject to ecclesiastical authority, is more closely bound than the professor of the secular sciences. Yet the difference is one of degree only, inasmuch as every science and every investigator is bound by the moral and religious duty of subordination. Some Scholastics, it is true, e.g. Durandus and Vasquez, denied to Christian theology a strictly scientific character, on the ground that the content of faith is obscure and incapable of demonstration. But their argument does not carry conviction. At most it proves that dogmatic science is not of the same kind and order as the profane sciences. What is essential to any science is not internal evidence, but merely certainty of its first principles.

There are many profane sciences which borrow unproved from a superior science their highest principles; these are the so-called lemmata, subsidiary propositions, which serve as premises for further conclusions. The theologian does the same. He, too, borrows the first principles of his science from the higher knowledge of God without proving them. Every subaltern science supposes of course in the superior discipline the power to give a strict demonstration of the assumed premises. But all scientific axioms rest ultimately on metaphysics, and metaphysics itself is unable to prove strictly all its principles all it can do is to defend them against attack. It is plain then that every science without exception rests on axioms and postulates which, though certain, yet admit of no demonstration. The mathematician is aware that the existence of geometry, the surest and most palpable of all sciences, depends entirely on the soundness of the postulate of parallels. Nevertheless, this very postulate is far from being demonstrable. In fact, since no convincing proof of it was forthcoming, there has arisen since the time of Gauss a more general, non-Euclidean geometry, of which the Euclidean is only a special case. Why, then, should Catholic theology, because of its postulates, lemmata, and mysteries, be denied the name of a science? Apart from the domain of dogma proper, the theologian may approach the numerous controversial questions and more intricate problems with the same freedom as is enjoyed by any other scientist. One thing, however, must never be lost sight of. No science is at liberty to upset theorems which have been established once and for all; they must be regarded as unshaken dogmas upon which the entire structure is based. Similarly, the articles of faith must not be looked upon by the theologian as troublesome barriers, but as beacon-lights that warn the mariner, show him the true course, and preserve him from shipwreck.

Methods of dogmatic theology

Whereas other sciences, as, for instance, theodicy, begin with proving the existence of God, it lies beyond the scope of theology to discover dogmatic truths. The subject-matter with which the student of theology has to deal is offered to him in the deposit of faith and, reduced to its briefest form, is to be found in the Catechism. If the theologian is content with deriving the dogmas from the sources of faith and with explaining them, he is occupied with "positive" theology. Guided by the doctrinal authority of the Church, he calls history and criticism to his aid to find in Scripture and Tradition the genuine unalloyed truth. If to this positive element is joined a polemic tendency, we have "controversial" theology, which was carried to its highest perfection in the seventeenth century by Cardinal Bellarmine. Positive theology must prove its theses by conclusive arguments drawn from Scripture and Tradition; hence it is closely related to exegesis and history. As exegete, the theologian must first of all accept the inspiration of the Bible as the Word of God. But even when elucidating its meaning, he will always bear in mind the unanimous interpretation of the Fathers, the hermeneutical principles of the Church, and the directions of the Holy See. In his character as historian, the theologian must not lay aside his belief in the supernatural origin of Christianity and in the Divine institution of the Church, if he is to give a true and objective account of tradition, of the history of dogma, and of patrology. For, just as the Bible, being the Word of God, was written under the immediate inspiration of the Holy Ghost, so Tradition was, and is, guided in a special manner by God, Who preserves it from being curtailed, mutilated, or falsified.

Consequently, he who from the outset declares the Bible to be an ordinary book, miracles and prophecies impossible and old-fashioned, the Church a great institution for deadening thought, the Fathers of the Church pious prattlers, is quite incapable, even from a purely scientific standpoint, of understanding God's momentous dispensations to mankind. From this we may conclude how unecclesiastical and at the same time how unscientific are those historians who prefer to explain the works of the Fathers without due regard for ecclesiastical tradition, which was the mental environment in which they lived and breathed. For it is only when we discover the living link which bound them to the Apostolic Tradition of which they are witnesses, that we shall understand their writings and establish the heterodoxy of some passages, as for instance, the Origenistic apocatastasis in the writings of Gregory of Nyssa. When Pius X, by his Motu Proprio of 1 Sept., 1910, solemnly obliged all priests to adhere to these principles, he did more than recall to our minds the time-hallowed rules of Christian faith; he freed history and criticism from those baneful excrescences which impeded the growth of true science.

When the dogmatic material with the help of the historical method has been derived from its sources, another momentous task awaits the theologian: the philosophical appreciation, the speculative examination and elucidation of the material brought to light. This is the purpose of the "scholastic" method from which "scholastic theology" takes its name.

The scope of the scholastic method is fourfold:

• to open up completely the content of dogma and to analyze it by means of dialectics;
• to establish a logical connection between the various dogmas and to unite them in a well-knit system;
• to derive new truths, called "theological conclusions" from the premises by syllogistic reasoning;
• to find reasons, analogies, congruous arguments for the dogmas;

But above all to show that the mysteries of faith, though beyond the reach of reason, are not contrary to its laws but can be made acceptable to our intellect. It is evident that the ultimate purpose of these philosophical speculations cannot be to resolve dogma finally into mere natural truths, or to strip the mysteries of their supernatural character, but to explain the truths of faith, to provide for them a philosophical basis, to bring them nearer to the human mind. Faith must ever remain the solid rock-bottom on which reason builds up, and faith in its turn strives after understanding (fides quoerens intellectum). Hence the famous axiom of St. Anselm of Canterbury: Credo ut intellegam. However highly one may esteem the results of positive theology, one thing is certain: the scientific character of dogmatic theology does not rest so much on the exactness of its exegetical and historical proofs as on the philosophical grasp of the content of dogma. But in attempting this task, the theologian cannot look for aid to modern philosophy with its endless confusion, but to the glorious past of his own science. What else are the modern systems of philosophy, sceptical criticism, Positivism, Pantheism, Monism, etc., than ancient errors cast into new moulds? Rightly does Catholic theology cling to the only true and eternal philosophy of common sense, which was established by Divine Providence in the Socratic School, carried to its highest perfection by Plato and Aristotle, purified from the minutest traces of error by the Scholastics of the thirteenth century.

This is the Aristotelo-scholastic philosophy, which has gained an ever stronger foothold in ecclesiastical institutions of learning. Guided by sound pedagogical principles, Popes Leo XIII and Pius X officially prescribed this philosophy as a preparation for the study of theology, and recommended it as a model method for the speculative treatment of dogma. While in his famous Encyclical "Pascendi" of 8 Sept., 1907, Pius X praises positive theology and frankly recognizes its necessity, yet he sounds a note of warning not to become so absorbed in it as to neglect scholastic theology, which alone can impart a scientific grasp of dogma. These papal rescripts were probably inspired by the sad experience that any other than Scholastic philosophy, instead of elucidating and clarifying, only falsifies and destroys dogma, as is clearly shown by the history of Nominalism, the philosophy of the Renaissance, Hermesianism, Güntherianism, and Modernism. The development also of Protestant theology, which, entering into close union with modern philosophy, swayed to and fro between the extremes of faith and unfaith and did not even recoil from Pantheism, is a warning example for the Catholic theologian. This does not mean that Catholic theology has received no stimulus whatever from modern philosophy since the days of Kant (d. 1804). As a matter of fact, the critical tendency has quickened the critico-historical sense of Catholic theologians in regard to method and demonstration, has given more breadth and depth to their statement of problems, and has shown fully the value of the "theoretical doubt" as the starting-point of every scientific investigation. All these advances, as far as they mark real progress, have exerted a salutary influence on theology also. But they can never repair the material damages caused to sacred science, when, abandoning St. Thomas Aquinas, it went hand in hand with Kant and other champions of our age. But since the Aristotelo-scholastic philosophy also is capable of continual development, there is reason to expect for the future a progressive improvement of speculative theology.

Another method of arriving at the truths of faith is mysticism, which appeals rather to the heart and the feelings than to the intellect, and sensibly imparts a knowledge of Divine things through pious meditation. As long as mysticism keeps in touch with scholasticism and does not exclude the intellect completely, it is entitled to existence for the simple reason that faith lays hold on the whole man, and penetrates his thoughts, desires, and sentiments. The greatest mystics, as Hugh of St. Victor, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Bonaventure, were at the same time distinguished Scholastics. A heart that has preserved the faith and simplicity of its childhood, takes delight even now in the writings of Henry Suso (d. 1365). But whenever mysticism emancipates itself from the guidance of reason and makes light of the doctrinal authority of the Church, it readily falls a prey to Pantheism and pseudo-mysticism, which are the bane of all true religion. Meister Eckhart, whose propositions were condemned by Pope John XXII in 1329, is a warning example. There is little in the present trend of thought that would be favourable to mysticism. The scepticism which has poisoned the minds of our generation, the uncontrolled greed for wealth, the feverish haste in commercial enterprises, even the dulling habit of reading the daily papers — all these are only too apt to disturb the serene atmosphere of Divine contemplation, and play havoc with the interior life, the necessary conditions under which alone the tender flower of mystical piety can blossom. Modernism claims to possess in its immediate and immanent sense of God a congenial soil for the growth of mysticism; this soil, however, does not receive its waters from the undefiled fountain-head of Catholic piety, but from the cisterns of Liberal Protestant pseudo-mysticism, which are tainted, either confessedly or secretly, by Pantheism.

Relation of dogmatic theology to other disciplines

At first, it was a thing altogether unknown to have different theological branches as independent sciences. Dogmatic theology was the only discipline, and comprised apologetics, dogmatic and moral theology, and canon law. This internal unity was also marked externally by the comprehensive name of science of faith (scientia fidei), or sacred science (scientia sacra). First to assert its independence was canon law, which, together with dogmatic theology, was the chief study in the medieval universities. But since the underlying principles of canon law, as the Divine constitution of the Church, the hierarchy, the power of ordinations, etc., were at the same time doctrines of faith to be proved in dogmatic theology, there was little danger that the internal connection with and dependence on the principal science would be broken. Far longer did the union between dogmatic and moral theology endure. They were treated in the medieval "Books of Sentences" and theological "Summæ" as one science. It was not until the seventeenth century, and then only for practical reasons, that moral theology was separated from the main body of Catholic dogma. Nor did this division degenerate into a formal separation of two strictly co-ordinated disciplines. Moral theology has always been conscious that the revealed laws of morality are as much articles of faith as the theoretical dogmas, and that the entire Christian life is based on the three theological virtues, which are part of the dogmatic doctrine on justification. Hence the superior rank of dogmatic theology, which is not only the centre around which the other disciplines are grouped, but also the main stem from which they branch out. But the necessity of a further division of labour as well as the example of non-Catholic methods led to the independent development of other disciplines: apologetics, exegesis, church history.

The relation existing between apologetics, or fundamental theology as it has been called of late, and dogmatic theology is not that of a general to a particular science; it is rather the relation of the vestibule to the temple or of the foundation to its superstructure. For both the method and the purpose of demonstration differ totally in the two branches. Whereas apologetics, intent upon laying the foundation of the Christian or Catholic religion, uses historical and philosophical arguments, dogmatic theology on the other hand makes use of Scripture and Tradition to prove the Divine character of the different dogmas. Doubt could only exist as to whether the discussion of the sources of faith, the rule of faith, the Church, the primacy, faith and reason, belongs to apologetics or to dogmatic theology. While a dogmatic treatment of these important questions has its advantages, yet from the practical standpoint and for reasons peculiar to the subject, they should be separated from dogmatic theology and referred to apologetics. The practical reason is that the existing denominational differences demand a more thorough apologetic treatment of these problems; and again, the subject-matter itself contains nothing else than the preliminary and fundamental questions of dogmatic theology properly so called. A branch of the greatest importance, ever since the Reformation, is exegesis with its allied disciplines, because that science establishes the meaning of the texts necessary for the Scriptural argument. As the Biblical sciences necessarily suppose the dogma of the inspiration of the Bible and the Divine institution of the Church, which alone, through the assistance of the Holy Ghost, is the rightful owner and authoritative interpreter of the Bible, it is manifest that exegesis, though enjoying full liberty in all other respects, must never lose its connection with dogmatic theology. Not even church history, though using the same critical methods as profane history, is altogether independent of dogmatic theology. As its object is to set forth the history of God's kingdom upon earth, it cannot repudiate or slight either the Divinity of Christ or the Divine foundation of the Church without forfeiting its claim to be regarded as a theological science. The same applies to other historic sciences, as the history of dogma, of councils, of heresies, patrology, symbolics, and Christian archæology. Pastoral theology, which embraces liturgy, homiletics, and catechetics, proceeded from, and bears close relationship to, moral theology; its dependence on dogmatic theology needs, therefore, no further proof.

The relation between dogmatic theology and philosophy deserves special attention. To begin with, even when they treat the same subject, as God and the soul, there is a fundamental difference between the two sciences. For, as was said above, the formal principles of the two are totally different. But, this fundamental difference must not be exaggerated to the point of asserting, with the Renaissance philosophers and the Modernists, that something false in philosophy may be true in theology, and vice versa, The theory of the "twofold truth" in theology and history, which is only a variant of the same false principle, is therefore expressly abjured in the anti-Modernist oath. But no less fatal would be the other extreme of identifying theology with philosophy, as was attempted by the Gnostics, later by Scotus Eriugena (d. about 877), Raymond Lullus (d. 1315), Pico della Mirandola (d. 1463), and by the modern Rationalists. To counteract this bold scheme, the Vatican Council (Sess. III, cap. iv) solemnly declared that the two sciences differ essentially not only in their cognitive principle (faith, reason) and their object (dogma, rational truth), but also in their motive (Divine authority, evidence) and their ultimate end (beatific vision, natural knowledge of God). But what is the precise relation between these sciences? The origin and dignity of revealed theology forbid us to assign to philosophy a superior or even a co-ordinate rank. Already Aristotle and Philo of Alexandria, in determining the relation of philosophy to that part of metaphysics which is directly concerned with God, pronounced philosophy to be the "handmaid" of natural theology. When philosophy came into contact with revelation, this subordination was still more emphasized and was finally crystallized in the principle: Philosophia est ancilla theologiae. But neither the Church nor the theologians who insisted on this axiom, ever intended thereby to encroach on the freedom, independence, and dignity of philosophy, to curtail its rights, or to lower it to the position of a mere slave of theology. Their mutual relations are far more honourable. Theology may be conceived as a queen, philosophy as a noble lady of the court who performs for her mistress the most worthy and valuable services, and without whose assistance the queen would be left in a very helpless and embarrassing position. That the Church, in examining the various systems, should select the philosophy which harmonized with her own revealed doctrine and proved itself to be the only true philosophy by acknowledging a personal God, the immortality of the soul, and the moral law, was so natural and obvious that it required no apology. Such a philosophy, however, existed among the pagans of old, and was carried to an eminent degree of perfection by Aristotle.

Division and content of dogmatic theology

Not only for non-Catholics, but also for Catholic laymen it may be of interest to take a brief survey of the questions and problems generally discussed in dogmatic theology.

God (de Deo uno et trino)

As God is the central idea around which all theology turns, dogmatic theology must begin with the doctrine of God, essentially one, Whose existence, essence, and attributes are to be investigated, While the arguments, strictly so called, for the existence of God are given in philosophy or in apologetics, dogmatic theology insists upon the revealed doctrine that God may be known from creation by reason alone, that is, without external revelation or internal illumination by grace. From this it follows at once that Atheism must be branded as heresy and that Agnosticism may not plead mitigating circumstances. Nor can Traditionalism and Ontologism be reconciled with the dogma of the natural knowableness of God. For if, as the Traditionalists assert, the consciousness of God's existence, found in all races and ages, is due solely to the oral tradition of our forefathers and ultimately to the revelation granted in Paradise, the knowledge of God derived from the visible creation is at once discounted. The same must be said of the Ontologists, who fancy that our mind enjoys an intuitive vision of God's essence, and is thus made certain of His existence. Likewise, to assume with Descartes an inborn idea of God (idea Dei innata) is out of the question; consequently, the knowableness of God by mere reason, means in the last analysis that His existence can be demonstrated, as the anti-Modernist oath prescribed by Pius X expressly affirms. But this method of arriving at a knowledge of God is toilsome; for it must proceed by way of denying imperfection in God and of ascribing to Him in higher excellence (eminenter) whatever perfections are found in creatures; nor does the light of revelation and of faith elevate our knowledge to an essentially higher plane. Hence all our knowledge of God on this earth implies painful deficiencies which will not be filled except by the beatific vision.

The metaphysical essence of God is generally said to be self-existence, which means, however, the fullness of being (Gr. autousia), and not merely the negation of origin (ens a se--ens non ab alio). The so-called positive aseity of Prof. Schell, meaning that God realizes and produces Himself must be as uncompromisingly rejected as the Pantheistic confusion of ens a se with the impersonal ens universale. The relation existing between God's essence and His attributes may not be called a real distinction (theoretical Realism, Gilbert de La Porrée), nor yet a purely logical distinction of the mind (Nominalism). Intermediary between these two objectionable extremes is the formal distinction of the Scotists. But the virtual distinction of the Thomists deserves preference in every regard, because it alone does not jeopardize the simplicity of the Divine Being. If self-existence is the fundamental attribute of God, both the attributes of being and of operation must proceed from it as from their root. The first class includes infinity, simplicity, substantiality, omnipotence, immutability, eternity, and immensity; to the second category belong omniscience and the Divine will. Besides, many theologians distinguish from both these categories the so-called moral attributes: veracity, fidelity, wisdom, sanctity, bounty, beauty, mercy, and justice. Monotheism is best treated in connection with God's simplicity and unity. The most difficult problems are those which concern God's knowledge, especially His foreknowledge of free future actions. For it is here that both Thomists and Molinists throw out their anchors to gain a secure hold for their respective systems of grace, the former for their proemotio physica, the latter for their scientia media. In treating of the Divine will, theologians insist on God's freedom in His external activity, and when discussing the problem of evil, they prove that God can intend sin neither as an end nor as a means to an end, but merely permits it for reasons both holy and wise. while some theologians use this chapter to treat of God's salvific will and the allied questions of predestination and reprobation, others refer these subjects to the chapter on grace.

Being the cornerstone of the Christian religion, the doctrine of the Trinity is thoroughly and extensively discussed, all the more because the Liberal theology of the Protestants has relapsed into the ancient error of the Antitrinitarians. The dogma of God's threefold personality, traces of which may be found in the Old Testament, can be conclusively proved from the New Testament and Tradition. The combat which the Fathers waged against Monarchianism, Sabellianism, and Subordinationism (Arius, Macedonius) aids considerably in shedding light on the mystery. Great importance attaches to the logos-doctrine of St. John; but as to its relation to the logos of the Stoic Neoplatonists, the Jewish Philonians, and the early Fathers, many points are still in an unsettled condition. The reason why there are three Persons is the twofold procession immanent in the Godhead: the procession of the Son from the Father by generation, and the procession of the Holy Ghost from both the Father and the Son by spiration. In view of the Greek schism, the dogmatic justification of the addition of the Filioque in the Creed must be scientifically established. A philosophical understanding of the dogma of the Trinity was attempted by the Fathers, especially by St. Augustine. The most important result was the cognition that the Divine generation must be conceived as a spiritual procession from the intellect, and the Divine spiration as a procession from the will or from love. Active and passive generation, together with active and passive spiration, lead to the doctrine of the four relations, of which, however, only three constitute persons, to wit, active and passive generation (Father, Son), and passive spiration (Holy Ghost). The reason why active spiration does not result in a distinct (fourth) person, is because it is one and the same common function of the Father and the Son. The philosophy of this mystery includes also the doctrine of the Divine properties, notions, appropriations, and missions. Finally, with the doctrine of circuminsession which summarizes the whole theology of the Trinity, the treatment of this dogma is brought to a fitting conclusion.

Creation (de Deo creante)

The first act of God's external activity is creation. The theologian investigates both the activity itself and the work produced. With regard to the former, the interest centres in creation out of nothing, around which, as along the circumference of a circle, are grouped a number of secondary truths: God's plan of the universe, the relation between the Trinity and creation, the freedom of the Creator, the creation in time, the impossibility of communicating the creative power to any creature. These momentous truths not only perfect and purify the theistic idea of God, they also give the death-blow to heretical Dualism (God, matter) and to the Protean variations of Pantheism. As the beginning of the world supposes creation out of nothing, so its continuation supposes Divine conservation, which is nothing less than a continued creation. However, God's creative activity is not thereby exhausted. It enters into every action of the creature, whether necessary or free. What is the nature of God's universal co-operation with free rational beings? On this question Thomists and Molinists differ widely. The former regard the Divine activity as a previous, the latter as a simultaneous, concursus. According to Molinism, it is only by conceiving the concursus as simultaneous that true freedom in the creature can be secured, and that the essential holiness of the Creator can be maintained, the fact of sin notwithstanding. The crowning achievement of God's creative activity is His providence and universal government which aims at the realization of the ultimate end of the universe, God's glory through His creatures.

The work produced by creation is divided into three kingdoms, rising in tiers one above another: world; man; angel. To this triad correspond dogmatic cosmology, anthropology, angelology. In discussing the first of these, the theologian must be satisfied with general outlines, e.g. of the Creator's activity described in the hexaemeron. Anthropology is more thoroughly treated, because man, the microcosm, is the centre of creation. Revelation tells us many things about man's nature, his origin and the unity of the human race, the spirituality and immortality of the soul, the relation of soul and body, the origin of individual souls. Above all, it tells us of supernatural grace with which man was adorned and which was intended to be a permanent possession of the human race. The discussion of man's original state must be preceded by a theory of the supernatural order without which the nature of original sin could not be understood. But original sin, the willful repudiation of the supernatural state, is one of the most important chapters. Its existence must be carefully proved from the sources of faith; its nature, the mode of its transmission, its effects, must be subjected to a thorough discussion. The fate of the angels runs in many respects parallel to that of mankind: the angels also were endowed with both sanctifying grace and high natural excellences; some of them rose in rebellion against God, and were thrust into hell as demons. While the devil and his angels are inimical to the human race, the faithful angels have been appointed to exercise the office of guardians over mankind.

Redemption (de Deo Redemptore)

As the fall of man was followed by redemption, so the chapter on creation is immediately followed by that on redemption. Its three main divisions: Christology, Soteriology, Mariology, must ever remain in the closest connection. [For the first of these three (Christology) see the separate article.]

1. Soteriology

Soteriology is the doctrine of the work of the Redeemer. As in Christology the leading idea is the Hypostatic Union, so here the main idea is the natural mediatorship of Christ. After having disposed of the preliminary questions concerning the possibility, opportuneness, and necessity of redemption, as well as of those regarding the predestination of Christ, the next subject to occupy our attention is the work of redemption itself. This work reaches its climax in the vicarious satisfaction of Christ on the cross, and is crowned by His descent into limbo and His ascension into heaven. From a speculative standpoint, a thorough and comprehensive theory of satisfaction remains still a pious desideratum, though promising attempts have often been made from the days of Anselm down to the present time. It will be necessary to blend into one noble whole the hidden elements of truth contained in the old patristic theory of ransom, the juridical conception of St. Anselm, and the ethical theory of atonement. The Redeemer's activity as Mediator stands out most prominently in His triple office of high priest, prophet, and king, which is continued, after the ascension of Christ, in the priesthood and the teaching and pastoral office of the Church. The central position is occupied by the high-priesthood of Christ, which manifests the death on the cross as the true sacrifice of propitiation, and proves the Redeemer to be a true priest.

2. Mariology

Mariology, the doctrine of the Mother of God, cannot be separated either from the person or from the work of the Redeemer and therefore has the deepest connection with both Christology and Soteriology. Here the central idea is the Divine Maternity, since this is at once the source of Mary's unspeakable dignity and of her surpassing fullness of grace. Just as the Hypostatic Union of the Divinity and humanity of Christ stands or falls with the truth of the Divine Maternity, so too is this same maternity the foundation of all special privileges which were accorded to Mary on account of Christ's dignity. These singular privileges are four: her Immaculate Conception, personal freedom from sin, perpetual virginity, and her bodily Assumption into heaven. For the three former we have doctrinal decisions of the Church, which are final. However, though Mary's bodily Assumption has not yet been solemnly declared an article of faith, nevertheless the Church has practically demonstrated such to be her belief by celebrating from the earliest times the feast of the Assumption of the Mother of God. Two more privileges are connected with Mary's dignity: her special mediatorship between the Redeemer and the redeemed and her exclusive right to hyperdulia. Of course, it is clear that the mediatorship of Mary is entirely subordinate to that of Her Divine Son and derives its whole efficacy and power therefrom. In order the better to understand the value and importance of Mary's peculiar right to such veneration, it will be well to consider, by way of contrast, the dulia paid to the saints and, again, the doctrine concerning the veneration paid to relics and images. For the most part, dogmatic theologians prefer to treat these latter subjects under eschatology, together with the Communion of Saints.

3. Grace (De gratia)

The Christian idea of grace is based entirely upon the supernatural order. A distinction is made between actual and sanctifying grace, according as there is question of a supernatural activity or merely the state of sanctification. But the crucial point in the whole doctrine of grace lies in the justification of the sinner, because, after all, the aim and object of actual grace is either to lay the foundation for the grace of justification when the latter is absent, or to preserve the grace of justification in the soul that already possesses it. The three qualities of actual grace are of the utmost importance: its necessity, its gratuitousness, and its universality. Although on the one hand we must avoid the exaggeration of the Reformers, and of the followers of Baius and Jansenius, who denied the capability of unaided nature altogether in moral action, yet, on the other hand, theologians agree that fallen man is quite incapable, without the help of God's grace, of either fulfilling the whole natural law or of resisting all strong temptations. But actual grace is absolutely necessary for each and every salutary act, since all such acts bear a causal relation towards the supernatural end of man. The heretical doctrines of Pelagianism and Semipelagianism are refuted by the Church's doctrinal decisions based upon Holy Scripture and Tradition. From the supernatural character of grace flows its second quality: gratuitousness. So entirely gratuitous is grace that no natural merit, no positive capability or preparation for it on the part of nature, nor even any purely natural petition, is able to move God to give us actual grace. The universality of grace rests fundamentally upon the absolute universality of God's salvific will, which, in regard to adults, simply means His antecedent will to distribute sufficient grace to each and every person, whether he be already justified or in the state of sin, whether he be Christian or heathen, believer or infidel. But the salvific will, in as far as it is consequent and deals out just retribution, is no longer universal, but particular, for the reason that only those who persevere in justice, enter heaven, whereas the wicked are condemned to hell. The question of the predestination of the blessed and the reprobation of the damned is admittedly one of the most difficult problems with which theology has to deal, and its solution is wrapped in impenetrable mystery. The same may be said of the relation existing between grace and the liberty of the human will. It would be cutting the Gordian knot rather than loosing it, were one to deny the efficacy of grace, as did Pelagianism, or again, following the error of Jansenism, deny the liberty of the will. The difficulty is rather in determining just how the acknowledged efficacy of grace is to be reconciled with human freedom. For centuries Thomists and Molinists, Augustinians and Congruists have been toiling to clear up the matter. And while the system of grace known as syncretic has endeavoured to harmonize the principles of Thomism and Molinism, it has served but to double the difficulties instead of eliminating them.

The second part of the doctrine on grace has to do with sanctifying grace, which produces the state of habitual holiness and justice. Preparatory to receiving this grace, the soul undergoes a certain preliminary process, which is begun by theological faith, the "beginning, root and foundation of all justification", and is completed and perfected by other supernatural dispositions, such as contrition, hope, love. The Protestant conception of justifying faith as a mere fiducial faith is quite as much at variance with revelation as is the sola fides doctrine. Catholics also differ from Protestants in explaining the essence of justification itself. while Catholic dogma declares that justification consists in a true blotting-out of sin and in an interior sanctification of the soul, Protestantism would have it to be merely an external cloaking of sins which still remain, and a mere imputation to the sinner of God's or Christ's justice. According to Catholic teaching, the forgiveness of sin and the sanctification of the soul are but two moments of one and the same act of justification, since the blotting-out of original and mortal sin is accomplished by the very fact of the infusion of sanctifying grace. Although we may, to a certain extent, understand the nature of grace in itself, and may define it philosophically as a permanent quality of the soul, an infused habit, an accidental and analogous participation of the Divine nature, yet its true nature may be more easily understood from a consideration of its so-called formal effects produced in the soul. These are: sanctity, purity, beauty, friendship with God, adopted sonship. Sanctifying grace is accompanied by additional gifts, viz., the three theological virtues, the infused moral virtues, the seven gifts of the Holy Ghost, and the personal indwelling of the Holy Ghost in the soul of the justified. This latter it is that crowns and completes the whole process of justification. We must also mention three qualities special to justification or sanctifying grace: its uncertainty, its inequality, and the possibility of its being lost. All of them are diametrically opposed to the Protestant conception, which asserts the absolute certainty of justification, its complete equality, and the impossibility of its being lost. Finally, the fruits of justification are treated. These ripen under the beneficent influence of sanctifying grace, which enables man to acquire merit through his good works, that is to say, supernatural merit for heaven. The doctrine on grace is concluded with the proof of the existence, the conditions, and the objects of merit.

4. Sacraments (De sacramentis)

This section is divided into two parts: the treatise on the sacraments in general and that on the sacraments in particular. After having defined exactly what is meant by the Christian sacraments, and what is meant by the sacrament of nature and the Jewish rite of circumcision as it prevailed in pre-Christian times, the next important step is to prove the existence of the seven sacraments as instituted by Christ. The essence of a sacrament requires three things: an outward, visible sign, i.e. the matter and form of the sacrament; interior grace; and institution by Christ. In the difficult problem as to whether Christ himself determined the matter and form of each sacrament specifically or only generically the solution must be sought through dogmatic and historical investigations. Special importance attaches to the causality of the sacraments, and an efficacy ex opere operato is attributed to them. Theologians dispute as to the nature of this causality, i.e. whether it is physical or merely moral. In the case of each sacrament, regard must be had to two persons, the recipient and the minister. The objective efficacy of a sacrament is wholly independent of the personal sanctity or the individual faith of the minister. The only requisite is that he who confers the sacrament intend to do what the Church does. As regards the recipient of a sacrament, a distinction must be made between valid and worthy reception; the conditions differ with the various sacraments. But since the free will is required for validity, it is evident that no one can be forced to receive a sacrament.

Furthermore, as regards the sacraments in particular, the conclusions reached with reference to the sacraments in general of course hold good. Thus in the case of the first two sacraments, baptism and confirmation, we must prove in detail the existence of the three requisites mentioned above, as well as the disposition of both the minister and the recipient. The question whether their reception is absolutely necessary or only of precept must also be examined. More than ordinary care is called for in the discussion of the Eucharist, which is not only a sacrament, but also the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. Everything centres of course around the dogma of the Real Presence of Christ under the appearances of bread and wine. His presence there is effected by means of the of the Eucharistic elements and lasts as long as the accidents of bread and wine remain incorrupt. The dogma of the totality of the Real Presence means that in each individual species the whole Christ, flesh and blood, body and soul Divinity and humanity, is really present. The Holy Eucharist is, of course, a great mystery, one that rivals that of the Holy Trinity and of the Hypostatic Union. It presents to us a truth utterly variance with the testimony of our senses, asking us, as it does, to assent to the continued existence of the Eucharistic species without their subject, a sort of spiritual existence, unconfined by space, yet of a human body, and, again, the simultaneous presence of Christ in many different places. The sacramental character of the Eucharist is established by the presence of the three essential elements. The outward sign consists in the Eucharistic forms of bread and wine and the words of consecration. Its institution by Christ is guaranteed both by the promise of Christ and by the words of institution at the Last Supper. Finally, the interior effects of grace are produced by the worthy reception of Holy Communion. As Christ is wholly present in each species, the reception of the Eucharist under one species is sufficient to obtain fully all the fruits of the sacrament. Hence the chalice need not be communicated to the laity, though at times the Church has so allowed it to be, but not in any sense as though such were necessary. Not everyone is capable of pronouncing the words of consecration with sacramental effect, but only duly ordained bishops and priests; for to them alone did Christ communicate the power of in the Holy Sacrifice of the Mass. A distinct phase of the Eucharist is its sacrificial character. This is proved not only from the oldest Fathers and the liturgical practice of the early Christian Church, but also from certain prophecies of the Old Testament and from the Gospel narrative of the Last Supper. To find the physical essence of the Sacrifice of the Mass, we must consider its essential dependence on, and relation to, the bloody sacrifice of the Cross; for the Mass is a commemoration of the latter, its representation, its renewal, and its application. This intrinsically relative character of the sacrifice of the Mass does not in the least destroy or lessen the universality and oneness of the sacrifice on the Cross, but rather presupposes it; likewise the intrinsic propriety of the Mass is shown precisely in this, that it neither effects nor claims to effect anything else than the application of the fruits of the sacrifice of the Cross to the individual, and this in a sacrificial manner. The essence of the sacrifice is generally thought to consist neither in the Offertory nor in the Communion of the celebrant, but in the double consecration. Widely divergent are the views of the theologians as to the metaphysical essence of the sacrifice of the Mass, that is to say, as to the question how far the idea of a real sacrifice is verified in the double consecration. A concurrence of opinion on this point is all the more difficult owing to the fact that the very idea of sacrifice is involved in no little obscurity. As regards the causality of the sacrifice of the Mass, it has all the effects of a true sacrifice: adoration, thanksgiving, impetration, atonement. Most of its effects are ex opere operato, while some depend on the co-operation of the participants.

The Sacrament of Penance presupposes the Church's power to forgive sins, a power clearly indicated in the Bible in the words with which Christ instituted this sacrament (John 20:23). Moreover, this power is abundantly attested both by the patristic belief in the Church's power of the Keys and by the history of the ancient penitential system. As at the time of Montanism and Novatianism it was a question of vindicating the universality of this power, so nowadays it is a matter of defending its absolute necessity and its judicial form against the attacks of Protestantism. These three qualities manifest at the same time the intrinsic nature and the essence of the Sacrament of Penance. The universality of the power to forgive sins means that all sins without exception, supposing, of course, contrition for the same, can be remitted in this sacrament. Owing to its absolute necessity and its judicial form, however, the sacrament really becomes a tribunal of penance in which the penitent is at once plaintiff, defendant, and witness, while the priest acts as judge. The matter of the sacrament consists in the three acts of the penitent: contrition, confession, and satisfaction while the priestly absolution is its form. To act as judge in the Sacrament of Penance, the confessor needs more than priestly ordination: he must also have jurisdiction which may be restricted more or less by the ecclesiastical superiors. As the validity of this sacrament, unlike that of the others, depends essentially on the worthiness of its reception, great attention must be paid to the acts of the penitent. Most important of all is contrition with the purpose of amendment, containing, as it does, the virtue of penance. The opinion, held by many of the early Scholastics, that perfect contrition is required for the validity of the absolution, is quite irreconcilable with the ex opere operato efficacy of the sacrament; for sorrow, springing from the motive of perfect love, suffices of itself to free the sinner from all guilt, quite antecedent to, and apart from, the sacrament, though not indeed without a certain relation to it. According to the mind of the Council of Trent, imperfect contrition (attrition), even when actuated by the fear of hell, is sufficient for the validity of the sacrament, though we should, of course, strive to call in nobler motives. Therefore the addition of a formal caritas initialis to attrition, as the Contritionists of today demand for the validity of absolution, is superfluous, at least so far as validity is concerned. The contrite confession, which is the second act of the penitent, manifests the interior sorrow and the readiness to do penance by a visible, outward sign, the matter of the sacrament. Since the Reformers rejected the Sacrament of Penance great care must be bestowed upon the Biblical and patristic proof of its existence and its necessity. The required satisfaction, the third act of the penitent, is fulfilled in the penances (prayers, fasting, alms) which, according to the present custom of the Church, are imposed by the confessor immediately before the absolution. The actual fulfillment of such penances is not essential to the validity of the sacrament, but belongs rather to its integrity. The Church's extra-sacramental remission of punishment due to sin is called indulgence. This power of granting indulgences, both for the living and the dead, is included in the power of the Keys committed to the Church by Christ.

Extreme Unction may be considered as the complement of the Sacrament of Penance, inasmuch as it can take the place of the latter in case sacramental confession is impossible to one who is unconscious and dangerously ill.

While the five sacraments of which we have treated so far were instituted for the welfare of the individual, the last two Holy Orders and Matrimony, aim rather at the well-being of human society in general. The Sacrament of Holy Orders is composed of various grades, of which those of bishop, priest, and deacon are certainly of a sacramental nature, whereas that of subdeacon and the four minor orders are most probably due to ecclesiastical institution. The decision depends on whether or not the presentation of the instruments is essential for the validity of ordination. In the case of the subdiaconate and the minor orders this presentation indeed occurs, but without the simultaneous imposition of hands. The common opinion prevalent today holds that the imposition of hands, together with the invocation of the Holy Ghost, is the sole matter and form of this sacrament. And since this latter obtains only in the case of the consecration of a bishop, priest, or deacon, the conclusion is drawn that only the three hierarchical grades or orders confer ex opere operato the sacramental grace, the sacramental character, and the corresponding powers. The ordinary minister of all orders, even those of a non-sacramental character, is the bishop. But the pope may delegate an ordinary priest to ordain a subdeacon, lector, exorcist, acolyte, or ostiarius. Beginning with the subdiaconate, which was not raised to the rank of a major order until the Middle Ages, celibacy and the recitation of the Breviary are of obligation.

Three disciplines treat the Sacrament of Matrimony: dogmatic theology, moral theology, and canon law. Dogmatic theology leads the way, and proves from the sources of faith not merely the sacramental nature of Christian marriage, but also its essential unity and indissolubility. In the case of a consummated marriage between Christians the marriage bond is absolutely indissoluble; but where there is question of a consummated marriage between pagans the bond may be dissolved if one of the parties is converted to the Faith, and if the other conditions of what is known as the "Pauline Privilege" are fulfilled. The bond of a non-consummated marriage between Christians may be dissolved in two cases: when one of the parties concerned makes the solemn profession of religious vows, or when the pope, for weighty reasons, dissolves such a marriage. Finally, the grounds of the Church's power to establish diriment impediments are discussed and thoroughly proved.

5. Eschatology (De novissimis)

The final treatise of dogmatic theology has to do with the four last things. According as we consider either the individual or mankind in general, there is seen to be a double consummation of all things. For the individual the last things are death and the particular judgment, to which corresponds, as his final state and condition, either heaven or hell. The consummation of the human race on doomsday will be preceded by certain indications of the impending disaster, right after which will occur the resurrection of the dead and the general judgment. As for the opinion that there will be a glorious reign of Christ upon earth for a thousand years previous to the final end of all things, suffice it to remark that there is not the slightest foundation for it in revelation, and even a moderate form of Chiliasm must be rejected as untenable.