Bible Encyclopedias
Censorship

Censorship at the Front

It remains to deal with the censorship of messages from authorized British correspondents on the several fronts. These were primarily (and compulsorily) censored by military censors on the field, but they all came through the Press Bureau, which occasionally exercised a super-censorship. The methods adopted caused constant grumbling and discontent.

The casualty lists were rigidly and, no doubt, properly suppressed, but owing to the representations of the Newspaper Proprietors' Association they were supplied periodically for the confidential information of editors.

In France, at the outset, no correspondents were allowed. In Sept. 1914, owing to demands by the Newspaper Proprietors' Association for more information, an official eye-witness, Gen. Swinton, was appointed. He wrote according to order, and no question of censorship arose. The news supplied was meagre and inappropriate, and it did not take long for mischievous results to accrue, and the official mind was at first disposed to blame the Press for what was wrong in the " publicity " of the moment. On March 12 1915, the following notice was issued by the Press Bureau, warning the newspapers that they were too optimistic in the pictures they gave of what was happening: " The magnitude of the British task in this great war runs serious risk of being overlooked by reason of exaggerated accounts of successes printed daily in the Press and especially by exhibiting posters framed to catch the eye and magnify comparatively unimportant actions into great victories. Reported reverses to the enemy are proclaimed as crushing defeats, Germany is represented as within measurable distance of starvation, bankruptcy and revolution, and only yesterday a poster was issued in London, declaring that half the Hungarian army had been annihilated.

" All sense of just proportion is thus lost, and, with these daily, and often hourly, statements of great Allied gains and immense enemy losses, the public can have no true appreciation of the facts or of the gigantic task and heavy sacrifices before them.

" The Director appeals to all those who are responsible for the Press to use their influence to bring about a better knowledge of the real situation, and rather to emphasize the efforts that will be necessary before the country can afford to regard the end for which we are striving as anything like assured. The posters, more especially those of the evening papers, are very often preposterous as well as misleading, and, at such a time, those responsible may fairly be asked to exercise a reasonable restraint and help the nation to a just appreciation of the task it has undertaken and the necessity for unremitting effort to secure the only end that can be accepted." The newspapers did not take this notice " lying down." On March 26 the Newspaper Proprietors' Association, through its chairman Sir George (afterwards Lord) Riddell, sent the following letter to the Press Bureau, and copies to the Prime Minister, Mr. Winston Churchill, Lord Kitchener and other members of the Cabinet: "My Council have had under consideration your Memorandum of 12th March, 1915, Serial No. D. 183, for which, in their opinion, there is no adequate justification. The Press has dealt faithfully with the news furnished by the naval and military authorities, but it may well be that the public misunderstand the situation and that this misconception is producing serious results. If, however, the people are being unduly soothed and elated the responsibility lies with the Government and not with the Press. In this connection my Council desire to direct your attention to the optimistic statements of the Prime Minister, Sir John French, ' Eye-Witness,' and other persons possessing official information. The Press acts upon the news supplied. If this is inaccurate or incomplete, the Government cannot blame the newspapers. My Council desire to represent that the methods now being adopted are fraught with grave public danger. Ministers are continually referring to the importance of energy and self-sacrifice on the part of the industrial population, who cannot be expected to display these qualities unless, generally speaking, they are acquainted with the facts.' In dealing with the news, the Naval and Military authorities should consider not only our enemies and the army in the field, but the commercial and industrial classes at home, upon whom so much depends. It is futile to endeavour to disregard the long-established habits and customs of the people.

"As you know, I am writing on behalf of the London Press only, but my Council are confident that their views are shared by the provincial newspapers." The result of this letter was that Mr. Asquith invited the Association to lay their views before him at a deputation. A free exchange of views took place, with the result that Mr. Asquith invited the Press to appoint a representative who would interview Lord Kitchener and Mr. Churchill each week with the object of putting questions to them and receiving private information for circulation to editors. Lord Riddell was detailed for the duty, and had frequent interviews with Lord Kitchener.

As a result of further urgent representations by the Association, represented by Lord Burnham, Lord Northcliffe and Sir George Riddell, the following correspondents were authorized in May 1915 - Mr. John Buchan (Times and Daily News), Mr. Percival Landon (Daily Telegraph and Daily Chronicle), Mr. (afterwards Sir) Percival Phillips (Morning Post and Daily Express), Mr. Valentine Williams (Daily Mail and Standard), Mr. Douglas Williams (Reuters). Mr. John Buchan was succeeded by Mr. (afterwards Sir) Perry Robinson, Mr. Percival Landon by Mr. (afterwards Sir) Philip Gibbs, and Mr. Valentine Williams by Mr. (afterwards Sir) Beach Thomas. Mr. Douglas Williams was succeeded by Mr. Lester Lawrence and Mr. (afterwards Sir) Herbert Rundell.

At the beginning, the regulations for the guidance of correspondents were as follows, but for the most part they were allowed to write as they wished.

"Unless officially communicated for publication," the undermentioned matters were not to be referred to: - Strength, composition and location of forces.

Movement of troops and operations.

State of supply and transport.

Casualties.

Important orders.

Criticisms and eulogies of a personal nature.

Moral of troops.

Before long, however, the regulations were rigidly enforced, and an attempt was subsequently made to strengthen them. A fresh set of rules was promulgated at G.H.Q. in Nov. 1915. They took this form (1) Current events must not be mentioned in detail until the events have been made public in the commander-in-chief's despatches.

(2) Only general mention of the fighting can be made. Nothing outside the official communiques is to be touched upon.

(3) Matters of controversial or political interest must be excluded.

(4) Praise or censure is to be left to the commander-in-chief.

(5) Mention of any information by name is prohibited, including such items as the New Army, Territorials, etc., also names of units or individuals.

(6) The articles of war correspondents must be confined to topographical descriptions and generalities.

(7) Detailed information obtained by war correspondents can be used only when permission is given, and the time of publication will vary according to circumstances.

These regulations called forth an angry protest from the Newspaper Proprietors' Association. The War Office denied all knowledge of them and they were withdrawn. The severe restrictions on the liberty of the correspondents led to continual complaints by the Association. Notwithstanding these, no marked improvement took place until July 1917. From that date onwards the stringency of the censorship was gradually relaxed, and the army eventually set up an organization to supply correspondents with information, so that in dealing with the German advance in the spring of 1918 they were able to write with freedom. By the exercise of tact, discretion and inviolable good faith, the correspondents gradually won the confidence of the army, so that towards the end of the war officers of all ranks were keen to have them with their troops and to give them every facility permitted by official regulations. A great victory was thus achieved and a great service rendered by the correspondents to the country and the Press.

Until Nov. 1917 the censorship was controlled by the Intelligence Department at G.H.Q. At that date it was transferred to a department known as Staff Duties. The difficulties were accentuated by the lack of association between the correspondents and the real head of the censorship at G.H.Q. The man who gave the orders did not censor the " copy," and was not in continuous and direct touch with those who did. The censors worked under great pressure, and the complaints were due chiefly not to their decisions, but to the principles laid down by those in command at G.H.Q. A minor difficulty was due to the necessity for making the despatches correspond with the daily official communique - the official account of the day's fighting. Nothing could be said by the correspondents that differed from the communiques, which usually came out after the despatches had been written. The head of the Intelligence Department until Nov. 1917 was Gen. Charteris. During the whole of the war the chief cause of complaint was the refusal of the authorities to permit the correspondents to identify the units taking part in particular operations, or, in other words, to name the troops engaged. Where the unit was mentioned, neither the date of the event nor the locality in which it occurred was to be specified. The regulations in this respect were meticulous. Even obituary notices were censored. In the later phases of the war the rule was occasionally relaxed, but generally speaking it held until the Armistice.

At other military fronts than France the system adopted was similar, but special difficulties occurred in regard to the despatches from Mesopotamia, which were censored at the Front, in India and at home.

The Naval Censorship

The navy had its own censorship department at the Admiralty, under the superintendence of Sir Douglas Brownrigg. This department worked partly through the Press Bureau and partly by direct relations with the Press. Generally speaking, the policy adopted was to suppress all information concerning the doings of the navy and allied forces and in particular events of an unfavourable character. Very little information was published concerning the mercantile tonnage sunk by the enemy. There was, however, much to be said for the suppression of these figures, the publication of which would have put fresh heart into the enemy and given them valuable information as to the effect of the submarine campaign. In many instances the German submarine crews were unaware of the effect of their operations.

The Home Front

A rigid censorship was exercised concerning the publication of information as to the production of munitions, measures of defence, bombardments, air raids, arrests, trials and executions of spies, etc.

Books, Magazines, etc. - These were subject to censorship on the same principles as newspapers. In many cases the authorities refused permission to reproduce matter which had already appeared in American and other publications, whether true or not, the contention being that publication in England would tend to confirm and increase belief in the statements made.

General Comments

As a method of suppression the censorship during the war may be regarded as having been a complete success. The vast task was well and efficiently done, but the authorities displayed little imagination, and during the first two and a half years failed to realize that the war was a conflict between nations, not armies. They did not fully appreciate that the united effort of all classes was essential to victory, and that such effort could be secured only by telling the people the facts and letting them know that the war was a matter of life or death to the nation (see Propaganda). Experience showed that in dark days the country always rose to the occasion. The authorities also failed to appreciate the necessity for telling other peoples, and in particular the Overseas Dominions and America, what Great Britain was doing. When the war commenced the War Office and the army were full of explosive and inaccurate ideas regarding the Press. Lord Wolseley had said that the special correspondent was the curse of the modern army. This spirit pervaded the services during the earlier stages of the war, notwithstanding the voluntary action of the newspapers in suppressing naval and military information in July and Aug. 1914. Maj.-Gen. Sir C. E. Callwell, who was the head of the Intelligence Department at the War Office when the war started, says in his Experiences: of a Dug-Out (1920): - " It speedily became apparent that the Powers-that-Be' did not mean to be expansive in connexion with incidents where our side was getting the worst of it." He also acknowledges that the Press was badly treated by the War Office and G.H.Q. at the outset and that he was placed in the uncomfortable position of administering a policy which he disliked and which he believed to be entirely mistaken. In short, the Press was regarded with distrust and suspicion. These feelings were gradually removed after constant protests, but not until the war had been in progress for nearly three years was a system evolved which by degrees gave the correspondents a reasonable amount of freedom. The rule prohibiting them, except in rare cases, from describing the achievements of the different units, who were thus robbed of the glory to which they were entitled, had most unfortunate results. The public yearned to know what the soldiers and sailors were doing, and the information was withheld from them. The Australian, Canadian and New Zealand censorships adopted a different system, so that the exploits of these troops were and are well known throughout the world. This led to the circulation of malicious stories to the effect that Great Britain was not doing her share, and that she was preserving her soldiers at the expense of those furnished from overseas. A reference to the terrible weekly casualty lists would at once prove the falsity of this statement. The truth is that so far as the British effort is concerned, the main burden was borne by troops furnished from Great Britain. Owing to the action of the British censorship, this fact is still imperfectly understood in other countries. The effects of the policy of silence were not confined to the war. Great Britain suffers from them permanently. In America and elsewhere the stupendous character of the British performances and sacrifices has been inadequately appreciated because they were not made known at the time. It is doubtful whether the people in Great Britain have fully realized themselves what they accomplished. During the war the Press was engaged in a continuous battle with the departments for more information. It was rarely possible to ascertain who was responsible for the policy of silence. The motives were laudable. What the authorities lacked was vision. The Press fully understood the necessity for secrecy in regard to forthcoming naval and military movements and also in reference to many naval and military operations. But there were other matters which might have been described had the authorities recognized the necessity for giving due publicity to what the nation was doing in the war. As already explained, the policy of secrecy was not confined to naval and military operations. It was only after continued protests by the Newspaper Proprietors' Association that publicity was given to the gigantic achievements of the Ministry of Munitions, and the manufacturers and millions of workers associated with it. Nothing was published about the marvellous working of the railways, one of the most remarkable feats in history. The Admiralty was a great offender. It was stated officially that " the Navy did not wish for publicity." The result was that the wonderful British seamen, including the mercantile marine, mine-sweepers and fishermen, did not receive adequate recognition of their services to the Allies. After continued representations by the newspapers, more publicity was given to their doings in the later stages of the war.

It must, however, be recognized that the censorship bristled with difficulties. It was necessary to prevent the enemy from receiving information; it was necessary to avoid publishing information that would unnecessarily alarm British people or their Allies, or mislead neutrals as to the progress of the war; and it was also necessary for British censors to pay due regard to the censorship policies of other countries with whom Great Britain was associated. The authorities may be excused for their' inability in the early days of the war to grasp the essential facts of the situation, but they laid themselves open to severe criticism for the delay in realizing that a change of policy was necessary. See Government Papers Cd. 7679 and Cd. 7680 (1915); Sir Edward Cook, The Press in Wartime (1920); Sir Philip Gibbs, Realities of War (1920); Neville Lytton, The Press and the General Staff (1921) Maj.-Gen. Callwell, The Experiences of a Dug-Out (1920); Sir Douglas Brownrigg, The Indiscretions of a Naval Censor (1919). (RI.) (2) United States. - American Federal legislation in the matter of censorship shows nothing comparable to the British and French Government censorship of newspapers. The Federal Government had no traditions of censorship except the disastrous ones in connexion with the Alien and Sedition laws of 1798. The First Amendment to the Constitution stated that " Congress shall make no law. .. abridging the freedom of speech or of the press... ." There had been no sufficient number of cases before 1917 to afford a clear interpretation of this, except that it had been held to be as binding in war as in peace (Milligan case, 71.U.S.2). In the first weeks after the United States had declared war, Congress rejected an amendment to the Espionage Act that would have established a censor's bureau. Recognizing that a war involving the whole nation necessitated full information, the President established a Committee on Public Information on April 14 1917. This agency for publicity concerning war efforts and purposes developed into a great news agency and a means of distribution of patriotic propaganda. Its only direct relation to the control of the press was a request made by it in the name of the Secretaries of State, War and the Navy that newspapers censor themselves in the matter of news that might help the enemy or embarrass the Government. There was no legal force behind this. It was generally observed but with much grumbling and denunciation of the chairman of the Committee, Mr. George Creel, as a " censor." The adherence of Congress and the President to the traditions of a free press and free speech in simply requesting a voluntary censorship was striking, but it was more in appearance than in reality. It seemed exceptional, for in addition to the usual reasons which justified the other belligerents in instituting official press bureaus and censors to control seditious utterances, the United States faced conditions unknown to them. It was the domicile of about 4,000,000 unnaturalized citizens of the Central Powers - " enemy aliens," to use an old and misleading phrase that was revived. In addition there were millions more born in those lands and using their languages, who had become citizens legally. During two and a half years of neutrality, the free and acrimonious discussion of the war and its issues had filled the Press, and been incessant in every home and community and school as well as in Congressional debates. The propaganda agencies of all the nations, and especially of the Central Powers, had flooded the mails, used the lecture platforms and organized their semiofficial press. The country had heard much of the German espionage system, spies were suspected everywhere, and many acts of sabotage, arson, and violence in factories engaged in munition production were ascribed to them. The activities of German agents, some real and many imagined, seemed to call for vigorous action. In other respects, too, the United States departed from its old individualistic tendencies, as in instituting the draft, regulating food, raising huge loans, observing meatless days and sending an army of 2,000,000 to fight in Europe. That wise and necessary restraint did not more often give way to oppression and violence is amazing in a country where the frontier had but recently disappeared.

The fact that no new agency was established to control the Press did not mean that communication, the Press and public speech were to continue to be unrestricted. On April 6 1917, the day war was declared, the radio stations were taken over by the Department of the Navy under the law of 1912. On April 28 the President placed the cables in charge of the same department and the dispatch of messages and use of codes was strictly regulated. On the latter date the telegraph lines were placed in charge of the War Department but transferred later to the Post Office Department when the Government took over the telegraph and express companies. Under the old Internment Statute of 1789, the Attorney-General was authorized by the President to intern dangerous enemy aliens and by an Act of Congress the Alien Property Custodian assumed charge of enemy aliens' property.

So far Federal officials were acting under pre-war legislation including the old Treason law. The earliest war measures aimed at sedition and disloyalty had as a background the passage of the conscription or Selective Service law. It was a great venture in legislation for the United States. The possibility of interference with its enforcement was clearly in mind in the Espionage Act (June 15 1917), which provided that (Section 3, title t): " Whoever when the United States is at war, shall wilfully make or convey false reports or false statements with intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of its enemies, and whoever when the United States is at war, shall wilfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty in the military or naval forces of the United States, or shall wilfully obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States shall be punished by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than 20 years, or both." The last of these clauses was the one oftenest invoked by Federal legal officers. Another section declared non-mailable all written or printed matter which violated any provision of the Espionage Act. This Act was not amended until May 1918 by the Passport and Sabotage Acts and the so-called " Sedition Law." The latter, a loosely drawn statute based on an Act of the state of Montana, sought to suppress all utterances of a disloyal character. It provided punishments up to 20 years' imprisonment for anyone who published " any language intended to bring the form of Government of the United States or the Constitution into contempt, scorn, contumely and disrepute." It opened the possibility for all kinds of complaints and prosecutions by those whose judgment was affected by war hysteria. The Federal Attorney-General, his assistant and the 88 U.S. district attorneys were flooded with silly complaints and beset by unofficial disloyalty hunters and amateur detectives, but kept their heads in most cases remarkably well, as did most of the judges. In the end no prosecutions were permitted until the Attorney-General reviewed the facts and gave authorization. The meaning of this statute was not interpreted by the Supreme Court until 1919, after the fighting was over. Not till then did the courts of first instance have a uniform and controlling indication that the relation between words alleged to be criminal and the armed forces of the nation must be direct enough to constitute " a clear and present danger." Before this, state and Federal courts had taken wide latitude in considering the " general tendency " of utterances. Men had been convicted for criticizing the Red Cross, doubting the utility of knitting socks for soldiers, using abusive and intemperate language in arguments about the war or producing such a motion picture as The Spirit of '76 which in one part represented British soldiers using bayonets at the Wyoming valley massacre. The obsession that the country was full of German spies persisted until 1918, although Federal officers had broken up German espionage early in the war.

The prosecutions and deportations, especially those instituted by Mr. A. Mitchell Palmer, the new Attorney-General, were subjects of most bitter complaint as the war ended. Federal legislation was supplemented by Acts of even a more drastic character, in most of the states. Many of the state Acts on sedition bear date of 1919, i.e. after the close of the war and therefore subject to application and interpretation in fields quite unrelated to the nation's safety during war. In 25 states the display of a red flag was a specified offence. The other source of complaint against Federal activity was the judicially unreviewable power exercised by the Postmaster-General, Mr. Burleson, in closing the mails to journals of which he disapproved. This control was most often exercised by cancelling their classification as second-class matter entitled to low mailing rates. This virtual exclusion from the mails was continued to the financial ruin of some newspapers even though the objection was based on the material in only one issue. Much bitter comment (some of it partisan) and discontent were aroused by the action of the Postmaster-General.

So far as the foreign language press was concerned there were about 750 newspapers in the 14 chief language groups with whose attitude the Government was chiefly concerned. Most of these regularly published the official news from Washington concerning war activities and purposes. The President was empowered under the Trading with the Enemy Act (Oct. 6 1917), to require that translations of political views and comment touching the United States or any other nation engaged in the war should be filed with the post-office officials at the mailing point in the case of all foreign language publications. Exemption from this rule by special permit was allowed and freely granted. The Post Office Department was designated by executive order as responsible for the enforcement of these measures. In the same Act a very inclusive section gave the President complete power to control any form of communication to be delivered directly or indirectly to any enemy or ally of enemy, or communications of any sort between the United States and any foreign country. By executive order of Oct. 12 the enforcement of this was put in the hands of a Censorship Board composed of the Secretaries of War and the Navy, the Postmaster-General, the chairman of the War Trade Board and the chairman of the Committee on Public Information. This body made the necessary regulations and by Dec. 11 1917 had gathered a large staff at the necessary ports to enforce them. The regulations in no way modified the voluntary censorship exercised by the Press over itself.

About 6,000 out of 4,000,000 " alien enemies " were interned or put under restraint. In all, 1,532 persons were arrested under the Espionage Act.; about 75 more for threats against the President or for sabotage. There were 908 indictments for conspiracy. Acquittals and cases pending reduced the number of those actually convicted under the Espionage Act to about 600. The best-known case was that of Eugene V. Debs, former Socialist candidate for president, who was sentenced to 10 years in a Federal prison for a speech opposing the war and denouncing war as the work of capital. Others were the suppression of The Masses, a radical monthly, the cases of Abrams, Goldstein, Kate O'Hare, Berger, Rose Pastor Stokes, and the I.W.W. cases (Haywood and 92 others).

Beyond the realm of Federal action were the state laws, drastic in some cases, and the executive orders of some zealous governors and state defence councils who saw danger in speaking foreign languages in public or over the telephone, or teaching German in the schools, or using certain text-books. There was sometimes a lack of discrimination between the parties essentially loyal, representing agrarian or labour discontent, and those of their leaders whose purposes and sentiments were doubtful. There was also the sort of unofficial censorship, undefined by law but real, which communities exercised against those who had been pro-German or who were now less ready than their neighbours thought fitting to subscribe for loans and the Red Cross, and to observe food regulations.

On the whole, however, it is doubtful if all these legal and extra-legal activities in a nation of ioo,000,000 were serious enough to justify any general condemnation of war legislation, the courts, and the nation. The quick reaction and sharp criticism of unfortunate acts and decisions indicated that free speech and free press were still basic ideals in the United States.

References

- Official Bulletin (for executive orders); annual reports of the Attorney-General, Postmaster-General, etc.; Willoughby, Government Organization in War Time and After (1919); Creel, How We Advertised America (1920). Chafee's Freedom of Speech (1920) is a full and critical account with extensive bibliography. See especially J. L. O'Brian, " Civil Liberty in War Time " in Proceedings of New York State Bar Association, Jan. 1919.

(G. S. F.)