the Week of Proper 26 / Ordinary 31
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Bible Encyclopedias
Battles in the Woevre
1911 Encyclopedia Britannica
"BATTLES IN THE, 1914 WOEVRE -8. - The military importance of the great plain which separates the Metz ridges from the line of heights along the Meuse was evident as soon as the frontier of 1871 was drawn. On its N. side, a strip of bold undulating country, the axis of which maybe taken as Montmedy-Thionville, skirts the Belgian and Luxemburg border, while at the S. it narrows, as the Meuse and Moselle converge toward Toul, to a blunted end facing the Haye Plateau and Toul. Along the Meuse (Verdun-Toul) and along the Moselle (Thionville-Metz) both sides gradually crowned the heights with permanent fortifications. The plain itself, through which the frontier ran along no very well defined line, was not fortified, each side treating it as a sort of foreground or glacis. Generally speaking, this frontier line left the plain to France, but the French ground immediately adjacent to the frontier was practically under the fire of the Metz guns. Hence the war outpost line, which was to protect the concentration of the French main armies, was drawn well back - almost to the verge of the Meuse heights - and, no attempt was made to hold the frontier region itself.
This proved, in the sequel, to be of enormous importance. For, from about the end of the 19th century, vast mineral resources had been discovered in the Briey basin or Eastern Woevre; this lay on both sides of the frontier, and was at the outbreak of war being developed by a Franco-German syndicate. From the military point of view - a short, purely military war being in prospect - no great importance was attached by the French to the evacuation of an untenable stretch of country, but when the war became a prolonged, and largely an economic, struggle, the German occupation and exploitation of the Briey area became a most important asset to the Central Powers.
Nevertheless, after the battle of the Marne and its concomitant fighting on the Meuse died away in Sept 1914, no major offensive took place in this area until the American attack of Sept. 1918. The reasons for this quiescence on the French side were not allowed to appear during the war, and are still rather obscure.
In the following article are described (I) the bitter trenchwarfare fighting which - without ever becoming a major offensive - went on continually in 1914-5, around the salient of St. Mihiel - the base of which was the Woevre plain--and (2) the American operations, which, carried out on a large scale and, without reserve, reduced the salient in two days in 1918.
(C. F. A.) (I.) Hauts De Meuse And Woévre, 1914-6 On Sept. 19 1914 the right wing of the French III. Army was carrying out an offensive advance from the Hauts de Meuse in the direction of Mars-la-Tour when the VIII. Corps encountered at Wool an advanced guard of the German army which was being; led toward the Hauts de Meuse by Gen. von Strautz. Before the engagement at Woe! had assumed any great importance it was suspended by the arrival of an order from Gen. Joffre to the effect that the VIII. Corps was to proceed immediately to Ste. Menehould, where it was to remain in general reserve. Consequently the Germans found themselves confronted only by re serve troops, not yet inured to war, and dispersed over a wide front, when they launched their attacks against the Meuse heights on the 10th and following days.
At Vigneulles Gen. Grand d'Esnon of the 75th Res. Div. was killed and the enemy surmounted the Hauts de Meuse. Before long the German heavy artillery was bombarding the forts of Lionville and Geronville toward the S. and Camp des Romains in front. On Sept. 24 St. Mihiel was in the hands of the Germans, who tried to gain ground W. of the Meuse but could not get beyond Chauvoncourt. In the N. von Strautz's army was held by Gen. Pol Durand's group of reserve divisions which had come to the assistance of the VI. Corps. Toward the S. it was attacked by the XVI. Army Corps at St. Baussant and by the VII. Ca y. Div.
The region of Leronville - Marbotte was without defenders, but the Germans did not advance in the direction of Commercy, as their aim was to encircle Verdun. To this end the German Crown Prince attacked to the S. of Varennes and in Argonne simultaneously and the French III. Army thus found itself threatened both to the N. W. and to the S. of Verdun.
The 15th Div. of the VIII. Corps was brought back to Chaumont-sur-Aire to the III. Army Reserve, ready to hasten either to the aid of the V. Corps in the Argonne or toward Chauvoncourt to help the 75th Res. Div.
The 16th Div. was transported by train from St. Menchould to Leronville - Sampigny and placed under the orders of the I. Army headquarters, for the purpose of covering Commercy, and was reinforced on Sept. 28 by the Belfort Brigade. From this moment von Strautz's army, which was composed of Bavarians, had its III. Army Corps bottled up at St. Mihiel and so the " Hernia," called also the " Wedge," came into being. From Les Eparges to the Meuse S. of St. Mihiel, the III. Army put in line the VI. Corps and part of Gen. Pol Durand's group. The Bislee peninsula and the front Koeur-la-Grande - Brasseitte - St. Agnant were held by the VIII. Corps with the 16th Inf. Div. and the Belfort Bde. To the E., in the region of the Bouconville ponds in Woevre, was the 7th Ca y. Div. Still farther eastward the XVI. Corps was attacking fiercely at St. Baussant, urged on by the determined commander of the I. Army.
The zone S. of the St. Mihiel wedge and Woevre and N. of Toul was assigned to the I. Army. The point of liaison between the I. and III. Armies was on the Meuse below Bislee. Before long the III. Army was put under the command of the I. Army and it was therefore Gen. Dubail who was matched against Gen. von Strautz.
At first the Germans tried to debouch from Chauvoncourt, but without success. Elsewhere, both in the S. and the N., they made every effort to enlarge the wedge while the French attacks were directed toward diminishing it. Hence there resulted partial engagements at Chauvoncourt, in front of Les Paroches, at Les Eparges near the Hauts de Meuse, in the Bois d'Ailly, in the Bois Brule, near Apremont, and at St. Baussant.
For the beginning of April 1915, Gen. Dubail ordered an attack on a large scale from the N. and the S. to be delivered by several army corps. A force designated the army detachment Gerard, including the I. and II. Army Corps, the Verdun Provisional Div., and the I. Ca y. Corps, opened the attack on April 5 and took possession of Fromezey, Gussaniville and l'Hopital farm (in the region of Etain), but broke down before the intact German wire - for in the marshy ground the artillery projectiles buried themselves deeply.
In conjunction with the attack by Gerard's force an attack was launched by the XII. Corps and VIII. Corps which, however, had no particular results. The fighting lasted from the 5th to the 22nd without achieving anything but the exhaustion of both attackers and defenders.
From that time forward the struggle resolved itself into a series of partial combats. The names Les Eparges, the Tranchee de Calonne, Chauvoncourt, Bois d'Ailly, Bois Brule, Seicheprey, Bois le Pretre recur day by day in the communiqués of 1915.
On May 5 1915 the VIII. Corps lost in one morning all the ground which it had taken several months to gain in the Ailly wood. There was even a moment when a gap in the line seemed to be broken through and the way opened to Commercy; but the counter-attacks came in time to regain part of the Bois d'Ailly, and restore the situation. In the course of one of these counterattacks in the woods, a company of the 172nd, led by Commandant d'Andre, crossed five lines of German trenches in succession and came within sight of St. Mihiel. But here they were confronted by German reserves and surrounded. For three days these heroes resisted all attacks, having nothing but their rifles and the German grenades picked up in the fifth line of trenches. They finally succumbed to hunger and thirst. Justly indeed was this trench named " the thirst trench." When Gen. von Strautz saw Commandant d'Andre on the day after the fighting was over, he said, " Vous avez ete deux fois blesse, vous etiez au Bois d'Ailly, vous etes Un brave." At Bois le Pretre, near the Moselle, the fighting was incessant and for the most part to the advantage of the French.
At Les Eparges it was mine warfare. In this the Germans had generally the upper hand, but, as at the Bois d'Ailly and the Bois le Pretre, the upper hand did not imply the gain of ground desired. In mine warfare the Germans had a very considerable advantage over their opponents in the matter of equipment and especially of boring tools. At the outset the galleries they made in the Crete des Eparges and the colossal dimensions of their mine chambers astonished even the men of the II. Corps, recruited though many of them were from the mining country of the Nord. But, though astonished, they were not dismayed, and feeble as their implements were, they often took their revenge for the mine attacks to which they were subjected.
The characteristic of the army of 1915 was the poverty of its material in comparison to that at the disposal of the enemy. In it was learned the lesson that a nation poor in coal and iron must shed much blood to save itself from slavery.
When in Sept. 1915 the Champagne offensive was launched,.. quiet set in on the front Les Eparges - Chauvoncourt - Bois d'AillyBois le Pretre. On both sides, the forces on this front were milked to obtain quality and quantity on the field of the great battle. When it died down, the battered formations came back to rest and recruit - and also to fight, for activity began again in Nov. and Dec. 1915.
In Feb. 1916 the storm burst at Verdun, and in July the other storm on the Somme. Then the front with which we are concerned became so calm that the commander of the VIII. Corps called the Wedge of St. Mihiel a convalescent home.
Here and there, now and then there was a coup de main, but the only result was to show both sides the necessity of not relaxing vigilance. The year 1917 came and went without changing either the positions or the attitude of the two parties. The great British offensive of Arras, the great French offensive on the Aisne, the Franco-British battles of Ypres absorbed all the offensive power of the adversaries on the western front. Not till 1918 did the sector Les Eparges - Chauvoncourt - Bois d'Ailly - Bois le Pretre become again the scene of victory.
In concluding this survey of operations on the front between Les Eparges and the Moselle, it is necessary to underline again the poverty of material and munitions under which the French army laboured. Not only did it possess little heavy artillery, but even the 75's, excellent for barrages, diminished daily and were replaced by B.L. guns of 90 and 95 mm., obsolete since 1900. Track for light railways could not he had. Boring tools were so short that mine warfare in the Forest of Apremont had to be waged with pick, chisel and crowbar. Ammunition was served out by spoonfuls, and at one moment the commander of the eastern group of armies had only 350 rounds per gun for his 75' s - half an hour's battle allowance.
These conditions were, of course, not peculiar to the front under consideration, and are introduced here to enable the reader to see how the Higher Command was obliged to apply the great Napoleonic principle of economy of force; to show how it was possible for the Crown Prince to break in the Verdun front or, for that matter, the whole front from the Meuse to Switzerland, for the defenders were few, their guns few, and their shell very few.
Reproduced by permission from the map of France on the scale of rizoo,000, published by the Service Geographique de FArmee.
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