the Week of Proper 26 / Ordinary 31
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Battle of Asiago
1911 Encyclopedia Britannica
or "BATTLE OF, 1916. ASIAGO - The Asiago plateau was the scene of various battles on the Italian front during the World War ( see Italian Campaigns); but what is called preeminently " the battle of Asiago " was that which was fought in the Austrian offensive of 1916, resulting in the first enemy occupation of Italian territory.
An attack from the Trentino with the object of cutting the Italian communications with the Julian front, and so bottling Cadorna's main force in what Krauss calls " the Venetian sack," was an operation which could not but commend itself to the Austrian general staff. In the words of Falkenhayn, who refused his cooperation to the proposal made by Conrad von Hgtzendorff in Dec. 1915, " this project contemplated an operation which must, once at least during the war, have certainly attracted the attention of every general staff officer who took a look at the map of the Italian theatre of war. It was very inviting." Falkenhayn's refusal to join in the enterprise was based on various grounds; his belief in the prospects of success at Verdun; his anxiety regarding the Russian front, and, probably, the idea that a formal state of war between Germany and Italy might still be avoided. He felt, too, that even if the plan were as successful as Conrad claimed it would be, its effect on the general course of the war would not be sufficiently important to warrant the risk taken in detaching a strong German force for the enterprise itself, or for replacing Austro-Hungarian divisions in the east if the actual attack should be left to Germany's ally. Conrad believed that the effect of the attack would be decisive, and Krauss, then chief of the staff to the Archduke Eugene, agreed, but was of opinion that a double attack should be made, on both the Julian and Trentino fronts. Without German assistance it was obviously impossible to collect sufficient forces for this double attack. But Falkenhayn went further; he put the number of. troops required for the Trentino attack alone at 25 divisions; he doubted the possibility of collecting such a force, and he questioned whether, if it were available, supply could be assured by the limited railway communications leading to the scene of action. Krauss was convinced that an offensive against Italy from the Trentino was practicable, and, if accompanied by a simultaneous attack on the Isonzo front, would lead to great results. He believed that the Trentino operation could be conducted in Jan. and Feb., when the winter snow was frozen hard, before the heavy spring snowfall. It is difficult for anyone who knows the Trentino in winter to admit his contention that this hard snow would resist the passage of troops in mass, not to speak of guns, even if one were to accept his idea of basing the operation on drives through the valleys, on the west of Lake Garda as well as on the east. Conrad does not seem to have considered the idea of attacking till later on in the season, and the plan which he put before German headquarters was radically different in idea from that which Krauss favoured.
Conrad's plan was to attack through the Asiago and Arsiero uplands, in the direction of Vicenza and Bassano rather than towards Verona. When he failed to convince Falkenhayn that the effort should be a joint one, he determined to attack independently, and, according to Krauss, he endeavoured to conceal his preparations from the Germans. Perhaps his independent action was a result of Falkenhayn's independent decision to attack at Verdun. Perhaps he wished to avoid further discussion of a project upon which his mind was set, the more so as he was embarking on the enterprise with a force greatly inferior to that which Falkenhayn had considered necessary. Conrad's attacking mass consisted of 14 divisions only.
In view of the relatively small force available, Conrad was compelled to reduce his front of attack. His original intention, apparently, had been to extend it to the north of the Brenta valley, though the main drive was to be to the south. With the troops at his disposal he could not afford this extension, and he made his effort between Rovereto and the Val Sugana (Upper Brenta). It seems obvious that with this limited force, operating in difficult country, Conrad could not have hoped to achieve the more ambitious results which he had urged would follow upon a successful attack from the Trentino. Assuming that he broke through and reached the plain, he could hardly expect to do more. But if his offensive were so far successful, if he had once cleared the way to the plains - then perhaps the stiff-necked Falkenhayn might change his mind, and take advantage of the opening offered by an Austrian success.
Cadorna's general line of argument, when rumours of attack began to arrive, resembled that of Falkenhayn. He believed he had shut the doors fast against any ordinary attack, and he did not think that Conrad could spare troops for an offensive on the grand scale, or that, if he could, he would make his big effort in the Trentino. Like Falkenhayn, Cadorna thought the railway communications insufficient. He assumed, moreover, that Conrad had reasonably accurate information about the forthcoming Russian offensive and would not risk attacking at such a distance when the Russian threat was imminent. But Conrad hoped to attack sooner than he eventually did; his troops were ready in April, but the snow caused a delay which gave rise to much impatience at Austrian headquarters. He had also persuaded himself that his troops in the east were strong enough to resist any pressure that could be brought against them.
Cadorna was sceptical of an offensive in strength, and thought that the reported movements in the Trentino signified a limited attack, to be undertaken with the object of hampering his offensive towards the east. In the late autumn and winter he had reduced the strength of the I. Army to the minimum in order to strengthen his attack on the Isonzo, and in reply to Brusati's expressions of anxiety regarding the adequacy of his forces during this period Cadorna pointed out that the requirements of the Isonzo front made it necessary to reduce the numbers of the I. Army, and that in the event of a threat developing from the Trentino there would be sufficient warning to allow the reenforcement of the front in good time. He reminded Brusati, on various occasions, that the role of the I. Army was strictly defensive. He had already indicated, early in the campaign, the defensive lines to be prepared, and had on various occasions insisted on the necessity of strengthening these lines. During the first few months of the war the troops of the I. Army had advanced at various points beyond the limits laid down by Cadorna, and in these sectors the army was aligned for offensive action. This would not have mattered if the necessary defensive works had been carried out, but the energies of the troops had been directed to preparing elaborate works in advance positions not well suited for defence, and the positions chosen by Cadorna for the main line of resistance were in many cases untouched. Brusati had carried out successfully the initial part of his work, the reduction in length of the Trentino front. The original front of the I. Army, from the Stelvio to Croda Grande (east of the Val Cismon) is close upon 240 m. in length, but the advances made in the first weeks of the war had shortened the line by over loo miles. The second part of the army's task, that of fortifying the 70 m. of front which could be considered % feasible for the operation of troops in large numbers, had been neglected in certain important sectors.
It was on March 2 2 that the probability of an Austrian attack was first reported by the I. Army command, whose initial requests were granted at once, the transference of two brigades to the Isonzo front being countermanded, and four additional brigades being placed at Brusati's disposal. In his answering despatch Cadorna repeated the instructions to fall back upon the principal line of resistance in case of an enemy attack. On April 2 Brusati sent a further report upon the concentration of enemy troops in the Trentino, and stated that he had taken the steps which he considered to be most opportune in relation to the means at his disposal. In reply Cadorna detached two more divisions, the 9th and loth, from the general reserve in Friuli, to be held in reserve at Schio and Bassano, and gave an additional group of Alpine battalions to the I. Army. As a result Brusati wrote, on April 6, that the reserves given him allowed him " to view with complete confidence even the most unfavourable event." Although Cadorna was still sceptical in regard to an offensive in force, he increased Brusati's artillery strength by 18 batteries of middle-calibre guns and gave special orders for the supply and transport of ammunition. On April 2 1 at Cadorna's request Brusati sent a report upon the defensive system between the Val Lagarina and the Val Sugana, accompanied by a map showing the various lines, stating that the conditions were " re-assuring," and that the third line of defence upon which Cadorna had laid special emphasis could be considered as being in a satisfactory state of efficiency. Three days later Brusati suggested the recnforcement of two sectors of the line, that between the Vallarsa and the Val Terragnolo, and the Tonezza sector, between the Val Terragnolo and the Astico. He asked for permission to split the 9th Div., which had been given him as a reserve, and send a brigade to each of the sectors mentioned. He also asked for another division to be held in reserve about Vicenza. Cadorna was unwilling to break up the 9th Div., and ordered that it should be held in reserve at Schio, within easy reach of the Vallarsa sector, while to reinforce the Tonezza sector he dispatched an additional brigade from the general reserve. He also detailed the 27th Div., in reserve on the Tagliamento, to be ready as a further reinforcement and formed a further artillery reserve of To heavy batteries.
At the end of April Cadorna went to visit the lines in person. He found that while the front lines had been elaborately fortified, in various sectors the reserve lines which he had indicated as the " battle positions " were almost untouched, and parts of the front line were unsuitable for prolonged resistance. Between the Val Lagarina and the Vallarsa and along the Val Terragnolo the Italian lines formed a dangerously exposed salient, running down from the high slopes and completely dominated by the Austrian guns on Monte Biaena, Monte Ghello, Monte Finonchio and the Folgaria plateau. In the Val Sugana the same fault was observable. The forward lines on Monte Armentera and Monte Salubio were poorly adapted for defence, but had been strongly fortified, while the line east of the Maso torrent, which Cadorna had indicated as the main line of defence, had undergone little preparation. Cadorna ordered the positions to be modified. The bulk of the heavy guns were withdrawn to the second line and the work of preparation was hastened on; but the enemy attack seemed imminent, and it was impossible to set about a complete reorganization under the immediate threat.
On the wings it was possible to improve the situation. In the centre the problem was different, for here the Italians were of necessity badly placed. The salient of Soglio l'Aspio (4375 ft.), between the frontier and the Upper Astico, was practically in the air, and could only be considered as an outpost. But the main line between the Posina and the Astico, which ran by Monte Maggio (5,730ft.), Monte Toraro (6,1.75 ft.), Campomolon (6,030 ft.) and Spitz Tonezza (5,512 ft.), was not satisfactory for defensive purposes. It was close under the Austrian guns and it had no depth. Behind the line the ground falls away southeastward in a steep glacis that drops abruptly in the end to the Posina on the south and the Astico on the east. It was owing to the essential weakness of this line and its extension northward! to the west of the Val d'Assa that Cadorna had ordered the preparation of a third line of defence that ran from Cima Portule (7,570 ft.) east of the Val d'Assa and round the southern rim of the Asiago basin by Punta Corbin across the Astico to the mountains south of the Posina. This line was shown as existing upon the map sent to Cadorna on April 21 by the I. Army command. In reality little had been done beyond the tracings on the map. The project had remained a project.
On May 8 Brusati was replaced by Gen. Pecori-Giraldi, the commander of the VII. Corps (III. Army). A few days previously Cadorna had modified the system of commands in the threatened sector. Up to the time of his arrival on the I. Army front the whole line between Lake Garda and the mountains east of the Val Sugana had been included in the V. Corps command (Gen. Zoppi). The Val Lagarina and Val Sugana sectors were now placed under independent commands, and the long line held by the V. Corps was reduced to include only the hill country between the Vallarsa and the eastern edge of the Asiago plateau. On the eve of the Austrian attack the alignment of the I. Army was as follows: - West of Lake Garda the line was held by the III. Corps (two divisions) under Gen. Camerana. The Val Lagarina sector, from the lake to Zugna Torta, was held by the 37th Div. under Gen. Ricci Armani (two brigades, three battalions of Alpini, with several weak battalions of territorial Militia). The Sicilia Bde. was arriving in the Adige valley to act as a reserve. The left-hand division of the V. Corps (the 35th) was in line between the Vallarsa and the Astico, the Roma Bde. right down upon the Val Terragnolo, backed by a territorial Militia regiment in Col Santo and two Alpini battalions holding the Borcola Pass. The Ancona Bde., freshly come into line, lay from Monte Maggio to Campomolon, while the Cagliari Bde. was echeloned forward in the Soglio d'Aspio salient, and a group of Customs Guards battalions held the edge of the Val d'Astico. Two brigades of the 34th Div. and a group of Alpini held the Val d'Astico and a line that roughly followed the frontier as far as Cima Manderiolo (6,665 ft.). A third infantry brigade and two brigades of territorial Militia lay in immediate reserve. The right wing of the army, occupying the Val Sugana sector (extending to the Val Cismon), consisted of the XVIII. Corps under Gen. Etna, three infantry brigades, four battalions of Bersaglieri and six battalions of Alpini. The 9th Div. lay at Schio, ready to reinforce the Vallarsa - Val d'Astico sector, while the 10th Div. was at Bassano, and a group of Alpini was at Marostica. The 44th Div., freshly returned from Albania, was concentrating at Desenzano, and the 27th still lay on the Tagliamento, where the X. and XIV. Corps were also in readiness to leave in case of need. In all Pecori-Giraldi had at his immediate disposal 130 regular battalions, even battalions of Customs Guards and 45 battalions of territorial Militia, the latter at very low strength and of small fighting value. The 44th Div., which was not ready to move at the beginning of the battle, brought the number of regular battalions up to 142. The artillery strength consisted of 851 guns, of which 348 were of heavy or medium calibre and 259 were light guns of position.
The Austrians had a great superiority in artillery, upon which they relied for breaking their way through the Italian lines. Between the Val Lagarina and the Val Sugana were concentrated some 2,000 guns, of which nearly half were of heavy or medium calibre, including 40 305-mm. howitzers, four 380's and two or three German 420's. The attacking force was arrayed in two armies, one behind the other, Dankl's XI. Army in front with nine divisions, von Koevess's III. Army in support, with five divisions. The troops in the Val Lagarina and the Val Sugana were not included in this force, which was to make its offensive between the two valleys, where only supporting attacks were to be carried out. Krauss, as chief-of-staff of the Archduke Eugene, was opposed to the disposition of the two armies and to the limitation of the attack to the hill country. He urged that the front of attack should from the outset be divided between Dankl and von .Koevess, and pressed for the adoption of his plan for the concentration of attacking masses in the valleys, especially in the Val Sugana. But the original plan, prepared in all its details by Conrad and his staff, was not modified; it would seem that the Archduke Eugene and his chief-of-staff had little freedom of action. The tactical direction of the attack was entrusted to Dankl, who had at his disposal some 180 battalions.
The offensive opened on May 14 with a very heavy bombardment along the whole line from the Val Lagarina to the Val Sugana; but the concentration of fire was most intense between the Vallarsa and the Upper Astico, and against this sector, the following day, the main infantry attack was launched. The plan was to attack first with the right wing of the XI. Army, commanded by the Archduke Charles, supported not only by its own artillery but by flanking fire from the massed guns on the Lavarone plateau. When the right wing had made sufficient ground the left wing was to come into action against the Italian line in the Seven Communes, north of the Upper Astico. On the extreme right of the attack, between the Val Lagarina and the Vallarsa, the Italians withdrew from their ill-chosen front lines, fighting steadily, and making the enemy pay for the ground gained. In the Val Terragnolo the Roma Bde. was run over by the enemy attack. Many prisoners were taken, and the second line, which was withdrawn in accordance with the general instructions given by Cadorna, came back in some disorder.
Against the forward line between Monte Maronia and Soglio d'Aspio the Austrian attack made no headway at first, the Cagliari Bde. and the Alpini holding firmly to their positions, but in the end the first line was occupied, the Italians retiring to the main line of defence, which ran from Monte Maggio by Campomolon to Spitz Tonezza. The Italian right was so far not heavily attacked, and demonstrative attacks by the Austrians in the Val Sugana were readily repulsed. Cadorna transferred his staff from Udine to Thiene on May 16, and next day he found a critical situation on his left. The Roma Bde., or rather what was left of it, was coming back in the Vallarsa, and Col Santo had been evacuated by the territorials, while the command of the sector had lost touch with the Alpine battalions. In the centre, too, the situation was bad. The Campomolon line was being strongly attacked, and showed signs of yielding, though reenforcements from the gth Div. had been promptly dispatched. The line had been insufficiently prepared, and was being methodically knocked to bits by the very heavy fire of the Austrian big guns. But the chief danger lay on the left, where there was little to stop the Austrian advance between the Vallarsa and the Val Terragnolo. Here, too, practically nothing had been done to prepare the reserve positions, and owing to a mistaken order the retiring troops had not occupied Monte Pasubio, the key position now that Col Santo had gone. The Volturno Bde., of the 10th Div., which was on its way to reinforce another threatened sector, was diverted to the more critical point.
A battalion was hurried up in motor lorries, and marched up to Pasubio by the Passo di Xamo. They arrived after a night march, in the nick of time. Two hours later the first Austrian patrols appeared and were quickly repulsed. The rest of the Volturno Bde. followed, and held the position till they were relieved and reinforced by the 44th Division. By May ig the Austrians were attacking hard all along the line to which the Italians had retired, from Coni Zugna and the Passo di Buole to Pasubio, and the Campomolon line had gone. On May r8 the Austrian attacks, supported by very violent artillery fire, broke the front of the Ancona Bde., and the rest of the 35th Div., threatened on the flank, withdrew during the night. The retreat was covered by the Vicenza battalion of Alpini, who fought a gallant rear-guard action, and a strong counter-attack by the group of Alpini from Marostica checked the Austrian pursuit. The 35th Div., with its reinforcements from the 9th, came back to the line Monte Aralta (south of the Posina) - Monte Cimone - Barcarola, but the Italian centre was now broken. There were gaps both to the right and left of the 35th, though the Alpini were holding north of the Posina and the 27th Div. was coming up rapidly to the valley..
It was a critical moment for the defending army. The Austrian right was increasing the pressure against the positions west of the Vallarsa, and was collecting forces for the first of the long series of attacks against Pasubio, which was only lightly held. The 44th Div. was on its way to the front, but had not yet arrived, and a large number of the guns in this sector had been destroyed prematurely, in the belief that retreat was imminent. There was breathing space for a moment in the centre, but the Austrian left now came into action, Krautwald von Annan's III. Corps being launched against the Italian 34 th Division. Ample Italian reserves were now on the move, the XIV. Corps being en route to fill the gap between the 35th and 34th Divs. and reinforce the latter, but it was a race. Krauss blames the Austrian XX. Corps (Archduke Charles) for waiting till the guns could be brought up to support a new attack instead of driving through at once to Arsiero with all available troops. Perhaps a column, perhaps a strong force, might have pushed straight on to Arsiero and beyond; and if so, it might have gone hard with the Italians. The risk was not taken, and the short respite gave time to close the doors in the face of the invader.
The course of the battle, with the necessity of bringing up reserve divisions, led to a reorganization of the attacking forces, von Koevess taking command of the left wing and Dankl of the right. In the Vallarsa and Pasubio sector the attack developed strongly. The advance along the ridge from Zugna Torta, which had been throughout stubbornly contested by the Italians, had been definitely checked by a regiment of the Taro Bde. at Malga Zugna, and the Austrians endeavoured to break through by coming up from the Vallarsa against Passo di Buole. At the same time Pasubio was assailed with the utmost determination. Farther north the Archduke Charles was waiting for his guns and for reserves, and between him and the III. Corps Kirchbach's I. Corps was coming into action. The III. Corps was now hammering against the Italian 34th Div., whose position was precarious, and although Etna's Val Sugana troops had held their own against various tentative attacks, they were withdrawn to the second line of defence.
Although the wings were holding, the situation in the centre was very grave, and Cadorna considered that if the Austrians were able to concentrate on the weak spot and keep up the impetus of their attack they might succeed in breaking through to the plain. On May 20 he went to Udine, and after consultation with the Duke of Aosta and Frugoni gave orders for the concentration of a reserve army in the Venetian plain. The movement of these troops, which were placed under the command of Frugoni, began on the night of May 21, by road: the railways were occupied with the transport of I. Army reserves (the X. Corps and various other units), and were not available till May 26. The first four corps of this reserve army (the V.), which were made up of units drawn from the II. and III. Armies, were ready on June 2.
Meanwhile the Austrians were continuing their advance in the centre, but the situation on the Italian left was improving. By May 22 the 44th Div., commanded by Gen. Bertotti, was in solid possession of both sides of the Vallarsa road and of Pasubio, and in touch with Ricci Armani on its left. The latter was holding firmly on Coni Zugna and the Passo di Buole, and neither here nor on Pasubio could the repeated attacks of the Austrian right make any impression. On May 24 a desperate effort was made to storm the Passo di Buole and Pasubio, but the Sicilia and Taro Bdes., who held the Zugna ridge, and the right wing of the 44th Div. on Pasubio, repulsed the onset with very heavy losses. The columns attacking Passo di Buole suffered heavily from the flanking fire of the 44th Div. guns in the Vallarsa. The left wing of the division was not attacked in force and Bertotti was able to assist Ricci Armani with his guns. Next day the attack was renewed, heavy columns coming up the slopes against the Passo di Buole, only to be thrown back, broken and decimated, one brigade being practically destroyed. The last attack in force was on May 30, when repeated efforts were made to storm the Pass, in vain. Although further attacks were made after this date the fighting never again reached the same intensity. The Austrian losses had been too heavy for them to continue their attacks in mass, and their attempts to advance in open formation were easily checked.
The importance of the defence at the Passo di Buole can hardly be over-estimated. If the Zugna ridge had fallen, the effect upon the Pasubio position, already a salient, would have been more than serious, and upon the holding of the Pasubio lines depended the maintenance of the positions held by the right wing of the V. Corps. On May 22, following upon the retreat from the Campomolon line, the troops holding the lines in the Seven Communes had been detached from the V. Corps, and the command in this sector had been given to Gen. Lequio, who had come from Carnia. On May 24 the rest of the V. Corps had for the most part retired beyond the Posina or down the Astico to the plain, and had been replaced by the 27th Division. If Pasubio went, the line south of the Posina was turned, and the Austrians had a new route to the plain by the Valli dei Signori, as well as the opening they were now making for, by the Lower Astico. Pasubio was the key of the situation, and the Austrians hammered unceasingly against Bertotti's right wing. The guns never ceased, and a long succession of attacks broke in vain upon the Italian lines. The Austrian infantry advanced along the great ridge from Col Santa; they came up from Anghebani and Chiesa in the Vallarsa and from the Val Terragnolo by the Borcola Pass. Bertotti had four brigades under his command, including the remains of the Roma, and the 6th Group of Alpini, and he changed his troops continuously. The conditions were very hard, and frostbite was responsible for many casualties, for the snow still lay deep on the high ridges, but the spirit of the troops was proof against all trials, and it was against the iron lines of Pasubio that the Austrian offensive came to failure.
North-east of Pasubio, along all the rest of the mountain front to above the Val Sugana, the Austrians gained notable successes. The gap between the 35th and 34th Divs. had been filled by the arrival of the 30th Div. (XIV. Corps), and the 28th was on its way, the three Divs. (34th, 30th and 28th) now forming the XIV. Corps under Lequio. But von Koevess's attack had broken through the Italian line in the Seven Communes. For two days the Italian 34th Div. had fought off the attacks of the Graz (III.) Army Corps. On May 21 the order was given to retire to the line Monte Verena - Cima di Campolongo, and the stay on this line was short. Contact was lost with the left wing of the XVIII. Corps in the Val Sugana, and the Austrians turned the right wing of the division by a bold and skilful advance by way of the Porta Manazzo. A retreat was ordered to the Portule line, east of the Val d'Assa, which was supposed to be the principal line of resistance. The 34th was unable to stand on this line. Owing to an error in the transmission of an order the Alpine troops who were holding the positions of Cima Undici and Cima Dodici retired before the Austrians attacked, and uncovered the flank of the division, while on the same day (May 25) the attacking forces succeeded in occupying the important position of Corno di Campo Verde (6,815 ft.). Next day the attack was continued from north and west, and the Italians were swept off the whole line between the Val d'Assa and the Val Galmarara. A number of prisoners and guns were lost, and prospects looked black for the Italians, though the 28th Div. was now coming into action. On May 26 the situation was such that Cadorna thought it wise to make further preparations for a step which he had already considered and planned - a retreat from the Isonzo and Cadoro. He ordered all heavy artillery not absolutely necessary for defensive purposes, and all stores beyond the minimum required for immediate supplies, to be withdrawn from the Isonzo front and brought south of Treviso, behind the Silo. With the possibility of a general retreat in view, it seemed necessary to withdraw the heaviest impedimenta in good time. Although Cadorna believed that he could hold back the Austrian attack, he had no intention of omitting any precautions.
The Italian position looked unfavourable and worse was yet to come, but Cadorna's confidence was justified. The impetus of the Austrian attack was dwindling. The effort had been great, and losses had been very heavy. The attacking divisions were beginning to lose their offensive value, and the reserves were insufficient. By May 27 Conrad had been compelled to ask Falkenhayn to send to Italy a division of the Austrian XII. Corps, which belonged to Prince Leopold's Army Group. By the end of the month Cadorna was holding his own, although both Dankl and von Koevess were still making progress.
On May 27 Dankl's left wing was down in the Astico valley and close upon Arsiero, and on the following day his centre crossed the Posina in force and attacked the Italian 27th Div. on the southern slopes of the valley. Stiff fighting took place beneath Soglio di Campiglia and Pria Fora, and the Italians withdrew to the mountain line which had been hastily prepared from Forni Alti by Monte Spin to Pria Fora. Retiring on the night of May 29, the troops that were to fall back upon Pria Fora lost their way in the dark and kept too far south, halting on Monte Ciove, the ridge that joins Pria Fora to Monte Novegno and Monte Brazome. At dawn the mistake was realized, but the quick-following enemy were already in possession of Pria Fora, which is almost impregnable from the south.
A desperate attack failed to retrieve the error, and Pria Fora remained in possession of the Austrians.
The line now held by the Italians (27th and 9th Divs.) was the last bulwark defending the plains in this sector, and both here and across the Astico the Austrians made a great effort to break through. The bulk of the 30th Div. was slowly pushed back across the Val Canaglia, in spite of a prolonged and gallant resistance by the Grenadier Bde. on Monte Cengio. Although the Grenadiers finally lost the summit of Cengio, they held on to the lower slopes above Schiri, and Dankl was unable to make headway in the valley, while the right of the division was swung back to the western slopes of Monte Pau. For a long fortnight Dankl hammered at the line south of the Posina and east of the Val Canaglia, but could not gain a yard. On June i the 27th Div. front was reduced, the remade 35th Div. under Gen. Petitti di Roreto coming into line in the Novegno sector, and the 9th (Gen. Gonzaga) taking both sides of the Astico valley. Dankl's attack was specially directed against two points: Monte Pasubio, where troops of the VIII. and XV. Corps were thrown again and again to the attack, and the Novegno sector, where the Archduke Charles concentrated his main effort against Petitti's troops. The attack was bound to follow this direction. It has been suggested that the Archduke should have pushed straight for the plain, down the Lower Astico valley. If ground had been gained here it would have been useless. The weak point of the Austrian position was that their successes were gained on a constantly narrowing front. The wings of the Italian line had held firm, and it was above all necessary to gain room south of Arsiero. On June 2, 3, 4 and 5 massed infantry attacks were delivered south of the Posina, but no impression was made on the Italian lines.
Meanwhile von Koevess had been pushing back the Italians in the Seven Communes. On May 28 Asiago was evacuated, and farther north the 34th Div. retreated from east of the Galmarara across the parallel valleys of Nos and Campomulo. Farther north again the Austrians gained ground on the Marcesina plateau and so came within 4 m. of Primolane in the Val Sugana, a point well behind the Italian lines in the valley. But communications were nearly impossible here, and von Koevess had to make his effort more to the south, narrowing still further the front of attack. An endeavour to gain ground in the Val Sugana had failed on May 26, and no other attempt was made in this sector, for which, in fact, there were no more troops available.
By June 2 Cadorna's V. Army was assembled in the Vicentine plain, and on June 4 Brusiloff broke through at Lutsk. The first news of the Russian attack did not perturb Austrian headquarters, though Gen. von Cramon was taken aback. Conrad thought that his line in the east was firmly held. In a few days the situation was changed altogether. But even before the news of the disaster had reached Bozen it was clear that the offensive against Italy had failed. Von Koevess was to gain a little more ground. After four days' heavy fighting east of the Campomulo valley and towards the head of the Val Frenzela, on the evening of June 8 the Italian right on Monte Castelgomberto was forced to retire from the summit of the mountain, but no ground was lost towards the Val Frenzela. The Austrians were only 3 m. from Valstagna, low down in the Brenta valley, but they had shot their bolt.
In spite of the news from the Russian front the attack was continued, south of Asiago and south of the Posina, for 10 more days. Here were the shortest routes to the plain, and here the Austrians had been able to bring up their guns in sufficient numbers. The Archduke Charles continued his attacks against Petitti's division, and Kirchbach's I. Corps made a great effort against the Italian positions south-west of Asiago. With the arrival of reinforcements the Italian line was once more rearranged, Gonzaga's 9th Div. passing to the X. Corps command (Gen. Grandi), the second division of the Corps (the loth) lying in reserve, while the XXIV. Corps (Gen. Secco) came in between the X. and the XIV., its front-line division (the 32nd) taking over the gallant Grenadier Bde., which had suffered very severely in the Cengio and Val Canaglia fighting, and the 33rd being held in second line till June 7, when it replaced the 32nd.
The command of the 30th Div. received two fresh brigades, Forli and Piemonte, on June 7, after a furious attack which gave the Austrians a footing on Monte Lemerle, and for ro days the division fought off repeated infantry attacks. On June 15 the Austrian command issued an army order saying that Monte Lemerle would fall in two days, and that only three mountains blocked the way to Milan. For four days the Austrians attacked, making a last effort on June 18, when 20 battalions were sent in against the Lemerle - Magnaboschi line in an attempt to drive a wedge between the Italian 30th and 33rd Divisions. The attack failed completely, thanks to the heroic defence of the Forli Bde., and the admirable work of the Italian field guns. To the east of the Val Canaglia the result was the same, the Liguria Bde. of the 33rd Div. holding their ground against repeated infantry attacks, backed by greatly superior artillery fire. Weakness in artillery was Cadorna's main preoccupation for many days. In the early stages of the offensive the I. Army had lost over 400 guns, including over 120 heavy and medium calibre. The first reinforcements had to be sent to strengthen the left wing. The next urgent need was north of Asiago, where the 34th Div. was reinforced by guns sent up by Enego, and in the Lower Astico, to stop the Archduke Charles. The troops between Asiago and the Val Canaglia had very few guns, and even when sufficient artillery reenforcements were available Cadorna preferred first to strengthen his wings for the counter-attack that he was already preparing.
The Archduke Charles made his last infantry attack on June 14, at the close of three days' heavy fighting for Monte Ciove, in which the Cagliari Bde. withstood repeated attempts to break through at this vital point. The rest of the division was equally staunch, and the troops were helped by the example of their commander. Petitti had established his divisional command far forward on Monte Novegno, where it came under the heaviest shell-fire. All around the ground was pocked with shellholes; several times telephonic communication was interrupted, so that orders had to be given by megaphone or bugle; on June r 2 the majority of the divisional staff was put out of action by a direct hit. The command was obviously too far forward, but it was the knowledge of their general's presence, amid the same dangers as themselves, that kept the men firm in their places in spite of the long strain and terrible losses. The Cagliari Bde. lost two-thirds of its strength, and other units suffered nearly as heavily.
The last Austrian blow was struck on June 18, south of Monte Lemerle, in vain, when already the first move of the Italian counter-attack had taken place. Cadorna had declined to draw upon his new V. Army prematurely, as he wished to keep a " mass of manoeuvre " in hand against the possibility of a break-through by the Austrians; but by June 2 he felt himself master of the situation. He had 12 divisions in the plain under Frugoni, and the attack was already slackening. The XXIV. Corps was detached from the V. Army and sent to the south of the Asiago plateau, as already described, and orders were given to the XX. Corps to concentrate north of the Val Frenzela and prepare to attack the Austrian left. The attack was not to be made until the position in the centre was assured, and it was to be accompanied by an advance from Pasubio upon Col Santo. On June 13 Cadorna took counsel with his generals, who were nearly unanimous in expressing a grave view of the situation. Bertotti was confident that he had the measure of his adversary in the Pasubio sector; the others felt themselves still hard pressed by the Archduke Charles and von Koevess's right wing. Cadorna had confidence in his own estimate of the situation, and confirmed the order for an attack by the XX. Corps, which came into action between the XIV. and the XVIII. The Alpine troops on the right of the Corps pushed forward quickly and occupied various important heights on the northern rim of the Asiago plateau. But the Austrians were now getting ready to go - out of the salient and back to a strong line which they had already selected.
Attacking on May 25, all along the line, the Italians found the invaders in retreat. In some places rear-guards were left to cover the withdrawal; in others the Italians, advancing cautiously, in some cases too cautiously, found no resistance until they had made considerable progress over the difficult ground. The counter-offensive, which was to be directed against the two sides of the Austrian salient, was never fully developed, for it was anticipated by the Austrians, who withdrew skilfully and in good order. The line chosen by Krauss ran from south of Rovereto in front of Col Santo to the Borcola Pass; thence along the rim of the Arsiero plateau, north of the Posina and east of the Upper Astico; thence north-eastward across the Val d'Assa to Monte Mosciagh, and thence northward to the old frontier. This gave a very strong defensive line, with ample depth east of the Upper Val d'Assa, which therefore remained entirely in Austrian hands, a useful line of communication in any case, and an invaluable opening in the event of further offensive action.
Cadorna was especially anxious to reach the Portule line, and he reinforced the troops in the Seven Communes (now under the command of Gen. Mambrotti, who had replaced Lequio) by four divisions of the V. Army, now available as a reserve on the understanding that they were not to be employed unless the situation should develop favourably. But the Austrians had a great advantage in position, and used it well. The Italian attacks, handicapped by the limitation imposed, made little headway, though they prevented the dispatch of Austrian units already under orders for the eastern front. Farther south, repeated attempts were made to retake Monte Cimone, which the Archduke Charles had wished to abandon, but which Krauss insisted should be held. Although Alpine troops gained a footing north of the summit they were subsequently blown off by a mine, and Monte Cimone, which rises sheer-sided, like a vast battleship, between the Astico and the Rio Freddo, completely dominating the Arsiero basin, remained in Austrian hands.
Cadorna relinquished the idea of a big counter-offensive as soon as he found a resistance which could only be overcome by long preparation and the use of artillery in mass. The fighting which took place after the first week in July was all directed to masking his intention to attack with all speed upon the .Isonzo. The Austrian attempt to break through ended in definite failure, and even its secondary object, that of preventing the Italian offensive on the Isonzo, was not attained. But the attack was well planned, and conducted with skill and determination. The Austrian artillery fire was very destructive; the transport was admirably organized, and worked very well in spite of the great difficulties of the terrain; the infantry, most of them picked troops, fought with high courage and determination. Failure was due to the fact that the attack met with a resistance that went beyond Conrad's calculations. In the first days of the attack some Italian units, badly placed and badly handled, showed only a feeble opposition. In the weeks that followed, the men who held at Passo di Buole and on Pasubio, south of the Posina and east of the Val Canaglia and in the Seven Communes, outnumbered at first and always outgunned, completely broke up the attack that had begun so well. The casualty list shows the nature of the fighting. The Austrian losses were estimated at over roo,000 men; the Italian figures, up to the end of the counter-movement, are: 35,000 killed and 75,000 wounded, with 45,000 prisoners, many of whom should be counted among the wounded.
The success of the Italian resistance was primarily due to the power of the Italian soldier, when properly handled, to take hard punishment. It has already been said that in the initial phase of the battle the Italian leadership was at fault, and on this point much controversy has taken place, one party blaming Cadorna and another Brusati. In view of the facts and figures it seems impossible to avoid the conclusion that the chief responsibility lay with Brusati. On his own showing he had forces that he considered sufficient, and perhaps they might have been if they had been more skilfully disposed. Brusati had failed to realize the necessity of defence in depth, or the essentials of a good defensive line, but a graver error still was his neglect in regard to the preparation of second-line positions. It was serious enough that the positions indicated by Cadorna in the early days of the war had not been prepared. Much more serious was Brusati's report that these lines were in a satisfactory state of efficiency, 'when in fact they were largely untouched. Cadorna relied upon Brusati's reports, and when, at the end of April, he inspected the positions himself, the enemy attack was daily expected, and it was too late to effect more than slight modifications. In reply to the common criticism that Cadorna ought to have inspected the lines earlier, the answer is that he was fully occupied from Oct. to Dec. 1915 with his Isonzo offensive, and that from Dec. to April the greater part of the line between the Val Lagarina and the Val Sugana was under deep snow. After the initial disasters, which can scarcely be laid at his door, Cadorna showed the qualities of a great leader. He was quick to grasp the situation, and effective in the measures he took to cope with it. And he realized, when the outlook seemed blackest and all his generals were against him, that the impetus of the enemy attack was failing and that he could control the situation.
It has been suggested that Cadorna should have pursued his counter-offensive and left the Isonzo alone. There will always be adherents of the fallacy that Italy should have attacked through the Trentino, though they are in the main confined to those who do not know the country, or those who have no experience of modern war. With these, presumably, no argument would serve. To those who maintain that Cadorna should have sacrificed everything in order to improve his defensive position in the Trentino sector, it may be answered that the line on which he stopped (or rather the modification of it necessitated by the retreat after Caporetto), properly prepared, backed by other lines in sufficient depth, and adequately served by new roads, was maintained until the end of the war. In refusing to waste men in attempting more than was necessary Cadorna took the right decision, and won a notable success.
(W. K. McC.)
These files are public domain.
Chisholm, Hugh, General Editor. Entry for 'Battle of Asiago'. 1911 Encyclopedia Britanica. https://www.studylight.org/encyclopedias/eng/bri/b/battle-of-asiago.html. 1910.
