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"In his primitive condition as he came out of the hands of his Creator, man was endowed with such a portion of knowledge, holiness, and power, as enabled him to understand, esteem, consider, will, and to perform the true good, according to the commandment delivered to him: yet none of these acts could he do, except through the assistance of divine grace. But in his lapsed and sinful state, man is not capable, of and by himself, either to think, to will, or to do that which is really good; but it is necessary for him to be regenerated and renewed in his intellect, affections or will, and in all his powers, by God in Christ through the Holy Spirit, that he may be qualified rightly to understand, esteem, consider, will, and perform whatever is truly good. When he is made a partaker of this regeneration, or renovation, since he is delivered from sin, he is capable of thinking, willing, and doing that which is good, but yet not without the continued aids of divine grace." Such were the sentiments of the often misrepresented Arminius on this subject; to which is only to be added, to complete the Scriptural view, that a degree of grace to consider his ways, and to return to God, is through the merit of Christ vouchsafed to every man. Everyone must be conscious that he possesses free will, and that he is a free agent; that is, that he is capable of considering and reflecting upon the objects which are presented to his mind, and of acting, in such cases as are possible, according to the determination of his will. And, indeed, without this free agency, actions cannot be morally good or bad; nor can the agents be responsible for their conduct. But the corruption introduced into our nature by the fall of Adam has so weakened our mental powers, has given such force to our passions, and such perverseness to our wills, that a man "cannot turn and prepare himself by his own natural, strength and good works to faith and calling upon God." The most pious of those who lived under the Mosaic dispensation often acknowledged the necessity of extraordinary assistance from God: David prays to God to open his eyes, to guide and direct him; to create in him a clean heart, and renew a right spirit within him, Psalms 51:10; Psalms 119:18; Psalms 119:33; Psalms 119:35 . Even we, whose minds are enlightened by the pure precepts of the Gospel, and urged by the motives which it suggests, must still be convinced of our weakness and depravity, and confess, in the words of the tenth article, that "we have no power to do good works pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God preventing us, that we may have a good will, and working with us when we have that good will." The necessity of divine grace to strengthen and regulate our wills, and to cooperate with our endeavours after righteousness, is clearly asserted in the New Testament: "They that are in the flesh cannot please God," Romans 8:8 . "Abide in me," says our Saviour, "and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine, no more can ye, except ye abide in me. I am the vine, and ye are the branches: he that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit; for without me ye can do nothing," John 15:4-5 . "No man can come to me, except the Father, which hath sent me, draw him." "It is God that worketh in you, both to will and to do of his good pleasure," Php_2:13 . "Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to think any thing as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God,"

2 Corinthians 3:5 . "We know not what to pray for as we ought, but the Spirit helpeth our infirmities," Romans 8:26 . We are said to be "led by the Spirit," and to "walk in the Spirit," Romans 8:14; Galatians 5:16; Galatians 5:25 . These texts sufficiently prove that we stand in need both of a prevenient and of a cooperating grace. This doctrine we find asserted in many of the ancient fathers, and particularly in Ambrose, who, in speaking of the effects of the fall, uses these words: "Thence was derived mortality, and no less a multitude of miseries than of crimes. Faith being lost, hope being abandoned, the understanding blinded, and the will made captive, no one found in himself the means of repairing these things. Without the worship of the true God, even that which seems to be virtue is sin; nor can any one please God without God. But whom does he please who does not please God, except himself and Satan? The nature, therefore, which was good is made bad by habit: man would not return unless God turned him." And Cyprian says, "We pray day and night that the sanctification and enlivening, which springs from the grace of God, may be preserved by his protection." Dr. Nicholls, after quoting many authorities to show that the doctrine of divine grace always prevailed in the catholic church, adds, "I have spent, perhaps, more time in these testimonies than was absolutely necessary; but whatever I have done is to show that the doctrine of divine grace is so essential a doctrine of Christianity, that not only the Holy Scriptures and the primitive fathers assert it, but likewise that the Christians could not in any age maintain their religion without it,—it being necessary, not only for the discharge of Christian duties, but for the performance of our ordinary devotions." And this seems to have been the opinion of the compilers of our excellent liturgy, in many parts of which both a prevenient and a cooperating grace is unequivocally acknowledged; particularly in the second collect for the evening service; in the fourth collect at the end of the communion service; in the collect for Easter day; in the collect for the fifth Sunday after Easter; in the collects for the third, ninth, seventeenth, nineteenth, and twenty-fifth Sundays after Trinity. This assistance of divine grace is not inconsistent with the free agency of men: it does not place them under an irresistible restraint, or compel them to act contrary to their will. Our own exertions are necessary to enable us to work out our salvation; but our sufficiency for that purpose is from God. It is, however, impossible to ascertain the precise boundary between our natural efforts and the divine assistance, whether that assistance be considered as a cooperating or a prevenient grace. Without destroying our character as free and accountable beings, God may be mercifully pleased to counteract the depravity of our hearts by the suggestions of his Spirit: but still it remains with us to chose whether we will listen to those suggestions, or obey the lusts of the flesh. We may rest assured that he will, by the communication of his grace, varied often as to power and distinctness, help our infirmities, invigorate our resolutions, and supply our defects. The promises that if we draw nigh to God, God will draw nigh to us, and pour out his Spirit upon us, James 4:8; Acts 2:17 , and that he will give his Holy Spirit to every one that asketh him, Luke 11:13 , imply that God is ever ready to work upon our hearts, and to aid our well doing through the powerful, though invisible, operation of his Spirit: "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh and whither it goeth; so is every one that is born of the Spirit," John 3:8 . The joint agency of God and man, in the work of human salvation, is pointed out in the following passage: "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling; for it is God that worketh in you both to will and to do of his good pleasure," Php_2:12-13; and therefore we may assure ourselves that free will and grace are not incompatible, though the mode and degree of their cooperation be utterly inexplicable, and though at different times one may appear for a season to overwhelm the other. This doctrine has, however, been the subject of much dispute among Christians: some sects contend for the irresistible impulses of grace, and others reject the idea of any influence of the divine Spirit upon the human mind. The former opinion seems irreconcilable with the free agency of man, if held as the constant unvarying mode in which he carries on his work in the soul of man, and the latter contradicts the authority of Scripture; "and therefore," says Veneer, "let us neither ascribe nothing to free will, nor too much; let us not, with the defenders of irresistible grace, deny free will, or make it of no effect, not only before, but even under, grace; nor let us suffer the efficacy of saving grace, on the other hand, to be swallowed up in the strength and freedom of our wills; but, allowing the government or superiority to the grace of God, let the will of man be admitted to be its handmaid, but such a one as is free, and freely obeys; by which, when it is freely exerted by the admonitions of prevenient grace, when it is prepared as to its affections, strengthened and assisted as to its powers and faculties, a man freely and willingly cooperates with God, that the grace of God be not received in vain." "All men are also to be admonished," observes Cranmer, in his "Necessary Doctrine," "and chiefly preachers, that in this high matter they, looking on both sides, so temper and moderate themselves, that they neither so preach the grace of God that they take away thereby free will, nor on the other side so extol free will, that injury be done to the grace of God." And Jortin remarks: "Thus do the doctrine of divine grace and the doctrine of free will or human liberty unite and conspire, in a friendly manner, to our everlasting good. The first is adapted to excite in us gratitude, faith, and humility; the second, to awaken our caution and quicken our diligence."

Many, indeed, relying on mere abstract arguments, deny free will, in the strict meaning of the term, altogether, and define the mental faculties of man according to their various fancies. But the existence and nature of our moral and rational powers are and ought to be, in true philosophy, the subject of mental observation, not the sport of hypothesis. Those who love metaphysical abstractions may people the worlds of their imagination with beings of whatsoever character they prefer; but the nature and capabilities of man, as he really is, must be determined not by speculation but by experience. It is true that this experience is the object of consciousness, not of the senses; and, accordingly, each man is, in some respect, the judge in his own case, and may, if he chooses, deny his own freedom and his power of self control, or of using those means which God hath appointed to lead to this result. But this is seldom done in ordinary life, except by those abandoned individuals who seek, in such a statement, an excuse for capricious or unprincipled conduct,—an excuse which is never admitted by the majority of reasoning persons, much less by the truly pious. The latter, indeed, will always be found attributing any thing good they achieve to the cooperating efficacy of superior assistance. But they will, with equal sincerity, blame themselves for what they have done amiss; or, in other words, acknowledge that they should and might have willed and acted otherwise; and this is exactly the practical question, the very turning point, on which the whole controversy hinges. The only competent judges in such a question, says Dr. R. H. Graves, are those who have made it the subject of mental observation, exertion, and pursuit; or, in other words, those who have sought after righteousness, under whatever dispensation, Acts 10:35; Romans 2:7; Romans 2:10 . And surely the confessions, the prayers, the repentance, and the sacrifices of the humble and pious of all ages show that they felt, not only that they were themselves to blame for their actions, and therefore that they might have done otherwise, that is, they had a free will, but that, to make this will operative in spiritual matters, they required an aid beyond the reach of mere human attainment. Some may fancy this statement inconsistent in itself; and I allow that it cannot satisfy the mere speculative supporters either of free will or its opponents. But to me it seems the testimony of conscience and experience, which, in natural religion, must, as I conceive, be preferred to abstract hypothesis. The inquiry is not how the mind may be, but how it is actually, constituted. This surely is a question of fact, not of conjecture, and must therefore be decided by an appeal to common sense and experience, not by random speculation. Again: even those who in theory contend for the doctrine of necessity, yet in all the affairs of life where their interests, comforts, or gratifications are concerned, both speak and act as if they disbelieved it, and as if they really imagined themselves capable of such self determination and self control, as to improve their talents, their opportunities, and their acquirements, and so to exercise a material influence on their worldly fortunes. But suppose the assertions of individuals, as to their consciousness in this particular, to disagree. It is then evident, that, the question being as to the nature of man in general, it must be determined by the voice of preponderating testimony. But how, it may be asked, are the suffrages to be collected? Since the judgment of each individual must in this scheme be considered as a separate fact, how is a sufficiently extensive induction to be made? In answer, it may be asserted, that in every civilized nation the induction has been already made, the suffrages have been taken, the case has been tried, and the decision is on record. And the verdict is the most impartial that can be looked for in such a case, because given without any reference to the controversy in dispute. All human laws, forbidding, condemning, and punishing vicious actions, are grounded on the acknowledged supposition that man is possessed of a self control, a self determining power, by which he could, both in will and in deed, have avoided the very actions for which he is condemned, and in the very circumstances in which he has committed them. Nor would it be easy to find a case where the criminal has deceived himself, or hoped to deceive his judges, by pleading that he laboured under a fatal necessity, which rendered his crimes unavoidable, and therefore excusable. The justice of all legislative enactments evidently and essentially depends on the principle, that the things prohibited can be avoided, or, in other words, might have been done otherwise than they were done; and this is the very turning point of the controversy. Accordingly, in whatever instances such freedom of will is not presupposed, (as in the cases of idiots and madmen,) the operation of such enactments is suspended. All nations, therefore, who consent to frame and abide by such laws, do thereby testify their deliberate and solemn assent to the truth of this principle, and, consequently, to the existence of free will in man; and do certify the sincerity of their conviction by staking upon it their properties, their liberties, and their lives. Numberless other instances might be adduced in which the practice of mankind implies their belief in this principle. And so conscious of this are the opponents of free will, that they generally deprecate appeals to common sense and experience, and resort to metaphysical arguments to examine what is in truth a matter of truth, not of conjecture; or, in other words, to determine, not what man is, but what they imagine he must be. In their reasonings they differ, as might have been expected, as much from each other as they do from truth and reality. But the experience of common sense and conscience will always decide, that no man can conscientiously make this excuse for his crimes, that he could not have willed or acted otherwise than he did. The existence of the above faculties in the human mind once acknowledged, leads, by necessary inference, to the admission, that there exists in the great First Cause a power to create them. Not, indeed, that these faculties themselves exist in him in the same manner as in us, but the power of originating and producing them in all possible variety. We can indeed conclude, that having created all these in us, his nature must be so perfect that we cannot attribute to him any line of conduct inconsistent with whatever is excellent in the exercise of these faculties in ourselves. And therefore we cannot ascribe to him, as his special act, any thing we should perceive to be unworthy of any just or merciful, any wise or upright, being. But this furnishes no clue whatever to a knowledge of the real constitution of his nature, or of the manner in which his divine attributes exist together. In truth, we no more comprehend how he wills than how he acts, and therefore we have no better right to assert that he wills evil than that he does evil. Again: we as little understand how he knows as how he sees, and therefore might as well argue that all things exist in consequence of his beholding them, as that all events arise in consequence of his foreknowing them. In short, all that can be inferred by reason concerning the intrinsic nature of the invisible, unsearchable Deity, must be admitted by the candid inquirer to be no better than conjecture. And he who should hope from such doubtful support as his fancied insight into the unknown operations of the divine mind to suspend a system of irrespective decrees, embracing the moral government of the world, would but too much resemble him who should imagine the material globe adequately sustained if upheld by a chain whose highest links were wrapped in clouds and darkness. Thus our affirmative knowledge of the Deity, as derived from this part of our inquiry, consists in the certainty, (though his nature is unknown to us,) that he is the creative source of all that is great, glorious, and good, in heaven or in earth; while we may negatively conclude, that his moral government shall, on the whole, be conducted in a manner not inconsistent with whatever is excellent in the exercise of power and wisdom, justice and mercy, goodness and truth. Nor is it a little important, as connected with the present inquiry, to keep in mind this distinction between our affirmative and negative knowledge in this matter. For it shows us that as, on the one side, we cannot pretend to such an insight into the nature and character of the divine knowledge as to deduce therefrom a system of eternal and irrespective decrees; so neither, on the other, can this system of moral government be ascribed to the Deity, because it would be manifestly unworthy, not merely of him who has created all moral excellence, but of any of those beings on whom he has conferred the most ordinary degrees of mercy and justice. The natural benefits or evils arising out of moral or immoral practices are, in fact, so many rewards or punishments, exhibiting the Being who has so constituted our nature as a moral governor. This part of his government may not be so clearly discernible in individual instances, because much of the happiness and unhappiness attending virtue and vice is mental and invisible. In the case of nations, however, considered merely as bodies politic, the internal sanction of an approving or reproaching conscience, of subdued or distracting passions, can have no existence; and therefore the external sanctions are more uniformly enforced. Hence, whoever carefully examines the dealings of Providence with the human race will admit, that national prosperity has ever kept pace with national wisdom and integrity; whereas, the greatest empires, when once corrupted, have soon become the prey of internal strife or foreign domination. Again: man is made for society, and cannot exist without it: consequently, all the regulations which are really conducive to the maintenance of civil policy and social order must be regarded as evident consequences of our nature, when enlightened to the rational pursuit of its own advantage; and therefore should be considered as intimations of a moral government, carried on through their intervention. In addition to which, it ought to be observed, that these laws may be regarded in another point of view,—as a most important class of moral phenomena; inasmuch as they virtually exhibit the most unexceptionable declarations of reason on this subject, because they are collected from the common consent of mankind, and therefore rendered, in a great measure, independent of the obliquities of individual intellect, the errors of private judgment, and the partial views of self interest, prejudice, or passion. But all the laws of civilized nations, both in their enactment and administration, not only presuppose certain notions concerning the freedom and accountableness of man, the merit and demerit of human actions, and the inseparable connection of virtue and vice with rewards and punishments, but greatly contribute to fix and perpetuate these notions. It is therefore evidently the intention of that part of the moral government with which we are acquainted, to impress these principles deeply on the human mind, and to induce the human race to regulate their conduct accordingly. The laws, then, of this moral government under which we find ourselves placed, and from which we cannot escape, correspond with and corroborate the conclusions deduced from the observation of mental phenomena. And from both we conclude that similar principles of government will be adopted, (so far, at least, as man is concerned,) in other worlds and in future ages; only more developed, and therefore more evidently free from its present apparent imperfections. Upon this account we look, in another life, for some such general disclosure and consummation of the ways and wisdom of Providence as shall vindicate, even in the minor details, the grand principles upon which, generally speaking, the government of God is at present obviously conducted. How this may be done, with many questions connected therewith, reason without revelation could, as I conceive, do little more than form plausible conjectures. Though now that it has pleased God in Christ to bring life and immortality to light through the Gospel," it is possible for reason to estimate the beauty and the mercy and the wisdom of the dispensation by which it has been effected.