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Bible Dictionaries
Stoics
Hastings' Dictionary of the New Testament
or (οἱ Στωικοἱ φιλόσοφοι)
The Stoics are mentioned by name only once in the NT (Acts 17:18), when St. Paul met with them and the Epicureans at Athens. For the circumstances of this encounter see article Epicureans. Though the Stoics are not again mentioned, St. Paul’s speech on the Areopagus seems framed with them in mind, and one of his sentences, ‘for we are also his offspring’ (Acts 17:28), a quotation from Aratus, is almost identical with the words of Cleanthes, one of the founders of the sect. Moreover, several other passages in the NT. e.g. 2 Peter 3:5-7; 2 Peter 3:10-13, Hebrews 4:12, suggest acquaintance with this system of philosophy. Among philosophies of this period Stoicism occupied an exalted position. The teaching of Plato and Aristotle had waned in popularity, the Epicureans suffered from an evil reputation, while Stoicism claimed to enable men to endure the prevailing hardships of thought and life. Its cultivation of high ideals, the nobility of its foremost adherents, its repression of the coarser and insistence on the nobler elements in human nature, won esteem and admiration. Though its unrelenting severity prevented it from ever becoming the creed of the multitude and restricted it to the select few, Stoicism has always been a potent influence among serious men far beyond the limits of its actual disciples.
1. Circumstances which favoured its growth
(a) The disappearance of the city-States.-Earlier Greeks had rejoiced in their citizen-life, and gladly identified their individual lives with the life of the city. But evil days arrived, and internal quarrels led to the intervention of the Macedonian power and the consequent loss of self-government. Later still came the all-conquering Romans, sweeping them all into the Imperial net. Now, bereft of all interest in civil affairs, the more serious-minded turned for relief to those deeper human considerations in which they could think as they would, and adulation and sycophancy would not be required. It was in part, therefore, a movement of despair.
(b) Loss of faith in the traditional religion.-The old mythologies and pagan practices had now lost their power over the Greek mind.
(c) Influx of Oriental ideas.-This was due to that intermingling of peoples which followed the Alexandrian conquests. Comparison with the beliefs of others showed how abstract, improbable, and unpractical were their own philosophies in face of the new needs.
2. The founders of Stoicism were not pure Greeks, although the chief centre of instruction was Athens, nor was the system a product of the true Greek spirit. As its later history shows, it was much more congenial to the sterner Roman temperament, and it was at Rome that it achieved its greatest triumphs. The earliest teachers came from Cyprus, Cilicia, Babylon, Palestine, Syria, and Phrygia, and the universities of Tarsus, Rhodes, and Alexandria were its strongholds. The founders of Stoicism were Zeno, Cleanthes, and Chrysippus. Zeno (circa, about 342-270 b.c.) came to Athens from Citium in Cyprus. He seems to have visited all the existing schools of philosophy before settling down among the Cynics. And even they did not entirely satisfy him. The Cynics banned speculation absolutely, despised all human delights, and welcomed hardships with open arms. In the end Zeno forsook them, and became a teacher himself in the ‘painted porch’ (ἡ ποικίλη στόα, hence the name ‘Stoic’). Of his earnestness, poverty, and contentment there can be no doubt. Cleanthes (circa, about 300-220 b.c.), the master’s successor, is known best for his famous Hymn to Zeus, a remarkable production. Chrysippus (circa, about 280-206 b.c.) is usually regarded as the second creator of this system. ‘Had there been no Chrysippus, there had been no Porch’ (Diog. Laertius, VII. vii. 183). He collected and systematized the earlier doctrines, but, while contributing to its logic, psychology, etc., made no addition to its ethics. At Rome Stoicism came to its own, and Seneca, Epictetus, and M. Aurelius Antoninus stand pre-eminent among its adherents. Seneca (4 b.c.-a.d. 65), a contemporary of St. Paul, was the tutor and later the counsellor of Nero. Between his professed devotion to placid Stoic principles and his actual life a strange contradiction exists (see T. B. Macaulay, Lord Bacon, London, 1852). An advocate of poverty and self-abnegation, he became wealthy and maintained his position at Court by abject flattery and perhaps worse. In Epictetus (fl. c. [Note: . circa, about.] a.d. 100), the poor lame slave of Epaphroditus afterwards freed, we meet a kindlier, humbler, and altogether more beautiful character. He taught the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of man. Laughing at misfortunes or even denying their very existence, he bore all hardships cheerfully and regarded even death as a mere incident to be left complacently in the hands of God. M. Aurelius (a.d. 121-180), the Stoic Emperor, would have been happier as a private citizen. Confronted with distasteful duties both without and within his Empire, he proved no great success as a monarch. Meditation was more to his liking than activity, and his literary remains are a treasure-house of fine sayings. The persecution of the Christians, to which he lent himself, must have appeared to him a political necessity.
3. The teaching of the Stoics may be divided into the following branches: Logic, Physics, Ethics, and Religion. Individual differences will here be ignored, and indeed they are not always easy to determine. On the whole, Stoicism laid emphasis on the requirements of practical life, and everything was subordinated to this aim.
(a) Logic.-This term was employed somewhat vaguely and included Dialectic, Rhetoric, and Logic properly so called. Its comparative unimportance in the system may be gathered from two well-known illustrations which were employed. Ethics was likened to the yoke of an egg, physics to the white, and logic to the shell. Again, physics was said to resemble the trees in a field, ethics the fruit which the trees produced, and logic the fence around the field. It need only be said, therefore, that the Stoics’ chief aim was to reach a criterion of truth; and this they found in the feeling of certainty. The mind is at first a complete blank and depends on impressions received from the outside world. These impressions are either confirmed or rejected by the reaction of the mind’s own reasoning powers. Certainty is reached when the impressions become distinct and overwhelming.
(b) Physics.-In this branch of their system the Stoics derived much from Heraclitus, as did their contemporaries the Epicureans from Democritus. They declared the primary element to be a fiery ether which, after assuming grosser forms such as fire, as we see it, air, water, and earth, finally resumes its original character. They also held that the only reality is matter; and in this substance they expressly included air, sky, and stars, the mind of man, including even his thoughts, passions, and virtues, and finally God. The novelty of their teaching lay in the idea of tension which they believed permeated all things. It was according to the variations of this quality that one substance differed from another. Yet even this is material or corporeal, differing only in its varying degrees of fineness or subtlety in different objects. Notwithstanding this materialistic view of things, the Stoic maintained that the whole world of men and things is under the government of reason, which permeates and harmonizes all. In this reason man participates, and may partly understand its larger operations and in his own degree co-operate therewith. Man’s lower nature must be kept subordinate to these higher purposes, and in the end he will be re-absorbed into the Universal Reason.
(c) Ethics.-Here we reach that branch of Stoicism for which all the rest existed and to which it was only preliminary. It may be summed up in the well-known phrase, ‘live in conformity with Nature.’ But it is the Stoic interpretation of this formula that is significant. As against the Epicureans, who made pleasure the object of life, they insisted that virtue is the only Good. All those objects which are usually regarded as desirable they banned-position, honours, wealth, health, men’s favour, etc. In this they differed from the Cynics, their predecessors, only in being somewhat less harsh and severe. In opposition to the Epicureans, who held that pleasure was the motive power of animals and young children, they taught that these were guided rather by the instinct of self-preservation. And, though allowing that pleasure is often associated with virtue, they declared that it was too precarious a factor to be relied on and should be ignored altogether. The aim of this attitude was practical, viz. to set man free from all the varying chances and changes of fortune and to reach a condition of ‘apathy.’ Whether, therefore, civil and personal affairs were congenial or otherwise, a man must remain master of both his feelings and his actions.
‘In the fell clutch of circumstance
I have not winced nor cried aloud.
Under the bludgeonings of chance
My head is bloody, but unbow’d’
(W.E. Henley, Invictus, 5-8).
Confronted with ordinary human affections and passions, whose disturbing influence is obvious to all, they declared them one and all to be wholly injurious. Even pity and compassion should be eschewed. No one suffers as much as we suppose. It is only just to note that in later times this general austerity was slightly modified. Some things might be preferred, others avoided, and the range of totally indifferent things was made narrower. But the underlying principle was never changed. Man must ignore or even laugh at circumstances and act quite independently of them. Emotion is only perverted reason. Further, Stoicism recognized no degrees or gradations of virtue or vice. A man was entirely virtuous or entirely vicious. The ‘wise man’ of the Stoics was perfect in every way. This extraordinary doctrine, modified later, was due in part to the emphasis laid on motive or intention. Right motives made an act virtuous, however unfortunate its effects. The tendency to suicide, so marked a feature among them, seems to contradict their theoretical indifference to pain. They explained this by saying that a man need live only as long as it was possible to do so with dignity and utility.
Cosmopolitanism was a striking element in the Stoic system. The only city to which they acknowledged fealty was the City of Zeus. All men being sons of God were brothers, and distinctions of race and country must be abolished. In theory friendships and the customary relations of home and State might not be prohibited, but in practice reasons for their neglect were invariably forthcoming.
(d) Religion.-This was materialistic pantheism. God, the ruler and upholder of all that exists, is identical with universal law, and like all else is material. Though believing in a First Cause and a Mind governing all, both are corporeal. The different parts of the universe may be finer or coarser, but they are only forms of the one primary force. Cleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus, which includes both adoration and supplication, seems in strange conflict with all this. Perhaps it may be taken as the revolt of the devout spirit against the arbitrary theories of the reason. In regard to the traditional and often debasing ceremonies of religion then in vogue, the Stoic attitude was one of compromise. Essentially they could not but be opposed to them. Prayer was generally an error and by implication showed distrust in Divine goodness. Earthly temples were unworthy of God. Yet they tolerated the popular forms of worship, and explained them ns a picturesque way of setting forth poor human ideas of the Deity. The age-long problems of Evil and Freedom proved insoluble on Stoic assumptions.
(e) Relation to Christianity.-Many facts make this an interesting subject of study. Even the OT, and Apocalyptic books such as Sirach, 4 Maccabees, and Wisdom of Solomon had been affected by Stoicism. And, with so many points of contact in their ethical teaching, it is small wonder that Stoicism and Christianity have been suspected of influencing each other. Again, Tarsus, the home of St. Paul, was likewise a great centre of Stoic teaching, and it is supposed that the great Apostle shows traces in his writings of this early association. In regard to Seneca, too, a tradition arose that he became a disciple of St. Paul and a Christian. A full discussion of the value and bearing of these facts is given in Lightfoot (see Literature). On the acquaintance of St. Paul with Stoic literature and ideas as shown in his speech on the Areopagus we have already remarked. Striking coincidences occur between the language of the Gospels and the Pauline Epistles and the sayings of Seneca and Aurelius. It may certainly be acknowledged that in these two pagan writers we reach the high-water mark of non-Christian ethics. For various reasons it is not possible to say certainly whether indebtedness exists on the one side or on the other. But in relation to fundamental principles many vital differences separate them. Each system starts from different premisses and reaches different conclusions.
(1) The Stoic conception of God was materialistic and pantheistic. Fatherhood in any real sense was thereby excluded. Divine love and paternal care were impossible and fellowship with the Father of our spirits was out of the question.
(2) Self-repression, with the object of attaining complete ‘apathy,’ was the fundamental demand of Stoicism, but how the ordinary man was to effect this it did not show. In any case, his resources were restricted to himself: there was no place for a Saviour, and the weak were left to fail.
(3) In regard to a future life, the Stoics leave us with a feeling of great uncertainty. One wonders, indeed, that they should have desired it. At most they thought of it as a bare possibility. Such continuance could only be an endless rotation, resulting probably in experiences as unpleasant as in this life. In the presence of such contrasts we are therefore obliged to conclude that, however many or close the resemblances between Christianity and Stoicism, they were in vital matters fundamentally different. That St. Paul should show some acquaintance with Stoic teaching was inevitable, and that he did not openly expose its weakness was probably due to the fact that the system was never likely to trouble those to whom he preached. As for Seneca, he would doubtless encounter Christians at Rome, but probably in circumstances that would leave him indifferent to their principles and beliefs.
Literature.-The leading sources are: Diogenes Laertius, de Vitis Philosophorum, vii.; Cicero, de Finibus; Plutarch, de Stoicorum Repugnantiis, and de Placitis Philosophorum; works of Seneca, Epictetus, and M. Aurelius. Of modern authorities we may refer to E. Zeller, Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, Eng. translation , London, 1880; H. Ritter, History of Ancient Philosophy, Eng. translation , iii. [Oxford. 1839]; A. Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle, 2 vols., London, 1866; W. W. Capes. Stoicism, London, 1880; W. L. Davidson, The Stoic Creed, Edinburgh, 1907; J. B. Lightfoot, Philippians 4, London, 1878. ‘St. Paul and Seneca,’ p. 270 ff.; article ‘Stoics’ in Encyclopaedia Britannica 11, Hasting's Dictionary of the Bible (5 vols) , and Encyclopaedia Biblica .
J. W. Lightley.
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Hastings, James. Entry for 'Stoics'. Hastings' Dictionary of the New Testament. https://www.studylight.org/dictionaries/eng/hdn/s/stoics.html. 1906-1918.
