Bible Dictionaries
Science (2)

Hastings' Dictionary of the New Testament

Search for…

Enter query below:

or

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Prev Entry
Science

Next Entry
Scorn

Resource Toolbox

Print Article

SCIENCE.—1. The word ‘science,’ in the language of to-day, refers sometimes to a process and sometimes to the results of that process. The process itself is the representation in thought of the facts and events of human experience. The result of this process is the formulation of statements and doctrines which are regarded as true. We therefore use the word ‘science’ generally to embrace both (1) scientific method and (2) scientific truth. The object of science is to apply its method to every field of possible knowledge, and so to include within its doctrine all the facts of human experience.

I. State of science in the civilization in which Christ lived

1. Relation to Hellenism.—The civilization of Palestine was complex and syncretic. The two main factors in it were the ancient Hebrew culture (largely tinctured by other Oriental elements), which preponderated, and Hellenism. This latter was a power extending throughout the Graeco-Roman world, and tending to influence every department of life; and so, despite the innate conservatism of the Jews, the more external elements of Palestinian culture received a strong Hellenistic tincture. The organism of the State was deeply affected, public institutions were modified, and social relations not untouched. The arts, too, were influenced, but, by the time the science of the Hebrews was reached, the wave of Hellenism had lost much of its vigour. The mind of the Jew was equipped against it. The Greek language was, after all, but slightly known (cf. Acts 21:40; Acts 22:2), and, though Herod surrounded himself with Greek literati and many Jews received a Greek education abroad, these facts indicate the limit of the penetration of Greek science into the life of the Jews. This may be illustrated by reference to St. Paul. Though brought up to some extent under Hellenistic influences in Tarsus, his culture was Greek only in its form and in certain of its graces. To the Hebrew mode of thought and Rabbinic logic—inward and characteristic elements of Jewish culture—he tenaciously clung. His writings are all those of a Jew rather than of a Hellenist. It is, then, unnecessary to attend to Hellenistic thought when considering the ‘science’ that formed the intellectual background of the teaching of Christ. The Aristotelian logic had no nameable influence upon His own thought, or upon the mind of the Synoptists who reported His words, or upon the conceptions of the common people who ‘heard him gladly.’ The logic of the society in which Christ moved was Rabbinic and not philosophic, and its standard of truth was religious rather than scientific.

2. Hebrew standard of truth.—We recognize that, according to the scientific standard, those propositions are true which accurately and impartially describe observed facts; that is, the test of truth is its logical form as descriptive. This notion of truth was originally foreign to the Hebrews. The words in the OT which are translated ‘true,’ ‘truth,’ etc., may be traced to roots which have primarily an ethical meaning and convey ‘the notion of constancy, steadfastness, faithfulness’ (see art. ‘Truth’ in Hasting's Dictionary of the Bible ). Hence they are more generally applied to a person than a proposition, and attach to a proposition only in a derivative way, the sayings of God being ‘faithful’ because His character is beneath and behind them,—they are established in the Divine nature, and so cannot be moved. Thus, that a proposition should tally with facts did not stand out with such importance as it does for us moderns: indeed, to the ancient Hebrew, truth was a matter of motive and character rather than of accuracy. Thus in the Decalogue there is no actual and direct condemnation of lying, but the prohibition is directed against the bearing of false witness, the dastardly motive being the thing denounced, rather than the failure accurately to describe facts. This comes out in strong relief in the Jewish notion of history. The aim of the historian was less to give a record of events than to edify. Indeed, by the time of Christ the whole circle of historical ideas had received a fanciful character, because that narrative was deemed to be the best which gave the most laudatory account of the Hebrew heroes.

Truth then, according to the Hebrew mind, was that which edified, and not merely accurate description of fact. Only from this point of view can we understand many NT sayings with reference to truth. Jesus claimed that He Himself was the truth. In saying ‘I am the way, and the truth, and the life’ (John 14:6), He is not referring to what we call scientific truth, but rather edifying and ennobling thought, or, as explained above, religious truth. Pilate, a Roman logician, had quite a different conception of truth. When he said ‘What is truth?’ (John 18:38), he was moving in a universe of thought foreign to the Jews.

3. Hebrew method of attaining truth.—The Hebrew idea of truth being so different from our scientific standard, it is to be expected that their way of reaching it would correspondingly differ from our scientific method,—the observation and description of facts. The Hebrew method did not always seek facts, and, when they were at hand, was not content simply to describe them.

(1) Facts were sometimes ‘invented.’

This may be illustrated by reference to Talmudic geography. The Talmud answers the question* [Note: Tosefta, Maaser sheni, ch. 2; Hallach, ch. 2; Jerus. Shebhiith vi. 2; Bab. Gittin 8a.] as to which islands belong to Israel and which do not, by saying that if a straight line be drawn from Amanus (?a mountain in the north) to the River of Egypt, those islands situated within this line belong to the land of Israel, etc. But, of course, no islands ever belonged to the land of Israel at all. Again, it is deliberately asserted that there are seven seas in Palestine. Only six are named, but one of these is named twice in order to make up the number seven, merely so that the holy number may be introduced. And, further, apart from this specific enumeration, the Talmud names only four seas as included in Palestine. These two instances are typical. In the first, islands are said to exist which have never been observed, and in the other the number of actually existing seas is artificially increased in order to bring in the sacred seven.

(2) Metaphysical explanation was sometimes attempted, description in itself being considered inadequate. The introduction of the number seven above is an illustration of this. Psalms 24 gives another type, where Jahweh is praised for His power and skill in making the solid and immovable earth to rest upon the fluid and fluctuating sea. The observation is a bad one, but that does not concern us. The point for us to notice is that to the observation that the land is ‘founded upon the sea’ is added the metaphysical explanation that this is a miraculous exhibition of the power of God. The fact that this is poetry, and could be paralleled with passages taken from modern Western poetry, does not affect the point, for these modern passages are admittedly and obviously poetical in contradiction to scientific statements, whereas in Hebrew literature there is no such distinction. What is said in poetry is equally true to the Hebrew mind when written in prose, as when the idea of the windows of heaven is repeated in such various literary styles as are found in Genesis 7:11, 2 Kings 7:2, Malachi 3:10. Hence the indiscriminate Jewish doctrine of inspiration, which made no distinction between styles of literature, ascribing to all passages of the Canon an equal measure of truth.

The Jews did, of course, accumulate, as the Talmud and the OT sufficiently show, a mass of valid technical knowledge. They knew much concerning metals, such as gold; other chemical substances, such as soda; and certain processes of metallurgy. ‘The Jews,’ says Ernst von Meyer, ‘did indeed possess a certain disjointed knowledge of chemical processes acquired accidentally, but these were applied for their practical results alone, and not with the object of deducing any comprehensive scientific explanation from them.’ [By ‘scientific explanation’ here von Meyer means what has been called ‘description’ above]. They never made experiments. Any conclusions concerning nature at which they arrived were due to haphazard reflexion upon chance occurrences. Accurate description was not their object, nor did they attempt it. The facts of nature, like the incidents of history, were to them properly explained by reference to other things than those which might be observed. Rabbi Joshua, for instance, gives the following account of rain: ‘The clouds ascend to the heights of the heavens, then stretch themselves out like a sponge and take up the rain-water; but having holes in them like a sieve, they let the water fall through on to the earth in drops.’ That only one drop falls at a time is due to a kindly Providence, for otherwise great harm would be done to the earth (Bergel). The Rabbis explained thunder as the crashing together of clouds, or as the splitting of ice in the clouds when struck by the hot lightning. Earthquakes were variously described as God clapping His hands, or sighing, or treading upon His footstool. Of all scientific efforts the Jewish teachers seem to have been most successful in Astronomy. They described the heavens as a hollow, dome-like, half-ball, spread over the flat earth. The stars they held to be fixed to the inner surface of this dome; some of them being firmly fastened and others moving along ways made for them.

To whatever branch of knowledge we turn, we find that observations are an insignificant part of the system of teaching about nature, and for the method of mere description we have the method of metaphysical explanation.

4. Defects of Hebrew thought.—The history, political and geographical situation, and religious exclusiveness of the Hebrews assisted in the cultivation of a type of thought as characteristic and powerful as any that the world has seen. It is not enough to say that the Hebrew mind was ‘Semitic’; for, while it shares many of the characteristics of the thought of other Semitic peoples, in some respects it stands out from them in bold contrast. Among the fine qualities of the Hebrew mind were: (1) a sanity and sobriety of thought which preserved their religion and literature from all those offensive and extravagant traits which mark the popular religions of Syria, Asia Minor, and Arabia; (2) an extraordinary gift for the observation of individual incidents and facts, as appears in the inimitable narratives of the historical books of the OT; the vivid portraiture, satire, and denunciation of the prophets; and the marvellous, if often trivial, minuteness of Rabbinic discussions; (3) unparalleled energy of feeling and sense of individuality; and (4) a strength of will that alone can account for the vitality of a people which has been exposed to a more bitter persecution and more relentless fate than any other race in history. Of these four notable characteristics the third and fourth are obviously not such as tend to the cultivation of the scientific frame of mind. With the first and second it is quite otherwise—sobriety of thought and a keen eye for particulars are necessary to a proper scientific observation. But at the same time they are insufficient for scientific description, which demands certain mental qualities in which the Hebrew mind was notably deficient—breadth of vision, systematic and architectonic power, consistent and persistent thinking. An examination of Hebrew thought discovers, in general, a notable defect, traceable to this failure in breadth of grasp and over-emphasis on the particular and strong development of the emotional and volitional nature. This defect is the absence of the power of logical abstraction, and it shows itself in two ways that are of considerable importance—first, the Hebrew mind could not frame general definitions; and, secondly, it had no notion of general law.

The Western (Greek) mode of definition per genus et differentiam we commonly assume not only to be the only mode possible, but also to be indispensable to thought. While it is indispensable to our modern thought, especially with its highly developed scientific method, it was not indispensable to the Hebrews, for they did without it. The Hebrews defined, not by reference to a class—as when we say ‘man is a rational animal’—but by reference to a type, as when it is implied that natural man is Adam, and redeemed man is Christ, the second Adam (Romans 5, 1 Corinthians 15).

In the second place, this inability to think abstractly prevented the Hebrews from arriving at the notion of natural law. The word ‘law’ in Hebrew literature always meant the arbitrary pronouncement of a ruler (of course a despot) or deity. Law meant nothing general or abstract. The Torah was an actual and definite direction given in Jahweh’s name by the priest, and was either judicial, ceremonial, or moral. The various synonyms for torah have in general the same definite, particular character—‘judgment,’ ‘statute,’ ‘commandment,’ ‘testimonies,’ and ‘precepts’* [Note: Respectively mishpât, hukkâh, miẓwâh, ‘çdôth, pikkûdîm.] (see art. ‘Law (in OT)’ in Hasting's Dictionary of the Bible ). When used in a general sense to indicate a large section of the OT, it is in no way abstract, but only collective.

The nearest approach which Hebrew thought offers to our highly abstract natural laws is to be found in certain proverbial sayings (e.g. Jeremiah 31:29, Matthew 16:2-3), and a few rough groupings of empirical facts which we shall notice later on. There is nothing, however, that in any real sense corresponds with the modern idea of law as ‘the résumé or brief expression of the relationships and sequences of certain groups of’ perceptions and conceptions, existing only ‘when formulated by man’ (Karl Pearson). The same characteristic explains the absence of abstract philosophic terms from Hebrew literature. The doctrine of freewill, e.g., though constantly implied in the OT, is never abstractly stated. ‘Instead of saying man is free, Scripture says man can choose; he can act; he can do’ (Delitzsch, Syst. of Bibl. Psychol. p. 192).

5. Hebrew knowledge of Nature.—It follows from what we have seen that the Jews had no sound body of scientific doctrine. They had no very clearly defined conception of the earth and its surroundings, either in early times or at the time of Christ. They regarded the earth as the middle point of the universe. The heavens were a mere material covering or dome (Is 34:4, 40:22, Psalms 104:2, Job 37:18), with doors (Genesis 28:17, Psalms 78:23) and windows (Genesis 7:11; Genesis 8:2, 2 Kings 7:2; 2 Kings 7:19), and the earth rested on the sea (Psalms 24:2). These are obviously little more than childish reproductions of sense-impressions. The same is true of every department of physical science, including Astronomy. There is no criticism, no classification, no formulation of laws, no definite effort towards a coherent description of phenomena. When we turn to Mathematics, we find traces of very rudimentary knowledge. The square is mentioned (Exodus 27:1; Exodus 28:16), and the circle (Isaiah 44:13), the plumb-line and scales were known (Amos 7:7, 2 Kings 21:13). The four simple mathematical processes appear also to have been practised: Addition (Numbers 1:22; Numbers 26:7), Subtraction (Leviticus 27:18, Exodus 16:23), Multiplication (Leviticus 25:8, Numbers 3:46), Division (Leviticus 25:27; Leviticus 25:50).

The only department of thought in which the Hebrews can claim to have elaborated anything at all worthy to be called ‘science’ is literary criticism. This, however, was pursued, not in a modern spirit of desire for knowledge, but because the disasters which the nation had experienced drove its religious leaders to a more careful analysis and preservation of the Law, in order that, by obeying it, the anger of God might be appeased and the prosperity of the people might return. The scribes ‘busied themselves in providing for all conceivable’ legal ‘cases that might occur, and especially in making a hedge or fence round the Law, i.e. in so expanding the compass of legal precept beyond what was laid down in the Pentateuch and in the oldest form of tradition, that it might be impossible for a man, if he observed all their traditional rules, to be even tempted to transgress the Law’ (see art. ‘Scribes’ in Hasting's Dictionary of the Bible ). Thus the literary and legal ‘science’ of the scribes had all the defects of the ‘scientific’ temper of the Jews—the criterion of truth was not descriptive accuracy, but edification, the method was inventive and metaphysical, there was an absence of generalizing and systematizing power, and an over-emphasis of the particular and concrete.

II. Relation of Christ to the ‘science’ of His time and race.—We have now to inquire as to the mind of Christ in respect of the various matters discussed above, that is, we have to ask whether His standard of truth was Hebrew or modern; whether He sought to explain nature by the metaphysical or the descriptive method; whether He shared the mental characteristics of the Hebrews or not, and whether we are to assume that He held those erroneous views of nature which were common among the Hebrews.

1. Among the most obvious characteristics of the mind of Christ is His sense of the radical opposition between Himself and the life of His own day. This opposition expresses itself at every turn in many ways. The political ambitions of the Herodians, the compromising worldliness of the Sadducees, the formalism and pride of the Pharisees, and the carnal carelessness of the generality, alike met with His denunciation and appeal. The traditions of the scribes He altogether rejected, and even the authority of the Law He subjected to a penetrating criticism. Against all existing systems of thought, all Rabbinical teaching, all conventional observance, He set up one authority—His own consciousness of God, Himself. In a unique way He lived in the realities of things, never compromising, never with double mind. To the great reality of the Father and of the Kingdom was added the great reality of Himself, in simple deep-founded truth.

2. We have seen that the Hebrew notion of truth differed from the modern notion, in that it rather attached to the nature of a person than to the quality of a proposition. A proposition was true, not so much because it tallied with certain facts as because it had its origin in a certain character. In other words, the Jewish idea of truth was religious, while the modern idea is scientific. But the Jewish idea was never purely religious. It was confused with metaphysical and mechanical elements. In the mind of Jesus, however, this Hebrew notion of religious truth is purified of all foreign elements, and ceases all contact with the accidents of experience, making its home in the soul and in God.

It is noteworthy that the Synoptists report no sayings of Jesus from which these conclusions as to the meaning Christ attached to the word ‘truth’ can be formally drawn, though, when once they have been drawn, it is seen that none of the sayings of Jesus contradicts them. In the Synoptics the word ‘truth’ is not used by Jesus except in such phrases as ‘of a truth,’ the Gr. equivalent for ‘Amen’ (Luke 9:27; Luke 12:44; Luke 21:3). When we come to the Fourth Gospel, however (which we assume to be of sufficient historicity to allow us to use the words ascribed to Jesus as representing His thought), we find the words ‘true’ and ‘truth’ continually in the mouth of Christ. Now, while the criterion of truth in the mind of Christ does not vary, we must not be surprised if different shades of meaning are expressed from time to time by the same words ‘true’ and ‘truth.’ Indeed, Jesus does not use the word ‘truth’ always with the same nuance of meaning. In the first place, it represents a quality in a person (Luke 4:23, Luke 18:37), then a quality which attaches to actions (Luke 3:21), and, finally, that which may be communicated from God to man in thought so as to affect the life and give the quality referred to above (Luke 8:32, Luke 14:17, Luke 16:13, Luke 17:17). The whole conception is summed up in Luke 14:6, where Jesus says, ‘I am the way, and the truth, and the life’—the Personality of Jesus is a revelation that is ethical and vitalizing, and that comes to men to quicken consciences, illumine minds, and arouse affections. There is, indeed, in this thought an element answering to our modern notion of accuracy; it is not, however, explicit, but implicit in the idea of a faithful or reliable character. Thus Jesus carries the Hebrew idea of religious truth to its final expression, and in so doing neither anticipates nor challenges the modern notion of scientific truth. To the modern mind truth is description of phenomena—to Christ it meant spiritual insight: by the modern mind it is reached through demonstration and reasoning—for Christ it was instinctive or inspirational: to the modern mind it is part of a system of thought—with Christ it was an element or moment in life.

‘ἀλήθεια,’ says Beyschlag, ‘is to Him not this or that worldly and finite truth, but the truth of God, the revelation of God as the eternally good, who, as such, is open-hearted to the world … it is the sister of χάρις, for every revelation of God is a revelation of holy love’ (NT Theol. ii. 429). See also Truth.

3. But although ‘truth,’ according to the mind of Christ, was a Hebrew and religious concept and not the modern scientific notion, the thought of Jesus was free from all the extravagances which we have seen to be characteristic of the Jews, though it shared some of their conceptions as to natural phenomena.* [Note: Jesus’ evident acquiescence in Jewish demonology, at least in its main features, is a case in point.] If His thought was not scientific, neither was it pseudo-scientific. Neither the midrash of the Jewish annalist nor the magical metaphysics of the Rabbis has any place in His teaching. While He was a keen observer of nature (Matthew 6:26; Matthew 6:28; Matthew 13:31-32; Matthew 13:36-43, Mark 4:26-29, Luke 13:6-9; Luke 13:20-21), His utterances about nature never attempted explanations beyond the reach of observation; and while His judgment was to an unequalled degree independent, He neither criticised the scientific opinions of His day nor attempted to add to humanity’s inadequate store of knowledge. Whether this abstinence from scientific speculation and instruction was intentional (as Wendt suggests), or the natural result of His unwavering and complete concentration of soul upon ‘His Father’s business,’ is not important in this connexion. It is sufficient to notice that He eschewed alike Rabbinical explanations and scientific research, dealing finally only with ‘those matters which are naturally the objects of spiritual intuition,’ and which, unlike natural phenomena, cannot be adequately investigated by the human understanding.

So far as nature is concerned, then, we may say that the knowledge which Jesus exhibits in His sayings is just such as a free mind with great natural powers of fresh observation might gather from a joyous intercourse with the ordinary aspects of the material world.

4. One matter of considerable controversial importance, however, in this connexion demands brief attention. What was the attitude of Jesus to the literary ‘science’ of the Rabbis? It was a double attitude. First, He abolished certain precepts of the Law itself (Matthew 5:32; Matthew 5:38), and added others on His own authority (Matthew 5:32; Matthew 5:34; Matthew 5:39); and, secondly, He disparaged and discredited the learned societies of scribes, and, by the weight of His own authority, overthrew their teaching. But this repudiation of the teaching of the schools and criticism of the Law was not conceived in any modern scientific temper, or achieved by means of modern critical apparatus. It was the inevitable outcome of Christ’s conception of Divine truth as a living reality within Himself. His utterances concerning the OT were all from this point of view. He judged them according to their spiritual and religious value, not according to any canons of textual criticism, modern or ancient. This is true even in the case of the quotation from Psalms 110. ‘He did not weigh a truth,’ says Bishop Moorhouse, ‘in what we should call critical balances … the question of the age or authorship of any passage in the OT was never either stated by our Lord Himself or raised by His opponents.’

5. We have next to ask whether we may conclude from His recorded sayings that Jesus shared those logical characteristics which we have seen to be at the foundations of Hebrew ‘scientific’ thought. We noticed two main marks of the Hebrew mind—its vivid, simple, and temperate apprehension of the details of life and nature, and its inability to take such a wide and comprehensive view of fact and experience as would make the generalizations of modern science possible. The first of these is pre-eminently characteristic of the thought of Jesus. The vivid originality, profound simplicity, and pictorial impressiveness of His speech make every reader of His words agree that ‘never man so spake.’ His insight into the human soul, His parables so true to life, His startling paradoxes, His telling object-lessons, all show the best traits of Jewish thought carried to their highest power. The concrete, stirring, and simple elements of life are seized and appreciated with the imagination of the poet and the practical sense of the workman. Jesus is never abstract, never modern—but always particular and Hebrew. But, on the other hand, it is impossible to speak of the mind of Jesus as defective in the sense given above. While He always expresses Himself with the simple concreteness characteristic of Hebrew thought, it cannot be said that He is limited by it, for it is the best possible medium or dialectic in which to enunciate religious truth. It is scientific truth which demands abstraction, with definitions per genus et differentiam and laws. We have seen that Jesus remained always and wholly within the world of religious truth, and always and wholly outside the world of scientific statement. He was not a theologian who theorized about religious truth—He was the Truth. He was not a philosopher who tried to prove the being of God—He declared God. And so the apparatus of scientific description was for Him unnecessary. It would be futile to speculate as to whether He could have used it had He wished. All we need say is that He was a Jew with a Hebrew mind of the highest possible type, and so in the fullest possible sense equipped to utter the highest revelation of God which has been vouchsafed to man.

Literature.—Bergel, Die Medecin der Talmudister: Studien über die naturwissensch. Kenntnisse der Talmudisten; Beyschlag, NT Theol.; Bousset, Jesu Predigt in ihrem Gegensatz zum Judentum; Delitzsch, System of Biblical Psychology; Edersheim, Life and Times of Jesus; Günzburg, Dogmat. histor. Beleuchtung des alten Judentums; Kopp, Gesch. der Chemie; Lewysohn, Die Zoologie des Talmuds; E. von Mẹyer, Hist. of Chemistry; Moorhouse, The Teachings of Jesus; A. Neubauer, Géog. du Talmud; W. Nowack, Lehrb. der Heb. Arch.; Karl Pearson, Grammar of Science; Schürer, HJP [Note: JP History of the Jewish People.] , passim; Stevens, Teaching of Jesus; Wendt, Teaching of Jesus.

Newton H. Marshall.