the Week of Proper 28 / Ordinary 33
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Bible Encyclopedias
Western European Front Campaigns
1911 Encyclopedia Britannica
or "1914 WESTERN EUROPEAN FRONT CAMPAIGNS -8. - The story of the successive campaigns in Belgium and France during the World War, embracing the continuous struggle on the western front from Aug. 2 1914 to Nov. II 1918, is dealt with below under four main sections, representing the phases into which it naturally divides itself: - viz. the " open " warfare campaign of 1914, which ended without decisive victory to either side in the open field and left the armies " stabilized " on a continuous line from Nieuport to the Swiss frontier; the three years of trench-warfare campaigns, 1915-7; the great German offensives of March-July 1918, which, breaking the stability of the trench-warfare system, re-introduced a condition of semi-open warfare; and finally, the allied offensive which synchronized at its outset with the last German attack effort, and closed with the Armistice at II A.M. on Nov. i i 1918.
I. THE Campaign Of Aug.-Nov. 1914 France's Defence Problem. - During the years which followed the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-I, a guerre de revanche for the reconquest of Alsace and Lorraine was very frequently discussed in France. But it implied aggressive action against Germany, and those who judged with reason and not with sentiment knew very well that such action was impossible. In fact, Germany, at every international crisis that arose, asserted, sharply and menacingly, her readiness to accept a challenge, while France prudently yielded and avoided a conflict.
It may be observed that, under similar military systems - that is, under laws of universal military service - the effort of France could not surpass the effort of Germany, for France counted less than 40 million inhabitants against the 65 to 70 millions of Germany. Presuming equality of national effort, the vis viva of France in relation to that of Germany would be in the proportion of 4 to 7; and this calculation makes no allowance for the fact that in Germany all factors combined to exalt the army, to intensify war preparation, and to produce solid cadres and reserves, while in France the tendency of politics was to depreciate the army and to lower its quality, to minimize its training periods, and to depress its military spirit. It is not unfair to say therefore that the possible warlike power of Germany was at least double the possible warlike power of France.
If, next, we cast a glance at the theatre of the possible war, we see at once that France had no natural frontier with respect to Germany, and was obliged to make good this defect by a system of fortresses and entrenched camps - a form of defence which it is exceedingly difficult to maintain at such a level as to be capable of resisting at any moment an artillery that itself is constantly evolving in the direction of increased power. On the side of Germany, on the other hand (even leaving out of consideration her first-class fortresses, for which money was never lacking), there was a line of defence of the very first order, the Rhine - impossible to turn even if the neutrality both of Holland and of Switzerland were violated, for its flanks rest on the Alps and the sea. There are not in Europe two lines of defence of this value, and it was reinforced by a chaplet of entrenched camps. Supposing then that, in spite of the conditions mentioned, France somehow contrived an initial superiority, her penetrative effort could in no case pass the Rhine, while, in a German penetration of France, Paris was within measurable reach.
From the point of view of numbers, the French alliance with Russia might seem at first sight not only to redress the balance but even to weigh down the scales heavily in France's favour. The effective utilization of these numbers was, however, subjected in practice to grave limitations. The strategic conditions of what came to be called the eastern front are discussed in the article Eastern European Front Campaigns, and here it 1S only necessary to say that these conditions and in particular the paucity of railway communications and of rolling-stock in Russia - evident from a glance at any map of central and eastern Europe - left it within Germany's power to use by far the greater part of her forces in an initial campaign against France. These forces might, from the relation of the two populations concerned and the characters of their respective politics, attain a figure almost double those of France. In such a contingency, the French armies almost might be crushed under a very considerable numerical superiority; the Germans could sweep up to Paris; and there probably the war would end. Germany would rapidly bring back her armies to deal with Russia, aided both by the general E.-W. orientation of her railways and by their perfect technical preparedness. That the German plans did not always take this form, that the soundness of its principle was a matter of considerable controversy, within the German General Staff as well as in military publications, and that the numerical German superiority was not in fact attained, may be freely admitted. But, as the most dangerous alternative that France had to consider, this plan was found' to be taken on the logical basis upon which the military policy of the defence should be build up. Whether Germany's own allies would cooperate in such an invasion, and if so, to what extent, was doubtful. Austria's main effort would have to be made in the East; and as regards Italy, it was known that her obligation under the Triple Alliance would become operative only if one of her Allies was defending itself against attack. On the other hand, the Entente Cordiale between England and France had enabled the latter to concentrate her naval effort in the Mediterranean, and the details of possible cooperation on land, for some years before 1914, had been studied by the British and French general staffs in concert. But England reserved to herself complete freedom to decide for or against intervention if and when the case arose. It was not till Aug. 2 1914 that Sir Edward Grey engaged that the British navy would protect the Channel coast of France, and not till the actual violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany that the British Government declared war on their own account.
Armies require, for their operations, zones with fronts proportionate to their effectives, for it is obvious that they should neither occupy a space so vast as to deprive them of the density necessary for powerful action, nor on the other hand be so overcrowded that their component parts cannot each contribute at the proper time its share in the effort towards a common object. The proper width of these zones depends on the balance of many factors between two reasonable limits; but, above all, it is necessary that all the elements that are to be brought into action at the same time should have at their disposal enough routes, more or less parallel, leading to the objective, and that these routes should be approximately at deploying interval apart. Now if Germany attacked France without violating any neutralities, the available width between Switzerland and Luxemburg was practically the same as it had been in 1870. The frontier had changed its position. It is true that Strassburg and Metz were comprised no longer in France but in Germany, and to that extent Germany had gained. But, apart from the fortresses, this frontier was only a conventional line, devoid of strategic interest. The space available for the deployment of the armies, and the distance in a straight line from one neutral frontier to the other, had not altered. Further, not all this space was equally utilizable; the Vosges region, for instance, which was very unsuitable for military operations, formed a large part of it. Thus if the available zone of the Franco-German frontier had seemed somewhat cramped even in 1870, it was far more so - and was becoming impossibly so - for the much larger armies of 1914. If the Germans violated no neutrality, it was out of their power to bring into play the ensemble of their attacking forces, and this fact gave to the French army - presumed to be numerically much inferior - an immense advantage. With its fortresses of Belfort, Epinal, Toul and Verdun, the French front of contact was very strong, and moreover, organized both to resist any brusque attack of the nature of a " bolt from the blue" and to enable the French army on mobilization to concentrate close up to the frontier without fear of being disturbed. Such, at any rate, was the adopted French view, though the experience of the war, which brought into play destructive engines of a power formerly unimagined, suggests grave doubts as to its accuracy.
In any case, it was clear that, if the Germans wished to obtain in a short time a success decisive enough to put France out of action, or at least to cripple her sufficiently to enable a large part of their forces to be sent against Russia, the violation of one or another national neutrality was a necessity for her - that of Switzerland if it was decided to envelop the French right, that of Belgium and of Luxemburg if the French left was to be the object of the manoeuvre. It was not necessary to violate the neutralities of both flanks, but military opinion was divided as to which would be selected. Each had its partisans in the German General Staff, and neither possibility was ignored by the French. At first sight, the passage through Switzerland might seem the more difficult. But, examined more closely, it loses most of its difficulties. For, in effect, the operation would consist in slicing off such a corner of Switzerland as would give the necessary number of roads, railways and Rhine passages (which could, of course, be multiplied in the sequel). For this, the Jura region alone would be enough; and the Swiss forces, massed on the flank of the invaders, would be held in check by another army, presumably Austrian. For it must be borne in mind that the Swiss army could not have been mobilized and concentrated quickly enough to hold the line of the Rhine in sufficient strength to bar access, and that Switzerland possessed not a single fortress to support it. On the other hand, the probability of the Belgian route being the one chosen - as it was - was indicated by the systematic and prolonged German preparation of rail facilities on that front.
Thus, for many years, it had been regarded as certain that part of the German army of invasion would traverse either Belgium or Switzerland. But it was not possible to foresee the proportioning of forces that would be adopted by the Germans on the thus extended front, for the high development of their railway network, and the consequent flexibility of their concentration transports, gave every facility for changes of plan and variants. Further, it was naturally to be presumed that they would make efforts to secure in advance the agreement of the state whose territory they proposed to borrow, and the success or otherwise of these diplomatic moves would necessarily react on the proportioning of forces on the military front. And this was true whether the Germans sought by way of Belgium to reach Paris and deal France a mortal blow by capturing the capital, or by way of Switzerland to cut France in two. In either event, the French armies of the eastern frontier, once turned, would have no alternative but retreat.
The French General Staff naturally foresaw that, since the holding of Russia would devolve upon Austria, the French army would probably have to struggle alone against greatly superior German forces (possibly against a preponderance of almost 7 to 4, as previously stated). The first effort must be directed towards establishing a well-prepared and fortified front, proportioned to the forces available, and to locate this as near to the Alsace-Lorraine frontier, whence the enemy could launch a direct attack at any moment, as was possible without exposing the army to the risk of a surprise. In the next place, the possibilities of attack through both Belgium and Switzerland must be guarded against. To extend the line of battle sufficiently to secure both approaches, or even one of them, in an adequate manner, would involve such a weakening of the whole front as would enable the enemy to attack anywhere with a certainty of finding only a third to a quarter of the French forces against him. Any such plan was contrary to all the principles of war, and therefore unthinkable. A completely defensive line must extend from Dunkirk to the Vosges, the Donon, and thence, in order to guard the Swiss frontier as far as Bellegarde, to the Rhine; at the rate of one army corps to 7.5 km. of front, this line ( 750 km.) would require loo army corps, without reckoning reserves, to secure it - or more than four times the whole of the numbers available. If the violation of Belgium could be taken as certain the Swiss frontier need not be considered; the line would then run from Belfort to Dunkirk, a length of 550 km.; but 73 army corps - more than the entire French army - would even so be required for its defence. However, if the French staff acted on this assumption, the German army would undoubtedly abandon the Belgian plan and advance through Switzerland; in which case the French army would be turned on the right in such a way that the forces sent to secure the northern frontier could not possibly arrive in time to stop the enemy from crossing the plains of the Saone and coming down into the basin of the Seine. Such a disposition was therefore impossible. The French force must occupy the centre of the line, in Alsace-Lorraine, which was the part most threatened, and be ready to oppose on the north or the south according to the enemy's decision. Accordingly, the following dispositions were made. They are the key to the whole of the first period of the war.
The choice of the first line of defence, to be held against direct attack, was determined by the necessity of fixing it at a sufficient distance from the fortress of Metz, the outer defences of which almost touched the frontier, so that the zone of action of the entrenched camp extended into French territory in the Woevre plain, which could not be defended. The most advanced line of battle considered practicable was that of the Meuse slopes, which dominate the Woevre and continue into the neighbourhood of Verdun. This accordingly became an entrenched camp, which had to be raised to the highest pitch of efficiency as a counter to Metz, the " loaded pistol pointed at the heart of France." The line of battle was based on Verdun, and, consolidated by forts constructed on the Meuse slopes, passed in its natural course through Toul and then through the good defensive positions afforded by the left slope of the valley of the Moselle. Between Epinal and Mirecourt these heights lay further from the river, and accordingly the French line drew away from Epinal to arrive at a hill called the Cote de Vivine. Thus the entrenched camp of Epinal, on the Moselle, lay in the advance of the battle-line, and enabled an offensive flank movement against the left of the enemy attack to be made under the protection of its artillery. Behind this first very solid line, which could be held by forces very inferior to those of the enemy, a whole series of positions were available in case of a retreat, in the valleys of the rivers flowing south and north.
The front being rendered secure from direct attack, there remained the question of the two flanks, in the event of an invasion by way of either Belgium or Switzerland. Facing the road from Switzerland there was a great concave arc of positions commanding the plain of the Saone and based on entrenched camps, i.e. Belfort, Epinal, Langres and Dijon. In front of these stood Besancon, in a position to divide and delay the invading stream. Facing the Belgium road, with Verdun, which acted as a sort of left shoulder, as the starting point, was a returning arc marked by the entrenched camps Reims, Laon and La Fere. In advance of these positions Maubeuge played a part corresponding to that of Besancon on the other side.
The enemy must take a certain line to traverse either of the neutral countries, even supposing that he met with no opposition. This would allow time for the French reserves to form, and for the first-line army to concentrate along the Verdun-ToulEpinal line, to prepare positions facing N. on the left flank of an invader from Belgium or facing S. on the right of an invader from Switzerland, and to be ready to attack, in either event, at the favourable moment. Reason and prudence dictated these dispositions, in view of France's isolation, separated as she was from her Russian ally, and of the fact that Germany and Austria had the advantage of " interior lines." The dimensions of the two flanks - from Verdun to ReimsLaon-La Fere, and from Belfort to Epinal-Langres-Dijon, respectively - were in accordance with the resources provided by the French recruiting laws in force for some years after 1872; but they had become insufficient for those given by the law of 1889, which greatly increased the military sacrifices demanded from the nation and added considerably to the war effectives. The result was that the flank facing an attack from Belgium, instead of ending at the Laon-La Fere system, which was becoming useless, was prolonged as far as Paris, which, as an immense fortified camp, must, by the mere fact of its presence, play a supremely important part, as was seen in 1914. Compared with this great entrenched camp, Reims itself was quite secondary. As for the other flank, it could be continued indefinitely beyond Dijon, by means of the formidable defensive positions provided by the mountains of the Cote-d'Or, which commanded the
plains of the Saone. No new fortifications had been considered necessary. The line of battle opposed to Metz could also, because of the increased military resources, be prolonged N. of Verdun, still keeping the edge of the Meuse slopes up to Stenay and even beyond, so as to constitute a threat to the German right, on condition, however, that this right did not extend into Belgium. In the event of a turning movement by way of Belgium, the French left was not to go beyond the Verdun shoulder, and thence would trend away into a defensive, refused flank.
An alternative policy, that of entering Belgium and by reinforcement enabling the Belgians to hold the line of the Meuse, was the subject of a good deal of consideration in French military circles before the war. It involved, however, an extremely complex problem. The attitude of Belgium on the question of admitting French and British forces had been one of marked reserve, although there had been pourparlers at different times between the Belgian and the British authorities; and in fact it was not till Aug. 4 1914 that Belgium asked for the support of England, France and Russia, undertaking herself the defence of the fortified places. Yet, even had Belgium accepted British and French aid earlier and a united Allied front been formed along the Meuse, the strategic situation thus created would have been very difficult, owing to a cause which was operative whether the French advanced to the Belgian Meuse or not. The line of the Meuse runs N.-S. between Mezieres and Maestricht, while the direction of the frontier between Mezieres and the Vosges is substantially E.-W. A German concentration in the region Aachen-Trier would therefore occupy a zone midway between these two lines, and could act in the direction of either as circumstances dictated. Thus, whether the French army, flung northward, was to go as far as the Belgian Meuse or only to the French territory adjacent, was certainly a question of very great local significance, because the Soo-km. line of defence from the angle to the sea, destitute of natural defences and weak in artificial, was distinctly inferior to the short, strong, well-fortified line Givet-Namur-Liege. But it did not alter the fact that the German forces concentrated between Aachen and Trier might, after perplexing the defence by demonstrations, fling their weight upon the line between Mezieres and Verdun, break it by means of superior numbers, and so gain a position not only between the separated halves of the French but also nearer to Paris than either.
These conditions, together with Belgium's hesitating attitude, practically imposed the defensive principles upon which the French General Staff must proceed. Obscured as they were by the dramatic events of Aug. 1914, - by the glorious insistence of Belgium, the French offensives into Alsace, Lorraine, and the Ardennes, the tidal wave of the German I. and II. Armies traversing the Belgian plain and northern France, - it was nevertheless on these principles that the German effort was shipwrecked. For in Sept. 1914 the breakwater of the defence was established solidly on the line, marked substantially by the Vosges, the natural defences of Lorraine, the Cote de Meuse, Verdun, the Montagne de Reims and the advanced defences of Paris, which strategic reasoning had already indicated as the basic line of defence for France in the given conditions.
These conditions include other alternatives than the one selected by the Germans; and it may be asserted that, given the fact of Belgium's resistance and of England's intervention, the course taken by the Germans was - as against the alternative of a violation of Swiss neutrality, which would have occasioned much less concern to England than that of Belgium, and even as against that of a frontal forcing of the Lorraine defence, which perhaps was not as invulnerable as it was believed to be - the course which was the least disadvantageous for France.
(H. BE.) The French "Plan r7." - The characteristic of all French plans of concentration up to those bearing the No. 16 was that they were all applications of the defensive principles outlined above, differing only in detail, and providing for an initial defensive phase of operations out of which an appropriate counter-offensive would arise when the occasion was ripe. From 1912 onwards, however, a new school of thought had begun to prevail in the French General Staff. The teachings of Colonel (afterwards General) Loiseau de Grandmaison, the constant improvement of the mobilization scheme in details, the sharper tone of policy and sentiment after the Agadir crisis, all combined to create a "younger school" in the staff which did not admit that the army was so inferior in power or war-readiness that the defensive need be assumed a priori, as had hitherto been the case. Military France, like the rest of military Europe, was caught by a wave of enthusiasm for the offensive per se; doctrines and text-books were revised, senior officers, and generalissimo-designate, having predilections, real or alleged, for the defensive, were got rid of; and as soon as it became clear that the process of mobilization and concentration had been sufficiently accelerated, " Plan 17 " was drawn up, with the immediate general offensive in full force as its keynote.
" Plan 17," issued to commanders-designate of armies and their chief-of-staff in Feb. 1914, was based on certain assumptions which may be summarized as follows: On the right wing, the hypothesis of a German invasion through Switzerland was assumed to be so improbable that only an echelon of three reserve divisions, and these available for active operations towards Belfort, was allotted to that flank. On the left flank, the problem was far more delicate and difficult, as it depended on whether or not Belgian neutrality would be violated, and, if so, how far N. the right of the German forces would extend. It was involved with two other questions, that of the attitude of Belgium and that of the strength of the German army; neither of these was answered very definitely, and the assumptions of the plan proved substantially incorrect. Belgian aid was not counted upon - indeed, in one important detail provision was made for the case of the Belgians not interfering with a German march-througharid the German army for battle purposes was assumed to contain only some 20 or 21 active corps, the reserve divisions, it was thought, not being available till after an interval, and then only for subsidiary functions such as sieges and railway guarding. The conclusion drawn was that the German right, in case Belgian territory was taken in, would extend to the limit of the Ardennes - i.e. the Belgian Meuse - at the farthest, if as far. But the hypothesis of a frontal attempt of the Germans to break through between Longwy and the Vosges, without touching Belgian territory, was the basis of the plan; and the measures to be taken. in case Luxemburg and the Belgian Ardennes came into the theatre of war were embodied in a "variant." It was supposed, in addition, that attempts might be made by the Germans in Lorraine or the Woevre to break into the French concentration areas in the first days of hostilities; and a very strong protective system (drawn back in the Woevre out of range of a sortie from the Metz outer defences) was provided against this emergency, the augmentations of the peace effectives brought about by the "Three Years Law" having made this possible. On to this protective system, constituted by one corps of each front-line army, the remaining corps were to graft themselves as they arrived, and the whole was to be ready for active operations on the 12th day of mobilization. It was assumed - correctly - that the Germans would attack, and - incorrectly - that their attack would be a simultaneous onset of fairly evenly distributed forces; and it was argued that a French offensive, debouching with startling rapidity, would create a situation with which the German military system was not elastic enough to deal.
These active operations, if Belgian territory remained untouched, were to be a general offensive of four armies with another immediately behind them, directed eastward from the Meuse below Verdun and northeastward from the Nancy-Vosges front, northward from Belfort; and, if Luxemburg and Belgium were infringed, an equally general offensive with all five armies in line, those of Alsace and Lorraine directed as before, but those of the Woevre and the middle Meuse northeastward and even northward according to the positions found to be occupied by the German right. In either case the central army, besides helping its neighbours as required, was to drive back all sorties from Metz and begin the investment of that place.
The dispositions of the plan were as follows: The I. Army (five corps, two cavalry divisions and army artillery) was to attack with its main body from the concentration area west of the Vosges in the direction Baccarat-Saarburg-Saargemiind; the right, VII. Corps and a cavalry division based on Belfort, to advance into upper Alsace, rouse the population to a revolt, and hold as large a German force engaged as possible; between the VII. Corps and the main body, a smaller force in the Vosges was to maintain liaison and by descents into Alsace to cooperate with the advance from Belfort.
The II. Army (five corps, two cavalry divisions and army artillery), grouped initially about Nancy and Luneville, on the left of the I., was to attack in the direction Chateau SalinsSaarbriicken. The improvised fortifications of Nancy in the first stage, and a group of reserve divisions issuing therefrom in the later stages, were to protect the left of this army against Metz;.
and the I. Army, developing its advance along the Vosges, was to guard the right, cooperating in the battle of the II. Army with all the forces not absorbed by the flank along the Vosges.
The III. Army (three corps, three reserve divisions, one cavalry division and army artillery) was to connect this " principal attack" in Lorraine with the other "principal attack" mentioned below, first by holding the Cote de Meuse between Verdun and Toul, next by repelling sorties from Metz and blocking up the west front of that fortress, and lastly by giving support to the attacks of the neighbouring armies.
The V. Army (five corps, two reserve divisions, one cavalry division and army artillery) had to deal with two alternatives, those of violation or non-violation of Belgian territory. In the latter case, it was to drive eastward from its concentration area N. of Verdun and the Argonne across the Meuse, dropping in its progress a flank-guard to watch the Belgian frontier; its objects were to defeat and drive northward all German forces encountered, and to storm or invest, according to circumstances, the fortifications of Thionville (Diedenhofen), guarded and assisted on its right by the III. Army. In the first alternative, it was to be so disposed that it could both attack northeastward on Neufchateau and Florenville in the Ardennes, and guard its left rear with a special detachment.
The IV. Army (three corps, one cavalry division and army artillery), concentrated behind the III., was the general reserve. It was destined to be used either on the right or on the left of the III. Army according to which of the two "p rincipal" attacks - Lorraine or Ardennes - needed additional weight. If the offensive of the V. Army was directed upon Neufchateau and Florenville, the IV. Army was to come in between the V. and the III., and fight its way in the direction of Arlon. Behind the right were to be three reserve divisions, ready to follow up the VII. Corps and take over the guard of the Rhine as it advanced. Behind the left, but not definitely allocated to the V. Army, were to be three more reserve divisions about Vervins, with a somewhat indeterminate mission. A corps of several cavalry divisions was to form about Mezieres in the first days of mobilization on the left of the protective system, and thereafter to operate eastward or northeastward into the Ardennes as required. Its supporting infantry was to occupy the bridges between Dinant and Namur if the Belgian Government did not do so.
This was the plan which was carried into effect when war came in August 1914. As early as Aug. 2, it was decided to act on the hypothesis of a German movement through the Belgian Ardennes, the seizure of Luxemburg by the German advanced guards on that day being a sufficiently suspicious indication. But during the following days the French General Headquarters were confronted with a mass of definite and indefinite information which it was hard indeed to appraise. On the protective line, apart from two severe local fights, at Mangiennes in the Woevre and Lagarde in Lorraine - the first a French, the second a German victory - there were no events and no important indications. To the N. of the left flank, want of liaison, and, it must be added, of mutual confidence, made it difficult for the French to gauge exactly what the Belgian army would do, and especially what was happening at Liege. That fortress was attacked on Aug. 5, and its capture (see Liege) was announced as a fait accompli on Aug. 7, yet for many days thereafter the gathering masses of the Germans between Aachen and the Ardennes seemed to make no move.
The British Expeditionary Force (four divisions and a cavalry division) was about to land in France, but it was not comprised in " Plan 17." A secret appendix to the plan, known to a few, provided for a hypothetical "Army W." landing from overseas and proceeding to the region of Valenciennes and Maubeuge, but the way in which this army (should it materialize) might best be employed could not be seen until the role of the French V. Army had become clearer. Meantime, it was to double the part of left echelon which was assigned to the French reserve formations about Vervins.
But meantime, the troop-trains were arriving in the concentration areas, and the broad " Plan 17 " had to be replaced by an operation order "No. 1." On the morning of Aug. 8, therefore, General Joffre, general-in-chief of the "Armies of the NorthEast," issued his specific instructions.
The French Offensive
The enemy, it seemed, had grouped his main forces in the region of Metz, in front of Thionville (Diedenhofen), and in Luxemburg, with some 12 divisions in Lorraine and Alsace and an undetermined force which included parts of Io divisions in the Liege and Ardennes regions. This main force (Metz - Luxemburg) seemed to be pointing westward, but might equally well swing southward, pivoting on its fortifications. The French armies were, consequently, to take the offensive - which was to be as foudroyante as possible - and with all forces in combination to seek to bring the enemy to decisive battle, resting their right flank on the Rhine. In order to ensure simultaneity and unison in the battle effort, it was laid down that the left wing armies might have to hold back, so as not to become involved in battle with German masses traversing the southern Ardennes or northern Woevre, or both, before the right wing had advanced and made effective contact with its opponents.
The I. Army (Gen. Dubail), composed as in "Plan 17," was, instead of merely cooperating with and flankguarding the II. (as in the plan), to become the main offensive element in Lorraine and Alsace. Its VII. Corps, with a cavalry division, was to break into upper Alsace at once from Belfort, to drive back all forces it met, and, progressively reinforced by the three reserve divisions from Vesoul, to gain ground towards the fortified barrier Strassburg - Molsheim, destroying bridges and blockingup bridgeheads on the Rhine as it advanced. The main body of the army, with a frankly E.N.E. direction, was to push towards the front Fenestrange (Finstingen) - Saarburg - the Donon, and to drive back its opponents on Strassburg and into lower Alsace.
The II. Army (Gen. de Castelnau), composed as in the plan, was now to play the part of auxiliary to the I. Its first objective was to be the front Delme - Salins - Dieuze, and its axis Chateau Salins - Saarbriicken. It was to flankguard towards Metz, and, moreover, to leave two of its five corps in the region of Toul at General Joffre's disposal.
The III. Army (Gen. Ruffey), constituted as in the plan, was disposed in the Woevre facing Metz, and was to be ready either to counter-attack any German forces emerging from the Metz region or to take the offensive northward, with its left on Damvillers, according to the situation. The two corps taken from Castelnau would probably be employed in concert with this army, either in repelling a counter-offensive from Metz or in a northward movement.
The roles to be given to the I V. and V. Armies were now defined more precisely. The IV. (Gen. de Langle de Cary) was to group itself between Argonne and Meuse, and the V. Army (Gen. Lanrezac) to condense between Vouziers and Aubenton, ready either (a) to attack any German army which traversed the Meuse between Mezieres and the line Damvillers-Montfaucon or ( b ) to cross the Meuse themselves for the Ardennes - Arlon offensive. The II. Corps, hitherto the left wing of the protective system and attached to the V. Army, was now added to the IV. Army and directed to hold firmly to the northern outliers of Verdun and the left flank of Ruffey's army. Beyond the flank of Lanrezac was the group of reserve divisions about Vervins; the cavalry corps operating E. of Mezieres and Montmedy was expected, if and when forced back over the Meuse, to take positions about Marienburg and Chimay. The role of " Army W." was as yet quite unsettled, as also was that of the Belgians.
Such was the order which initiated the "Battle of the Frontiers," the opening of the World War on the western front. The intentions may be, and have been, criticized, but they are clear. The general offensive of the French right wing, fixed for the 12th day of mobilization (Aug. 14), was directed N.E. and E.N.E. into the Rhine lands behind Strassburg and Molsheim, with a subsidiary effort in Alsace which would make good a front facing Molsheim - Strassburg - Neu Breisach and the upper Rhine fortifications, and, in case of success bringing the I. Army to behind Strassburg, besiege that fortress. The general offensive of the left was to: be timed to coincide with the decisive phase of the operations of the right, but placed according to the progress of the main enemy armies which were presumed to have their right flank not farther N. than Mezieres and their left flank on or in the fortified region Metz - Thionville.
But the possibility of arranging for the whole system to take its time from Dubail was made doubtful by a geographical factor - the Meuse. Had the areas in which the IV. and V. Armies were to act formed a single region, it would have been different, but the critical question was how to get these two armies over the Meuse at the exact moment determined by events in Lorraine, which might also be the very moment at which the German masses from Luxemburg themselves arrived on the river. It was this disturbing factor, quite as much as any events to the N. of Mezieres, which governed the development of the French scheme. The details of this development, so far as concerns the left wing, are extremely complex and must be studied in the documents reproduced in F. Engerand's Briey, Joffre's Preparation de la guerre et conduite des operations, Lanrezac's Le plan de campaigne francais, and the anonymous Le Plan XVII. (pub). Payot). Here only a summary can be given.
By Aug. 13, the eve of the day fixed originally for the general offensive, the order of Aug. 8 had ceased to apply integrally to the left wing. While Dubail and Castelnau were to advance on the front Donon - Saarburg - Saarbriicken, as previously indicated, and a new and stronger army of Alsace under Gen. Pau was to carry out that part of the scheme which the VII. Corps had just attempted with disastrous results (see Frontiers, Battles Of The: section Alsace ), Ruffey, de Langle de Cary and Lanrezac were directed according toa new scheme which was independent in time as well as place of operations in Lorraine. It was now clear that the German northern group was stronger than had been supposed, but the evidence of its intention to cross the Meuse above Liege and sweep round through the Belgian plain seemed less convincing than the probability of its descending southward, and the French Command, after much interchange of views with Lanrezac, decided to push part of the V. Army northward into the region W. of Givet as a defensive precaution, and with the remainder and the IV. and III. Armies to carry out a series of preparations which would suit either of two hypotheses. If the Germans moving westward through the Ardennes were well advanced, they were to be struck by an offensive against the front, flank and rear, as soon as they were thoroughly involved in the crossing of the Meuse; if, as now seemed more probable, they were grouped with greater density in the northern and northeastern parts of the Ardennes, there would still be time for the V. and IV. Armies to advance before battle, not only over the Meuse, but also over the Lemoy and the lower Chiers. In that event the III. Army, which, with various mobile forces belonging to Toul and Verdun and the corps of the II. Army reserved to the general-in-chief by the order of Aug. 8, could assemble a considerable force, was to divide into a defensive group facing Metz and an offensive group which would aim northward, conforming to the right of the IV. Army, which would make good the lower Chiers; while the V. Army, holding defensively on the Meuse at Givet, was to reach the front Beauraing - Gedinne - Paliseul - Cugnon.
On Aug. 14, the offensive in Lorraine opened. Its progress was slow, but not marked by any untoward incidents up to Aug. 19. It was independent of events to the left of the Moselle except in so far as sorties might emerge from the S. and S.E. fronts of Metz, against which contingency the defensive group of the III. Army, the two reserved corps near Toul, and the echeloned left wing of the II. Army, were an adequate safeguard. On the other wing, however, obscurity still prevailed. Though Lanrezac was becoming more and more uneasy as to his left flank, and the Belgians, standing on the Geete line, called for support, nothing positive as to the German dispositions revealed itself, but on the evening of the 15th the veil was, partly at least, torn away. The part of Lanreza :.'s army which was stationed in the angle of the Sambre and Meuse became engaged with a large force of the enemy at Dinant. This consisted in reality only of cavalry and light infantry, but was estimated by the French commander, Franchet d'Esperey, as an army corps at least. At the same time, information came in tending to show that the Germans in the Ardennes included sixteen divisions. Moreover, the impression was formed both by Franchet d'Esperey opposing them and by the French cavalry commander skirting their southern flank, that the Dinant Germans were flankguarding a much more considerable force engaged in passing the Meuse below Namur; and Lanrezac energetically insisted on the fact that such large enemy forces could not conceivably be intended to operate entirely on the right bank of the Meuse. A remarkable absence of troops, at the same time, was reported by the French aviators reconnoitring the Arlon region. Thereupon Joffre formed a new plan. The V. Army, except one corps (already attached to the IV.), and its two reserve divisions, reinforced by one of the reserve corps on the Moselle and by forces from Algeria, newly arrived, was to join the forces already in the angle of the Sambre and Meuse, and to cooperate with the Belgians and the British - both of which armies now for the first time figured in the scheme of operations - in attacking the front and outer flank of the German " northern " forces, while the IV. Army was to prepare to debouch from the front Sedan - Montmedy in the direction) of Neufchateau against the " southern " enemy group (formerly presumed to be the " main " one) advancing from Luxemburg on the front Sedan-Damvillers; and the offensive portion of the III. by Etain and Jametz, was to be ready to march on Longwy, to break into the rear of this force. But this manoeuvre was merely sketched out by preparations, and next day the veil descended again. The supposed movement of German masses over the Belgian Meuse was unconfirmed, and indeed denied; and without for the moment devoting more attention to the details of the cooperation to be obtained between the three distinct and independent commands W. of the Meuse (especially as Sir John French indicated Aug. 21 as the earliest date at which the British could come into action), Joffre's headquarters merely sent the cavalry corps withdrawn from the Ardennes to get into touch with the right of the Belgian positions on the Geete and - as a precaution against minor inroads through the Belgian plain into the industrial region of Lille - began the transfer to Arras of some ill-equipped territorial divisions, which, under General D'Amade, had hitherto watched the Italian frontier. It was to the proposed offensive of the IV. and especially of the II. Army that Joffre devoted his principal attention. For, on the estimate which had been formed of the German strength - which, however, was radically incorrect because it ignored the presence of reserve corps in immediate proximity to active corps - it seemed to certain of the directing brains at Vitry-le-Francois that the more forces the Germans placed west of the Belgian Meuse the slighter would be the resistance to be expected about Neufchateau and Longwy and the better the chances of cutting the enemy in two by the offensive directed on these points.
From day to day the situation developed without becoming quite clear (for the Germans veiled their dispositions with the utmost success), and Joffre held stubbornly to the conception of his Neufchâteau-Longwy offensive. Lanrezac's anxieties and those of the Belgians increased, but they served only to confirm the impression that the drive into the Ardennes would, if properly timed and directed, reap a great harvest; and the declaration of Sir John French that he would not be able to begin operations till Aug. 23, instead of Aug. 21, caused the scheme of a combined operation N. of the Sambre to recede still farther into the background. On Aug. 20, Joffre, estimating that all the German forces destined for the Meuse had by that time passed out of the region Audun-leRoman, Arlon, Luxemburg, gave the orders which launched the IV. Army into the Ardennes and the III. on Virton and Longwy.
The period of nuances was at an end. On that very day, on the one flank, Dubail's and Castelnau's offensive, which had penetrated to Morhange, Saarburg and the Donon, met defeat ( see Frontiers, Battles Of The: section Lorraine). Castelnau drew back hastily towards Nancy-Luneville; Dubail, in spite of the exposure of his long right flank in the Vosges (which Pau's methodical advance from Belfort had done little to shorten), took down his left more steadily; but almost in a moment both were back in their concentration areas, followed by the eager enemy. On the other flank, the German masses facing the Belgian army front, hitherto screened by their cavalry, had at last declared themselves on Aug. 18, and the Belgian army, threatened with separation from Antwerp, yet most unwilling to give up the expectation of British or French support on its S. flank, was falling back from one position to another. Its decision to close up northward and fall out of the main operations was, it must be recognized, put off to the last possible moment, but the disconnectedness of the Allied movements left no alternative. For at that date Sir John French was not ready; and in the angle of Sambre and Meuse, Lanrezac, a prey to new and not ill-founded anxieties regarding his liaison with de Langle de Cary, was, with Joffre's approval, standing fast till Aug. 23, the date British cooperation should arrive.
In spite of the anxieties and disappointments caused by these events, joffre held firmly to his intention. On the morning of Aug. 21 the executive order for which the IV. and III. Armies were waiting was sent. For the situation was now clear, and the plan of breaking through between the German manoeuvre-masses and their fixed pivot, which in one form or another had been consistently followed in the period of obscurity, seemed destined now to have its reward. But there was one fundamental miscalculation. The old error which had led the professional soldiers of Napoleon III.'s day to regard the Prussian citizen-army as a " sort of militia," had reappeared in the form of a contempt for " reserve " formations. It was a mere matter of calculation that Germany's resources permitted her to create such formations; but that they should figure in the masse de choc was regarded as incredible. Yet it was true; and thus, instead of meeting a battle-army of 42 to 50 divisions with an array of 73 French, 6 Belgian and 4 British, as anticipated, the Allies encountered in reality one of 77 divisions, i.e. an equivalent instead of a much inferior force. This was especially important as bearing on the prospects of success in the Neufchateau and Arlon directions. Strength was encountered where weakness was expected, and the relatively small numerical superiority of the attack did not suffice.
The story of the battles of Longwy and the Ardennes, of Charleroi, and Mons, will be found in detail in the article Frontiers, Battles Of The. Here it must suffice to say that the French offensive into the Ardennes and towards Virton-Longwy-Audun-le-Roman met with general failure, and in some places with disaster; that the German II. and I. Armies, swinging on Huy as a pivot, swept down upon the French V. Army at Charleroi and the British Expeditionary Force at Mons, and bore them back; and that on Aug. 25 at 22 :00 hours (10 P.M.) Joffre's orders were issued for a general retreat. The German plan of campaign had prevailed, and the German Command had the initiative in its hands.
At this point, then, the story of the operations is most conveniently told from the point of view of that side which dictated their course.
The German Plan of Campaign.
For the Germans, a war against France was essentially part of a two-front war. The resources of the country not being equal to simultaneous offensives against France and Russia, the choice had to be made between (a) standing on the defensive against France while seeking a decision in battle in the East, ( b) waging a defensive war on both fronts, and ( c) striving to crush France while standing on the defensive in the East. Of these ( b) was held to be excluded by the presumed impossibility, for an industrial state, of enduring a long war, as well as by obvious military objections; (a) was never completely excluded, and had until some ten years before the war been the fundamental war-plan of the German General Staff; while ( c) had in those last years obtained general acceptance, owing to the difficulty, for Germany, of waiting till the slow-moving Russians could be brought to action and defeated in a battle of the first magnitude. Whether, in view of the increased strength of the defensive on the one hand and the increased war-readiness of Russia on the other, the adoption, once more, of alternative (a) was not the best policy for Germany in the circumstances of 1914, is an open question; but, in fact, ( c) was maintained and carried into effect.
But this increased readiness of Russia made it imperative for the Germans to protect East Prussia by a force at least sufficient to offer a step-by-step defence of that province and also, with their main armies reduced to that extent, to obtain a decision of the war in the West at the earliest possible moment, so as to release the greater part of the forces which had gained it for service in the East. The proportioning of means to the two theatres, therefore, was a very difficult problem, admitting of many a priori solutions, which might bring either victory or ruin.
The solution that found most adherents was that of Count von Schlieffen, chief-of-staff of the German army, in the first years of the present century. On assuming office, he had both restudied the draft plans of campaign and the tactical doctrines in vogue, and he had come to these conclusions: (a) that an offensive of maximum power, carried so far as to put France out of action definitively, was the only way to secure freedom of action in the East; (b ) that this offensive, to secure the result aimed at - nothing less would suffice - must be developed on so broad a front as to grip and out-wing the most northerly and the most westerly points of France's defensive dispositions; (c ) that a maximum density must be sought for on the right wing, even at the cost of exposing Lorraine and the Rhine lands to invasion.
The first of these considerations led to the acceptance - contrary to all the traditions of the German army - of the principle that not only active, but reserve, Ersatz and every other category of soldier must be effectively used. Schlieffen even proposed an intimate mixture, practically an amalgamation, of active and other elements, and aimed at putting into the field - in case of a single front war, it is true - no less than 114 divisions against France. The second consideration led to the idea of a swing through Belgium and northern France far wider than that which was actually carried out. The route of the outer flank, which in spite of its extension beyond all probable French defences was to have a defensive echelon following on, was to touch Dunkirk, Abbeville, Rouen and pass round by Chartres, far to the W. of Paris - which would be invested automatically - so as to march in upon Auxerre and Troyes from the east. The line Ghent-Maubeuge-Thionville was to be reached on the 22d and the line Amiens-Rethel-Thionville on the 31st day of mobilization; that is, not hurry but certainty and power were to be the executive rules.
The third consideration, however, led to an even more remarkable result than the second. Of the 114 divisions no fewer than 101 were to operate N. and W. of the Thionville pivot, Lorraine, Alsace and the Rhine lands being committed to 13, of which two were allocated to the fortresses. The leitmotiv of extreme density on the right occurs in all Schlieffen's drafts and schemes. ." Macht mir nur den rechten Fliigel stark " were his half-conscious dying words. In a second scheme, based on the two front war, which provided for a defence force in East Prussia approximately equal to that which von Moltke actually placed there in 1914, the total force was lessened to that extent, but the ratio of about seven divisions N.W. of Thionville to one S.E. of that pivot was maintained.
When von Moltke, the younger, succeeded Schlieffen, the above plans were gradually blunted, first because the idea of making the active army a simple kernel for soldiers of all categories was accepted only in part, and secondly because the growing war-readiness of the French army, the fever of offensive spirit that had obviously seized it, and after 1913 its very high peace-strength, made it increasingly likely that the French would open the war with a determined offensive into Lorraine and the Rhine lands. In these circumstances so drastic a depletion of the forces to the left of Metz as that contemplated by Schlieffen did not commend itself to Moltke, who found a compromise in allocating one-quarter of the whole available force, instead of one-eighth, to the defensive (or defensive-offensive) front, and holding large quantities of empty rolling-stock on the Rhine in readiness to transfer a proportion of this quarter to the right wing as soon as circumstances should allow this to be done. The amplitude of the swing was, however, undeniably diminished thereby.
In one point, Schlieffen and Moltke were agreed - the necessity of pushing out beyond the line of the Belgian Meuse. In both schemes therefore the quick seizure of Liege and a deployment foreground beyond that fortress figured as an indispensable preliminary to the operations proper.
The German plan, to which effect was given in August 1914, provided as follows: (a) A protective system was formed all along the line, consisting, not as had been expected of complete formations, but of single brigades of infantry (with a proportion of other arms), brought up from their peace stations without waiting to receive and equip their reservists. These brigades took over from the local troops the positions of the line that their respective army corps were to occupy, and their reservists rejoined by parties. (b ) There was a concentration of the remainder of each corps, after mobilization in the usual way, behind its own representatives in the protective system. This concentration of the active corps was completed by the 14th day of mobilization (Aug. 15). (c ) Concentration of reserve corps, as a rule immediately behind or to a flank of the corresponding active corps, was completed by the 16th day (Aug. 17). (d) Concentration of other formations, Ersatz divisions and mixed Landwehr brigades, was completed from the 11th to the 17th day. ( e ) The six advanced, peace-strength brigades of the corps intended to assemble about Aachen were employed as a striking force under General von Emmich, which without waiting for siege artillery was to attempt to storm Liege at once, if the Belgians did not agree to let the Germans pass. The German ultimatum to Belgium was handed in late on the evening of Aug. 2 (rst day of mobilization), and required an answer within twelve hours. There is reason to believe that, on Belgium's refusal, a proposal was made to Holland to allow the use of the Maestricht tongue as a gateway into the Belgian plain, but, whether this be so or not, it was only on the evening of the 3rd day of mobilization that the striking force crossed the frontier.
The order of battle, and allocation of the German forces N. of the pivot, was as follows: I. Army (General-Oberst von Kluck), five corps, assembled behind the Maestricht tongue (JiilichKrefeld area); II. Army (General-Oberst von Billow), seven corps, including one attached from I. Army, assembled facing the Liege frontier (Aachen - Malmedy - Euskirchen); III. Army (General-Oberst von Hausen), four corps, assembled in the area St. Vith - Wittlich - Bittburg; IV. Army (Duke Albrecht of Wiirttemberg), five corps, assembled in the area Luxemburg (seized Aug. 2)-Trier-Diekirch - Wadern; V. 'Army (Wilhelm, German Crown Prince), five corps, assembled in the area Metz - Thionville - Saarbriicken.
Thus twenty-six active and reserve corps (52 divisions) - with a number of Landwehr brigades to follow - were allocated to the five armies of the moving wing, of which nearly half were to cross the Meuse between Namur and the Dutch frontier as soon as the way was clear. The remainder were to traverse the Ardennes from E. to W. in echelon from the right (III. Army) and to prepare to wheel gradually S.W. in proportion to the progress of the I. and II. Armies on the other side of the Meuse.
The 2nd Cavalry Command was of three divisions in front of the I. and II. Armies; the 1st Cavalry Command of three divisions in front of the III.; the 4th Cavalry Command of two divisions in front of the IV. They were individually responsible to the Supreme Command, except when from time to time placed at the disposal of certain armies. Similarly, the armies were in principle directly subordinate to the Kaiser's headquarters, i.e. to General-Oberst von Moltke, Chief of the General Staff, unless temporarily paired, as was the case at the outset, with the I. and II. Armies, of which Billow was in general charge.
The organization of the forces E. and S.E. of Metz was somewhat different. Rupprecht, Crown Prince of Bavaria, was appointed not only Chief of the VI. Army, but " Commander-inChief in the Rhine lands," a title with wider implications than that of an army commander, and his task included the protection of the left flank of " the Army " or " the main forces." He had under him his own VI. Army (five corps, of which four were Bavarian), the VII. Army of General-Oberst von Heeringen (three corps) and the 3rd Cavalry Command (three divisions), in addition to the war garrisons of Metz, Strassburg, and the upper Rhine defences (Neu Breisach, Istein). These 16 active and reserve divisions were to be supplemented a few days later by 62 Ersatz divisions, and mixed Landwehr brigades, which were grouped in some cases in "Landwehr Commands." In all, the formations assigned to the western theatre of war comprised 68 active and reserve divisions, 62 Ersatz divisions, 17 2 Landwehr brigades and 10 cavalry divisions.
The First Operations of the Germans
The first operations to be carried out were: (r) The seizure of Liege and of as large a foreground as possible beyond; (2) the securing of the left flank of " the Army," and the attraction of as many French divisions as possible to Lorraine and Alsace, by the living and passive forces under Prince Rupprecht. Both these essentials having been provided for, the five armies (I. - V.) were to proceed at once to the main task, which was to be a great " wheel through Belgium into France, pivoting on Thionville - Metz," in which wheel the II. and I. Armies were to govern the pace. The II. Army was to swing on the arc Liege - Wavre, the I. following in echelon on the arc Tongres - Brussels, flankguarding towards Antwerp, whither, it was presumed, the Belgian field army would retire. No very distant objectives were fixed. When Liege and the region W. of the Meuse had been occupied, and the cavalry divisions of the I. Cavalry Command had fixed the situation of the Belgian army, of the British forces expected to land at Ostend, and of the French forces which might be pushed into Belgium from the S., specific orders could be given. Meanwhile, the problem was to deploy the two highly condensed armies of Kluck and Billow on the W. side of the Meuse, in spite of Liege and of the Belgian field army. On this, as the I. and II. Armies were to give the time to the rest, the whole movement depended; but while the III., IV. and V. Armies awaited developments, the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Commands were to push through the Ardennes and towards Damvillers, in order to clear up the situation in the Meuse valley from Namur to St. Mihiel - a mission which naturally brought about a series of conflicts with the French cavalry, and, above Stenay, with the French protective infantry system in the Woevre. In point of information, this cavalry activity probably yielded only confirmations of the obvious, but it was invaluable in veiling the army movements when later these were begun.
The Liege operation is described under Liege. There was no surprise, Belgium having mobilized her available forces at an early date in the European crisis; and five out of six brigade attacks on the night of Aug. 5-6 failed. One, however, penetrated into Liege, and for some days neither the German nor the Belgian, British or French Commands seem to have been able to form a clear view of the situation, as the fort-ring held out. Reconnoitring patrols of the German 2nd Cavalry Command, which passed the Meuse near the Dutch frontier simultaneously with parts of the attacking force, learned nothing of the Belgian dispositions, and the main body remained near its bridge. On Aug. 8 the situation at Liege was clear enough to enable the cavalry to push westward, and in the days following it established the front of the Belgian field army as lying approximately on the Geete line from S. of Jodoigne to Diest. But on Aug. 12, the attempt of the Germans to work round to the left of this position was checked in a severe local action at Haelen. The Liege forts, meantime, had to be reduced by super-heavy siege artillery, one by one, and it was not till Aug. 15 that the masses of the German I. and II. armies were able to begin to cross into the area comprised between Liege and the Geete. The resistance of the Liege forts had put back the start of the great wheeling movement for four days.
Thus the difficult and essential preliminary operation of seizing a bridgehead beyond the Meuse did not pass off quite according to programme. It had often been alleged that the Germans had obtained a long start in their concentration by means of surreptitious mobilization. That this was not actually the case has been shown by a study published in 1920 by the Belgian General Staff; but even had such a mobilization taken place, it would not have helped to solve the problem of Liege. All that infantry could contribute to its solution, the first six peace-strength brigades contributed. The rest was a matter of siege artillery, and it must be regarded as a serious flaw in Moltke's plans that this artillery did not put in an appearance on Aug. 6 instead of on Aug. 10.
On the other flank, the operations in Lorraine and Alsace, which were to maintain the "pivot" of the wheel against French attack proceeded more favourably than had been anticipated - too favourably, as the sequel was to show. The problem was difficult, and a priori reasoning could not assist its solution materially. For here, much more than on the Belgian flank, events depended upon the independent will of a great enemy army which was equally capable of the offensive or of the defensive-offensive; and although the tendency of French military thought in the last years before the war had evidently been towards the former, it was not
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Chisholm, Hugh, General Editor. Entry for 'Western European Front Campaigns'. 1911 Encyclopedia Britanica. https://www.studylight.org/encyclopedias/eng/bri/w/western-european-front-campaigns.html. 1910.
