Bible Encyclopedias
Serbia

Agriculture

Serbia is a land of small holdings, the former Turkish proprietors having been expropriated in 1833 and 1880: in 1900, out of a total of 401,093 families, no less than 91.5% were owners of land. Of these only 86 persons owned over loo hectares of land, and only three persons over 300, while there were 98,253 properties (33.4%) of under three hectares. There has been a very rapid development of cooperative societies since 1895 (90o in 1909, with 35,000 members; I,200 in 1913, with 40,000 members).

Of a total area of 2,045,176 hectares there was in 1905 (a) cultivated land 1,223,671 (arable land 1,027,815, gardens 25,815, vineyards 33,101, orchards 136,939); (b) grazing land 418,391; (c) commons and uncultivated land 110,101. In 1908 the chief products of the harvest were (in tons) maize 533,691, cereals 457,734, hay and clover 226,858, straw 777,728, plums 530,061, potatoes 54,946. In 1905 (latest statistics available) the live stock was distributed as follows: horses 174,363, cattle 969,953, pigs 908,580, sheep 3,160,- 166, goats 510,063.

Forests

Over one-third of Serbia's total area (3,750,000 ac.) is forest land, all but 750,000 ac. of this belonging to the State or the various communes. The chief varieties of tree are beech (750,000 ac.), oak and conifers.

Mines

The mining industry of Serbia has a great future, but has hitherto been but little developed, owing to lack of capital and means of transport. Table i gives the export of ores (in metric tons) according to the last statistics available. That these are merely the first primitive beginnings is best shown by the fact that in the year 1 The phonetic spellings of the names of the districts and towns, following the system adopted by the Committee of the Royal Geographical Society, are: Belgrade, Valyevo, Vranya, Kraguyevats, Kra j ina, Krushevats, Morava, Nish, Pirot, Podrina, Pozharevats, Rudnik, Smederevo, Tilnok, Toplitsa, Uzhitse, Chachak, Leskovats, Shabats, Priyepolye, Rasha, Zvechane, Kosovo, Prizram, Tetovo, Skoplye, Kumanovo, Bregalnitsa, Tikvesh, Okhrida. The spellings given above follow the Croatian form or its equivalent.

TABLE I.-Exports of Ores.

1910 a single copper mine (Bor) exported ore to the value of over 8,000,000 francs, thus exceeding the total result of all the mines given above.

Foreign Trade.-The progress of Serbian trade may best be gathered from the following Tables 2 and 3. In 1910 maize to the value Table 2.-Imports and Exports.

Table 3.-Distribution of Trade.

of over 21,400,000 francs was exported. The famous plum industry (known to the west only through German intermediaries) accounted in 1908 for the export of 49,042 tons of prunes (value 10,350,721 francs) and of 14,398 tons of plum jam (value 3,251,093 francs). The pig trade, upon which Serbia's prosperity very largely depended, having been injured by Austria-Hungary's tariff policy, a new system of slaughter-houses was established in Belgrade, and in 1911 the chief of these exported 9,751 tons of pork (68,047 head). By 1913 the amount exported had risen to 12,913 tons (100,776 head).

Finance.-On Jan. I 191 the public debt amounted to £26,362,- 240. Table 4 shows how the budget balanced in the years before the war. In 1915 the budget was fixed at the same figure. From 1915 to 1918, owing to the conquest of the country, no proper budget was possible, the Government and army subsisting upon the subsidies of the Allied Powers.

Table 4.-Finance.

Education.-In 1909 there were only 1,296 elementary schools in Serbia with 2,584 teachers and 138,434 Pupils, and 20 secondary schools with 393 teachers and 7,317 pupils. In 1910-11 the university of Belgrade had 1,025 students. Only 27% of the pop. could read and write.

Army.-After 1908 great efforts were made to increase the efficiency of the army. Organized under a system of obligatory service, the war strength in 1914 was estimated at 350,000 men, which, with the addition of the Landsturm, could be raised to about 400,000. (See Army: Balkan Armies.) Political History, 1909-18 The annexation of Bosnia by Austria-Hungary in 1908 marked a turning point in the history of Serbia. Henceforth public opinion, supported by prominent statesmen in every party, was practically unanimous in regarding a conflict with AustriaHungary as sooner or later inevitable. This belief had at once a national and an economic basis: for Count Aehrenthal not merely supported the Hungarian policy of repressing Yugoslav national aspirations inside the Dual Monarchy, but obstructed Serbia's commercial development by tariff and frontier restrictions, by a veto upon either direct access to the sea or a common frontier with Montenegro, and by opposition to all idea of Balkan cooperation. Those Serbs who feared so unequal a conflict and would have preferred a more conciliatory attitude towards Austria-Hungary, were reduced to silence by Aehrenthal's refusal to admit the international aspect of the problem or to consider the Serbian proposals for arbitration before the Hague Tribunal. Isolated in Europe and jealously shut off from her natural outlets on the Adriatic, Serbia was driven to seek new political and economic ties in the east and south. The policy of Aehrenthal inevitably strengthened the tendencies towards the creation of a Balkan League, and these were accelerated by the political unrest evoked throughout the Balkan Peninsula by the Young Turk Revolution.

The Balkan League.-The idea of a Balkan League was by no means new. It had been advocated as early as 1844 by the Serbian statesman Garasanin, and formed the subject of serious negotiations between Prince Michael Obrenovic and the Bulgarian exiles of his day, and also between Kossuth, Prince Michael, and Prince Cuza of Rumania. The last serious overtures had been made in 1891 by the Greek premier Tricoupis, and after their betrayal to the Porte by Stambulov the idea remained dormant for nearly 20 years. The speech of the Russian Foreign Minister Isvolski on Christmas Day 1908, advocating a league between Turkey and the three Balkan Slav States, inaugurated a new era of Russian activity in the Balkans, under the active direction of Tcharikov, the ambassador at Constantinople, and Hartwig, who rapidly acquired great influence as minister at Belgrade. In the spring of 1910 the kings of Bulgaria and Serbia paid successive visits to St. Petersburg and Constantinople, and Dr. Milovanovic, the Serbian Foreign Minister, was especially active in his endeavours to secure the adhesion of Turkey to a general Balkan League. His views were also shared by Venizelos, who came into power in Greece in October of the same year, and even to a lesser degree by Gesov, a Russophil, who became Bulgarian premier in March 1911. In view, however, of the increasingly chauvinistic attitude of the Young Turk regime in Macedonia and Albania, Venizelos considered it advisable to make overtures to Bulgaria, with a view to common defensive action against a possible Turkish attack. His initiative led to important secret negotiations, in which Mr. J. D. Bourchier, The Times correspondent, acted as intermediary. These preceded by at least five months the first conversations between Serbia and Bulgaria, which appear to have originated from an overture made by Rizov in Belgrade at the instance of King Ferdinand.' On Oct. 11 1911 Gesov, on his return from the west, had a long discussion with Milovanovic in the train between Belgrade and Nish, and secret negotiations continued throughout the winter. The coming of age of Prince Boris of Bulgaria in Feb. 1912 was attended by the crown princes of Serbia, Montenegro, Greece and Rumania, and this demonstration was widely regarded as a symbol of increasing cooperation between the Christian States of the peninsula. On March 13 1912 a secret treaty of alliance was concluded between Serbia and Bulgaria, and was supplemented on May 12 by a military convention. On May 29 a similar treaty was concluded between Bulgaria and Greece. There was no actual treaty binding Serbia and Greece, while the Serbo-Montenegrin treaty, concluded as late as Sept. 1912, was less political than military and provided for separate though parallel action.

The Treaties.-By the terms of the Serbo-Bulgarian agreement each State was bound to assist the other with all its forces, in the event of an attack by one or more States unspecified, and in particular in the event of any Great Power trying to annex any portion of Turkey's Balkan possessions. If internal troubles should arise in Turkey, either ally might initiate proposals for military action, and any point upon which agreement was not reached, should then be referred to Russia for decision. Special provision was made for possible conquests, Serbia recognizing Bulgaria's rights over the territory lying east of the Rhodope Mountains and the Struma river, and Bulgaria similarly recognizing Serbia's rights north and west of the Sar (Shar) Mountains. The districts lying between these limits, 1 See Samouprava, Oct. 28 1913.

the Aegean and the Lake of Okhrida, were to form " a distinct autonomous province "; but should their partition prove inevitable, then Serbia undertook to make no claim beyond a line drawn from the Lake of Okhrida to near Kriva Palanka on the old Turco-Bulgarian frontier and including Skoplje, but not Monastir, Prilep or Veles. In the event of a dispute, the Tsar was to act as arbitrator, and Bulgaria undertook to accept the more southerly line as its new frontier with Serbia, if the Tsar should decide in favour of the latter. In the event of war, Bulgaria undertook to place at least 200,000, Serbia at least 150,000, men in the field against Turkey. If either Turkey or Rumania attacked Bulgaria, Serbia was to send ioo,000 men to her aid; while Bulgaria on her part must provide 200,000 men in support of Serbia, in the event of an attack by Austria-Hungary.' The treaty between Bulgaria and Greece was much more indefinite, though it provided for mutual aid against Turkey, not merely in case of direct military aggression, but also of the infringement of treaty rights and of the principles of international law - a phrase which was of course intended to cover the championship of co-nationals in Macedonia or Thrace against Ottoman misrule.

No attempt was made to define the territorial claims of the two countries in the event of a successful war, and the division of the spoils was thus left to the chance of a future agreement. The military convention was not concluded till Sept. 22, when events were already moving rapidly. By it Greece undertook to provide at least 120,000 men against Turkey, while Bulgaria increased the contingent already promised in her agreement with Serbia to 300,000 men. Special clauses provided for a blockade of the Aegean by the Greek fleet, and forbade the conclusion of peace or even of an armistice without the consent of all the allies.

The League, Turkey and the Powers. - Internal disorder had spread rapidly throughout Turkey in Europe in the year following Italy's invasion of Tripoli: and the ferocious policy of suppression adopted by the Committee of Union and Progress towards all the non-Turkish nationalities culminated in a reign of terror at the parliamentary elections of 1912, in a recrudescence of Komitaji activities, and in an Albanian rising even more widespread and more determined than in the two previous summers. The premature death of Milovanovic on July 1 not merely deprived Serbia of her ablest modern statesman, but removed one of the few restraining influences in any Balkan capital. He was succeeded as premier by Trifkovic, and in the conduct of foreign affairs by the Old Radical leader Pasic, who placed almost unreserved reliance on Russian support and worked in the closest accord with Hartwig. On Sept. 12 Pasic became premier at the head of a purely Old Radical Cabinet.

By this time not even the most pacific statesmanship could have arrested the growing anarchy in Turkey. Public opinion in Belgrade and Sofia was roused by a massacre of Bulgarians at Kocana (Kochana) on Aug. 1, and by the report of similar outrages in the Sanjak. By the middle of the month, Uskub, and the entire district recognized by the secret treaty as Serbian, were in the hands of the insurgent Albanians; and the concessions granted by the Porte, while failing to arrest the movement, only served as an incentive to swift action on the part of the neighbouring States.

The somewhat vague proposals for decentralization and administrative reform put forward by Count Berchtold on Aug. 20 prompted the Balkan allies to hasten their preparations. While the slow-moving concert of Europe was discussing alternative proposals for Turkish reform, the Porte suddenly held up Serbian war material at Salonika and began to mass troops round Adrianople. Before any collective step had been taken by the Powers, the situation was gravely compromised by the almost simultaneous mobilization of the Bulgarian, Serbian, Greek 1 Gesov in his Memoirs asserts that King Ferdinand in signing this was decided by his knowledge of the text of a secret AustroRumanian military convention, permitting Rumania in the event of war with Russia, to annex not only Bessarabia, but also Silistra, and even Ruscuk (Ruschuk), Sumla (Shumla) and Varna.

and Turkish armies (Oct. I). At the last moment the Porte announced its intention to enforce the Vilayet Law of 1880, which had been allowed to remain on paper for a whole generation. But this was very naturally regarded by the Balkan allies merely as a fresh attempt at evasion, and the Powers still further alarmed them by a note which, in its endeavours to soothe Turkish susceptibilities, laid far more stress upon Turkish territorial integrity and sovereign rights than upon the cause of reform. Simultaneously the Powers warned the four Balkan States against warlike action and assured them that even in the event of victory no change in the territorial status quo would be tolerated. The further announcement of their intention - after a lapse of 34 years - to enforce the Treaty of Berlin, decided the four allies to precipitate events, and before the impending note could be formally communicated, the King of Montenegro, by an act of undoubted collusion, declared war upon Turkey. On Oct. 13 the other three Balkan Governments presented to the Porte a series of far-reaching demands, culminating in racial autonomy for all the nationalities of the Ottoman Empire, and four days later the Turks, without deigning to answer, declared war on Serbia and Bulgaria. (For the military events, see Balkan Wars.) All the Great Powers, though for quite divergent reasons, genuinely attempted to prevent war. This is equally true of Russia, who, though privy to most of the designs of the Balkan allies, disapproved because she could not wholly control the time and method of action, and of Austria-Hungary, to whom the existence of an antiAustrian clause in the treaty had been betrayed, but who already reckoned confidently upon setting the allies at variance before it could come into operation. That the Powers, having failed to prevent war, adopted a passive attitude during its early stages, was due to the almost universal assumption in official circles that the Turks would be victorious, and that the refractory Balkan States would soon be only too glad to accept a settlement dictated from without.

The First Balkan War. - The rapid and overwhelming success of the allies radically transformed the situation. By the end of November Turkish rule in Europe was restricted to the Chatalja lines, the Gallipoli Peninsula, and the three fortresses of Adrianople, Janina (Yannina) and Scutari. The Serbs in particular, after the victories of Kumanovo and Monastir, were in actual occupation of all Macedonia west of the Vardar, and had reached the Adriatic at Durazzo and Medua. They were thus able to go far beyond their obligations under the military convention, by help to the Bulgarians investing Adrianople.

Kumanovo was much more than an ordinary victory. restored to Serbia that self-confidence which had been so gravely shaken by the rebuffs and scandals of the previous 30 years: and throughout the Yugoslav provinces of Austria-Hungary it was hailed as an atonement for Serbia's downfall on the field of Kosovo, and as a pledge of her new mission as the Southern Slav Piedmont. In Croatia especially, where the Hungarian Government had suspended the constitution and established Cuvaj as dictator, there were continual demonstrations in favour of the Balkan allies, even on the part of sections of the population hitherto regarded as Serbophobe. Austria-Hungary at first adopted a waiting attitude, but as the Serbs approached the Adriatic, she suddenly ordered a general mobilization, and suppressed all public expressions of feeling, while the official press of Vienna and Budapest adopted a menacing tone towards Serbia. Great prominence was given to the alleged insults offered to Herr Prochaska, Austro-Hungarian consul at Prizren, and for some days public opinion was allowed to believe that he had been shamefully mutilated by Serbian officers. It only transpired at a much later date that Prochaska, known to be in touch with the open enemies of Serbia in the Sanjak, had been entirely unmolested by the invaders, but that on the other hand he had received definite instructions from Vienna to create an " incident '.' such as might provide a pretext for action. The Austro-Hungarian chief-of-staff and War Minister, Gens. Conrad and Auffenberg, are known to have favoured a radical solution of the Southern Slav question by immediate war with Serbia (see under Austrian Empire: Foreign Policy) : and Count Forgaes, who as minister in Belgrade, had supervised the anti-Serbian forgeries exposed at the Friedjung trial, was now permanent under-secretary at the Ballplatz and using all his influence with Count Berchtold in favour of war. There is practical certainty, however, that the Archduke Francis Ferdinand on this occasion supported Francis Joseph's aversion to war, and that the decisive factor was Italy's opposition to any " forward " policy from Vienna. As negotiations were already proceeding between Berlin, Vienna and Rome for a fifth renewal of the Triple Alliance (actually signed on Dec. 5 1912 for six years), Italy was able to use as a lever the special Austro-Italian agreement of 1909, by which AustriaHungary had pledged herself to make no change in the Balkan status quo, " without a previous agreement with Italy, based on the principle of compensation." Moreover, Berlin, concerned for the Alliance, insisted strongly in Vienna upon the need for reassuring Rome by a more moderate attitude towards Serbia. The march of events had taken Vienna altogether by surprise, and in complying with its ally's wishes, it was influenced by the altered outlook of the Great Powers. On Oct. 8, in a last effort to avert war, they had warned the Balkan States that no territorial changes would be tolerated. But the success of the campaign and the general relief with which public opinion hailed the downfall of Turkish rule in Europe, soon led to a change in their attitude. On Oct. 30 M. Poincare proposed a general declaration of desinteressenaent in territorial questions: and though this was rejected by Vienna, its moral effect was only increased when Mr. Asquith spoke in favour of recognizing the accomplished fact and remaking the map of eastern Europe. On Nov. 2 this view was strongly endorsed by M. Sazonov. For the moment all that Count Berchtold could do was to encourage Bulgarian designs on Constantinople and attempt to sow dissensions among the allies. The Turks, seeing themselves isolated in Europe, made overtures of peace as early as the 11th to King Ferdinand, who was not willing to consider them until his troops had been checked before Chatalja. On the 25th, however, negotiations were opened and resulted, not in peace, but in an armistice (Dec. 3) pending a general peace conference in London. When this opened at St. James's Palace on Dec. 16, Serbia was represented by the ex-premier and historian Novakovie, the president of the Skupstina Nikolie, and the minister in Paris, Vesnie. The wisdom of the allies in excluding Greece from the armistice soon became apparent: for her command of the sea limited the Turks to the Anatolian railway as the sole channel of reinforcement. In London Turkey pursued a policy of dilatory diplomatic intrigue and only receded inch by inch before the very drastic demands of the allies. After a month had been wasted, the Powers, with unexpected unanimity, presented a joint note to the Porte, advising the cession of Adrianople to Bulgaria and hinting at the loss of Constantinople as a possible consequence of renewed hostilities (Jan. 18 1913). Kiamil Pasha laid the proposals of the Powers before a specially convoked council of notables, and was on the point of yielding when the extremists of the Committee of Union and Progress overthrew his Cabinet and murdered the commander-in-chief, Nazim Pasha (Jan. 23). In view of the united front presented by the Powers, there can be little doubt that the new Cabinet would soon have been driven to the necessary concessions. But the Balkan delegates, rightly or wrongly, took the protestations of the Young Turks at their face value, and broke off the negotiations on Jan. 28. The council of ambassadors initiated by Sir Edward Grey continued to sit in London, and devoted especial attention to the Albanian problem and to the friction produced between Albanians and Serbs by the latter's presence on the Adriatic. Since the commandant of Scutari, Hasan Riza, declined to recognize the armistice, hostilities before the town had continued throughout Dec. and Jan., and Serbia sent repeated reinforcements to the aid of the Montenegrins.

Resumed Hostilities

When war was resumed on Feb. 3 the brunt fell upon Bulgaria, and the Serbs, being complete masters of Macedonia, were free to contribute 47,000 men and a siege train of 38 guns to the operations against Adrianople, which held out until March 26. The dispute which arose as to whether Shukri Pasha had surrendered to the Bulgarians or to the Serbs, was in itself quite unprofitable, but was a symptom of the friction which was daily increasing between the two allies. Gen. Stepanovie, who commanded the Serbian contingent, was allowed to pass through Sofia with his staff, without a single greeting, and on April 16 Bulgaria renewed the armistice with Turkey, without waiting for her allies. The final phase of the war concentrated round Scutari, which Montenegro and Serbia made desperate efforts to reduce. Even the announcement that the council of ambassadors, in fixing the frontiers of the new Albanian State, had definitely included Scutari (while leaving Dibra, Prizren, Pee [Ipek] and Djakovo to the two Serb kingdoms) only served as an incentive to create if possible a. fresh fait accompli. But Austria-Hungary upheld her veto, and on March 20 addressed a severe note to Montenegro, reproaching her for the murder of a Bosnian Franciscan and other incidents, and at the same time dispatched a strong naval squadron to the southern Adriatic. Her next step was to urge upon the Powers a collective demand for the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of the Montenegrin and Serbian forces from the territory assigned to Albania, and to threaten the use of force unless at least the civil population of Scutari were allowed to leave the town (March 23). This demand was supported by Britain, partly in order to avert a conflict, and was conceded: but the close support of Cetinje by Belgrade rendered the danger of Austro-Hungarian intervention increasingly acute. On March 31 the Powers ordered Montenegro to cease hostilities, and on her refusal established a naval blockade of her strip of coast. This seemingly illusory measure at least had the effect of restraining Austria-Hungary, who could not act separately so long as the Powers held together. It was, however, simply defied by King Nicholas, who gained time by consenting to the withdrawal of the Serbian troops and meanwhile closed the frontier and conducted secret negotiations with Essad Pasha, commandant of the town since the assassination of Hasan Riza on March 30. On April 23 Scutari surrendered to the Montenegrins, and the Powers had difficulty in restraining Austria-Hungary from immediate action. What finally decided her appears to have been the knowledge that her seizure of Mount Lovicen (Lovchen), the key to Cetinje, would be followed by Italy's occupation of Valona, with its control of the entrance to the Adriatic.

Amid the countless rival intrigues the Powers presented in public a unanimous front, and on May 14 the Montenegrins found themselves obliged to surrender Scutari to Adml. Burney, as commander of the international fleet. Negotiations could now be resumed in London for a general peace (May 20), and the Powers found it easier to take a strong line. Before the delegates could be brought to business, it was necessary for Sir E. Grey to inform them, with quite undiplomatic bluntness, that unless they were prepared to conclude peace without further delay they had better leave London altogether. By the Treaty of London, which was signed on May 30 1913, and only contained seven brief articles, Turkey ceded to the four allies conjointly the island of Crete and all territory lying to the west of the Enos - Midia line, and all the contracting parties agreed to refer the settlement of Albania and the Aegean Islands to the five European Great Powers, and all financial questions to the International Commission convoked in Paris.

The Dispute between the Allies

The Balkan allies were now faced by the thorny problem of dividing the spoils. Macedonian autonomy, which the treaty had laid down as the ideal solution, was from the first abandoned by all parties. Their success, as it had far exceeded their expectations, also increased their appetites and encouraged them to extend their claims. Thus while Serbia found herself in effective possession of most of Macedonia, and remembered the imperial traditions of Stephen Dusan, Bulgaria saw the possibility of acquiring Adrianople and Thrace, and not content with the " Big Bulgaria " of the Treaty of San Stefano, dreamed of " the four seas " (the Adriatic as well as the Black, Aegean and Marmora). The four Governments seemed each bent upon annexing a maximum of territory, and thus too often became the tools of Powers whose ambitious plans of political and military equilibrium they had unconsciously upset. Above all, the long delays in restoring peace stabilized the various regimes of occupation and proved fatal to mutual understanding. Between Bulgaria and Greece there was no territorial bargain, and no obvious means of reaching one, while Serbia as early as Jan. 23 formally raised the question of a revision of the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty. This rested on the argument that Serbia was entitled to compensation for four reasons - (i) that she had furnished her ally with military support far in excess of her bargain, (2) that she had absolved Bulgaria from her military obligations in Macedonia, (3) that she had loyally continued the war three months after her own work was done, and (4) that the acquisition of Adrianople by Bulgaria radically modified the basis upon which the bargain rested. But if Serbia's attitude is to be justified, it must be on the broader ground that events had transformed the situation still further to her disadvantage in another direction. Her two parallel aims in the war had been the political liberation of her kinsmen under Turkish rule, and her own economic emancipation by means of free access to the sea; and from the practical rather than the sentimental standpoint the second was much the more vital. Her whole calculation centred upon securing the Sanjak, Kosovo and a link with Montenegro, and a port in northern Albania (as the best substitute for access through Herzegovina); and when Austria-Hungary imposed her veto upon the latter, the Vardar valley became Serbia's only possible alternative outlet, and this involved her retention of Veles, Prilep, Monastir and Okhrida as well as the " disputed zone." That Vienna deliberately aimed at thus embroiling Serbia and Bulgaria is shown by the fact that during the earlier Albanian negotiations Count Berchtold had offered to Serbia the whole of the Vardar valley with Salonika itself, if she would renounce her Adriatic claims. Bulgaria, on her side, insisted on the literal interpretation of the treaty and showed herself indifferent to Serbia's difficulties on the west.

Meanwhile Russia had made every effort to avert a conflict, Sazonov going so far as to express regret at the Serbo-Greek negotiations (April 17), while warning Bulgaria of possible danger from Rumania, in the event of aggression against Serbia (April 28). On April 30 the Russian ministers in Sofia and Belgrade simultaneously reminded the two allies of their obligation to submit disputes to Russian arbitration. But Sazonov's success in settling a Bulgaro-Rumanian frontier dispute had only served to render Sofia more unyielding, and on May 19 the Bulgarian commander-in-chief wrote to the premier, assuming war with Serbia and Greece to be inevitable, and urging concentration against the former. The pressure very rightly brought to bear by Sir E. Grey upon the peace delegates in favour of the Treaty of London was misinterpreted by the Bulgarians (who alone had any motive for haste) as a guarantee of that Treaty against Turkey, and as dispensing them from the need of guarding their eastern frontier. They were still further encouraged by the openly Serbophobe tone of the official press in Vienna and Budapest: and King Ferdinand had already ordered Gen. Savo y to hasten the transference of the army from the Thracian to the Macedonian front, when on May 27 Pasic, under pressure from the Serbian opposition, publicly committed his Government to the demand for treaty revision. This hastened the resignation of the pacific Gesov, behind whose back King Ferdinand was already concerting aggressive action. Before he went, Gesov, under strong Russian pressure, met Pa g e a Tsaribrod (June 1) and agreed to Russia's proposal for a meeting of Balkan premiers at St. Petersburg; but a further proposal for the immediate reduction of the allied armies to a third, though accepted by Serbia and Greece, failed owing to the impossible conditions put forward by Gen. Savo y. Gesov's successor, Dr. Danev, opposed the meeting of the premiers, contended that Russia had already prejudged the case by even considering revision, and relied increasingly upon AustriaHungary. That his confidence was not ungrounded is shown by Count Berchtold's assurance to Rumania in May that the Dual Monarchy was ready to defend Bulgaria " even by force of arms."' Serbia and Greece on their part were fully alive to the danger; there had been informal talks between Venizelos and Novakovic in London, and between Prince Alexander of Serbia and Prince Nicholas of Greece in January and March at Salonika. After the accession of King Constantine, a less conciliatory mood prevailed in Athens and Belgrade, each of whom in turn made secret overtures to Rumania for a defensive alliance, but without success (April 19, June 8). Their own agreement was hastened by the common danger, and the Serbo-Greek military convention of May 14 was revised on June i and supplemented by a definite treaty of alliance for io years. While the first of these provided for mutual military support in case of a Bulgarian attack upon either ally, the second extended the casus foederis to an attack by a third Power, " in circumstances envisaged by the Treaty of Alliance between Greece and Serbia." Both the wording and the events of the moment make it clear that the intention was to guard against an Austro-Hungarian attack upon Serbia; in 1913 King Constantine took this risk, but in 1915 he was to deny its application.

On June 8 the Russian Government made its supreme effort for peace, by inducing the Tsar to address a personal appeal to the kings of Serbia and Bulgaria, which closed with the warning that " the first to make war would be responsible before the Slav cause." King Peter's courteous though somewhat ambiguous answer was never published; but that of King Ferdinand, which threw the entire blame upon Serbia and argued that the Bulgarian claim had long been admitted by Russia, was a fresh blow to the cause of peace. On June 13 the Powers made a joint demarche at Sofia and Belgrade in favour of demobilization, but Bulgaria imposed the impossible condition of a preliminary joint occupation of the disputed territory. Her attitude stiffened still further after the speech of the new Hungarian premier, Count Tisza, who emphasized the right of the Balkan States to settle differences in their own way - even by war - and declared that Austria-Hungary could not allow any other Power to acquire special prerogatives in the peninsula (June 19). As a natural result, Russia's fresh proposals for a conference of Balkan premiers in St. Petersburg, while promptly accepted by Belgrade and Athens, were met by Dr. Danev with a reiterated demand for joint occupation, and a virtual ultimatum giving Russia a week in which to pronounce as arbiter and 48 hours to announce compliance with the request. With Sazonov's sharp reply bidding Bulgaria to expect nothing more from Russia, St. Petersburg's influence over Sofia may be said to have ended. Count Tarnowski, the Austro-Hungarian minister in Sofia, was supreme in the counsels of King Ferdinand during the critical fortnight that followed. The deadlock was complete, when on June 22 the Serbian Cabinet was driven to resign, owing to the resentment of the military party at its alleged moderation. The most it could do was to place itself unreservedly in Russia's hands, and when this was endorsed by the Skupstina after a stormy secret session Pasic resumed office (June 26). But Russia was by this time powerless to avert the catastrophe.

The Second Balkan War

On the night of June 29, without previous declaration of war, the Bulgarian armies made an almost simultaneous attack upon the Serbs and Greeks. Their extended order and lack of proper reserves showed how greatly they had underestimated their enemy, and Gen. Savo y is credibly reported to have declared that he could cut through the Serbs like " a knife through rotten cheese." But the Serbian generalissimo, Gen. Putnik, was fully alive to the Bulgarian preparations, and in confidential orders to his commanding officers had warned them that the Bulgars would " use their amicable relations with us " for a surprise attack. In point of fact, on certain sectors those who carried out this " stab in the back " had been dining only a few hours earlier 1 Prince Fi rstenberg to Take Jonescu, who published the facts in La Roumanie, Dec. 15 1914.

with their Serbian comrades across the lines. It is probable that Savov did not aim at regular war, but hoped by a sudden shock to drive a wedge between Serbs and Greeks, seize the coveted districts of Macedonia and then hold them until the foreign intervention which he believed to be imminent should settle the dispute on a basis of " bea.ti possidentes." This is borne out, not merely by captured despatches, but by the amazing fact that when Putnik's forces everywhere held their own, Savov on July i telegraphed the order to stop hostilities. But the war so lightly begun could no longer be stopped. That afternoon the Serbian counter-offensive opened, and a proclamation of King Peter, prepared some weeks previously in Belgrade, with a blank space for insertion of the date, was issued to the troops. The desperate struggle which continued almost uninterruptedly from July i to 9 is known as the battle of the B regalnica (Bregalnitsa), though it actually extended over a much wider front. At its close the Bulgarians found themselves cut into two by the inaccessible Plaskovica Mts., and were obliged not merely to relax their hold upon the Vardar valley at Krivolak, but to abandon the whole Ovicepolje (Ovche Polye) district, the strategic key to central Macedonia.

It appears certain that the original attack took place without the knowledge of the Danev Cabinet and contrary to its unanimous decision.' But that the premier was contemplating war at an early date is shown by his request that Vienna should ascertain whether the Turtucaia-Balcik (Balchik) line would buy Rumania's neutrality (June 28) and by his warning to the Rumanian minister that Serbian resistance would be over before Rumania could complete her mobilization (July I). That there were two parallel policies in Sofia is further shown by the fact that on the very day of the request to Vienna the Rumanian Government officially informed Bulgaria that it would not remain neutral in the event of war. During the mutual recriminations that followed defeat, Dr. Danev publicly asserted (1) that Count Tarnowsky had already given assurances to King Ferdinand that Austro-Hungarian troops would re-occupy the Sanjak in the event of a Serbo-Bulgarian war, and (2) that on June 26 a treaty was signed between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, by which the latter bound herself, in the event of an AustroSerbian or an Austro-Russian war, to mobilize enough troops to paralyse Serbia's action, while Austria-Hungary in her turn undertook to prevent, either by diplomatic or military action, any attack of Rumania upon Bulgaria in the event of the latter becoming involved in war with the allies, and even to intervene herself, should the war take a turn unfavourable to Bulgaria. These assertions have never been contradicted: the first coincides with the known facts, but for the second documentary evidence is as yet lacking. The memorandum addressed by Radoslavov and Genadiev to King Ferdinand on July 6 - advocating a close accord with Austria-Hungary as the sole hope of averting disaster - neither proves nor disproves the existence of an alliance, for they may well have written in ignorance of a secret compact; but it should have served as an index to the attitude of those statesmen in 1915.

The Treaty of Bucharest

By July 17 the Serbs had forced back the Bulgarians at all points to the frontier of 1912, and could henceforth adopt a mainly defensive attitude; but on July 16 Rumania declared war and began to throw troops across the Danube, while on July 15 the Porte repudiated the provisions of the Treaty of London and ordered Enver Pasha to advance upon Adrianople.

The frantic appeals of Sofia to the Powers to enforce upon Turkey respect for a treaty concluded under their auspices were disregarded, and Western public opinion was not inclined to save Bulgaria from the consequences of her own act. At the same time the entry of two new combatants greatly complicated Austria-Hungary's designs of intervention. She was held back by both her allies - Italy, who viewed with alarm the Balkan activities of any outside power and was determined to insist upon compensation, and Germany, who feared the loss of Rumania for the Triple Alliance, and the consequent derange ' Gesov, The Balkan League, p. 92.

ment of the military balance in Europe. William II. was further influenced by a triple personal motive - the appeal of his brotherin-law King Constantine, old friendship for King Charles, and active dislike for King Ferdinand. This momentary divergence of view between Vienna and Berlin sealed Bulgaria's fate: though Vienna and St. Petersburg united to hold back Rumania from occupying Sofia or claiming the Ruscuk (Ruschuk)-Varna line. Bulgaria had no course left but to sign an armistice on July 31 and to open peace negotiations at Bucharest with her four Christian neighbours. This apparent emancipation of the smaller Powers from the European concert's control decided Austria-Hungary in favour of belated action against Serbia. But on Aug. 9 the Italian Government made it clear to Vienna that it would not recognize the casus foederis of the Triple Alliance as applicable to such a case; 2 and the combined pressure of Rome and Berlin, coupled with the certainty of Russian aid to Serbia, again averted war at the last moment.

The Treaty of Bucharest, signed on Aug. 10, gave to Rumania the Turtucaia-Balcik line, deprived Bulgaria of almost all her conquests in Macedonia and left her to settle the fate of Thrace as best she could with Turkey. Serbia acquired all Macedonia to the W. of the Vardar, and to the E. the districts of Stip (Istib or Shtip) and Kocana; but at the last moment Bulgaria was left in possession of a dangerous salient at Strumnica (Strumitsa), which enabled her to threaten Serbia's only railway connexion with the Aegean. The new Serbo-Greek frontier had already been fixed by mutual agreement, and ran from Gjevgjeli (Gyevgyeli or Gevgeli) (30 m. N. of Salonika) to the S.E. corner of the Lake of Okhrida, leaving Florina and most of the Monastir-Salonika railway to the Greeks. The Treaty of Constantinople, which was concluded between Bulgaria and Turkey on Sept. 29 and deprived the former of the greater part of Thrace, did not directly concern Serbia; but the indifference shown by her and her new allies, and still more by Britain and Russia, to Turkey's violation of a treaty which was their joint work and indeed was morally binding upon them, was to be dearly paid for by Bulgaria's attitude in the World War.

The treaties marked a new orientation in the Near East. Slav cooperation was replaced by mutual hatred, which promptly threw defeated Bulgaria into the arms of Turkey and predisposed both for an alliance with Berlin; Rumania's ties with the Triple Alliance were sensibly loosened, while Greece was drawn in two directions by dynastic attractions and party rancours. The military balance had undoubtedly been altered to the disadvantage of the Triple Alliance, yet it was to William II. that King Charles addressed a cordial telegram on the conclusion of peace, " which thanks to you remains definitive," and it was to the joint efforts of France and Germany that Greece owed Kavalla.

The Albanian Conflict. - Austria-Hungary now concentrated her attention upon Albania, and thereby rendered still more acute the relations between Serbs and Albanians. In the past three decades the latter had been rapidly ousting the former from the historic territories of Kosovo, Prizren and Decani (Dechani), and now tried to justify present possession by a claim as autochthonous owners of the soil. The mountainous and inaccessible character of these borderlands and the extreme backwardness of their population made a guerrilla warfare almost inevitable; and the summons addressed to Belgrade by the Great Powers for the withdrawal of the Serbian troops (Aug. 19) was a signal for further trouble. Late in Sept. there was a formidable Albanian rising, and the insurgents, aided by numerous bands from beyond the frontier and armed with foreign rifles, seized Dibra and even Okhrida, and forced Serbia to remobilize the Morava division and many of her reserves. In order to prevent fresh raids, the Serbs occupied certain strategic points in Albania, and this gave Austria-Hungary excuse for a sharp warning. Thus for the first fortnight of October there was once more acute friction between Vienna and Belgrade. At last Serbia accepted the inevitable and with 2 The essential facts were first revealed by Signor Giolitti in the Italian Parliament in Dec. 1914.

drew her troops, but covered her retreat by a note to the Great Powers, begging them to enjoin upon their Albanian protégés a respect for the frontiers created for their benefit (1804). Even after this crisis was over, Count Berchtold made further trouble for Serbia by steadily opposing her Government's very natural desire to take over, so far as Serbian territory was concerned, the shares of the Orient railway hitherto owned by Austrian subjects. Vienna's permanent ill-will was further revealed by attempts to block the conclusion of a concordat between Serbia and the Vatican.' By Christmas 1913 the situation in Old Serbia 2 was rapidly becoming normal, but the administration in the new territory left much to be desired, and the closing of Bulgarian schools, the expulsion of Exarchist clergy and occasional excesses against the Moslem population caused serious unrest and discontent. The Pa g e administration became absorbed in defending itself against the increasingly violent onslaughts of the Opposition. In Dec. 1913 and again on June 2 1914 it resigned, but eventually remained in office. On March 4 the Opposition had withdrawn from the Chamber as a protest against alleged unconstitutional action of the Government in budget matters. But though the tension was increased by the activities of a powerful military clique known as " The Black Hand " and by the sudden and arbitrary seizure of its club premises by the masterful Minister of the Interior, Protic, the Government was still in office in the summer. The visit of Crown Prince Alexander and Pasic to St. Petersburg early in February had given rise to rumours of a new Balkan League under Russian auspices; but the advent of Radoslavov to power in Sofia had really made any such plan impracticable, and King Charles of Rumania, though bent upon cooperation with Serbia and receiving the Tsar with special honours at Constanta (Constantsa), had no idea of breaking his connexion with the Triple Alliance.

The Assassination of the Archduke

On June 24 King Peter, incapacitated by ill-health, appointed Prince Alexander as Regent, and simultaneously dissolved Parliament, Pa g e having in April pledged himself to the election as for a " Great Skupstina " for constitutional changes. Only four days later the assassination of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife at Sarajevo revived the latent Austro-Serbian conflict in a more acute form than ever. The authors of the crime, Princip and Cabrinovic, belonged to a group of Bosnian Serb students, mostly under the age of 20, who gave terrorist expression to the universal discontent aroused by Austro-Hungarian repression throughout her Yugoslav provinces. The victories of Serbia during the Balkan Wars and the openly hostile policy pursued towards her by Vienna and Budapest had assured to her in the eyes of public opinion the position of the Yugoslav Piedmont. Thus no external incentive to the crime was needed: and the young hotheads were further swayed by sentimental considerations. The motive of the Archduke's visit was to conduct manoeuvres which had no meaning save as a rehearsal for a future campaign against Serbia: while the selection of " Vidovdan " (St. Vitus's Day - the anniversary of Kosovo) for his public reception in Sarajevo was regarded as a deliberate challenge to the Serb idea. It was, however, proved that the assassins had been in Belgrade and had been secretly smuggled across the Drina into Bosnia, after receiving hand grenades and revolvers from the Serbian Komitajis Major Tankosic and Ciganovic. On these facts the Ballplatz sought to establish the complicity of the Serbian Government, but for this no evidence has ever been produced. Indeed presumption overwhelmingly favours the opposite theory. The country was exhausted by two wars; the Albanian campaign in the previous autumn had shown the reluctance of the peasant soldiers to return to the colours, and it was now the eve of harvest. Military stocks were alarmingly 1 This statesmanlike measure was negotiated by Vesnic, the Serbian minister in Paris, and Gavrilovic (afterwards Yugoslav minister in London), aided by Bakutic, a Croat expert in canon law, from Sebenico.

2 Since 1912 this name was transferred to the original kingdom and the " Old Serbia " of Turkish times became " New Serbia." low, as the next winter was to show. The young Prince had only just assumed the reins of Government; the position of the Cabinet was shaky, and a fierce electoral campaign was opening. The Concordat with the Vatican had only just been signed, and delicate negotiations with Montenegro for a customs and military union and perhaps even a dynastic arrangement, were still pending. Serbia had every conceivable motive for avoiding aggressive action. After the tragedy, it is difficult to see what other course her Government could have pursued; its one omission was to offer a thorough inquiry, without waiting for any suggestion from Vienna. The situation was from the first envenomed by the press of Belgrade, Vienna and Budapest; but it is to be noted that while the former had always had an irresponsible and highly scurrilous section, which the Government was unable to restrain owing to the lack of any proper press or libel laws, the two latter had always been extremely sensitive to the directive of the Ballplatz, and the worst offences were committed by journals with the strongest official ties.

Austria-Hungary and Serbia

The ominous silence preserved by Austria-Hungary for nearly three weeks after the murder has been very largely explained by the documents published since the war by the Austrian and German republican Governments. From memoranda on Balkan policy prepared for Count Berchtold during May 1914, and re-drafted by him personally both before and after the murder, it is evident that AustriaHungary was pressing upon Germany the need for clearing up the situation with Rumania, and for attaching Bulgaria to the Triple Alliance, and that Germany wished to use Bucharest as a bridge between Vienna and Belgrade, but dropped this idea after the tragedy. On July 2 Francis Joseph wrote to William II. that the main basis of Austro-Hungarian policy must be the isolation of Serbia, and " her elimination as a political factor in the Balkans," again advocated alliance with Bulgaria and proposed that Rumania should he warned that the friends of Serbia cannot be the friends of Austria-Hungary and Germany. 3 On reading the letter the Emperor William said that he must be prepared for European complications and must therefore talk with his Chancellor; but he at once authorized Count SzOgyeny to inform Francis Joseph that he might reckon upon Germany's full support " even in this case," and he urged that if there was to be an advance into Serbia, it should be at once, especially as Russia was certain to be hostile, though unprepared for war (July 5). 4 Next day Herr von Bethmann Hollweg instructed the German minister in Sofia to cooperate with his Austro-Hungarian colleague in favour of the Bulgarian alliance, and the German minister in Bucharest to announce Germany's abandonment of all idea of agreement with Serbia. That Germany gave carte blanche to Austria-Hungary has been vehemently denied by Bethmann Hollweg in his Memoirs, but is admitted in so many words in the preface to the official German White Book,' and is proved by Herr von Tschirschky's assurances to Francis Joseph on July 2, by the instructions which he received from William II. and Bethmann Hollweg, and by William's letter of July 14 to Francis Joseph s As early as July 8, Tschirschky reported to Berlin Berchtold's intention of drafting an ultimatum in such a form that " its acceptance seems out of the question," 7 and not merely is there no trace of Berlin rebuking this tendency, but there are repeated signs of impatience in Berlin at Vienna's delays. Not merely was the full initiative left to Vienna, 8 but on July 12 there was a joint decision between Vienna and Berlin not to inform Italy of their intentions, but to place her before " an irretrievable situation." 9 In Vienna the onl y counsels of moderation came from the Hungarian premier, Count Tisza, who at the Crown Goos, Das Wiener Kabinett and die Entstehung des Weltkrieges, p. 29.

4 Ibid., p. 31.

P. 5 (Authorized English Edition).

s Die Deutschen Dokumente, Nos. II, 15, 26.

Ibid., No. 19.

8 Goos, op. cit., p. 44.

9 Diplomatische Aktenstiicke (Republik Oesterreich) i., p. 51 (No. 16).

Council of July 7 opposed Count Berchtold and declined to admit war to be inevitable. He deprecated a surprise attack, without previous diplomatic action, as likely to place AustriaHungary in a bad light before Europe and rally the Balkan States against her; he favoured harsh, but not impossible (unerfiillbar) demands upon Serbia, and even if their refusal should lead to war, he would not favour Serbia's complete annihilation, partly because Russia would then be forced to intervene, and partly because as Hungarian premier he could not sanction annexations at Serbia's expense. (Here he was following the traditional Hungarian view that the inclusion of further Sla y s in the Dual Monarchy was a menace to Magyar supremacy in Hungary.) All the other ministers present - viz. the three joint ministers, Berchtold, Bilinski, and Krobatin, the Austrian premier Count Stiirgkh and the chiefof-staff Baron Conrad - were agreed that a mere diplomatic success, even if it led to the public humiliation of Serbia, would be worthless, and that demands must be addressed to her such as would render rejection, and consequent military action, probable. By threatening to resign, Count Tisza carried his point that there should be no mobilization until the ultimatum had been rejected.' His attitude is clearly revealed by two memoranda which he addressed to Francis Joseph on July i and 8. In the first he condemns Berchtold's idea of using Sarajevo as an excuse for the final reckoning with Serbia as " a fatal blunder," but begs Francis Joseph to make every effort to overcome William's " prejudice in favour of Serbia." From the second it transpires that it was " the satisfactory assurances " of Berlin which had decided all Tisza's colleagues in favour of war with Serbia. He himself dissents, and insists that Serbia must be given a chance of escape, though only through severe diplomatic defeat. This is necessary in order to avoid complications with Italy, to ensure Britain's sympathy and to enable Russia to remain inactive. 2 On July 14, however, after full discussion with Berchtold, Tisza called upon Tschirschky and announced that " he had abandoned his original doubts and is quite in accord with energetic action," 3 and that " the note will be so drafted that its acceptance may be virtually ruled out." 4 Berchtold on his side informed Tschirschky that Tisza had not merely come round to his view, but had " in certain points introduced a stiffening." On July 15, in answering an interpellation, Tisza denied that war was inevitable, but significantly added that a State which does not regard war as ultima ratio cannot maintain itself as a State. Thus while Tisza must be credited with statesmanship such as was signally lacking in his colleagues, his final decision and his subsequent zeal in the conduct of war make it impossible to claim him or his Government as unwilling actors in the great struggle, just as it is beyond dispute that the Magyar policy towards Croatia and the nationalities was a foremost factor in provoking the Austro-Serbian conflict which actually fired that train.

The Ultimatum to Serbia

A further proof of Germany's failure to exercise a restraining influence on her ally is afforded by the detailed note presented on July 20 by the Serbian charge d'affaires in Berlin to Herr von Jagow, expressing the strongest detestation of the murder, the desire for friendly relations with Austria-Hungary and a readiness to meet all such demands as might be compatible with State independence.' Jagow, however, deliberately refrained from taking up the note's concluding appeal for friendly intervention in Vienna, and there is no evidence to show that he even reported to Count Berchtold the Serbian appeal, while on the contrary he ignored King Charles's offer of mediation on July 50. The secret of the ultimatum was jealously guarded, and the long delay, created, as was intended, a false sense of security in some quarters. Its delivery at Belgrade, which took place at 6 P.M. on July 23, was carefull y timed for the moment after President Poincare's departure from St. Petersburg after his State visit, the object ' Goos, op. cit., pp. 53-62.

3 Goos, pp. 62-70.

3 Diplomatische Aktenstiicke 5, No. 23.

4 Die Deutschen Dokumente, No. 49.

5 Die Deutschen Dokumente, No. 86.

being to eliminate the chances of French mediation. The ultimatum, after reminding the Serbian Government of its formal undertakings of March 31 5909, charged it with " culpable tolerance " of terrorist propaganda directed against AustriaHungary and blamed Serbian officers and functionaries with planning the Sarajevo murders. It therefore demanded that the " Narodna Odbrana " (League of National Defence) and any similar society guilty of anti-Austrian propaganda should be dissolved, that objectionable passages should be expunged from Serbian educational works, that all officers or officials whom Austria-Hungary might name as guilty of propaganda should be dismissed, and that the Belgrade Government should not merely arrest certain specified persons charged with complicity, but should order the trial of others, allow Austro-Hungarian delegates to take part in the inquiry and accept the collaboration of Austro-Hungarian officials " in the suppression of the subversive movement." The general impression produced by this document upon European opinion is best summarized in the words of Sir E. Grey, who telegraphed the next day to Sir M. de Bunsen, that he " had never before seen one State address to another independent State a document of so formidable a character." The fifth demand in particular (that of collaboration), he pointed out, " would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Serbia's independent sovereignty." 6 None the less, Serbia in her reply actually consented to " such collaboration as agrees with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure and with good neighbourly relations." Only on one point did she reply in the negative; the share of Austro-Hungarian officials in the actual inquiry would, it was argued, be a violation of the constitution and the criminal code, but even this could be met by " communications in concrete cases." On all other points there was unqualified submission, and in certain respects, such as the offer to introduce legislation for fuller control of the press and to stiffen frontier regulations regarding weapons, the answer went much further than had been demanded. As a final proof of sincerity, Serbia offered to submit any outstanding points to the decision of the Hague Tribunal or even to the Great Powers which had imposed upon her the declaration of March 35 5909.7 Thus Serbia is found for the third time in six years offering to submit herself to the verdict of the Hague - the two previous occasions being the Bosnian crisis and the Friedjung trial - and each time it is Austria-Hungary who rejects the proposal. Three days later, as a last resort, the Serbian Government informed the Italian Foreign Minister that it was even prepared to swallow the whole note, " if only some explanation were given regarding the mode in which Austrian agents would require to intervene," and went so far as to offer to accept these explanations from a third party, if AustriaHungary was not disposed to give them to Serbia direct.8 Austria-Hungary had demanded an answer to her note by 6 P.M. on July 25, thus leaving a period of 48 hours for either reply or mediation. The official documents published in Berlin and Vienna since the war make it abundantly clear that the Ballplatz deliberately couched the note in such terms as to be unacceptable; but even in 1914 this was obvious from its tenor and from the significant fact that Baron Giesl, who received the Serbian answer from Pasic a quarter of an hour before the expiry of the time limit, instantly handed him a fresh note announcing the rupture of diplomatic relations and the immediate departure of himself and his staff. Moreover the text of the answer was kept secret in Vienna for several days, until a sarcastic commentary could be added; and Belgrade, presumably owing to the confusion which prevailed there, appears to have taken no steps to bring it promptly to the notice of the other Powers.' This is the more regrettable, since even William II. (to judge from his marginal notes on 6 British Diplomatic Correspondence, No. 5. 7 British Diplomatic Correspondence, No. 39. s British Diplomatic Correspondence, No. 64. 9 e.g. it was communicated to Sir E. Grey by the Serbian minister on the same day on which it reached London through the Austrian embassy with Count Berchtold's comments.

diplomatic documents, as published since the Revolution) was impressed by the moderation of the Serbs, regarded Vienna's essential wishes as fulfilled and expressed the view that Giesl ought to have remained in Belgrade. His ministers, however, had failed to support Sir E. Grey's proposal for a prolongation of the time limit, and were thus responsible for bringing Russia into action. On July 27 the Tsar replied to a despairing appeal of the Prince Regent for assistance to Serbia, by a telegram strongly urging him to " neglect no step which might lead to a settlement," but conveying the assurance that " Russia will in no case disinterest herself in the fate of Serbia." 1 On July 28 Austria-Hungary formally declared war upon Serbia, and on the same day rejected the Russian proposal for a friendly exchange of views between Vienna and St. Petersburg.2 Henceforward the Austro-Serbian quarrel is merged in the larger diplomatic conflict between Alliance and Entente. Due stress ought, however, to be laid upon one of Sir Edward Grey's many efforts to avert war even at the last moment. On July 29 he received Count Mensdorff's assurance that Austria-Hungary " had no idea of territorial aggrandisement," and when he hinted that there were other means of turning Serbia " into a sort of vassal state," received the rejoinder " that before the Balkan War Serbia had always been regarded as being in the Austrian sphere of influence." 3 Undeterred by this ominous attitude, Sir Edward on July 30 put forward the proposal that Austria-Hungary, after occupying Belgrade, should cease her advance and consent to discussions with Russia, who otherwise could not be expected to " suspend military preparations." 4 In other words, Belgrade would become a kind of pledge in Vienna's hands for the attainment of a satisfactory settlement. The elaborate dispute regarding the Russian and German mobilizations has hitherto obscured the essential fact that on July 31 Francis Joseph definitely, almost petulantly, refused the British proposal as transmitted through Berlin,' thereby rendering the military action of St. Petersburg inevitable.

The Outbreak of War. - When Baron Giesl presented the ultimatum, Pasic had been absent electioneering in the provinces; but he at once returned to Belgrade, and on July 25 mobilization was ordered, and the seat of Government and the archives were hastily transferred to Nish. In view of so grave a crisis elections became impossible, and as parliamentary sanction was more than ever necessary, the Government had no other course than to ignore the fact of dissolution and to call the previous Skupstina once more into existence. At its first meeting in Nish on Aug. 1, the entire Opposition endorsed the Government's action, and for the moment party life was in abeyance. Parliament also ratified the Concordat with the Vatican and a law ensuring to Catholicism full freedom of worship in Serbia. There was an unexpected delay in the invasion of Serbia, and it was not till Aug. 12 that the first Austro-Hungarian troops crossed the Drina and the Save. After 12 days of desperate fighting (known as the battle of the Jader) the invaders were thrown back across the frontier, this being the first definite Allied victory. Unduly elated by this success and by the news of Russia's rapid advance in Galicia, the Serbs were now led to underestimate Austria-Hungary's resources, and encouraged by the Allies, passed to the offensive early in September. Their rash invasion of Syrmia - a necessary preliminary to any successful penetration of Bosnia from the east - soon proved beyond their strength and had to be abandoned by Sept. 13; and the joyous welcome everywhere accorded to them by the population merely brought down a cruel vengeance on its head when the Austro-Hungarian army returned. A further mistake was made in attempting to hold the rich but strategically indefensible Macva (Machva) district, doubtless owing to the horrid excesses committed there by the enemy during their first inroad. None the less the Serbs were able to check a second Austrian advance across ' Serbian Blue Book, Nos. 37 and 43. 2 Russian Orange Book, No. 25, and British Diplomatic Correspondence, No. 93. 3 British Diplomatic Correspondence, No. 91. 4 Ibid., Nos. 103 and Ito. 5 Die Deutschen Dokumente, No. 482. the Drina in mid-September. But on Nov. 6 General Potiorek began a third invasion in great force, and during the next month steadily pressed back the Serbian forces into the heart of their country. The danger was aggravated by shortage of ammunition, and when at last the necessary supplies began to arrive, a large force of Bulgarians armed with machine-guns and acting with the connivance of Sofia, raided the Vardar railway from the Strumnica salient and destroyed an important bridge on the only line by which the new guns could be moved up to the front. The enforced evacuation of Belgrade on Nov. 29 revealed the extremity of the danger, and brought the latent political crisis to a head. On Dec. 5 the purely Radical Cabinet resigned and was succeeded on Dec. 13 by a Coalition Government, in which Pasic remained premier, but the leaders of all parties save the Liberals received portfolios. It was however in this blackest week that the Skupstina unanimously endorsed the Government's declaration that its foremost war aim was " the liberation and union of all our Serb, Croat and Slovene brethren not yet set free." This was the first public step of Serbia in favour of Yugoslav unity.

Serbia after the Austrian Rout

With the arrival of munitions from the West the army's flagging spirits revived, and the brilliant offensive initiated on Dec. 2 by Gen. Mike and the ist Army resulted, after a twelve days' battle along the whole front, in the complete rout of Potiorek. By Dec. 14 Serbian soil was for the third time entirely free from invaders, and an enormous booty was captured. But the enemy left deadly infection behind him, and by the early spring of 1915 exhausted Serbia was immobilized by a typhus epidemic which is estimated to have caused about 300,000 deaths among the civil population. A notable part in checking its ravages was played by Lady Paget as head of the Serbian Relief Fund units in Skoplje, and by Col. Hunter and a R.A.M.C. detachment, who organized a scheme of disinfection on the whole Serbian railway system. The latter step appears to have been taken in view of the possibility of Allied troops being employed upon the Danube, an idea which receded from the general design, in proportion as the Austro-German recovery in Galicia became more marked. Serbia's negative role during 1915 was due not only to exhaustion but to considerations of high policy. The attitude of Bulgaria was from the first extremely equivocal, and Serbia, had she listened to certain ill-considered pleas for a fresh offensive into Hungary, would have been at any moment liable to an attack from the rear, unless she could rely upon Greece or the Allies to hold Bulgaria in check. Meanwhile the Entente was eagerly working for the intervention of Italy and of Bulgaria, neither of whom could receive adequate satisfaction save at the expense of Serbian aspirations. During the winter pressure was repeatedly brought to bear upon Nish to make territorial concessions to Bulgaria in Macedonia; but the one and only condition upon which Serbia could safely have considered this - namely, that the Allies should guarantee Yugoslav unity in the event of victory - was precluded by their parallel negotiations with Italy, whose official policy it was to prevent, not to further, Yugoslav unity, and to whom by the Treaty of London, concluded on April 26 1915, no less than 700,000 Yugosla y s were assigned. The fact that this treaty's concealment from Serbia was made an absolute condition by Rome, did not tend to diminish the reserve of the Nish Government, who almost immediately learned the essential facts through Mr. Supilo's discoveries in official circles at Petrograd. The Serbs, who were not formally recognized as Allies by the Western Powers, were more conscious than ever of the value to them of the Vardar valley, which would form part of any serious concessions to Bulgaria; and they were from the first sceptical as to the possibility of winning over Bulgaria, whom they believed to be tied to Vienna and Berlin by a secret compact. They were further handicapped by the attitude of Greece, who in the autumn of 1914 exercised her right of veto, under the Serbo-Greek Treaty, upon any cession of territory to Bulgaria and was prepared to demand Monastir as compensation. This attitude could not be ignored at a period when Greece was still ready to intervene on the side of the Allies, and when even King Constantine had firmly rejected William II.'s suggestion that he should fall upon Serbia and tear up the Treaty of Bucharest. What changed the views of both Athens and Sofia was simply the unfavourable turn in the military fortunes of the Allies. As long as the Bulgarians thought that the Dardanelles would be forced, their help could probably have been secured in return for the promise of Macedonia and the guarantee of an Allied occupation: what was lacking was the corresponding pledge to Serbia. The conclusion of a Bulgarian loan in Berlin in Feb. was the first sign of a change, and after March neutrality was the best that the Allies could hope for from Bulgaria, though she showed great skill in furthering Bulgarophil illusions in the West. Thus the concrete proposals addressed to Sofia by the Entente on May 29, over Serbia's head, came two months too late. The Radoslavov Cabinet now played for time, and while asking on June 15 for further details, concluded parallel negotiations with Turkey regarding the Thracian railway. On July 18 the official Narodni Prava spoke of the impossibility of Bulgaria keeping out of the war, and public opinion freely discussed the rival alternatives. The final reply of the Entente (Aug. 3) offered Bulgaria the " whole uncontested zone " of the treaty of 1913, with immediate occupation as far as the Vardar; discussion even of Skoplje and of the " contested zone " after peace; Seres at once and Kavalla in the future; and the Enos-Midia line in Thrace. The price was to be war upon Turkey. Greece at once protested, and the Emperor William urged his brotherin-law on no account to cede Kavalla. But the decisive factor was the fall of Warsaw on Aug. 8; not only public opinion, but the general staff now regarded Germany's triumph as inevitable. The Turco-Bulgarian agreement was initialed on the very day after the Allied note, and completed at the end of the month, and on Aug. 20 its negotiator, the Germanophil Zekov, replaced Ficeo as War Minister. Meanwhile the position of the Pasic Cabinet was extremely delicate. It loyally declined to discuss the indirect overtures made to it from Vienna, and stood officially for the programme of unity: but during the summer, yielding to pressure from the reactionaries in Petrograd, it showed a readiness to limit its claims to the territory generally regarded as purely Orthodox - viz. Banat, Syrmia, BosniaHerzegovina and South Dalmatia - and to leave the Catholic Croats and Slovenes to their fate. This scheme would have fitted in with Italian designs and with the Treaty of London, which envisaged three separate Slav States, an enlarged Serbia, an enlarged Montenegro and a reduced Croatia. Its weakness lay in the ignorance of its promoters; for even such a division would have left well over a million Catholics in " Orthodox " Serbia. Its failure, however, was above all due to the vigilance of Mr. Supilo and his colleagues of the Yugoslav committee.

The Conquest of Serbia

In the late summer the Serbian Government was unduly optimistic as to Greek and Rumanian intervention, and its disbelief in a German invasion was encouraged by Allied military opinion. Only three weeks before Mackensen crossed the Danube, Lord Kitchener, in conversation with a Serbian representative, gave his opinion that any action from the north was mere bluff. Hence though the Skupstina on Sept. 5 authorized the Government to make territorial concessions, Pasic adopted a waiting attitude. Bulgaria's mobilization, two days after the opening of the Austro-German bombardment along the river front, proved his calculations to have been correct. Yet even at this moment Allied opinion hoped that Bulgaria might enter on the Entente side, and therefore a veto was imposed upon the Serbian general staff's plan for an immediate attack upon Sofia before the Bulgarian army was ready (Sept. 27). Next day Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons announced that in the event of Bulgaria's aggression " we are prepared to give to our friends in the Balkans all the support in our power, in the manner that would be most welcome to them, in concert with our Allies, without reserve and without qualification." Relying on the fulfilment of this pledge, the Serbs devoted their main effort to checking the AustroGerman advance and remained on the defensive towards Bul garia. The danger was increased by King Constantine's repudiation of Greece's treaty obligations towards Serbia and the overthrow of Venizelos. That statesman, however, had enquired of the Allies as early as Sept. 23, whether, if Bulgaria declared war on Serbia, and if Greece asked Serbia to supply the 150,000 men stipulated by the Serbo-Greek Treaty for such a contingency, France and Britain would assume Serbia's obligation for her; and an affirmative answer was received within 48 hours. On Oct. 6, the rupture with Bulgaria was complete. The fatal delays in sending the promised troops, coupled with Allied insistence that the Serbs should hold back Mackensen to the last moment, belong to military history; but their results were eminently political. At the critical moment of the Bulgarian menace to the Nish-Salonika railway there were at Salonika not 150,000 Allied troops ready for action, but 35,000 French, and 13,000 British, the latter under strict injunctions from London not to cross the frontier into Serbia.' Nish was decorated to welcome Allies who never came. The whole Serbian plan of campaign collapsed, and the armies, losing control of the railway southwards, retired precipitately through the passes leading to the plain of Kosovo. General Sarrail, informed that he must not expect reinforcements, was forced to arrest his belated offensive northwards (Nov. 12) and soon to withdraw to the west of the Vardar. The Serbs were thus cut off from Allied help, lost Skoplje and only just escaped envelopment by the converging Austro-German and Bulgarian armies. The final retreat of the Serbian army and Government took place in the dead of winter across the inhospitable snow mountains of Albania and Montenegro to Scutari, Medua and Durazzo, a smaller section escaping southwards from Prizren and augmenting the Serbian forces south of Monastir. Fortunately, the general exodus of the civilian population was checked before it had gone too far; but the retreat stands out as one of the great tragedies of the war, and the loss of life which it involved must have far exceeded 100,000 and is estimated at twice that number by very sober authorities.' After dreadful sufferings the fugitives were conveyed by Allied transports to Corfu, which for the remainder of the war became the seat of the Serbian Government and a base for the convalescence and reorganization of the army. Notable assistance was rendered by British voluntary units, and some idea of the generous response of the British public to Serbia's need may be gathered from the fact that the Serbian Relief Fund from first to last collected over 1,000,000 in money and material, and employed over 700 workers in Serbia, Albania, Corfu, Salonika, Corsica, Biserta and France, while the Scottish Women's Hospitals under Dr. Elsie Inglis performed notable services for the Serbs both on the Balkan and the Russian fronts. The deaths of Mrs. Dearmer, Mrs. Harley (Lord French's sister), Mrs. Haverfield, Dr. Inglis herself and many others set a seal on the newfound friendship of the two nations.

Conquered Serbia was divided for administrative purposes between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, the latter holding the Timok, Nish, Skoplje and Macedonia: all that remained to the Serbs was a fragment of territory south of Monastir. Bulgaria now threw off the mask and officially declared the Serbian State to have ceased to exist. It therefore enrolled all men of military age throughout the occupied territory and in Feb. 1917 extended this to include the whole male population. It refused to recognize the Serbian Red Cross and took possession of the Serbian Legation in Sofia. All " ownerless " land was confiscated, all Serbian schools, law courts, and inscriptions were Bulgarized, libraries and collections were either destroyed or removed to Bulgaria, the Serbian clergy were evicted, and there were wholesale deportations. A formidable rising in the mountains behind Kursumlje (Kurshumlye) was brutally repressed, with over 2,000 executions (March 1 9 17). The war aims now repeatedly avowed by Sofia were the annexation not only of Macedonia, but of Kosovo and Prizren, and the whole upper Morava and Timok valleys: a common frontier with Hungary: the prevention See Gen. Sarrail, Mon commandement en Orient, p. 27.

2 G. Djuric, in Royal Statistical Journal, May 1919.

of Yugoslav unity and of Russia's acquisition of Constantinople: and (after Rumania's entry) the retention of the whole Dobruja. Dr. Radoslavov more than once proclaimed Bulgaria's resolve to keep all her conquests,' and his official organs declared that Serbia's reconstitution, " no matter under what form, would be a perpetual menace to Balkan peace " and will never be permitted. 2 Austria-Hungary showed much greater reserve, airing from time to time various alternative schemes for a vassal Southern Slav State under the Habsburgs, keeping Prince Mirko of Montenegro as a possible candidate for its throne and employing agents in Switzerland to sow dissension among the exiles.

The Serbs in Exile

Soon after the establishment of the Serbian Government at Corfu party rivalries began to revive. The deputies were scattered, living mostly on the Riviera, an independent press was impossible, and regular Allied subsidies made the Government virtually immune from serious democratic control. The supersession of the Voivode Putnik and almost all his staff caused great indignation, and though the whole Serbian Coalition must bear the responsibility, it was known to be the work of Pasic, and his masterful colleague in the Radical party, Protic, then still out of office. In Aug. 1916 an attempt is alleged to have been made upon the life of the Prince Regent at the front, and the Government, after vainly urging the Skupstina to institute a new form of courts-martial, proceeded in the winter - while the joint advance under Sarrail was crowned by the capture of Monastir from the Bulgarians - to order numerous arrests on a charge of conspiracy and murder. Among those implicated were the late governor of Macedonia, Gen. Popovic, the ex-War Minister Gen. Bojanovic, and several distinguished staff officers: many line officers known for their gallantry were placed on the retired list or confined to the island at Corfu.

The Conspiracy Trial which opened in Salonika in Jan. 1917 and was conducted behind the shelter of a strict military censorship, resulted in a death sentence upon nine Serbian officers, and notably of Col. Dimitrijevic, the head of a secret society known as " Union or Death," or more colloquially the Black Hand, whose chief aim had been to fan nationalist sentiments in the army. There is no doubt that " Apis," as Dimitrijevic was called throughout the Slavonic South, interfered unwarrantably in politics, and it is probable that he had his hand in the Sarajevo murder; but the lack of convincing evidence for the alleged conspiracy makes it probable that he was the victim of rival military and political cliques. Strong pressure of the Old Radical leaders forced the Prince Regent to sign three death warrants and to disregard appeals for mercy from the Western capitals. This trial revived all the old party dissensions: the reactionaries had triumphed on the very eve of the collapse of their chief support, the Tsarist Government. Pasic found himself between two fires - the need for a more democratic restatement of foreign policy, and the demand of the young Radical and Progressive parties for a revision of the Salonika trial. Refusal led to their withdrawal from the Cabinet, and its reconstruction on a purely Old Radical basis under Pasic and Protic. The last occasion when all parties cooperated was on July 20 1917, when the Declaration of Corfu, drawn up between Dr. Trumbic for the Yugoslav committee and Pasic for the Serbian Government, met with unanimous approval. Panic, having strengthened his position abroad by a visit to Paris and London, declined to convoke Parliament for four months after the legal period had expired. At last, as the result of a direct appeal of its President to the Crown, it met in Corfu on Feb. 12 1918; and the Government resigned, but after weeks of fruitless negotiation for a coalition ministry, was allowed to resume office. The Opposition, which numbered 60 as against 64 Old Radicals, still insisted on the revision of the trial and the transference of foreign affairs from Panic to their own candidate Draskovic; and in April, when the budget was introduced, they withdrew in a body from the Chamber, thus leaving the Government without the quorum of 84 required by the ' e.g. in Vossiche Zeitung, Oct. to 1916.

'e.g. Narodni Prava, May 19, Kambana, Oct. 9 1916.

Serbian Constitution. Serbian public opinion was too scattered and disorganized to be effective, and the Corfu Government tried to discredit its opponents' action before the uninformed West, as defeatist or even Austrophil. Thus throughout the spring and summer of 1918 there was acute and growing tension among the rival Serbian groups, and the real initiative in the Yugoslav question and in the political campaign against AustriaHungary, had passed to Trumbic, Benes, Lansing and the Allies and to the leaders of the movement inside the Dual Monarchy. Pasic had reverted to his Pan-Serb attitude, opposed inclusion of Dr. Trumbic in a Yugoslav and no longer purely Serb Cabinet, and steadily obstructed the Yugoslav committee's work. There was, moreover, a certain section in the army which aimed at Serbia's military occupation and annexation of Habsburg territory, rather than a free union on equal terms. Fortunately all such ideas were absent from the mind of Voivode Misic, whose comprehension of the issues at stake was illustrated by his special encouragement of the Yugoslav volunteers and by his signal tact in dealing with the newly constituted Government in Zagreb. Events, moreover, favoured union on terms of full equality; for Austria-Hungary had ceased to exist and her authority had been shaken off by all her Yugoslav subjects long before the Serbian army in its northward advance had even reached Belgrade. Any slight possibilities of initial friction were averted by Italy's action in advancing beyond the Armistice line; the whole Croat and Slovene population thus clamoured for the arrival of the Serbian army and received it everywhere as their liberator from Habsburg rule and their champion in the complications which then seemed imminent. (For the completion of national unity, see YUGOSLAVIA.) BIBLIOGRAPHY. - General: C. Jirecek, Geschichte der Serben (to 1537, 2 vols., 1913 and 1917), and Staat and Gesellschaft im mittelalterlichen Serbien (1913); S. Novakovic, Die Wiedergeburt des Serbischen Staates (1912); G. Yakshitch, L'Europe et la Resurrection de la Serbie (2nd ed., 1919); H. W. V. Temperley, History of Serbia (1917); S. Stanojevic, History of Serbia (in Serbian, 1913); Jovan Cvijic, La Peninsule Balkanique (1919) and Govorii z ` lanci (Speeches and Essays, 2 vols., 1921); G. Gravier, Les Frontieres Historiques de la Serbie (1919). Of war literature may be mentioned: E. Denis, La Grande Serbie (1916); Miss Waring, Serbia (1918); G. YelinicDevas, La nouvelle Serbie (1919); Crawfurd Price, Serbia's Part in the War (1918); Barby, L'epopee Serbe (1916). On the Balkan wars, see Diplomaticus, Nationalism and War in the Near East (1915); R. W. Seton-Watson, The Rise of Nationality in the Balkans (1917); Immanuel, Der Balkankrieg (1913); H. Barby, Les Victoires Serbes (1913) and Bregalnitsa (1913). On economics, see Vuk Primorac, La Question Yougoslave (1918); G. Djuric, " A Survey of the Development of the Serbian (S. Slav) Nation " (Royal Statistical Journal, May 1919); La Serbie Economique, 1914-1918 (1918); M. Zebitch, La Serbie Agricole (1917); Costa Stoyanovitch, Economic Problems of Serbia (1919). The Serbian standpoint on the Albanian question can be found in Vladan Georgevitch, Die Serbische Frage (1909) and Balkanicus (S. Protic), Le Probleme Albanais (1913); on the Macedonian question in Tihomar Georgevitch, Macedonia (1918). For sources concerning origin of war, see A. F. Pribram, Collected Diplomatic Documents: Die Politischen Geheimvertrage OesterreichUngarns (1879-1914) (1920); R. Gooss, Das Wiener Kabinett and die Entstehung des Weltkrieges (1920); Diplomatische Aktenstilcke (1920); Die Deutschen Dokuinente (4 vols., 1920); H. Kanner, Die Neuesten Geschichtsliigen (1921). See also History of the Peace Conference (ed. H. W. V. Temperley, vol. iv.). (R. W. S.-W.)