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NAPOLEONIC CAMPAIGNS. - i. The era of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars falls into two main divisions, the first of which (1792-1801) is dealt with under the heading French Revolutionary Wars. In the present article are described the campaigns in central and eastern Europe, directed by Napoleon - no longer one amongst many French generals,. nor even a simple Primus inter pares, but " Emperor " in the fullest sense - between the years 1805 and 1814. Napoleon's short Spanish Campaign of 1809 is dealt with under Peninsular War (this article covering the campaigns in Spain, Portugal and southern France 1808-1814), and for the final drama of Waterloo the reader is referred to Waterloo Campaign.

The campaigns described below are theref ore (a) The Austrian War of 1805 (Ulm and Austerlitz).

(b) The Conquest of Prussia and the Polish Campaign (Jena, Auerstadt, Eylau and Friedland).

(c) The Austrian War of 1809 (Eckmiihl, Aspern and Wagram).

(d) The Russian War of 1812 (Borodino and the retreat from Moscow).

(e) The German " War of Liberation," culminating in the Battle of the Nations around Leipzig.

(f) The last campaign in France, 1814.

The naval history of1803-1815includes the culmination and the sequel of the struggle for command of the sea which began in 1793 and reached its maximum intensity on the day of Trafalgar.

1 2. The Campaign of 1805

2 3. Austrian Army

3 4. The March on Ulm

4 5. Movements of the French

5 6. Austrian Plans

6 7. Action of Albeck or Haslach

7 8. Elchingen

8 9. Mack surrounded

9 10. Napoleon's Advance to Vienna

10 11. Campaign of Austerlitz

11 12. Jena 1806.

12 13. Outbreak of the War

13 14. Advance of the Grande Armee

14 15. Prussian Movements

15 16. The 13th of October

16 17. Battle of Jena

17 18. Battle of Auerstadt

18 19. Prussian Retreat

19 20. Campaigns in Poland and East Prussia

20 21. The Russian Army

21 22. Advance to the Vistula

22 23. Pultusk

23 24. Campaign of Eylau

24 25. Heilsberg and Friedland

25 26. The Austrian Army in 1809

26 27. The French Army

27 28. Austrian Offensive

28 29. Napoleon takes command

29 30. Eckmiihl

30 31. Austrian Retreat

31 32. Aspern and Wagram

32 33. The Russian War of 1812

33 34. The Strategic Deployment

34 35. Opening of the Campaign

35 36. Smolensk

36 37. Borodino

37 38. Moscow.

38 39. The Retreat from Moscow

39 40. The Beresina.

40 41. Final Operations

41 42. The War of Liberation

42 43. Napoleon's Preparations

43 44. Spring Campaign of 1813

44 45. Battle of Liitzen

45 46. Bautzen

46 47. The Autumn Campaign

47 48. Dresden

48 49. French Defeats

49 50. Napoleon's Movements

50 51. Campaign of Leipzig

51 52. The Battle of the Nations.

52 53. Retreat of the French and Battle of Hanau

53 54. The Defensive Campaign

54 55. Montmirail

55 56. Laon

56 57. The Allies March on Paris

57 The Military Character of Napoleon

58 Bibliography

59 Bibliography

2. The Campaign of 1805

may be regarded as a measure of self-defence forced upon Napoleon by the alliance of Russia (April 11th), Austria (August 9th) and other powers with Great Britain. The possibility had long been before the emperor, and his intention in that event to march straight on Vienna by the valley of the Danube is clearly indicated in his reply (November 2 7th, 1803) to a Prussian proposal for the neutralization of the South German states. In this he says, " It is on the road from Strassburg to Vienna that the French must force peace on Austria, and it is this road which you wish us to renounce." When, therefore, on the 25th of August 1805, he learnt definitely that Villeneuve (see Naval operations below) had failed in his purpose of securing the command of the Channel, which was the necessary preliminary to the invasion of England, it was but the affair of a few hours to dictate the dispositions necessary to transfer his whole army to the Rhine frontier as the first step in its march to the Danube. On this date the army actually lay in the following positions: I. Corps Bernadotte Hanover (Gottingen) II. „ Marmont Holland III. „ Davout IV. „ Soult Camp of Boulogne and V. „ Lannes other points on the VI. „ Ney English Channel VII. „ Augereau Guard Bessieres Paris.

The corps were, however, by no means fit for immediate service. Bernadotte's corps in Hanover was almost in the position of a beleaguered garrison, and the marshal could only obtain his transport by giving out that he was ordered to withdraw to France. Marmont and Davout were deficient in horses for cavalry and artillery, and the troops in Boulogne, having been drawn together for the invasion of England, had hardly any transport at all, as it was considered this want could be readily supplied on landing. The composition of the army, however, was excellent. The generals were in the prime of life, had not yet learnt to distrust one another, and were accustomed to work under the emperor and with one another. The regimental officers had all acquired their rank before the enemy and knew how to manage their men, and of the men themselves nearly two-thirds had seen active service. The strength of the army lay in its infantry, for both cavalry and artillery were short of horses, and the latter had not yet acquired mobility and skill in manoeuvring. Napoleon's determination to undertake the invasion of England has often been disputed, but it is hard to imagine what other operation he contemplated, for the outbreak of hostilities with his continental enemies found him ill-supplied with intelligence as to the resources of the country he had then to traverse. To remedy this, Murat and other general officers as well as minor agents were sent ahead and instructed to travel through South Germany in plain clothes with a view to collecting information and mastering the topography. The emperor was, moreover, imperfectly acquainted with the degree of preparation of his adversaries' designs, and when he dictated his preliminary orders he was still unaware of the direction that the allies' advance would assume. That he foresaw the march of events which ultimately drew Mack to Ulm is inconceivable. On the 26th of August, however, he learnt that 10o,000 Russians were about to enter Bohemia thence to unite with an Austrian army of 80,000 near the junction of the Inn and Danube, and this information compelled him to alter the general direction of his advance so as to traverse the defiles of the Black Forest north of the Neckar, cavalry only observing the passes to the south.

3. Austrian Army

- The Austrians after the defeats of 1800 had endeavoured to reorganize their forces on the French model, but they were soon to learn that in matters of organization the spirit is everything, the letter very little. They had copied the organization of the French corps, but could find no corps commanders fit to assume the responsibility for these commands. As always in such conditions, the actual control of the smallest movements was still centralized in the hands of the army commanders, and thus the rate of marching was incredibly slow. They had decided that in future their troops in the field should live by requisition, and had handed over to the artillery, which needed them badly, a large number of horses thus set free from the transport service, but they had not realized that men accustomed to a regular distribution of rations cannot be transformed into successful marauders and pillagers by a stroke of the pen; and they had sent away the bulk of their army, 120,000 under their best general, the archduke Charles, into Italy, leaving Lieut. Field Marshal Mack von Leiberich in Germany, nominally as chief of the staff to the young Prince Ferdinand, but virtually in command, to meet the onset of Napoleon at the head of his veterans. Mack was a man of unusual attainments. He had risen from the ranks in the most caste-ridden army in Europe, and against untold opposition had carried through army reforms which were correct in principle, and needed only time to develop. It was his fate to be made the scapegoat for the disasters which followed, though they need no further explanation than that, at the head of 80,000 men and exercising only restricted powers of command, he was pitted against the greatest strategist of all ages who was responsible to no overlord and commanded, in the fullest sense of the term, an army considerably more than twice as strong.

4. The March on Ulm

The outbreak of the campaign was hastened by the desire of the Austrian government to feed their own army and leave a bare country for Napoleon by securing the resources of Bavaria. It was also hoped that the Bavarians with their army of 25,000 men would join the allies. In the latter hope they were deceived, and the Bavarians under General Wrede slipped away to Bamberg in time. In the former, however, they were successful, and the destitution they left in their wake almost wrecked Napoleon's subsequent combinations. Mack's march to Ulm was therefore a necessity of the situation, and his continuance in this exposed position, if foolhardy against such an adversary, was at any rate the outcome of the high resolve that even if beaten he would inflict crippling losses upon the enemy. Mack knew that the Russians would be late at the rendezvous on the Inn. By constructing an entrenched camp at Ulm and concentrating all the available food within it, he expected to compel Napoleon to invest and besiege him, and he anticipated that in the devastated country his adversary would be compelled to separate and thus fall an easy prey to the Russians. For that blow he had determined to make his own army the anvil. But these views obviously could not be published in army orders, hence the discontent and opposition he was destined to encounter.

5. Movements of the French

It was on the 21st that Napoleon learnt of Mack's presence in Ulm. On that date his army had crossed the Rhine and was entering the defiles of the Black Forest. It was already beginning to suffer. Boots were worn out, greatcoats deficient, transport almost unattainable and, according to modern ideas, the army would have been considered incapable of action.

Sept. 28.

Oct. 6.

Oct. 9.

Oct. 16.

Bernadotte .

Wurzburg

Anspach

Nurnberg

Regensburg

Marmont .

Wurzburg

Anspach

Nurnberg

Regensburg

Davout. .

Mannheim

Mergentheim

Anspach

Dietfurt

Ney. .

Selz

Crailsheim

Weissenburg

Ingolstadt

Lannes. .

Strassburg

Gmund

Nordlingen

Neuburg

Soult. .

Landau

Aalen

Donauworth

On the 26th of September, its deployment beyond the mountains was complete, and as Napoleon did not know of Mack's intention to stay at Ulm and had learned that the Russian advance had been delayed, he directed his columns by the following roads on the Danube, between Donauworth and Ingolstadt, so as to be in a position to intervene between the Austrians and the Russians and beat both in detail. On the 7th of October this movement was completed - the Austrians abandoned the Danube bridges after a show of resistance, retreating westward - and Napoleon, leaving Murat in command of the V. and VI. corps and cavalry to observe the Austrians, pressed on to Augsburg with the others so as to be ready to deal with the Russians. Learning, however, that these were still beyond striking radius, he determined to deal with Mack's army first, having formed the fixed conviction that a threat at the latter's communications would compel him to endeavour to retreat southwards towards Tirol. Bernadotte in his turn became an army of observation, and Napoleon joining Murat with the main body marched rapidly westward from the Lech towards the Iller.

6. Austrian Plans

Mack's intentions were not what Napoleon supposed. He had meanwhile received (false) information of a British landing at Boulogne, and he was seriously deceived as to the numbers of Napoleon's forces. He was also aware that the exactions of the French had produced deep indignation throughout Germany and especially in Prussia (whose neutrality had been violated, see § 14, below). All this, and the almost mutinous discontent of his generals and his enemies of the court circle, shook his resolution of acting as anvil for the Russians, of whose delay also he was aware, and about the 8th of Octoberhedetermined to march out north-eastward across the French lines of communication and save his sovereign's army by taking refuge if necessary in Saxony. Believing implicitly in the rumours of a descent on Boulogne and of risings in France which also reached him, and knowing the destitution he had left behind him in his movement to Ulm, when he heard of the westward march of French columns from the Lech he told his army, apparently in all good faith, that the French were in full march for their own coun try.

enfurt

TrA mberg

Actually the French at this moment were suffering the most terrible distress - up to the Danube they had still found sufficient food for existence, but south of it, in the track of the Austrians, they found nothing. All march discipline disappeared, the men dissolved into hordes of marauders and even the sternest of the marshals wrote piteous appeals to the emperor for supplies, and for permission to shoot some of their stragglers. But to all these Berthier in the emperor's name sent the stereotyped reply- " The emperor has ordered you to carry four days' provisions, therefore you can expect nothing further - you know the emperor's method of conducting war."

7. Action of Albeck or Haslach

Meanwhile Murat, before the emperor joined him, had given Mack the desired opening. The VI. corps (Ney) should have remained on the left bank of the Danube to close the Austrian exit on that side, but by mistake only Dupont's division had been left at Albeck, the rest being 'Campaigns in Germany1796-1809Scale. I :2.000,000 English Miles o ro zo Mainz rnstdin Oppenheim Hel&stadt Hochstadt Mergent eim V ffenheim ,,„Windsheim Fiirth Sulzbach Schwandorf Ingel ngen nsbach °Philipp Gaildor Schort korf Aalen G utfd' Esslingen =?? «?

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Kntebis 0, Rottenbur ° ffenburg f°Freudenstadt (k I. ..-1 8 Haslac 'f., Dillingen Burga Weissenh Pleinfeld Beilngries Hemau eiingrie Weisser.burg I u, E?cltstac}t ? In Monheim ( olsta

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iirdlingen Neresheim ,?; _vo?lVeissenstein Heide n'eim Geislingen ? c fin en il zburg Zusmars Teming 'gsburg Duchau Neu Breis Engen Messkir Uttlinge Stok. ch n Bucha 0 Mengen o Allmans l eiler Ostrach Aulendorf Pfullendorf ° Waldse Wurzach Wasser. rg Stein enburg Riline 'Constance Frauenfe. men sta`d.': orarib eI berg. ufstein brought over the river. Mack on the 8th had determined to commence his withdrawal, but fortune now favoured the French. The weather during the whole of October had been unusually wet, the swollen Danube overflowed the low ground and the roads had become quagmires. On the south bank, owing to better natural drainage and a drier subsoil, movement was fairly easy, but the Austrians found it almost impossible. On the i r th of October, when they began their march, the road along the Danube was swept into the river, carrying with it several guns and teams, and hours were consumed in passing the shortest distances. At length in the afternoon they suddenly fell upon Dupont's isolated division at Albeck, which was completely surprised and severely handled. The road now lay completely open, but the Austrian columns had so opened out owing to the state of the roads that the leading troops could not pursue their advantage - Dupont rallied and the Austrians had actually to fall back towards Ulm to procure food.

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8. Elchingen

For three more days Mack struggled with an unwilling staff and despondent men to arrange a further advance. During these very three days, through a succession of staff blunders, the French failed to close the gap, and on the morning of the r4th of October both armies, each renewing their advance, came in contact at the bridge of Elchingen. This. bridge, all but a few road-bearers, had been destroyed, but now the French gave an example of that individual gallantry which was characteristic of the old revolutionary armies. Running along the beams under a close fire a few gallant men forced their way across. The floor of the bridge was rapidly relaid, and presently the whole of the VI. corps was deploying with unexampled rapidity on the farther side. The Austrians, still in their quagmire, could not push up reinforcements fast enough, and though Mack subsequently alleged deliberate obstruction and disobedience on the part of his subordinates, the state of the roads alone suffices to explain their defeat. Only the right column of the Austrians was, however, involved; the left under General Werneck, to whom some cavalry and the archduke Ferdinand attached themselves, did indeed succeed in getting away, but without trains or supplies. They continued their march, famished but unmolested, until near Heidenheim they suddenly found themselves confronted by what from the diversity of uniforms they took to be an overwhelming force; at the same time the French cavalry sent in pursuit appeared in their rear. Utterly exhausted by fatigue, Werneck with his infantry, some 8000 strong, surrendered to what was really a force of dismounted dragoons and foot-sore stragglers improvised by the commanding. officer on the spot to protect the French treasure chests, which at Munic e: ensburg soy Landshut Moosburg that moment lay actually in the path of the Austrians. The young archduke with some cavalry escaped.

9. Mack surrounded

The defeat at Elchingen on the 14th of October sealed the fate of the Austrians, though Mack was still determined to endure a siege. As the French columns coming up from the south and west gradually surrounded him, he drew in his troops under shelter of the fortress and its improvised entrenched camp, and on the 15th he found himself completely surrounded. On the 16th the French field-guns fired into the town, and Mack realized that his troops were no longer under sufficient control to endure a siege. When, therefore, next morning, negotiations were opened by the French, Mack, still feeling certain that the Russians were at hand, agreed to an armistice and undertook to lay down his arms if within the next twenty-one days no relief should arrive. To this Napoleon consented, but hardly had the agreement been signed than he succeeded in introducing a number of individual French soldiers into the fortress, who began rioting with the Austrian soldiery. Then, sending in armed parties to restore order and protect the inhabitants, he caused the guards at the gates to be overpowered, and Mack was thus forced into an unconditional surrender.

On the 22nd of October, the day after Trafalgar, the remnant of the Austrian army, 23,000 strong, laid down its arms. About 5000 men under Jellachich had escaped to Tirol, 2000 cuirassiers with Prince Ferdinand to Eger in Bohemia, and about io,000 men under Werneck, had surrendered at Heidenheim. The losses in battle having been insignificant, there remain some 30,000 to account for - most of whom probably escaped individually by the help of the inhabitants, who were bitterly hostile to the French.

10. Napoleon's Advance to Vienna

Napoleon now hastened to rejoin the group of corps he had left under Bernadotte in observation towards the Russians, for the latter were nearer at hand than even Mack had assumed. But hearing of his misfortune they retreated before Napoleon's advance along the right bank of the Danube to Krems, where they crossed the river and withdrew to an entrenched camp near Olmi tz to pick up fresh Austrian reinforcements. The severe actions of Diirrenstein (near Krems) ors the iith, and of Hollabriinn on the 26th of November, in which Napoleon's marshals learned the tenacity of their new opponents, and the surprise of the Vienna bridge (November 14) by the French, were the chief incidents of this period in the campaign.

11. Campaign of Austerlitz

- Napoleon continued down the right bank to Vienna, where he was compelled by the condition of his troops to call a halt to refit his army.

After this was done he continued his movement to Briinn. Thither he succeeded in bringing only 55,000 men. He was again forced to give his army rest and shelter, under cover of Murat's cavalry. The allies now confronted him with upwards of 86,000 men, including 16,000 cavalry. About the 10th of November this force commenced its advance, and Napoleon concentrated in such a manner that within three days he could bring over 80,000 French troops into action around Briinn, besides 17,000 or more Bavarians under Wrede. On the 28th Murat was driven in by the allied columns. That night orders were despatched for a concentration on Briinn in expectation of a collision on the following day; but hearing that the whole allied force was moving towards him he decided to concentrate south-east of Briinn, covering his front by cavalry on the Pratzen heights. Meanwhile he had also prepared a fresh line of retreat towards Bohemia, and, certain now of having his men in hand for the coming battle, he quietly awaited events.

The allies were aware of his position, and still adhering to the old " linear " system, marched to turn his right flank (see Austerlitz). As soon as their strategic purpose of cutting him off from Vienna became apparent, the emperor moved his troops into position, and in the afternoon issued his famous proclamation to his troops, pointing out the enemy's mistakes and his plan for defeating them. At the same time he issued his orders for his first great battle as a supreme commander. The battle of Austerlitz began early next morning and closed in the evening with the thorough and decisive defeat of the allies.

12. Jena 1806.

- Around the Prussian army, and particularly the cavalry, the prestige of Frederick the Great's glory still lingered; but the younger generation had little experience of actual warfare, and the higher commanders were quite unable to grasp the changes in tactics and in the conduct of operations which had grown out of the necessities of the French Revolution. The individual officers of the executive staff were the most highly trained in Europe, but there was no great leader to co-ordinate their energies. The total number of men assigned to the field army was i io,000 Prussians and Saxons. They were organized in corps, but their leaders were corps commanders only in name, for none were allowed any latitude for individual initiative. Ill-judged economies had undermined the whole efficiency of the Prussian army. Two-thirds of the infantry and one-half of the cavalry were allowed furlough for from ten to eleven months in the year. The men were unprovided with greatcoats. Most of the muskets had actually seen service in the Seven Years' War, and their barrels had worn so thin with constant polishing that the use of full charges at target practice had been forbidden. Above all, the army had drifted entirely out of touch with the civil population. The latter, ground down by feudal tradition and law, and at the same time permeated by the political doctrines of the late 18th century, believed that war concerned the governments only, and formed no part of the business of the " honest citizen." In this idea they were supported by the law itself, which protected the civilian against the soldier, and forbade even in war-time the requisitioning of horses, provisions and transport, without payment. Up to the night of the battle of Jena itself, the Prussian troops lay starving in the midst of plenty, whilst the French everywhere took what they wanted. This alone was a sufficient cause for all the misfortunes which followed.

13. Outbreak of the War

- During the campaign of Austerlitz Prussia, furious at the violation of her territory of Anspach, had mobilized, and had sent Haugwitz as ambassador to Napoleon's headquarters. He arrived on the 30th of November, and Napoleon, pleading business, put off his official reception till after the battle of Austerlitz. Of course the ultimatum was never presented, as may be imagined; Haugwitz returned and the king of Prussia demobilized at once. But Napoleon, well knowing the man he had to deal with, had determined to force a quarrel upon Prussia at the earliest convenient opportunity. His troops therefore, when withdrawn from Austria, were cantoned in south Germany in such a way that, whilst suspicion was not aroused in minds unacquainted with Napoleonic methods, they could be concentrated by a few marches behind the Thuringian forest and the upper waters of the Main. Here the Grand Army was left to itself to recuperate and assimilate its recruits, and it is characteristic of the man and his methods that he did not trouble his corps commanders with a single order during the whole of the spring and summer.

As the diplomatic crisis approached, spies were sent into Prussia, and simultaneously with the orders for preliminary concentration the marshals received private instructions, the pith of which cannot be better expressed than in the following two quotations from Napoleon's correspondence: " Mon intention est de concentrer toutes mes forces sur l'extremite de ma droite en laissant tout l'espace entre le Rhin et Bamberg entierement degarni, de maniere a avoir pres de 200,000 hommes reunis sur un meme champ de bataille; mes premieres marches menacent le coeur de la monarchie prussienne " (No. 10,920). " Avec cette immense superiorite de forces reunis sur un espace si etroit, vous sentez que je suis dans la volonte de ne rien hasarder et d'attaquer l'ennemi partout ou it voudra tenir. Vous pensez bien que ce serait une belle affaire que de se porter sur cette place (Dresden) en un bataillon carre de 200,000 hommes " (Soult, No. 10,941).

14. Advance of the Grande Armee

On the 7th of October the Grande Armee lay in three parallel columns along the roads leading over the mountains to Hof, Schleiz and Kronach; on the right lay the IV. corps (Soult) about Bayreuth; with his cavalry in rear, and behind these the VI. corps (Ney) at Pegnitz; in the centre, Bernadotte's T. corps from Nordhalben, with the III. corps (Davout) Lichtenfels; Guard and headquarters, Bamberg. The left column was composed of the V. (Lannes) at Hemmendorf, with the VII. (Augereau) extending south to the Main at Burgebrach.

Napoleon's object being surprise, all the cavalry except a few vedettes were kept back behind the leading infantry columns and these latter were ordered to advance, on the signal being given, in " masses of manoeuvre, " so as to crush at once any outpost resistance which was calculated upon the time required for the deployment of ordinary marching columns. This order has never since found an imitator, but deserves attentive study as a masterpiece (see H. Bonnal, Manoeuvre d'Iena). To meet the impending blow the Prussians had been extended in a cordon along the great road leading from Mainz to Dresden, Blucher was at Erfurt, Riichel at Gotha, Hohenlohe at Weimar, Saxons in Dresden, with outposts along the frontier. An offensive move into Franconia was under discussion, and for this purpose the Prussian staff had commenced a lateral concentration about Weimar, Jena and Naumburg when the storm burst upon them. The emperor gathered little from the confused reports of their purposeless manoeuvres, but, secure in the midst of his " battalion square " of 200,000 men, he remained quite indifferent, well knowing that an advance straight on Berlin must force his enemy to concentrate and fight, and as they would bring at most 127,000 men on to the battlefield the result could hardly be doubtful. On the 9th of October the cloud burst. Out of the forests which clothe the northern slopes of the Thuringer Wald the French streamed forth, easily overpowering the resistance of the Prussian outposts on the upper Saale, 1 and once the open country was reached the cavalry under Murat trotted to the front, closely followed by Bernadotte's corps as " general advance guard." The result of the cavalry scouting was however unsatisfactory. On the night of the loth, 1 At the action of Saalfeld on the loth, the young and gallant Prince Louis Ferdinand of Prussia was killed.

the emperor was still unaware of the position of his principal foe, and Murat with Bernadotte behind him was directed on Gera for the iith, the remainder of the army con tinuing along the roads previously assigned to them.

In the meanwhile, however, the Saxons had been moving from Naumburg through Gera on' Jena, Hohenlohe was near Weimar, and all the other divisions of the army had closed in a march eastwards, the idea of an offensive to the southward which Napoleon had himself attributed to them having already disappeared.

Reaching Gera at 9 A.M. Murat reported the movement of the Saxons on the previous day, but omitted to send a strong detachment in pursuit. The traces of the Saxons were lost, and Napoleon, little satisfied with his cavalry, authorized Lasalle to offer up to 6000 frs. reward for information of the Prussian point of concentration.. At i A.M. of the 12th Napoleon issued his orders.. Murat and Bernadotte via Zeitz to Naumburg; Davout (III. corps and a dragoon division) also to, Naumburg; Lannes to Jena, Augereau following;. Soult to Gera.

15. Prussian Movements

In the meantime the Prussians were effecting their concentration. Riichel, who with 15,000 men had been sent into the mountains as an advanced guard for the projected offensive, was recalled to Weimar, which he reached on the 13th. The main body were between Weimar and Apolda during the 12th, and the Saxons duly effected their junction with Hohenlohe in the vicinity of Vierzehnheiligen, whilst the latter had withdrawn his troops all but some outposts from Jena to the plateau about Capellendorf, some 4 m. to the N.W. The whole army, upwards of 120,000 men, could therefore have - been concentrated against Lannes and Augereau by the afternoon of the 13th, whilst Soult could only have intervened very late in the day, and Davout and Bernadotte were still too distant to reach the battlefield before the 14th. All the French corps, moreover, were so exhausted by their rapid marches over bad roads that the emperor actually ordered (at 1 A.M. on the 13th) a day of rest for all except Davout, Bernadotte, Lannes and Murat.

The Prussian headquarters, however, spent the 12th and 13th in idle discussion, whilst the troop commanders exerted themselves to obtain some alleviation for the suffering of their starving men. The defeats undergone by their outpost detachment had profoundly affected the nerves of the troops, and on the afternoon of the 11th, on the false alarm of a French approach, a panic broke out in the streets of Jena, and it took all the energy of Hohenlohe and his staff to restore order. On the morning of the 12th the Saxon commanding officers approached Hohenlohe with a statement of the famishing condition of their men, and threatened to withdraw them again to Saxony. Hohenlohe pointed out that the Prussians were equally badly off, but promised to do his best to help his allies. Urgent messages were sent off to the Commissary von Goethe (the poet), at Weimar for permission to requisition food and firewood. These requests, however, remained unanswered, and the Prussians and Saxons spent the night before the battle shivering in their miserable bivouacs.

16. The 13th of October

During the early morning of the 13th the reports brought to Napoleon at Gera partially cleared up the situation, though the real truth was very different from what he supposed. However, it was evident that the bulk of the Prussians lay to his left, and instructions were at once despatched to Davout to turn westward from Naumburg towards Kdsen and to bring Bernadotte with him if the two were still together. The letter, however, ended with the words " but I hope he is already on his way to Dornburg." Now Bernadotte Emery walker, sc.

had neglected to keep the emperor informed as to his whereabouts. He was still with Davout, but, concluding that he had missed an order directing him to Dornburg, he thought to conceal his error by assuming the receipt of the order evidently alluded to in the last words, and as a result he marched towards Dornburg, and his whole corps was lost to the emperor at the crisis of the next day's battle.

On the road from Gera to Jena Napoleon was met by intelligence from Lannes announcing his occupation of Jena and the discovery of Prussian troops to the northward. Knowing the emperor's methods, he wisely restrained the ardour of his subordinates and asked for instructions whether to attack or wait. The emperor rode forward rapidly, reached Jena about 3 P.M., and with Lannes proceeded to the Landgrafenberg to reconnoitre. From this point his view was, however, restricted to the immediate foreground, and he only saw the camps of Hohenlohe's left wing. At this moment the Prussians were actually on parade and ready to move off to attack, but just then the " evil genius " of the Prussian army, von Massenbach, an officer of the Headquarter Staff, rode up and claiming to speak with the authority of the king and commander-in-chief, induced Hohenlohe to order his troops back to camp. Of all this Napoleon saw nothing, but from all reports he came to the conclusion that the whole Prussian army was actually in front of him, and at once issued orders for his whole army to concentrate towards Jena, marching all night if need be. Six hours earlier his conclusion would have been correct, but early that morning the Prussian headquarters, alarmed for the safety of their line of retreat on Berlin by the presence of the French in Naumburg, decided to leave Hohenlohe and Rachel to act as rear-guard, and with the main body to commence their retreat towards the river Unstrutt and the Eckhardtsberge where Massenbach had previously reconnoitred an " ideal " battlefield. This belief in positions was the cardinal principle of Prussian strategy in those days. The troops had accordingly commenced their march on the morning of the r3th, and now at 3 P.M. were settling down into bivouac; they were still but a short march from the decisive field.

17. Battle of Jena

On the French side, Lannes' men were working their hardest, under Napoleon's personal supervision, to make a practicable road up to the Landgrafenberg, and all night long the remaining corps struggled through darkness towards the rendezvous. By daybreak on the 74th, the anniversary of Elchingen, upwards of 60,000 men stood densely battalions were sent forward, and these, delaying their advance till the fog had sufficiently lifted, were met by French skirmishers, and small columns, who rapidly overlapped their flanks and drove them back in confusion. Hohenlohe now brought up the remainder of his command, but in the meanwhile the French had poured across the neck between the Landgrafenberg and the main plateau, and the troops of Soult and Augereau were working up the ravines on either hand. In view of these troops the Prussian line, which had advanced faultlessly as if on parade, halted to prepare its bayonet attack by fire, and, once halted, it was found impossible to get them to go on again. The French who had thrown themselves into houses, copses, &c., picked off the officers, and the flanks of the long Prussian lines swayed and got into confusion. The rival artilleries held each other too thoroughly to be able to spare attention to the infantry, whilst the Prussian cavalry, which had forgotten how to charge in masses of eighty or more squadrons, frittered away their strength in isolated efforts. By ro A.M. the fourteen battalions which had initiated this attack were outnumbered by three to one, and drifted away from the battlefield. Their places were taken by a fresh body, but this was soon outnumbered and outflanked in its turn. By 2 P.M. the psychic moment had come, and Napoleon launched his guards and the cavalry to complete the victory and initiate the pursuit. Rachel's division now arrived and made a most gallant effort to cover the retreat, but their order being broken by the torrent of fugitives, they were soon overwhelmed by the tide of the French victory and all organized resistance had ceased by 4 P.M.

Briefly summarized, the battle came to this - in four successive efforts the Prussians failed because they were locally outnumbered. This was the fault of their leaders solely, for, except for the last attack, local superiority was in each case attainable. Organization and tactics did not affect the issue directly, for the conduct of the men and their junior officers gave abundant proof that in the hands of a competent leader the " linear " principle of delivering one shattering blow would have proved superior to that of a gradual attrition of the enemy here, as on the battlefields of the Peninsula and at Waterloo, and this in spite of other defects in the training of the Prussian infantry which simultaneously caused its defeat on the neighbouring field of Auerstadt.

18. Battle of Auerstadt

Here the superiority of French mobility, a consequence of their training and not necessarily of their system, showed its value most conclusively. Davout in obedience to his orders of the previous morning was packed on the narrow plateau of the mountain, whilst, below in the ravines on either flank, Soult on the right, and Augereau on the left, were getting into position. Fortunately a dense fog hid the helpless masses on the Landgrafenberg from sight of the Prussian gunners. Hohenlohe had determined to drive the French into the ravine at daybreak, but had no idea as to the numbers in front of him. For want of room, only a few Prussian over the Saale at Kosen, when his advanced guard came in contact with that of the Prussian main army. The latter with at least 50,000 men was marching in two columns, and ought therefore to have delivered its men into line of battle twice as fast as the French, who had to deploy from a single issue, and whose columns had opened out in the passage of the Kosen defile and the long ascent of the plateau above. But the Prussians attacked at the old regulation speed of seventy-five paces to the minute, and the French manoeuvred at the quick or double of i 20 or 150. The consequence was that the French always succeeded in reinforcing their fighting line in time to avert disaster. Nevertheless by mid=day their strength was well-nigh exhausted, whilst the Prussian reserve, eighteen battalions of guards under Kalckreuth, stood intact and ready to engage. But at the critical moment the duke of Brunswick fell mortally wounded, and Scharnhorst, his chief of the staff, was at the time absent on another part of the field. Meanwhile rumours from the battle-field at Jena, magnified as usual, began to reach the staff, and these may possibly have influenced Kalckreuth, for when appealed to to attack with his eighteen battalions and win the day, he declined to move without the direct order of the commander-in-chief to do so, alleging that it was the duty of a reserve to cover the retreat and he considered himself personally responsible to the king for the guards entrusted to his care. Even then the day might have been saved had Blucher been able to find even twenty squadrons accustomed to gallop together, but the Prussian cavalry had been dispersed amongst the infantry commands, and at the critical moment it proved impossible for them to deliver a united and decisive attack.

Seeing further efforts hopeless, Scharnhorst in the duke's name initiated the retreat and the troops withdrew N.W. towards Buttelstedt, almost unmolested by the French, who this day had put forth all that was in them, and withstood victoriously the highest average punishment any troops of the new age of warfare had as yet endured. So desperate had been their resistance that the Prussians unanimously stated Davout's strength at double the actual figure. Probably no man but Davout could have got so much out of his men, but why was he left unsupported?

Bernadotte, we have seen, had marched to Dornburg, or rather to a point overlooking the ford across the Saale at the village of that name, and reached there in ample time to intervene, on either field. But with the struggle raging before him he remained undecided, until at Jena the decision had clearly fallen, and then he crossed the river and arrived with fresh troops too late for their services to be required.

19. Prussian Retreat

During the night the Prussians continued their retreat, the bulk of the main body to Summerda, Hohenlohe's corps towards Nordhausen. The troops had got much mixed up, but as the French did not immediately press the pursuit home, order was soon re-established and a combined retreat was begun towards the mouth of the Elbe and Lubeck. Here help was expected to arrive from England, and the tide might yet have turned, for the Russian armies were gathering in the east. It was now that the results of a divorce of the army from the nation began to be felt. Instead of seizing all provisions and burning what they could not remove, the Prussian generals enforced on their men the utmost forbearance towards the inhabitants, and the fact that they were obeyed, in spite of the inhumanity the people showed to their sick and wounded countrymen, proves that discipline was by no means so far gone as has generally been believed. The French marching in pursuit were received with open arms, the people even turning their own wounded out of doors to make room for their French guests. Their servility awakened the bitterest contempt of their conquerors and forms the best excuse for the unparalleled severity of the French yoke. On the 26th of October Davout reached Berlin, having marched 166 m. in twelve days including two sharp rearguard actions, Bernadotte with his fresh troops having fallen behind. The inhabitants of Berlin, headed by their mayor, came out to meet him, and the newspapers lavished adulation on the victors and abuse on the beaten army. On the 28th Murat's cavalry overtook the remnant of Prince Hohenlohe's army near Prenzlau (N. of Berlin) and invited its capitulation. Unfortunately the prince sent Massenbach to discuss the situation, and the latter completely lost his head. Murat boasted that he had ioo,000 men behind him, and on his return Massenbach implored his chief to submit to an unconditional surrender, advice which the prince accepted, though as a fact Murat's horses were completely exhausted and he had no infantry whatever within call. Only Blucher now remained in the field, and he too was driven at length into Lubeck with his back to the sea.

20. Campaigns in Poland and East Prussia

Hitherto the French had been operating in a rich country, untouched for half a century past by the ravages of war, but as the necessity for a campaign against the Russians confronted the emperor, he realized that his whole supply and transport service must be put on a different footing. After the wants of the cavalry and artillery had been provided for, there remained but little material for transport work. Exhaustive orders to organize the necessary trains were duly issued, but the emperor seems to have had no conception of the difficulties the tracks - there were no metalled roads - of Poland were about to present to him. Moreover, it was one thing to issue orders, but quite another to ensure that they were obeyed, for they entailed a complete transformation in the mental attitude of the French soldier towards all that he had been taught to consider his duties in the field. Experience only can teach the art of packing wagons and the care of draught animals, and throughout the campaign the small ponies of Poland and East Prussia broke down by thousands from over loading and unskilful packing.

21. The Russian Army

The Russian Army formed the most complete contrast to the French that it is possible to imagine. Though clad, armed and organized in European fashion, the soldiers retained in a marked degree the traditions of their Mongolian forerunners, their transport wagons were in type the survival of ages of experience, and their care for their animals equally the result of hereditary habit. The intelligence of the men and regimental officers was very low, but on the other hand service was practically for life, and the regiment the only home the great majority had ever known. Hence obedience was instinctive and initiative almost undreamt of. Moreover, they were essentially a wartrained army, for even in peace time their long marches to and fro within the empire had most thoroughly inured them to hardship and privation. Napoleon might have remembered his own saying, " La misere est 1'ecole du bon soldat." In cavalry they were weak, for the Russian does not take kindly to equitation and the horses were not equal to the accepted European standard of weight, while the Cossack was only formidable to stragglers and wounded. Their artillery was numerous and for the most part of heavy calibre - 18and 24-pounders were common - but the strength of the army lay in its infantry, with its incomparable tenacity in defence and its blind confidence in the bayonet in attack. The traditions of Suvarov and his victories in Italy (see French Revolutionary Wars) were still fresh, but there was no longer a Suvarov to lead them.

22. Advance to the Vistula

Napoleon had from the first been aware of the secret alliance between Prussia and Russia, sworn by their respective sovereigns over the grave of Frederick the Great, and this knowledge had been his principal reason for precipitating hostilities with the former. He remained, however, in complete ignorance of the degree of preparation attained on the Russian side, and since the seizure of Warsaw together with the control of the resources of Poland in men and material its occupation would afford, was the chief factor in his calculation, he turned at once to the eastward as soon as all further organized resistance in Prussia was ended by the surrender of Prenzlau and Lubeck. Scarcely leaving his troops time to restore their worn-out footgear, or for the cavalry to replace their jaded horses from captured Prussian resources, he set Davout in motion towards Warsaw on the 2nd of November, and the remainder of the army followed in successive echelons as rapidly as they could be despatched.

The cavalry, moving well in advance, dispersed the Prussian depots and captured their horses, as far as the line of the Vistula, where at last they encountered organized resistance from the outposts of Lestocq's little corps of 15,000 men - all that was left of Frederick the Great's army. These, however, gave way before the threat of the advancing French and after a few trifling skirmishes. Davout entered Warsaw on the 30th of November, being followed by the V., IV. and Guard corps during the succeeding fortnight, whilst the VI. and VII. were echeloned to their left, and the VIII. (Mortier) and IX. (Jerome Napoleon) and X. (Lefebvre), all new formations since the outbreak of the war, followed some marches in the rear. Jerome's corps was composed of the Bavarians, Wiirttembergers and Badensers.

Behind these all Prussia was overrun by newly formed units, (3 rd and 4th battalions) raised from depot companies, conscripts for 1807, and old soldiers rejoining after sickness or wounds. Napoleon caused these to be despatched to the front immediately after their formation. He had much territory to occupy, and in the long march of on an average 85 days, he considered that they could be organized, equipped and drilled en route.

Bibliography Information
Chisholm, Hugh, General Editor. Entry for 'Napoleonic Campaigns'. 1911 Encyclopedia Britanica. https://www.studylight.org/​encyclopedias/​eng/​bri/​n/napoleonic-campaigns.html. 1910.
 
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