the Week of Proper 28 / Ordinary 33
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Bible Encyclopedias
Military Staff
1911 Encyclopedia Britannica
or "MILITARY STAFF 25.752). - One result of the unqualified success which Prussian arms achieved in the wars of 1866 and 1870-I was that the general staff principle, which had so largely contributed to give victory to the hosts controlled by von Moltke in those contests, was adopted by almost every military power during the last quarter of the 19th century. The exact nature of the arrangements necessarily varied in different countries, but the ideals sought after were the same. Thus in the different staff organizations as they were constituted in peace-time, work in connexion with devising plans for offensive operations and for ensuring territorial defence, duties dealing with the collection of military information, the superintendence of the education of officers, the conduct of manoeuvres and the training of troops, were kept as far as possible distinct from administration- "adjutantur," as the Germans call it. Before the year 1900 most armies possessed a general staff which was more or less in close touch with its Government on the one hand and, thanks to its ramifications, with the troops on the other.
Only two of the more important nations - the United Kingdom and the United States - adhered for all practical purposes to previously existing systems, under which preparation for war was relegated to the background in staff duties. It is true that in either state certain improvements were effected by the military authorities, tending towards ensuring that at least some of the functions properly performed by a general staff should be allocated to special branches of the staff; but, such as they were, they did not go very far. Then came the S. African War of 1899-1902. The difficulties and disappointments encountered by British military forces in that protracted struggle, coupled with the unsatisfactory working of the staff in the field (especially in its higher grades) during the progress of the operations, made plain the need of reform, and the War Office was considering the question of far-reaching modifications of the system in force when, in 1904, the Government suddenly set up a " War Office Reconstitution Committee " charged with the duty of reorganizing the central administration of the army. The committee recommended a number of drastic alterations, but by far the most im portant of its proposals was that a General Staff Department, which was to constitute the foremost branch of the professional side of the War Office, should be created forthwith out of certain existing sections, with entirely new sections superposed. The committee further urged that a general staff organization, acting under the aegis of, and in close touch with, the general staff in Whitehall, should be introduced into military districts and commands. The recommendations of the committee were accepted by the Government, and so it came about that a British general staff was established ten years before the outbreak of the World War. During those ten years remarkable progress was made, and when the nation was confronted by the tremendous emergency of Aug. 1914 it had at its disposition a body of welltrained general staff officers, sufficient for the comparatively small army that was available to take the field at the opening of hostilities, although totally insufficient to meet the requirements of the vast forces which had to be improvised after war had broken out. The Government of the United States was still later than that of the United Kingdom in establishing a general staff of the kind that Scharnhorst had thought of a century before. This was only set on foot in 1911, six years before the entry of the Republic into the great conflict which was to upset so many preconceived ideas on the subject of conducting war, but which was to prove - even more conclusively than had the FrancoGerman War and the Japanese triumphs of 1904-5 - how imperative it is under modern conditions for a state which embarks upon a serious struggle with a foreign foe to have an efficient and suitably organized military staff at its command. Owing to the very small number of trained general staff officers that were available when the country became committed to hostilities on a vast scale, the U.S. forces were even worse equipped in this respect when they took the field in Europe than were those of the United Kingdom in their greatly expanded form.
The remarkable progress that has taken place in science of recent years has tended to impose some entirely new duties upon military staffs, brought about their expansion in certain directions, and even necessitated the creation of some entirely new branches as part of their organization. There is, for instance, in the first place that development in railway communications which has occurred in most civilized countries and in many possible and actual theatres of war, as also the contriving of numberless devices by which the construction of new lines of rail is facilitated during operations in the field. Then again there is the question of electric communications, which to-day play so conspicuous a part in war. Improvements in small arms and in ordnance have brought it about that the volume of ammunition needed for the weapons in the hands of troops has come to be out of all proportion to the amount which experience had proved to be ample in campaigns of the past. Developments in mechanical traction are giving this an ever-increasing military importance, not merely from the point of view of the supplying of armies but also from that of their tactical employment. The appearance of the tank on the battlefield is another feature of very recent date which tends to increase staff work. Finally, there is the establishment of air power which has introduced a factor of incalculable importance as affecting the control of belligerent armies; whether the combatant aeronautical service of a nation form part of its military organization or be independent, its operations in time of war impose duties upon military staffs such as had not to be performed by them in any contest previous to the World War. In some cases it is mainly the general staff that finds its labours increased by these modern developments, in other cases the new work falls rather upon the administrative staff. But in all cases both subdivisions of the staff are, at least to some extent, affected.
One most important duty which devolves upon the general staff in a State compelled by its geographical position and by political and international problems to maintain fighting forces both by sea and by land is the establishing and the maintenance of intimate relations with the naval authorities. Such conditions prevail in the case of most maritime nations, and, where this is so, it is imperative that the two services shall be capable of effective cooperation in the event of war. Effective cooperation when an emergency arises can only be ensured if the military :staff has been in close touch with the corresponding naval staff in time of peace. Much attention had fortunately been paid to this question in the United Kingdom during the period that intervened between the creation of the British general staff and the outbreak of the World War. Permanent contact existed between the thinking branches of the Admiralty and of the War Office. Problems which might possibly arise in the future had been examined by them in conference, principles of action had been laid down, details had been worked out, and to this is to be attributed the secrecy and the smoothness with which the British Expeditionary Force was transported across the Channel to France during the fortnight succeeding the declaration of war in 1914. Moreover, thanks to their being brought into contact at staff rides with naval officers and to the happy relations which existed between these two services, British general staff officers as a body had studied and were acquainted with naval doctrine and naval procedure, a great advantage when, as was the case at the Dardanelles, operations partook of an amphibious character. General staffs on the Continent did not, on the other hand, prove to be equally well-informed as to maritime conditions; this was made apparent during discussions such as often took place between military authorities representing the different Allies, concerning the policy which ought to be pursued in the Near East and other problems in which sea-power was necessarily involved. It is only natural, however, that a military staff which is representative of a sea-faring people should devote more attention to such subjects than will that of a non-maritime nation or of a nation possessing small maritime interests and limited maritime resources.
When a country elects to make of its air service a department of State distinct from the army, as has happened in the United Kingdom, it necessarily falls to the lot of the military general staff to maintain those intimate relations with the aerial general staff by which alone mutual cooperation can be secured in time of war. Under such circumstances the military general staff stands towards the air service as it does to the navy.
" War," said Clausewitz, " is only a continuation of State policy by other means," and elsewhere that " none of the principal plans which are required for a war can be made without an insight into the political relations." It was a recognition of this truth on the part of her Government that led to the triumphs of Prussia, first over Austria and then over France, in the days of von Moltke, the foremost professional interpreter of Clausewitz' doctrines. The executive in Berlin had during the middle decades of the 19th century been working hand in hand with the general staff. Sadowa and Sedan were the outcome. The history of the short-lived German Empire indicates that in later years a tendency made itself felt for the general staff to attempt to direct, and even partially to succeed in directing, the policy of the Government. A system of genuine militarism in its worst form began to creep in, which in due course brought untold disasters on the German people; but the passages quoted above from the great Prussian military writer do not inculcate anything of that kind. What they do inculcate is that there should be at all times an intimate understanding between what has been called the " brain of the army " and the civilian executive at the head of the State. The truth is that any Government which understands its business will always, when any question of a delicate nature arises between it and the rulers of some foreign Power, keep itself fully acquainted with the resources at command for enforcing its wishes should a quarrel supervene. If, moreover, the most is to be made of such fighting force as a country will dispose of in the event of finding itself in a state of belligerency with some neighbour, it is indispensable that the military - as also naval - authorities shall have made beforehand a study of the strategical situation that will, as far as can be foreseen, arise when hostilities break out. It is also indispensable that those authorities shall have been made aware in advance of the likelihood of the struggle's taking place. It is on the central directing branch of the general staff, i.e. on the General Staff Department at the War Office in the case of the United Kingdom, as it was on the " Great General Staff " of the days of von Moltke and the German Empire, that devolves the duty of maintaining relations with the Government and of advising it regarding the military aspect of problems created by the international situation. That central directing branch of the general staff is entitled to expect that the Government shall keep it fully au courant with the political conditions of the day.
The merits of the doctrine preached by Clausewitz seem to be self-evident, but leaders of opinion in the United Kingdom were slow to realize its importance. There existed an almost unaccountable inability to perceive the dangers to which a State unprepared for emergencies is exposed. When a Royal Commission presided over by Lord Hartington virtually recommended the setting up of a general staff in 1889, one of its members, a prominent politician who at a later date came to be Prime Minister, actually - in one of the most fatuous documents ever written by a public man - objected to the proposal on the grounds that, owing to its peculiar position, Great Britain had no need to study possibilities of conflict in advance. With such ineptitude in influential quarters, the bitter experiences of the S. African War were required to awaken British statesmen to a realization of their responsibilities. The lessons of that contest were to some extent learnt. By the setting up of the Committee of Imperial Defence, in which professional opinion was given a powerful voice, some preliminary steps had been taken in the right direction even before the creation of the general staff in 1904, and, subsequent to that date, the general staff at the War Office has been constantly consulted by the British Government and has been kept well-informed on all points of importance connected with the international situation.
How, as a matter of administration, the relations between the general staff and the executive are to be governed, and by what process communications between them are to be carried out, necessarily depends upon the political system in vogue in the state concerned. In any country possessing representative institutions the general staff can only be acting in a consultative capacity, at all events in peace-time. In the United Kingdom in the years preceding the World War the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Director of Military Operations were exofcio members of the Committee of Imperial Defence. When strategical or administrative questions in which military force was or might be concerned were to be discussed by the committee, documents setting out the general staff view on the subject were laid before it by the general staff representatives. The decision of the committee on the points under discussion was taken and recorded, and executive action sometimes followed if it was involved by the decision. But although the more prominent members of the Government were included in it, the committee itself was merely a consultative body, and no executive action involving expenditure could follow on one of its decisions without the obtaining of at least nominal Cabinet sanction. Such recommendations were liable to be vetoed on account of the expense by the committee without reference to the Cabinet. Moreover, it did not necessarily follow that the view of the general staff would be accepted by the committee even on academical questions.
An interesting example of the working of the system is provided by the story of the Dardanelles. The expediency of an attack upon the Straits in the event of a war with Turkey was gone into by the committee as an academical question in 1906. The general staff were opposed to such a venture and the Admiralty representatives in the main agreed with them, the committee decided that the undertaking would in the event of a contest be inadvisable, and the result was that study of the subject on the part of the general staff virtually ceased. When early in the World War the project was brought up afresh by the First Lord of the Admiralty, the decision which the Committee of Imperial Defence had arrived at eight years before was ignored, and when the operations were undertaken their progress was hampered by lack of information, owing to the general staff's having acted on that decision and having to some extent abandonedresearch with regard to the topography, the resources and .So: forth of this potential theatre of war. But experience proved that the general staff had been right.
When hostilities arise some instrument a good deal more effective than a consultative committee is needed to control conduct of the war, and, from Aug. 1914 to the date of the Armistice, the operations were, in the case of the United Kingdom, for the first two and a half years of the struggle under supreme charge of various forms of war council directly representative of the Cabinet and given a free hand by that body. They were later under supreme charge of the specially established War Cabinet. The general staff was practically always represented at the meetings of the war councils and of the War Cabinet, but purely in an advisory position without voting power. They were responsible to the council or the Cabinet for the advice they gave, but the council or the Cabinet was responsible to the country for accepting or rejecting that advice. It is true that as a result of somewhat peculiar conditions that held good in the early days of the struggle, attributable partly to the unique personality of Lord Kitchener and partly to the weakening of the general staff at the War Office when its cream was skimmed off and dispatched to the Continent, the influence of the brain of the army was not for a time exerted very effectually in the councils of the Government. But that was only a passing phase. At a later stage the general staff was always at least allowed to express its views, even if its opinion was not necessarily accepted.
As a matter of fact its opinion was occasionally ignored in questions of considerable importance. This was no doubt partly due to some want of confidence in its judgment felt in Government circles owing to the slow progress made towards victory, and partly due to the personality and the temperament of certain members of the Government itself. The general staff also must have been sometimes at fault on occasions when its advice was rejected, although, should the full facts ever be made known impartially, posterity will probably pronounce it usually to have been right. Still, a general staff, however well-organized it may be and however gifted and informed its personnel, is not infallible. That this is so was demonstrated in the protraction for years of the World War, whereas the British general staff had at the outset confidently reckoned on its only lasting some months. The German general staff, again, looked with contempt upon the huge forces that Lord Kitchener was known to be improvising, until the value of the British " New Armies" was proved up to the hilt in the field; and at a later stage of the struggle it totally miscalculated and underestimated the military potentialities of the United States. Moreover, all the European general staffs alike, in their forecasts made in time of peace, underrated the wastage in personnel and the expenditure in ammunition in a modern campaign on a great scale.
It has been said that a general staff must " think politically." If this maxim is merely to be taken as meaning that a general staff should appreciate political habits of thought, watch political tendencies, and keep itself acquainted with the political aspects of every question influencing military action alike in peace and in war, its truth is indisputable. But one of the most important duties falling to the lot of a general staff, especially in times of emergency, will often be to strive to prevent mere policy from adversely influencing the conduct of operations of war or affecting Government decisions in connexion with military subjects. History provides some striking examples of political considerations gravely prejudicing the prospects of armies in the field. MacMahon's fatal march to Sedan was a case in point. The retention of Gen. Penn Symons' advanced force at Glencoe in the opening days of the Natal campaign of 1899 furnishes another instance. Had the question at issue been regarded solely from the soldier's point of view, it is more than doubtful whether Gen. Townshend would ever have been launched on his ill-omened effort to reach Bagdad in Nov. 1915. When problems of this kind present themselves, a general staff will often have a difficult and delicate role to play. But the golden rule to govern its conduct on such occasions would seem to be that it ought to regard and present the problem from the fighting point of view alone. The politicians can look after the political side.
It cannot be too clearly understood that neither in the United Kingdom nor in any other military state does the staff of an army in reality consist of a general staff alone. There must always be what, for lack of a more distinctive nomenclature, is called in the British service its " administrative " side - although in point of fact many of the duties of a general staff are necessarily of an administrative character. It is indeed the case that, at least in peace-time, the administrative staff of an army is in a sense the more important of the two. The army has to be recruited and fed and clothed and equipped, and its discipline has to be maintained, otherwise there will be no troops for the general staff to dispose of and there will be no raison d'être for the general staff. Whereas the general staff will often in peace-time be engaged on work which in the event may prove of little profit, the administrative staff is constantly busy disposing of questions which if not dealt with will cause a collapse. Calling the administrative staff " adjutantur " may alter its status and may lower its dignity, but does not alter the fact that it is a staff and that it performs staff duties. The organization as affecting the administrative staff that was introduced into the War Office in the United Kingdom in 1904, and in due course extended throughout the army (the details of which have been touched upon in earlier paragraphs), worked extremely well both at headquarters and with the troops during the pre-war period, and it also gave good results when subjected to trial at manoeuvres between 1909 and 1914. The same staff organization was extended to India shortly after it came into force in the United Kingdom. Nor, when it came to be put to the test in warfare on a gigantic scale in many parts of the world, was it found wanting. Although the problems engaging the attention of the quartermaster-general's staffs and the inspector-general of communications' staffs were in many respects fundamentally the same in the Gallipoli Peninsula, in Mesopotamia, and in France and Flanders, the wide differences in the geographical and topographical conditions as between the three theatres of war obliged the problems to be solved on separate lines in each case. In France and Flanders several railways connected the troops at the front with the secure and wellequipped ports that acted as bases. In the Gallipoli Peninsula open beaches under fire served for bases, and the communications were to all intents and purposes maritime. For most of the time in Mesopotamia it was a case of an army dependent on one single line of river communication, hundreds of miles long, although the river was gradually to some extent supplemented by specially constructed sections of railway. And yet the organization of the administrative staff as it had been designed in peace-time met requirements under these diverse sets of circumstances. Where failures occurred, they were due to errors in execution or else to lack of essential resources. Such alterations as have recently been carried out as a result of the teachings of the World War have been in detail and not in principle.
The British plan subordinates the administrative staff to the general staff less than is the common practice. This is perhaps due to the nature of British campaigns of the1874-1902era, campaigns fought in regions often destitute of communications and always poor in resources. Almost everything hinged on supply and transport in these contests, and the transport generally had to be improvised on entirely new methods for each particular case. Losses in action were as a rule trifling as compared to losses from disease. For one thought that the commander or his chief advisers gave to the enemy, ten thoughts were given to communications. Instead of looking to the front they were generally looking to the rear. Duties such as are now apportioned to the administrative staff greatly outweighed in importance duties such as are now apportioned to the general staff. There was little difficulty in beating the enemy if only supplies could be got up to permit a fight. But, to whatever cause it may be attributable, the fact remains that the chief of the general staff of a British army nowadays is merely in the position of Primus inter pares relatively to the adjutant-general and the quartermaster-general - and it is the same at the War Office. In almost all other armies, on the other hand, including that of the United States, the chief of the general staff is definitely chief of the staff. And he also is usually called chief of the staff, the heads of different branches of the administrative staff being absolutely subjected to him. The "chief of the staff" plan was moreover adopted in the case of several British campaigns of modern date, e.g. that of 1882 in Egypt and Lord Wolseley's and Lord Kitchener's expeditions up the Nile in 1884-5 and 1898.
A chief of the staff was appointed to Sir R. Buller at the outset of the S. African War (although owing to unforeseen events he never took up the post), and at a later date Lord Kitchener went out as chief of the staff to Lord Roberts.
If the existing British staff organization comes to be compared with those where the chief of the general staff is also chief of the staff, it will be found that there is something to be said on both sides. That part of the British system under which a command or a district is in peace-time supplied with a superior officer in charge of administration, to whom wide responsibilities are allowed and who is generally in practice senior to the principal general staff officer, permits the general in command to devote nearly the whole of his attention to preparing his troops for war. But that arrangement would be unworkable in the field. There the progress of operations is so dependent on the work of the administrative staff that the commander cannot transfer his authority in connexion with the latter to somebody else - as is recognized in the British staff organization in time of war by the heads of the adjutant-general and the quartermaster-general staffs, as well as the inspector of communications, then dealing direct with the commander. Still, the fact that a peace arrangement does not fit in with the requirements of war is not a conclusive argument against that arrangement's holding good in peace-time, which after all represents the normal condition of things; and the British plan of a chief of administration is only a special feature in a larger question. Objections do undoubtedly exist in peace-time to the supremacy of the chief of the general staff. That automatically makes him responsible for the work of the administrative staff, and as all manner of administrative problems - unimportant problems, perhaps, but problems which have to be solved - are constantly arising in peace-time, most of the chief of the general staff's time may come to be occupied with matters that are not general staff matters at all, and military policy, manoeuvres, training of troops, higher instruction, defence schemes, and so forth, may suffer. But, if peace represents the normal state of affairs, armies none the less exist for purposes of war, and in time of war the case for the British system is not so strong.
In face of the enemy, operations - planning them, deciding whether the plan is feasible, and taking the necessary steps for their execution - are of paramount importance, but cannot be said actually to govern administration, for unless the army's establishments are maintained and unless it has its food, its ammunition, etc., it cannot carry out the operations. The success of the plan may in the main depend on strategical and tactical factors; but in framing the plan the duties which the administrative staff will have to perform in connexion with its execution must have been considered with meticulous care. It is for the administrative staff to say whether the plan is feasible from the point of view of supply, transport, depots, hospital service, and so forth. There may be great administrative difficulties in the way, which will as a matter of course be represented. It is, however, for the general staff to weigh the administrative as against the strategical aspects of the case and then lay the whole subject before the commander for a final decision. The British Field Service Regulations dearly admit by implication that the chief of the general staff is the superior of the adjutant-general, the quartermaster-general and the chief of communications, without their being actually under him. That, under conditions such as develop on active service, is apt to prove a somewhat clumsy arrangement and to give rise to friction. It is neither one thing nor the other. Granted that the " chief of the staff " system means centralization, granted that it demands from the chief of the general staff a somewhat closer acquaintance with purely administrative questions than would be necessary if the heads ,of the chief branches of the administrative staff were virtually his equals, even granted that under it less of his time will be available for the consideration of the strategical and tactical situation than would otherwise be the case, the system does seem a more satisfactory arrangement for purposes of operations in the field than that which found favour in the British army after the setting up of the Army Council. Nor would it seem to follow as a matter of course that the " chief of the staff" system must not be adopted in war-time, simply because it does not obtain during peace. (C. E. C.)
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Chisholm, Hugh, General Editor. Entry for 'Military Staff'. 1911 Encyclopedia Britanica. https://www.studylight.org/encyclopedias/eng/bri/m/military-staff.html. 1910.
