the Week of Proper 28 / Ordinary 33
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Italo-Turkish War
1911 Encyclopedia Britannica
or "ITALO-TURKISH WAR, 1911-2. - Following upon the discussions which took place between Rome and Constantinople during the summer of 1911, an ultimatum from Italy was delivered to the Porte on Sept. 28, demanding Turkey's consent to a military occupation of Tripolitana and Cyrenaica. A period of 24 hours was set by the ultimatum, and as the Turk ish reply did not meet the Italian demands a state of war was declared as from 2:30 P.M. on Sept. 29.
Military action was slow to succeed the formal declaration of war: the political situation had developed so rapidly that the diplomats had far outrun the soldiers. On Sept. 3, at the close of the Italian grand manoeuvres, the 1889 class of conscripts had been dismissed, leaving only the 1890 class with the colours. On Sept. 23 the 1888 class was called up, and two days later secret mobilization orders were issued. It was no doubt in the belief that Turkey would yield to pressure that the ultimatum was presented more than a week before an expeditionary force could be dispatched from Italy. In the interval the Italian navy had to act alone, at first by demonstration and later in earnest.
On Sept. 28 an Italian squadron appeared off Tripoli, and the following morning an officer landed and informed the acting Vali that if a satisfactory answer were not received from the Porte that afternoon a state of war would begin. Next day, the news of Turkey's refusal having arrived, the blockade of Tripoli was declared, and the Turkish authorities were notified that if the town were not surrendered in three days it would be bombarded. Most of the Italian subjects resident in Tripoli had already left and those who remained were taken off on the morning of Sept. 30. Next day the cable between Tripoli and Malta was cut.
Meanwhile hostilities had begun elsewhere. On Sept. 29 and 30 Italian destroyers, under the command of the Duke of the Abruzzi, sank two Turkish torpedo boats off Prevesa, on the coast of Epirus, and on Oct. 1 Adml. Aubry left Augusta to go in search of the Turkish fleet, which the declaration of war had found at Beirut. He had with him the two battleships" Roma "and" Vittorio Emanuele "and the torpedo cruiser" Agordat,"and on the way he was to pick up the battleship" Napoli,"which was in the narrow seas between Sicily and Tripoli, and the two cruisers" Amalfi "and" Pisa,"which had been sent to Derna, in Cyrenaica, to destroy the wireless station there. But the orders given to Adml. Aubry were suddenly countermanded. Instead of steaming for the Aegean in order to intercept the Turks, he was sent to Tobruk, which was occupied by a detachment of sailors on Oct. 4. Tobruk, which had been much discussed as a potential naval base, was thus the first point on the long coastline of Turkish N. Africa to be occupied by the Italians. The first detachment of the expeditionary force, moreover, which left Naples on the evening of Oct. 5, was sent to Tobruk instead of to Tripoli.
The renunciation of the attempt to cut off the Turkish fleet was a political move. The Italian Government believed that the Porte would soon realize that it was impossible to defend the Tripolitan provinces, and would be willing to enter into some arrangement which would satisfy Italian aspirations and save the face of Turkey. In these circumstances there was a natural disinclination to embitter relations by the destruction of the Turkish fleet. Another reason was the desire to localize the conflict, if a real conflict had to come. Italy was well aware that in declaring war against Turkey she ran the risk of stirring up further trouble, and if hostile operations could be confined to the African coast, the danger of other complications would certainly be lessened.
On Oct. 2 Adml. Thaon de Revel, who commanded the Italian cruiser squadron, landed in Tripoli under a white flag and again demanded the surrender of the town. The Turkish authorities, after a good deal of discussion, declined, and next day the Italian fleet bombarded the obsolete fortifications for about two hours. There was a mere show of resistance. The bulk of the Turkish garrison had already begun to leave Tripoli, and by the next day, in pursuance of the last orders received from Constantinople, all the troops had retired into the sandy plains. At noon the German consul reported the evacuation of the town. He stated that the Arabs had begun to pillage, and asked that troops should be landed at once. Next day a force of 1,600 sailors was disembarked, and two days later Adml. Borea-Ricci assumed the governorship of the town and received the submission of about a hundred sheikhs and other men of position, among them Hasuna Pasha Karamanli, lineal representative of the family which had ruled Tripoli prior to the Turkish occupation, and mayor under the Turkish regime.
A week elapsed between the landing of the sailors and the arrival of the expeditionary force, and during this time the sailors, besides patrolling the town, had to hold a defensive line some 8 m. in length. If the Turks had chosen to attack, they could almost certainly have retaken Tripoli. But they made better use of the time allowed them. When the Turkish garrison retired from the town and the Italian sailors landed, the majority of the Tripolitan chiefs were ready to make submission. They had no love for the Turk, and little objection to a new overlord. Two men turned the scale in favour of resistance by supporting the efforts of Neshat Bey, the Turkish commander in Tripoli - Ferhat Bey, deputy for Tripoli, and Suleiman el Baruni, a Berber from Fessato, who was deputy for the Jebel region. Each was possessed of great influence in his own district, and was able, first, to prevent the submission of the tribesmen, and, as time went on, to bring native levies to support the Turkish regular troops.
The first Italian transports appeared off Tripoli at dawn on Oct. 11, and the disembarkation at once began. But bad weather made it difficult to land guns, stores and transport, and it was not until Oct. 20 that all the equipment had been put on shore. The expeditionary force consisted of some 9,000 rifles with a few field and mountain batteries and two squadrons of cavalry, but this force had only a very limited radius of action owing to lack of transport. The conviction that the Turks would not receive support from the native tribesmen, and consequently, would never retreat toward the interior, had limited the transport organization to what was necessary for a two days' march. General Caneva, who was in command of the troops in the two provinces and had assumed the governorship of Tripoli, was practically tied to his base. He was faced by an unexpected situation, caused by the retreat of the Turks, but all his information was to the effect that the Italian occupation would be welcome to the Arabs and Berbers. He believed that he could deal with the Turks at his leisure. He had not yet realized that the Turkish garrison was now a nucleus round which a formidable resistance was being built up, and that already a reaction against the invader was imminent.
Meanwhile Derna, Horns and Bengazi (Benghazi) had been occupied. At Derna and Horns the Turkish garrisons retired southward after a short bombardment. At Bengazi the Italian landing was opposed, and the town was only occupied after a long day's fighting, the Italians, who had disembarked to the south of the little port, losing over 100 men. There was no further fighting in the Bengazi district for a considerable time, but both at Derna and Homs there were sharp encounters during the first few days after the landing of the troops.
The blow against the Italians in Tripoli came unexpectedly. During the early days of the occupation the belief that the Arabs would never make common cause with the Turks led to an overconfidence and lack of vigilance. There was little apprehension of an attack now that the Italian troops were in great superiority over the Turks, and the conviction that the Arabs were friendly led to no hindrance being placed upon communications between the town and the surrounding country. Arabs, and supposed Arabs, came and went freely. It was due to over-confidence also that the disarmament of the natives was not pursued with vigour or system until it was too late. In this way it was possible for the Turks, and those Arabs who were opposed to the coming of the Italians, to arrange for a rising behind the lines which should coincide with an attack.
To the west and south the Italian lines faced the open, rolling plain, but on the east, for a distance of two miles, they ran through the wide strip of palm groves and fruit gardens that stretches eastward from the town for nearly a dozen miles. Against this part of the line the Turks and Arabs, favoured by the thick vegetation, attacked suddenly on the morning of Oct. 23, simultaneous demonstrations being made on the south and west. The attack upon the regiment of Bersaglieri who held the long line in the oasis was carried out with decision and was aided by a simultaneous attack from a number of natives within the lines. On the left, by the village of Shara Shat, two companies were overwhelmed and cut to pieces, and the rest of the regiment was hard put to it to hold its own. Supporting troops were sent up from the town, but they had to fight their way through the network of gardens, sniped by those of the local Arabs who had joined in the fight, and the much greater number who had come through the gap made by the destruction of the two companies at Shara Shat. The fighting lasted all day, but in the evening the assailants were finally driven off.
There was much excitement in the town during the morning, and a few Italian soldiers were killed, one of them by a kavass of the German Consulate. The streets were rapidly cleared, and there was a good deal of firing by the troops, mostly in the air. A few Arabs were shot out of hand, and the kavass . above mentioned was executed after a summary trial. In the oasis, not only to the east of the town, but behind the southern lines, sniping went on all day, and the order was given that the oasis within the Italian lines should be cleared of its inhabitants, and that those found in arms against the Italians should be shot. The oasis was cleared during the next few days, and several thousand Arabs were brought into the town. There was a good deal of sniping, especially at first, and those who were found in possession of arms were either shot or brought into Tripoli under guard. Undoubtedly, innocent persons were killed during these days, but they were not very many, and most of them were shot by mistake in the confused bush fighting that succeeded the first inrush at Shara Shat. In all, according to the figures furnished by the Arab authorities, a little over 400 inhabitants of the oasis lost their lives. There were some cases of excess on the part of the Italian troops. Careful subsequent investigation showed that they were very few.
The European press, and especially that of England and Germany, was filled with messages which multiplied the number of Arabs killed by ten, and assumed that they were practically all unarmed and harmless peasants. It was soon realized that there had been gross exaggeration, and European opinion changed, but the fact that the repression had been severe, and that some innocent persons had been killed, was exploited to the utmost by the Turks in Tripoli and their supporters. Many men of the Tripoli district fought against Italy for a year in the mistaken belief that their families had been massacred.
The attack of Oct. 23 was followed three days later by another. The Turks and Arabs who attacked in the eastern oasis were beaten off after some hours' fighting, but south of the town the line was rushed by a large body of Arabs who penetrated into the gardens and were dislodged with difficulty by the reserves. For a short time the situation was anxious, but after about five hours' fighting the attacking tribesmen were driven off, leaving many dead. This fight showed that the line occupied was too long for the number of troops available, and it was reduced in extent by a considerable withdrawal in the eastern oasis. This withdrawal was made the subject of alarmist rumours in the European press and many thought that Tripoli would shortly be retaken; and the United States cruiser" Chester "was sent with orders to embark the American consul and any other American subjects. The consul declined to go, and his action was of value in indicating the true situation. No doubt, in addition to frightening Europe, the withdrawal encouraged the Turks and Arabs, who appeared to be in the position of besieging Tripoli. For a month the town did give the impression of being beleaguered; in reality, during this period, Gen. Caneva's chief enemy was cholera. The disease broke out towards the end of Oct. and for some weeks it caused much loss and still more anxiety. In all, nearly a thousand soldiers died of cholera, and the native population suffered heavily. The problem of tackling the epidemic was rendered more difficult by the large number of" immigrants "from the oasis, who had sought refuge in the town in the early days of the occupation, or had been brought in when the oasis was cleared. Prompt and effective measures were taken, but it was not until the middle of Nov. that the authorities could breathe freely, and for some weeks the situation required vigilance.
From the events of Oct. 23 and the following days it was clear that the calculations of the Italian Government had been at fault. Turkey was not prepared to lose the Tripolitan provinces without a struggle, and the local tribesmen were joining in the resistance of the garrison. Reinforcements were immediately dispatched to Tripoli, and on Nov. 5 a decree was published in Rome, annexing the two Turkish provinces. Italy was no longer inclined to consider a compromise, and the annexation was proclaimed in order to stop all efforts in that direction and define her intentions, not only to Turkey, but to the European Powers. Further reinforcements followed, and by the fourth week in Nov. Gen. Caneva had under his command 34 battalions of infantry (nearly 25,000 rifles) and 16 batteries of field and mountain artillery. On Nov. 26 an advance was made through the oasis on the east and the old lines were occupied after stiff fighting. Eight days after, on Dec. 4, a force of 12,000 men, with five mountain batteries and two squadrons, supported from the trenches by field guns and a few heavy guns which had arrived some days earlier, advanced into the plain against the main body of the enemy, which was based upon the little oasis of 'Ain Zara. It was hoped that the Turks would stand, but this was not their policy. They fought a stubborn containing action, and lost the few guns they possessed, but they retreated in good time, leaving to the quick-moving tribesmen the task of delaying the Italian advance. 'Ain Zara was occupied in force by the Italians, and Turkish headquarters were established at 'Aziziya, some 30 m. south of Tripoli, while a strong force, mainly Arab, was encamped at Suani Beni Adham, a day's march from the town. The eastern oasis was deserted by the Arabs, and its farthest point, Tajura, was occupied by the Italians on Dec. 13.
At the beginning of Nov. the Italian Government had considered the possibility of extending the theatre of war, by sea at least, in the hope of inducing Turkey to give up the struggle. AustriaHungary intervened, backed by Germany, and on receipt of a report of Italian activity off Salonika, Count Aehrenthal told the Italian ambassador in Vienna that Italian action" on the Ottoman coasts of European Turkey or in the Aegean Islands could not be allowed either by Austria or by Germany, as it would be contrary to the Treaty of Alliance."He said further that he considered" the bombardment of ports in European Turkey such as Salonika, Kavalla, etc., as contrary to Article VII."(of the Alliance). Italy's action being limited in this way, it was necessary to solve the Tripoli problem directly, but the task was more difficult than it need have been owing to other limitations laid upon the military authorities by the Italian Government. Gen. Caneva's orders appear to have been that he must not risk reverses or suffer heavy loss. In the circumstances a desert expedition in pursuit of the Turks and their mobile auxiliaries seemed hardly practical. In any event, the four months following the battle of 'Ain Zara passed without any action of importance in Tripolitana. A flying column sent southwards from 'Ain Zara on Dec. 1919 had a stiff fight near Bir Tubras. The oasis of Gargaresh, 2 m. west of Tripoli, was occupied on Jan. 20, after a skirmish with a body of Arabs who came up from the south when the Italians advanced into the open. Five weeks later the situation at Horns was improved by the capture and retention against counterattack of the Mergheb, a hill which dominates the little town. No other fighting took place in the western province until the spring was nearly over, though in Feb. the arrival of camels, motor lorries and Eritrean askaris seemed to point to an early advance.
During the period of inaction the relations between Italy and France came under a cloud. On Jan. 15 and 18, respectively, the French mail steamers" Carthage "and" Manouba,"en route from Marseilles to Tunis, were stopped and brought into Cagliari by Italian cruisers. The grounds given were that the" Carthage "was carrying an aeroplane destined for the Turks, and that a Red Crescent Mission which was on board the" Manouba "included several Turkish officers. The French Prime Minister, M. Poincare, made a speech that was exceedingly sharp in tone, and the press of both countries heaped fuel on the flames kindled by the incident. The matter was referred to The Hague, where the verdict was given in favour of Italy, but M. Poincare's speech and the threats of the French press were not forgotten by Italian public opinion.
In Cyrenaica progress had been no more speedy than in the region of Tripoli. No effort, in fact, had been made to advance towards the interior, or even to extend the area of occupation round Bengazi, Derna and Tobruk. Nothing, certainly, was to be gained by an advance into the blank desert behind Tobruk, and it was decided to make no move from Bengazi and Derna. Enver Bey succeeded in reaching Cyrenaica early in the winter, and by his energy and personality he succeeded in organizing a formidable resistance, securing a unity among the tribesmen, and a willingness to cooperate with the Turks, which had never before existed. Under Enver's direction both Bengazi and Derna, but especially the latter, were closely beset throughout the winter. The Derna lines, which were dominated from the hilly ground immediately behind the town, were harassed frequently, and between the end of Dec. and the first week in March four important attacks were delivered at intervals of about three weeks. All these attacks were repulsed after hard fighting, and the result of the engagement of March 3, in which the attack was directed by Enver Bey in person, seemed to convince the Turks and Arabs that their attempts were useless. The neighbourhood of Derna remained quiet for nearly five months. At Bengazi, except for one reconnaissance in force at the end of Nov. when an Italian column went out some 6 m. from the town and returned after a sharp fight, there was no action of any importance till March. Blockhouses were built to secure the Italian lines, and these were occasionally attacked, but the Italians made no movement until March 12, when Gen. Briccola, who commanded the garrison, sent out a column to attack a large body of Arabs who had occupied an oasis, or rather a collection of gardens, known as the Two Palms, less than half-a-mile from one of the Italian redoubts.
A mixed force of Turks and Arabs also approached the town from the south-east, but did not press home their attack. The Arabs in the oasis stood firm, but they were overwhelmed by the Italian attack and suffered very heavily.
After the battle of the Two Palms there was practically no fighting in the Bengazi district, but in April the long spell of inaction in the western province came to an end, and from that time onward the resistance of the Turks and Arabs was gradually broken by a series of operations at various points. On April Do and ii a landing was effected, without opposition, at Ras Makabes, a headland not far from the Tunis border, and a base was established near the old fort of Bu Kamesh. The Italian force consisted of two brigades, one from Tripoli and one from Italy, under the command of Gen. Garioni, and it made short work of a few minor attacks delivered by the Arabs. A landing on this part of the coast would have been effected earlier if it had not been for the difficulty of keeping up supplies during the winter.' In April Italian warships appeared off the entrance to the Dardanelles. They were fired on by the Turkish forts, and their answer to this fire drew a fresh and very energetic protest from Vienna. The Italian ambassador was informed that if Italy" wished to resume her freedom of action "Austria could do the same. An d further action on similar lines" might have grave consequences.' After a daring exploit by Capt. Millo, who penetrated the Dardanelles in a small destroyer, the northern Aegean was left alone by the Italians, but in May the island of Rhodes and 12 small islands of the Sporades were occupied by Italy. Only in Rhodes was there any resistance, but the Italian force under Gen. Ameglio, which was formed in the main of troops from Tripoli and Bengazi, fought a brilliant little action at Psithos and captured some 2,000 Turkish regulars.
On May 2 Gen. Reisoli pushed back the Arabs some distance to the east of Horns, inflicting considerable loss, and five weeks later the Tripoli district once more became the scene of fighting. Encouraged by the long period of quiet the Turks and Arabs had come nearer the town, and a considerable force was entrenched near the oasis of Zanzur, a few miles west of Gargaresh. On June 8 two Italian brigades drove the enemy out of their positions, while a reserve brigade nearer Tripoli awaited the expected arrival of enemy reinforcements. The Arabs came up in strength, but were soundly beaten, losing nearly 1,000 killed, while the Italians had over 300 casualties. A few days later the Arabs attacked the Italian positions near Horns, but were driven off with heavy loss (about 700 killed). They were taken in flank by a battalion of Bersaglieri, and after this repulse Horns was undisturbed by any further fighting. On June 15 an Italian force under Gen. Camerana landed near Misurata, and occupied the town some days later, and on June 27 Gen. Garioni started a series of operations from Bu Kamesh, which ended, after various successful actions, in the occupation of Zuara Transports actually left Italy for Zuara (Zoara) in Dec. but returned after being a month at sea in persistent bad weather.
and an advance towards the oases of Regdaline, from which the Arabs were driven on Aug. 16.
Peace negotiations were already being conducted at Lausanne but progress was very slow, and two important actions were fought before a conclusion was reached. On Sept. 2 Gen. Caneva was recalled to Italy, and the command of the troops in Libya was divided, Gen. Ragni becoming governor and commander-in-chief in Tripoli, and Gen. Briccola, who had hitherto been subordinate to Gen. Caneva, being given independent authority in Cyrenaica. Gen. Briccola's first action was to improve the position at Derna, which had been a daily target for a few Turkish shells for more than eight weeks. The Derna garrison had been weakened in order to provide troops for the Rhodes and Misurata expeditions, but early in Sept. detachments were sent from Bengazi, Horns, Zuara and Rhodes, and on the 14th three columns moved out from the lines, and occupied new positions on the high ground to the south. Three days later the Turks and Arabs attacked in force, but though they fought with the most reckless bravery they met with a very severe defeat, and lost some 1,500 men in killed alone. A week later a further Italian advance, both south and east, met with little resistance, and a number of unwounded prisoners were taken.
Meanwhile one more blow had been struck near Tripoli. Large numbers of Arabs had concentrated on the far side of Zanzur, and at dawn on Sept. 20 the Italians attacked. The battle, known as Sidi Bilal, followed the same course as that of the Zanzur battle on June 8, large numbers of Arabs and Turks coming up from the south, and the result was the same. The Arabs fought with great determination, and with greater skill than they had shown before, but their bravery was useless. The Turks and Arabs between them lost over 1,500 killed, while the Italian casualty list was nearly 600.
The Arabs of the plains were now convinced that further resistance was useless, and the Italian advance in preparation would probably have met with little opposition. But peace was imminent. The Treaty of Ouchy was signed on Oct. 15.
The conduct of the Tripoli campaign, as the narrative of events alone would indicate, was prejudiced, first, by the failure of the Italian Government to judge the situation correctly, and, secondly, by the limitations which were laid upon the military authorities. When it became evident that the original plan of campaign, which provided more for demonstration than for action, had failed, the Government were slow to admit the necessity for a change of policy. It was not possible at once to launch a desert expedition, and the difficulties of an advance to the Jebel, through country largely waterless, may be said to have justified the adoption of a less ambitious plan. What is difficult to understand is the practical veto upon action of any kind, which immobilized large forces in Tripoli from Dec. till April, and delayed the carrying-out of the policy which eventually put an end to hostilities, the policy of extending the area of operations and striking a blow whenever the chance offered. It was after long hesitation that the bulk of the native tribesmen joined those who had thrown in their lot with the Turk in the early days of the war. The Arab forces in the Tripolitan plains quadrupled between Dec. and March, the numbers increasing from 5,000 or 6,000 to over 20,000, and the cause of the increase was Italian inaction during that period. The operations of the summer changed the views of the Arabs, but Italian prestige was not wholly restored by the later successes. The policy of the Government bore heavily upon the army, which was the subject of much unfair criticism, and increased the difficulties of those who undertook the administration of the country after the peace. The troubles which were to come with the outbreak of the World War may be traced in part at least to the hesitations and uncertainties of the six months following the first landing. (W. K. McC.)
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Chisholm, Hugh, General Editor. Entry for 'Italo-Turkish War'. 1911 Encyclopedia Britanica. https://www.studylight.org/encyclopedias/eng/bri/i/italo-turkish-war.html. 1910.
