the Week of Proper 28 / Ordinary 33
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Bible Encyclopedias
German Finance
1911 Encyclopedia Britannica
"GERMAN FINANCE, 191021 The period from about 1895 up to the outbreak of the World War in 1914 had been one of growing economic prosperity for Germany. From time to time the advance had been interrupted by intervals of depression, but they were short-lived, and when they passed the progress continued. Between 1907 and 1913, for instance, German coal production rose from 143 million tons to 191 million tons, or roughly by one-third; the production of lignite from 621 to 87 million tons, or two-fifths; of pig iron from 13 to 29.3 million tons, or nearly one-half. Germany's imports increased in this period by 2 milliards (thousand millions) of marks 1 (£Ioo,000,000) and German exports by well over 3 milliards of marks (LIso,000,000), the total foreign trade of Germany increasing from 152 milliards (775,000,000) to 20.7 milliards of marks (LI,035,000,000).
German imperial finance reflected economic progress only to a small extent in its budget. Confederation had left the Empire itself in a weak position financially by reserving the most important sources of taxation for the individual component states. The governing theory was that direct taxes appertained to the states, while the Empire must rely on indirect taxation. In spite of the general financial and economic prosperity, the imperial debt had risen in 1910 to 5,016 millions of marks (having been 1,240 millions in 1890, 2,201 millions in 1895, 2,418 millions in 1900, and 3,323 millions in 1905). German statesmanship had been slow to adapt the needs of the imperial budget to the changing conditions. In 1909, however, an important fiscal reform was introduced. New sources of revenue to a total amount of about Soo millions of marks were tapped; the long-continued period of recurring deficits seemed at an end, and the hope of surplus income appeared justified. The additional expenditure on armaments, necessitated by the army estimates of 1912 and the naval estimates of 1913, amounting to about 185 million marks, was covered by increases in the customs duties and new property 1 Up to the outbreak of war, the German mark was practically equal to the English shilling ( see Exchange, Foreign). Its subsequent depreciation in value makes it impossible to convert the later figures for paper marks, as given in this article, into their real money value. Only where gold marks are referred to, the pre-war parity with sterling holds good. - (Ed. E. B.) taxes were introduced. It was proposed to cover the extraordinary expenditure, estimated at about one milliard of marks, by a single " defence tax," levied as a capital-tax on properties of io,000 marks up to 15,000 marks at 0. '5%, increasing to 1.5% on amounts of over 5 millions, and as an income-tax, starting with 1% on incomes of 5,000 to 10,000 marks and increased to 8% on incomes of more than 50o,000 marks. This " defence tax," levied in 1914-5, brought in 976.9 millions of marks, but, as events turned out, it was merely swallowed up in the exigencies of war expenditure.
The imperial budgets for 1910-3, for total revenue and expenditure ordinary and extraordinary, showed the following figures, in thousands of marks: - 1910, revenue 2,943,419, expenditure 3,024,260; 1911, revenue 3,057,592, expenditure 2, 8 97,4 0 3; 1912, revenue 2,915,384, expenditure 2,893,337; 1913, revenue 3,698,829, expenditure 3,698,829. There was a deficit in 1910 of 80,841,500 marks, and in 1911 and 1912 there were surpluses of 160,188,800 and 22,046,400 marks respectively.
War Finance
The pre-war " defence tax " was not an organic reform. It had provided the power to attack income and property as a source of imperial revenue, but only once. The Empire thus entered the war with an undeveloped system of taxation - without, indeed, any large current revenue from taxation which (like an income-tax) could easily be increased in proportion with the enormous requirements of the war. To introduce it during the war would not have been an easy matter, and the view prevalent in Government circles was not in favour of such a course. They counted on a war of short duration, and did not wish to exacerbate the feelings of the population, greatly distressed as it was through sacrifice of blood and life in the field as well as through the blockade, by imposing heavy burdens of taxation. They did not wish to interfere with the right of the individual states to obtain their own revenue from direct taxation, and desired to make as little alteration as possible in the existing arrangements. Therefore, the decision arrived at was that the cost of the war should be met not out of taxation, but by the issue of loans; only the interest on the loans issued was to be debited to the current budget and covered by income. The current budget itself was artificially assisted by taking out of it, at first in part and later in full, the largest items, i.e. the current expenses for the army and navy, and debiting them as extraordinary expenses of the war. In the course of the war, other expenses too, only indirectly connected with the war, such as bonuses to civil servants to compensate for the rise in prices, were debited to the war fund. On the other hand the revenue, which it was at first quite impossible to estimate, was simply included in the price of peace, although the most important part of it, for instance the customs revenue, suffered an immediate and very sharp reduction through the blockade and the resulting reduction in imports, as well as the suspension of customs duty on corn, grains and other articles of pressing need, which took place immediately on the outbreak of the war. It was a system which at first seemed to lighten the burden, but afterwards made it only heavier, and which, the longer the war continued, was found less and less adequate.
The German system of war economics was directed by the enormous demands of modern war on men and material on the one side and by the blockade on the other side. Strict economy was to be observed in all that was necessary for the war, especially in raw material required for war purposes and the not less important labour, while distribution was to be organized in such a manner that everybody received at least a share of the necessaries of life. To increase production to the utmost for the requirements of the war, and to make the whole of the economic system subservient to its satisfaction, was from the first the ruling idea. This transference of all economic activity to the needs of the war provided at the same time the financial means of carrying on the war. As the German people were increasingly, if not totally, cut off from foreign supplies, they were more and more dependent on home produce, and the profits of the war expenditure remained for the most part at home. The continuance of the regular savings system, combined with the retrenchment necessitated by the lack of opportunity for spending, liberated funds for investment in the war loans. In this process, however, the stocks of industry and commerce were drawn upon without being replaced; buildings, works and plant were used more fully, without attention being possible to necessary repairs; the agricultural land was farmed without its being invigorated by proper manuring; and finally the holdings of foreign paper and securities were liquidated as far as possible by transference to neutral countries in order to gain the means of paying for obtainable imports. Thus there went on a continuous usingup of the national capital, which was spent by the Government, and became for the private possessor paper mortgage bonds of the Empire.
At the outbreak of the war, loan-banks (Darlehnskassen ) for making advances of money were established, which granted loans at a low rate of interest against pledged securities and goods. At the same time, in order to safeguard the gold reserves of the Reichsbank, its obligation to redeem its notes in gold was sustended. The indirect, proportionate " covering guarantees " of the Reichsbank were also abolished, i.e. the provision in the Bank Law that the Reichsbank had to pay 5% per annum to the Treasury on the amount by which the bank-note issue at any time exceeded the cash reserve plus a sum of 550,000,000 marks, or, on the quarterly balance, 750,000,000 marks. The Reichsbank was thus enabled to issue any quantity of bank-notes without increasing the discount rate. This, on the other hand, led to a constantly increasing deterioration of the proportion between the bank-note issue and the means of covering it. Still, the creation of the offices for advancing money ( Darlehnskassen) and the abolition of the restriction on the note issue enabled Germany to dispense with a legal moratorium. A kind of substitute for a moratorium was furnished by the regulation empowering the law courts to grant delays, so that they could allow payments of cash and of mortgages to be deferred in cases of necessity. Men who were away at the front were in particular protected from proceedings for the enforcement of judgments. Lastly, debtors unable to meet their obligations were saved from bankruptcy and the consequent wasteful realization of their assets by a law (Aug. 8 1914) which enabled them to apply for an official control of their businesses ( Geschditsaufsichtsgesetz). According to this law the debtor could request the bankruptcy court to appoint a trustee to exercise supervision over business assets and their disposal, thus avoiding the personal disabilities and the effects as to property which are the normal consequences of public bankruptcy.
These were, on general lines, the sources whence the subscriptions to the war issues were derived. The Empire made the funds necessary for the war available at the issuing bank by discounting Treasury bills, and then appropriated in regular intervals the accumulated cash of the population ready for investment, by issuing war loans and funding the floating debt.
This system of war finance only succeeded completely up to the autumn of 1916. The first four war loans, with their subscriptions of 4,460 millions (autumn 1914), 9, 060 millions (spring 1915), 12,101 millions (autumn 1915) and 10,712 millions (spring 1916), brought in sufficient to cover the Treasury bills issued up to that time. Up to the autumn of 1915 there was even a considerable surplus, which helped to finance the carrying-on of the war for the succeeding months. But from the autumn of 1916 this condition of affairs was altered. The war loans issued regularly every half-year continued to produce large amounts: 10,562 millions in the autumn of 1916; 13,112 millions and 12, 626 millions in 1917; 15,001 and 10,443 millions in 1918. But the Treasury bills put into circulation regularly increased to a greater extent: in the autumn of 1916, 2 milliards remained uncovered; in the autumn of 1917 the amount had risen to 141 milliards; in the autumn of 1918 to 39 milliards; and in Nov. 1918 when the Armistice was concluded, besides the 98 milliards in war loans there were already in circulation 50 milliards in Treasury bills as floating debt of the Empire, this total being subsequently still further increased.
The reason for this state of affairs was the enormous increase in the cost of the war and the continued rise in prices. The average cost of the war per month was estimated for the first year of the war at 1.7 milliards of marks, in the second year 2 milliards, in the third year 3 milliards, in the fourth year 3.8 milliards, and in the last year 44 milliards of marks. In the extraordinary budgets of the five years 1914-8, the general war expenses were as follows:-1914, 6,935.7 millions of marks; 1915, 2 3,9 08
9; 1 9 16, 2 4,739.3; 1917, 4 2, 188.4; 1918, 33,928.4. In the same years the total indebtedness of the Empire rose by 11.3, 22.1, 3 0.3, 36.3 and 50.9 milliards; to this must be added 13.5 milliards in obligations undertaken towards Germany's allies. The full amounts of the actual costs of the war, however, are not shown in these figures. Very. considerable sums, as the accounts got more and more in arrears, only became due a considerable time after the war was over. These amounts and the cost of demobilization, reaching additional milliards, burdened for the most part the budgets of the years following.
The enormous increase of the State debt naturally resulted in a proportionate increase in the yearly expenses for interest. Where in 1913 the management and interest of the debt swallowed 147 millions, 375.6 millions were required in 1914, 1,248
1 millions in 19 1 5, 2,518.5 millions in 1916, 4,2 4 8 millions in 1917 and as much as 6,430
9 millions of marks in 1918. At the same time important sections of the revenue declined. Customs, yielding in 1913 a revenue of 679.3 million marks, provided in 1914-8 only 560.8, 359.9, 34 8.3, 232.7 and 133 millions, the decline being plain evidence of the growing effect of the blockade. In the same way the profitable enterprises of the Empire (posts and telegraphs and railwrs - at that time still not including the lines belonging to the individual states) suffered under the influence of the war, and instead of being sources of revenue became burdens; in 1913 they showed a surplus of 140.9 million marks, but in 1914-8 they required subventions of 53'6 42.2, 5 0.5, 1 39.8 and 596.5 million marks. The revenue from spirits dwindled considerably. It became therefore more and more a pressing necessity to find funds for the war, not only by the issue of war loans, but through taxation. In the summer of 1916 the tobacco duty, the stamp duty on freight notes, and postal. and telegraph charges were raised, but the resulting improvement in returns was meagre and insufficient even to cover the interest on the debt. In 1917 came a coal-tax and duties on passenger and goods traffic, and in 1918 a number of taxes were increased and new taxes introduced - an increased bourse-tax, a turnover-tax, stamp-tax on bills, taxes on sparkling wines, beer, tea and coffee and mineral waters, etc., while the tax on spirits was extended into a monopoly. There came also increases in the direct taxes in the individual states, whose finances under the influence of the war were also suffering severely.
The most important new source of taxation, however, was the taxation of war profits. It started with the law of June 21 1916, which covered not only the profits gained on war products but any and all profit gained during the war from whatever source, i.e. the difference between the taxable property of end 1916 and end 1913, and which took from the property remaining intact a supplementary duty, in so far as the taxable property did not show a reduction of more than io%. This supplementary duty was one per mille, and the duty on the increase 5% on the first io,000 marks, rising to 50% on increases over 1,100,000. Then. came a tax on the surplus profits of companies, beginning with io% on a surplus profit of 2% on the capital up to 30% on a surplus profit of 15% on the capital, and further progressive super-taxes based on the total rentability of the companies. In 1917 an advance of 20% was claimed on this war-tax of 1916, and in 1918 this was further extended. The Imperial Government proposed, besides the existing charges, a single war-tax on income, which would hit people with an income of 20,000 marks at the rate of 3 to 20%. This was shelved through the traditional objection of the states, which were still disposed to combat the annexation of the revenue from direct taxation by the Empire. Instead, the surplus income per head, that is the difference between the peace-time income and the war-time income, where such difference exceeded 3,000 marks, was made the subject of a tax calculated at 5% on the first 10,000 marks of the taxable surplus income, up to S o % if the difference in income amounted to over 201,000 marks. Then came the property-tax beginning with one per mile on the first 200,000 marks, rising to 5 per mile on a fortune of over 2 million marks. Thirdly, came a considerable increase of the tax on companies: it was based on a fixed rate of 80 /0 on the surplus profit, which obtained a reduction of 10 to 50% only when the surplus profit did not exceed a very moderate amount or where it did not exceed a very moderate return on the capital. The final extension of the war-profit tax took place in 1919. It again hit the individual with a tax on the surplus income, commencing with 5% and rising to 70% on a surplus income of only 400,000 marks. The war-tax on companies was also repeated. More particularly a tax was levied on total increase of fortune between Dec. 31 1913 and July 30 1919 and that at an extraordinarily high rate. Exemption from the tax was allowed only up to an increase of 5,000 marks, from which amount the tax began with io%, increasing to such an extent that an increase in fortune of 376,000 marks was taken in full and in no case could the taxpayer keep more than 172,000 marks of the increase. All that individuals gained during the war and the first period of transition over an increase of 172,000 marks was claimed by the State under this last extension.
The revenue from the war-tax of 1919 was estimated at 12 milliards, when it became law. In the years of the war the defence-tax, war-profits tax of 1916, and surplus-income tax of 1918 brought in the following amounts:-637.4 millions in 1914, 307.8 millions in 1915, 65.1 millions in 1916, 4,853.1 millions in 1917, 2,410.3 millions in 1918, and 4 million marks in 1919. The total yield of the defence-tax was 976.9 million marks; of the 1916 war-tax, with its increases, 5,777.1 millions; and of the 1918 war-tax 2,686.2 millions, a total of 9.4 milliards of marks.
Revenue | Expenditure | 191 | 2,350.8 | 8,653.8 | 1915 . | . . | . | .. . | 1,735.2 | 25,708'4 | 1916 . | . . | . | .. . | 2,029'4 | 27,740'9 | 1917 . | . . | . | .. . | 7,830.3 | 52,015.4 | 1918 . | . . | . | 6,795.0 | 44,030'7 Nothwithstanding these considerable amounts, and the increased revenue obtained through other forms of taxation, the German war budget was a most unfavourable one. The appended table gives the total revenue and expenditure of the Empire for the years 1914 to 1918, and, as already stated, a great part of the actual war costs are not included in the expenditure, as it only appears in the accounts for the years following: Revenue and Expenditure 1914-8 (in millions of marks). The war was financed, almost entirely, by an enormous increase in indebtedness, at first through issues of loans, and later, in ever-growing measure, through increasing the floating debt. The taxes and levies introduced during the war were barely sufficient to meet the current requirements, greatly increased through the interest on the debt as well as through decrease of revenue from peace-time sources. As far as the property and income-tax is concerned these were not permanent sources of income but were only available once, and terminated as soon as their result was obtained. But the expenses remained, and necessitated imperatively the replacement of the single levies through regular sources of revenue. After the WarIt was in this desperate situation financially that the war came to an end. The collapse which followed it, together with the crushing conditions of the Armistice and the Peace Treaty, disorganized the whole economic and financial life of the country. The effect of the war appeared after the defeat with frightful clearness. Of the German population 1,700,000 were killed, 1,50o,000 injured and thus had their capacity to gain a livelihood impaired. And the civil population, through the physical and moral strain of the war, showed a greatly increased mortality; more especially, countless children and old people were victims of the privations imposed by the blockade. The increased mortality of the civil population in 1914-9 is estimated at 800,000 souls. A still heavier blow was the fall in births through the separation of the sexes in consequence of the war. For the period of six years this reduction amounted to 3,700,000. Besides actual losses in numbers, there was also exhaustion of those who remained alive and the destruction of the means of productivity. Superficial critics have been apt to observe that Germany itself was saved from the ravages of the war, since it was fought, with the exception of a short incursion of the Russians in East Prussia, outside its frontiers. Herein lies a fallacy. The German industrial works were not indeed destroyed, but the greater part of the machinery and plant was used up to the utmost by war production without there being a possibility of seeing to repairs and renewals. Similarly, the agricultural areas were exhausted. Industry and commerce had lost the materials that were used up in the war; cattle had gone from the stalls; transport undertakings were crippled to an incredible extent. At the end of March 1920 only 45.9% of the existing locomotives were usable, whereas at the end of July 1914 the number under repair was only 19.1%. Germany in the late autumn of 1918 was not only in a state of military defeat and political chaos; financially and economically it was at its last gasp. What was needed was help from abroad, through importation of foodstuffs and raw materials, which alone could facilitate a transition from war to peace conditions. A complete change in the direction of its productive energies was required. During the years of war production was solely for war requirements, the Government being the sole big buyer, always eager for goods; when the demand for war requirements stopped suddenly it was necessary again to produce for peace requirements, and to find a market for them. First and foremost there was the task of again taking into the labour market the millions of people released from the army and of finding places for them in agricultural and industrial undertakings, in the works and factories and offices. Elaborate plans for this demobilization of the army had already been made during the war. They were, as so many other schemes, rendered useless by the destructive conditions of the Armistice. The periods fixed for the return and release of the army were too short, and all organization in that direction collapsed. The enormous supplies taken for the army, the value of which was estimated at several milliards of gold marks, and the return of which was imperative for the use and nourishment of the people during the first part of the period of transition, could not be stored in the given time. Moreover, Germany had to deliver up to the Allies 5,000 engines and 150,000 wagons, and the transport crisis already threatened was thereby rendered complete. In accordance with the supplementary conditions of March 1919 Germany had to hand over the biggest part of its commercial shipping, and this again greatly increased the difficulties of distribution. Worse still, the blockade still continued for months, and thus there was the severest restriction of imports of necessary provisions and raw materials, for which also only inadequate means of payment were available. Terrible were the results of these regulations. Not only was the political and social crisis rendered more acute, but the German economic position was disordered to such an extent that repeatedly a total collapse seemed unavoidable. The result was the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives among the civilian population, whose weakened condition was unable to withstand the continued privations. According to an estimate based on 375 German towns of 15,000 inhabitants and over, as against 140 deaths per io,000 in 1913 there were 175 deaths in 1919 and 158 in 1920. The mortality from tuberculosis alone was increased from 15'7 in 1917 to 27.1 in 1919, and in 1920 it was still as high as 18.4. That was not all. With the Armistice began the Allied occupation of the left bank of the Rhine and the bridgeheads on the right bank. A difficult economic situation was thus produced, which again became peculiarly acute in the spring of 1921 through the London " sanctions," for Germany lost control of her most important customs frontier; the " hole in the west " was torn open, and a flood of foreign goods, to the value of milliards of marks, poured without regulation or control into the starved country, aching for commodities of all descriptions. Whilst the German population was without the means to satisfy its re quirements in absolute necessaries, the country was flooded with foreign articles of luxury. Although masses were facing starvation, the carrying-out of the conditions, first of the Armistice and later of the Peace Treaty, permitted the classes which had profiteered out of the war and the revolution to satisfy their vulgar greed. The Peace Treaty of Versailles, as adopted by the Allies in May 1919, and imposed on Germany by the threat of renewing the war, completed the work of economic ruin. Germany lost with its territories a total population of 5.3 million souls. With Alsace-Lorraine, moreover, Germany lost nearly threequarters of its capacity for iron production; out of pre-war deposits of iron ore valued at 2.3 milliards of marks in Germany and Luxemburg (which had a customs treaty with Germany), there remained a value of only 0.403 milliard within the new German frontiers. Germany also lost with Alsace-Lorraine 26% of its potash. It lost with the transfer of the Saar valley to France roughly 9% of its pit-coal production, and was also obliged to agree to deliver to the Allies large quantities of coal, fixed in Oct. 1920 in Spa at 2 million tons per month. It was threatened with the loss of Upper Silesia, which had produced 23% of German pit-coal, 80% of zinc and 61% of raw zinc. Germany lost, moreover, almost all its commercial shipping, all overseas cables, its colonies, - in fact all the bases of its commerce abroad. Germany lost in the N. and the E. of its empire large agricultural districts which had formerly furnished about 25% of its supply of grain and potatoes, and io to 12% of its cattle. And while the Peace Treaty thus raised for Germany the crucial question whether it would be at all possible in future to supply a population now amounting to 61 million souls with nourishment and occupation on German soil - whether indeed within its new frontiers it was not really a case, from the economic point of view, of "20 million souls too many " - the country also found itself burdened with external financial obligations of unexampled magnitude by way of reparation payments to the Allies. The Depreciation of the MarkThe first effect of the defeat, - the internal collapse, and the terms of the Armistice and the Peace Treaty, - was the almost total breaking-down of the German currency system. The depreciation of the mark abroad had pursued a progressive course already during the war. In consequence of the blockade, and of increasing demands for war requirements in industrial production, German exports had declined much more quickly than the imports; and since the cover formerly available for excess of imports, arising from shipping charges, freights, etc., failed entirely and foreign investments were largely unrealizable, it was almost impossible to obtain credit abroad, which in normal times would have covered the deficit. By the end of the second year of the war (summer of 1916) the exchange in Switzerland, for instance, had fallen from a normal rate of 12 3.4 6 francs per 100 marks to 95.60 francs, showing a loss in exchange of 22.60%. Though depreciation still went on, in Oct. 1918 the Swiss rate was still as much as 71 50 francs and the loss in exchange not more than 42.10%. But after the end of the war the fall became steeper. The Swiss exchange was 622 francs per loo marks at the end of Nov. 1918, and the rate descended month by month to 352 francs at the end of May 1919, and then, after a brief reaction, to 26 francs at the end of Sept. 1919, 11.50 francs on Dec. 31 1919, and 6.15 francs (equal to a loss of 95%) at the end of Feb. 1920. From this point there was again a reaction in the summer of 1920, and on May 31 1920 the Swiss rate was 14.75 francs, but in the autumn of 1920 the depreciation recommenced, and towards the end of June 1921, the Swiss exchange for loo marks was 8 10 francs. (See Exchanges, Foreign, for the German exchange.) German currency depreciation during the war, as well as afterwards, was one of the factors which restricted the possibility of getting help from foreign capital. And though the value of money in Germany itself declined much more slowly than the mark exchange abroad, another result was that foreign purchasers were able to buy whatever was obtainable in Germany, stocks of goods and merchandise, town property, securities, plant and machinery, up to complete industrial enterprises, at catastrophically low prices. Another consequence was an enormous increase in German indebtedness towards foreign countries. The German mark note became the gambling counter of the world. The German notes went abroad in milliards at everfalling rates in payment for imported goods, to be bought up by big and little speculators, down to the hotel porter and the domestic servant who hoped to profit by any rise in exchange. Enormous foreign holdings of mark notes resulted also from credits given by banks in marks, also with an eye on an improvement in the exchange. Only in this way was it possible for Germany to pay for its large excess of imports over exports, which marked the destruction of Germany's economic position in these years of greatly reduced production at home. The price was a foreign indebtedness, the yearly burden of which in interest charges was estimated at the end of 1920 by competent judges at one milliard gold marks and by some critics at an even larger figure. Apart from all other difficulties attending economic reconstruction after the war, every attempt of Germany to reach a real internal consolidation was hampered by the monetary instability. On the one hand it raised prices, and on the other it depreciated the value of property and income. While, towards the end of the war and just after, wages had often been increased beyond the rise in prices, so that a moderate increase in real wages resulted to the worker, it was not possible to continue this for any length of time in view of the unhappy state of production. Much less was it possible for people enjoying fixed incomes, officials, civil servants, and brain-workers, to increase their income in proportion with the reduction of money value, and they sank lower and lower in the social scale. The worst sufferers were people relying on incomes from rents. Every reduction in the value of money amounted to a favouring of the debtor at the expense of the creditor. Those who had invested their capital in Government securities, mortgages, etc., at fixed rates of interest, were helpless against the reduction in money value, which reduced their capital as well as the interest to a fraction of its former amount. Producers themselves might be able, through the rise in prices, to obtain some compensation for the reduction in the value of money. But any such compensation could only be reached by a very small part of the population. No doubt, as in all periods of economic revolution, some lucky people found the means of enriching themselves to an extraordinary extent. But the high profits nominally realized by many German companies, if the amount were reduced to the actual value of money, represented not only no advantage, but a loss if compared with pre-war times. The large middle class was hit particularly hard. This class, the main repository of national culture, was in danger of being swallowed by the proletariat. Such a situation was bound to influence the State finances to a deplorable extent. Whatever services were required had to be paid for at a nominally higher rate. It was necessary too to spend enormous sums on subsidies for reducing the price of necessaries to the public, for keeping down the cost of transport, and for the relief of the unemployed. On the other hand, uneconomic State finance was itself a factor in the decline of money values. The State had to cover its financial requirements in default of taxation by further issues of paper money, increasing from week to week and month to month.' It was itself the producer of the artificial purchasing-power which brought in its train the continued rise in prices. The bank-note press, in substitution for the taxation machine, created a continually growing inflation. It was the uninterrupted use of the printing-press, as a means of meeting the expenditure, that characterized State finance in the first years after the collapse. Taxation Reform,1919-20The National Assembly of the new German Republic had to face the task of laying the foundations of a new financial system and re-creating it out of chaos. The old privileges of the separate states of the Empire, in depriving the central Government of the benefit of the most important sources of tax-revenues, had to go. The German Reich now had 1 On Jan. 1 1919, the regular note issue amounted to 22,188 million paper marks (as against 11,467 millions a year earlier) and the loanbank note issue to 10,109 millions (6,264 millions in 1918). On Jan. I 192 the total was about 120,000 millions. to bear by far the largest part of the costs of the war, the interest on the war debts, the war pensions and compensations, the whole of the burdens of the Peace Treaty, etc.; these swelled the budget expenditure to such an extent that the requirements of the individual states were left far behind. The great sources of direct taxation had now to be made free for obtaining revenue for the Reich. Events had made compulsory a strong centralization in German finance. By an order of the Finance Department of the Reich on Sept. 10 1919, the management of all fiscal levies was handed over to the central Government. A further order, of Dec. 13 1919, provided for the formal right of taxation. A decisive step was taken in the National Taxation Law of March 22 1920, which fixed on a new basis the position of the three great receivers of taxes, the Reich, the individual states, and the subordinate local Governments towards each other. Whereas the pre-war rule was that the use of certain sources of taxation by the individual states forbade the Imperial Government to use such sources, the new regulations reversed the position, ruling that the use of certain sources of taxation by the Reich forbade the collection of similar taxes by the individual states and local communities unless expressly empowered to collect a supplementary levy. Counties and municipalities kept their most important independent tax sources-the taxes on landed property and industrial activities. They were obliged to levy an amusement-tax, and were entitled to tax the lowest incomes which escaped the general income-tax. In principle they became pensioners of the State, receiving of the revenue from Reich taxation two-thirds, of the companies-tax also two-thirds, of the inheritance-tax one-fifth, of the tax on acquistion of landed property one-half, and of the turnover-tax 15% (i.e. Io % for the counties and 5% for the municipalities). This was a most important step in the direction of laying a sound basis for Reich finance. In the place of the various tax departments of the individual states there had to be created the gigantic machinery of a central Finance Department for the entire Reich. It could not come into existence without much early trouble and failure. The new department was at first quite unable to carry out the regulations, and only slowly and gradually came the introduction and collection of new taxes. And another difficulty followed quickly in consequence of the new regulations for financial management. The unification of the railways in Germany had been, like the unification of taxation, an old demand, but one which could not be carried out in times of peace, when the railways were a valuable source of revenue to the states, more especially to Prussia. Now it was accomplished, and the Reich, which previously had managed only the railways of AlsaceLorraine, from April 1 1920 took over all the railways. But the railways, instead of bringing in a profit, now found themselves with a deficit. From the moment, however, that the Reich had taken over the important sources of tax revenue, it was obliged to take over the railways as well, since the individual states were not able to carry their losses, and these losses now fell on the Treasury of the Reich. With this basic change in organization came now the extension of the field of taxation. Between Sept. 1919 and March 1920 a system of new taxes for the whole Reich was created. The taxation of income was catjied out in three different ways.
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