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Count Luigi Cadorna

1911 Encyclopedia Britannica

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"COUNT LUIGI CADORNA (1850-), Italian general, chief of the Italian general staff from July 1914 to Nov. 1917, commander-in-chief of the Italian armies in the field from May 1915 to Nov. 1917, and senator, was born at Pallanza, on Lago Maggiore, Sept. 4 1850. His father was Count Raffaele Cadorna, a distinguished soldier of the wars of the Risorgimento and the Crimea; and his uncle, Count Carlo Cadorna, was one of the outstanding political figures of the same period. Luigi Cadorna entered the army in 1866, and served in the infantry, in the artillery and on the staff, becoming colonel in 1892. His career followed the usual course and his reputation steadily increased. Lieutenant-general in 1905, he was appointed to command the Genoa army corps in 1910, and a year later he was chosen as an army commander in the event of war. He commanded one side in the manoeuvres of 1911, his opponent being Caneva. The victory was adjudged to Caneva, and though military opinion was divided upon the verdict it is probable that the result of the manoeuvres led to the preference being given to Caneva for the command of the Tripoli expedition. But on the death of Gen. Pollio, chief of the general staff, there was little or no question as to his successor, and on July io 1914 Cadorna received the appointment. He found the army in a deplorable condition, both as to personnel and as to material. And within three weeks the outbreak of general war forced the problems of army reform, consistently shirked by successive Cabinets, to the front. One of Cadorna's first acts on becoming chief-of-staff was to adopt the Deport field-gun, though the artillery had already begun to rearm with a Krupp quick-firer, and this prompt decision, which did not pass without criticism, was of the greatest value to Italy. Much was accomplished during the neutrality period, and though all efforts were handicapped by lack of money and by Italy's low industrial capacity, still, in the interval between Aug. 1914 and Italy's entry into the war, Cadorna fashioned a weapon with which it was possible to strike, and strike hard.

For 29 months Cadorna, handicapped always by lack of means, directed the operations against Austria-Hungary with insight, vigour and determination. Facile critics have found fault with his plan of campaign, but the more carefully and objectively Cadorna's plan is studied, the more it justifies itself against alternative policies. For a year Cadorna had the full confidence of his country, and his name, indeed, began to take on a legendary colour. The first check came with the initial success of the Austrian offensive in May 1916, though he had already incurred many enmities by the ruthless dismissal of those who appeared unequal to the duties of command - a process which in a great measure attained the desired end, though the dismissals were probably too numerous and certainly cost the army some good officers, besides handicapping others by the fear of supersession. As time went on, and signs of warweariness became visible among some of the troops, Cadorna entered the strongest protest against the policy of the Government, which, he said, permitted an anti-war propaganda which lowered the moral of the army. Cadorna's protests were largely justified. Too little was done to meet anti-war propaganda, and the soldier who went on leave often returned to the front embittered by having found his family in want, while others who had escaped military service were not only safe but were making money. On the other hand, it must be admitted that a part of the responsibility for declining moral lay at Cadorna's own door. For he did not seem to have realized fully the strain of modern war upon the troops, or understood the necessity of lightening that strain by every possible expedient. The disaster of Caporetto, a disaster due to a complex of causes, led to Cadorna being transferred from the command of the Italian armies to the newly formed Allied military council at Versailles. But before he left his command he had organized the resistance on the Piave-Monte Grappa front.

Cadorna came to Versailles under the shadow of defeat, but his personality and military insight speedily impressed his colleagues and removed the initial handicap. It was a misfortune for Italy when, in Feb. 1918, consequent upon the appointment of the Caporetto inquiry commission, it was thought necessary to remove him from Versailles. As a result of the inquiry he was placed on half-pay on Aug. 29 1918, and four days later his definite retirement was gazetted.

In March 1921 Cadorna published a book dealing with his tenure of the post of chief-of-staff (La Guerra aila Fronte Italiana ), which effectively answered much of the criticism that had been directed against his leadership. But with the passage of time this criticism had already begun to lose force. It was no longer necessary to find a scapegoat. More and more it was seen that Cadorna had made the Italian army fit for war, and that he had conducted the campaign under grave handicaps. Perhaps the most serious defect in Cadorna's leadership was that he failed to secure the loyal cooperation of many of his subordinates. The fact that he was not always well served was to some extent due to his methods. A certain friction also characterized Cadorna's relations with two successive Governments - on his side soldierly impatience with political methods and exigencies, and on theirs resentment at his criticisms of policy. Moreover, his belief in the necessity and duty of sacrifice made him slow to realize the limits of ordinary human endurance. But his achievement was great, and he remains, in spite of the disaster that closed his career, the foremost Italian military figure of the war. (W. K. McC.)