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Battles of Verdun
1911 Encyclopedia Britannica
or "BATTLES OF (1916-7).--On VERDUN Dec. 6, 7 and 8 1915, the commanders-in-chief of the Allied armies on the western front, Sir Douglas Haig (Great Britain), Gen. Alexieff (Russia) and Gen. Cadorna (Italy), met together at Chantilly for a conference presided over by Gen. Joffre (France). The question to be considered was the best method of applying the suggestion of M. Briand, who had been president of the council of French ministers since Oct. 20 1915, for united action on an united front. It was decided to start a general offensive simultaneously on all fronts as soon as the British army had been able to obtain and train the expected reinforcements, and as soon as the Russian army, which had been severely tried by the 1915 campaign, had been reorganized as to men and war material, and the French army had its full complement of heavy artillery, trench mortars and ammunition reserves. Until the fulfilment of these necessary conditions it was impossible to fix a date for the offensive; it was, however, to take place as soon as possible. In the event of the enemy foreseeing the Allied attack and attacking one part of the front first the defender should be assisted by his Allies to their utmost powers.
On Feb. 18 Gen. Joffre chose the Somme as the theatre of the Franco-British offensive, and wrote to Sir Douglas Haig that the attack should take place about July 1. But the German High Command had decided upon a winter offensive. Maj.-Gen. Erich von Falkenhayn, who had relieved Gen. von Moltke as commander-in-chief of the armies in the field, was in reality generalissimo of the Central Powers; the Austrian High Command had suggested to him that nearly the whole of the Austrian forces should be directed against Italy, and that nine new German divisions should be sent as reinforcements to the Russian front. When once Italy was put out of action 400,000 Austrians would then be available to take part in the battle against France. Falkenhayn, however, rejected this proposal because he did not believe that a defeat upon a frontier of such extent would cause Italy to lay down her arms.
At the end of Dec., in a memorandum to the Kaiser, Falkenhayn reviewed the situation to the following effect. England, he said, was the soul of the Entente and the implacable enemy of Germany; she was exhibiting to-day the same tenacity that she showed in her historical struggles against the Low Countries, Spain, France and Napoleon. But in order to exhaust the resources of Germany she could hardly count on anything but a war of attrition; and Falkenhayn recognized that in reality time was on the side of the Entente. It was then necessary to strike a blow at England. But where? It was not possible to bring about a decision in the East; any success would be purely of a local nature, without influence on the course of the war. In France the marshy soil of Flanders was an obstacle up to the middle of the spring; and as regards the British positions farther south, the objectives were too distant and their conquest would necessitate the employment of 30 divisions at least, which in point of fact the German army did not possess, and experienced officers were lacking to form the nucleus for new formations. Since England was out of reach, it was necessary to deprive her of her weapons, which were the Allied armies, and to give up the idea of a direct attack against the British armies." Obviously this is a pity from the point of view of what our feelings are towards our chief enemy in this war,"said Falkenhayn," but it is necessary to accept the situation. Above all the enemy must be struck at through submarine warfare carried out to its limit. There was no sort of imprudence in risking the hostility of America. Because of the strong current of political opinion which is favourable to Germany it is doubtful whether the United States could decide to take any active measures on the European continent. It is still more doubtful whether they would be able to intervene in time with sufficiently strong forces. In order to destroy the tools of England on the Continent, Austria-Hungary has demanded that Italy should be attacked. This scheme, however, must be discarded: its realization would have as its only result the securing of future advantages for Austria-Hungary, but it would not have any immediate influence on the war taken as a whole. Even if Italy abandoned the Entente (and this is difficult to admit) her defection would not have an appreciable effect on England. The military aid of Italy is so little, and Italy in any case is so much under the thumb of England that it would be strange to make any mistake in this appreciation of the situation. Interior troubles which may be expected in Italy at no long date will paralyze the power to fight in that country.
"The same thing," continued Falkenhayn, "applies to Russia. Her internal distress will soon oblige her to change her tune. An offensive on a grand scale is impossible for her in winter. In addition strategic objectives are not to be found: the capture of St. Petersburg would much complicate the question of supply; an advance against Moscow would lead us into the desert; the Ukraine is a granary, but we must wait for the settlement of the Rumanian question before pursuing the occupation of it. All the Allies then have been successively eliminated: only France remains. France," Falkenhayn repeats, "has almost arrived at the end of her military effort, with a devotion that has been after all admirable. If her people can be made to understand clearly that there is nothing more to be hoped for from a military point of view, the worst will be over and England will find herself without her best sword. A break-through carried out in mass, an operation which is doubtful and beyond the power of our forces, is not necessary in order to reach this end. Even by the employment of limited effectives our aim can probably be reached. Behind the French line on the western front there are objectives which are within accessible range, and for which the French Command would have to fight to the last man." Falkenhayn saw then the solution in a terrible conflict of attrition fought out on a limited front against the French army by the German army; the latter holding the initiative in attack could manipulate it according to circumstances and limit itself in effort and in losses. Two objectives presented themselves, Belfort and Verdun. The capture of either would have an enormous moral effect in France. Between these two Falkenhayn chose Verdun, for the following military reasons. "The French lines here are still at a distance of about 20 km. from the German lines of communication. Verdun is always the most powerful point d'appui for every attempt of the enemy to make untenable the German position in France and Belgium by the employment of relatively weak effectives." This noteworthy report by Falkenhayn is full of the most detailed comments on the general situation of the Central Powers and on the conduct of the war as seen at that time by the German High Command. It displays naively his hate for England and contempt for the United States. It should be compared with William II.'s speech on June 15 1918 to the Great General Staff, on the occasion of the anniversary of his coronation, when after three victorious offensives he was persuaded of certain victory and was already on the way to the Capital: "The German people did not clearly see, when war broke out, what meaning it would have. I see it very clearly. It was a question of a struggle between two conceptions of the world. Either the Prussian, German, or Teutonic conception of the world, where right, liberty, honour and morals should triumph, or the Anglo-Saxon conception, which implies abandonment to the idolatry of money. The peoples of the earth work as slaves for their masters the AngloSaxons, who hold them under the yoke. These two conceptions struggle one against the other. It is absolutely necessary that one of the two should be overthrown." In addition it is worthy of note that, in conjunction with the detailed and fairly exact appreciation on the internal state of Russia and Italy, a total misapprehension existed concerning the material situation and especially concerning the moral of France; the whole plan of campaign was based on the fact that France was nearly at the limit of its effort towards the end of 1915, and that it would only be necessary to create a certain friction on the French front to bring about a rapid exhaustion of the army and of the nation. Subsequent events showed in a striking way the fallacy of this idea.
Besides the reasons given by Gen. von Falkenhayn there were others which pointed to Verdun as the objective of a German offensive. The German commercial element, whose influence in the councils of the Imperial Government and amongst the military High Command was considerable, had represented in a memorandum to the Emperor the necessity of annexing the Briey basin, the mineral wealth of which would be a happy adjunct to the Sarre coal: this peace aim could be kept quiet, for the war map was evidently to play the chief role in those future negotiations which the supposed exhaustion of the Entente seemed to foreshadow. Moreover, the Imperial Crown Prince commanded the Army Group which was detailed to attack Verdun, and the honours which were to come to him therefrom would assure the future of the dynasty.
As soon as it was decided to attack Verdun local actions followed one another along the whole western front in order to divert the attention of the Allies; in Champagne, at Tahure, from Jan. 8-12, an operation took place followed by important works which accompany the preparation of an offensive on a grand scale; on Jan. 24 in Flanders at Nieuport and Hetsas; on Jan. 23 in Artois at Thelus and at Givenchy on the 28th; in Picardy on the 29th at Frise; in Alsace at Seppois on Feb. 13.
The chief aim was not to reach the objective laid down for each attack; it was a question of studying under what conditions and to what degree the preparation, lasting several days, thought up till then to be necessary, could be cut down by increasing the number of batteries, and through the rapidity of the rate of fire, of the German artillery. In 1915 the attacks carried out in Artois and in Champagne by the armies of the Entente had necessitated a preparation lasting from six to eight days. They gave the enemy time to meet the attack. In 1916 the German army was trying to regain the advantage of surprise.
Local Situation
During 1915 the French front at Verdun had played only a severely defensive role, rigidly set down by the High Command. The capture of Liege, Namur, Antwerp, Maubeuge and several other siege forts in France, had forced the admission that permanent fortifications had had their day. Whilst generalizing too hastily about certain experiences, the details of which were still not well known, it was admitted that every limited objective on which modern artillery was able to concentrate its fire should be smashed up in a few hours. Isolated defence of strong points and entrenched camps was no longer considerable; every detached fort became a nest for shells and could be defended only by evacuating it and by fighting outside. From this crept in the idea of submerging permanent works in a defensive zone, a "fortified region" making them a part of the whole scheme of defence.
Further, in a decree of Aug. 3 1915 siege forts had been suppressed with their autonomous organization within an enclosed perimeter, which implied the consequence of an isolated defence. This gave back to the armies powerful artillery immobilized in the interior of the country (2,300 heavy guns with 1,600,000 rounds and 1,800 field guns with 1,450,000 rounds) and territorial troops which were needed for urgent work on the front. Under the conditions under which the war was being fought it was inevitable, and this decree seemingly marked the definite end of the permanent fortifications which were to render such great services during the battle of Verdun.
Prolonged and well-directed bombardments by the most powerful artillery left the armour-plated turrets intact; the deep concreted shelters remained constantly in use, and the troops found these instant and safe shelter - hot food, provisions in food and munitions which prevented them from reaching the last extremity of exhaustion. The forts of old design needed deepening considerably, but they served their purpose usefully. One thing is certain, and that is that the officers commanding sectors which were attacked did not pay sufficient attention to the defence of the forts and fortified works.
The transformation of the entrenched camp of Verdun into a "fortified region" modified considerably the conditions of defence. The closed ring became an open chain; in addition, the salient on the right bank of the Meuse was very exposed, and quite rightly it appeared necessary to organize a second position on the left bank of the Meuse which would enable the continuity of the front to be reestablished, should it be necessary to abandon the whole of the right bank to the enemy. But the manual labour and the engineering stores were lacking for the rapid construction of these important works; in 1915 the preparation for the offensive in Artois and Champagne had absorbed the greater part of available material, and on the entire front the requirements remained great, for every sector commander cried out for manual labour and material for work which was always urgent. The requirements of Gen. Herr, who commanded the fortified region of Verdun, were met only very sparingly. Towards the end of 1915 he gave warning of the preparations for attack opposite his front, but Gen. Gouraud made identical remarks about the front opposite the IV. Army, which he was commanding in Champagne, where the enemy was feigning the preparation of an offensive. The French High Command believed, moreover, that in the event of Verdun becoming the objective of the German offensive, that offensive would be made on both flanks of the old entrenched camp: on one side between the Argonne and the Meuse, on the other opposite St. Mihiel; the salient formed by the French positions on the right bank might then become untenable. It was hardly likely that the German High Command would limit itself to a frontal attack directed against a sector which was crowded with powerful and permanent fortifications. It was in this sense that Hindenburg himself addressed a reproach to his predecessor, and Gen. Herr inclined to the same view. It was necessary then to concentrate his efforts on the whole of the fortified region; this meant dispersal of effort, as the means at his disposal were very limited. This scarcity had not only been pointed out to the Army Command, but to the French Government and to Parliament. Colonel Driant, deputy of Nancy, had spoken to the Army Commission, of which he was a member, about the dangerous situation in which the whole defence of the French front in Lorraine was left, without labour or material. Making these complaints their own, the Army Commission had them transmitted to the Minister for War, Gen. Gallieni, who asked Gen. Joffre for explanations on Dec. 16. The next day Gen. Joffre explained the arrangements that he had [taken on all the French front, and stated - a little quickly perhaps - that they were realized at Verdun; and he complained that the Government might compromise discipline in the army if they welcomed grievances and requests of his subordinates. General Gallieni replied, in the name of the council of ministers, that the Government retained all its confidence in the commander-in-chief, and that there was no question of a conflict of authority.
Meanwhile the construction of narrow-gauge railways, and the establishment of ammunition parks and new batteries, were being disclosed in Champagne at the same time as in Lorraine, and these indications became further noticeable in front of Verdun, and particularly on the northern front. On Jan. 20 Gen. Joffre sent Gen. de Castelnau there on a mission. The latter had been made chief of the staff of the group of French armies with the consent of the Government. After having stated that the resources placed at the disposal of Gen. Herr had been utilized judiciously and to the greatest degree possible, Gen. de Castelnau insisted that these resources should be increased; and this was sanctioned. From Feb. 1 onwards work was pushed forward actively, thanks to two reinforcing territorial divisions - but it was very late. The general effect of the measures undertaken by the enemy made it clear that the attack would materialize on the northern face of the salient on the right bank, between the village of Ornes and the Meuse. An army was concentrated to the rear of the threatened region: four army corps and considerable heavy artillery. The threat, however, on the Champagne front was not yet dispelled, and it seemed imprudent to determine the position of these reserves prematurely by bringing them into the line. As it was foreseen that the only standardgauge line of supply - the line Verdun - St. Menehould - would be cut in case of attack, the Verdun - Bar-le-Duc road was widened to six and then to eight metres in order to allow the continuous passage of two files of vehicles. Mensien, a small metregauge line, was improved so that the tonnage it could deal with was increased from 400 to 1,800 tons a day. These communications indeed appeared to be extraordinarily inadequate in comparison with the German network of lines, comprising 14 ordinary-gauge and 3 metre-gauge railways. They were, however, sufficient for the supply of the French troops.
General Herr had only a total of nine active divisions and six regiments of heavy artillery at his disposal on both banks of the Meuse as against nineteen German divisions, supported by a concentration of artillery hitherto unequalled.
The German line had been quiet for many months; to the rear great preparations had been observed, but in the front lines none of those approach works, considered as essential to the execution of an attack, had been made. At this period of the war, and for a long time after, it had been thought indispensable to place the attacking troops at an assault distance of between 200 and 250 metres, sheltered in parallel take-off trenches, in order to shorten as far as possible the distance to cover over open ground, at the same time avoiding "prematures" of their own artillery during the destruction of the enemy trenches and defences; the attacker had taken care not to reveal his intentions by digging these parallel trenches, which the French expected in order to be certain of a coming attack; he remained in his lines, at places Boo metres from the French trenches, because no defender would be in a fit state to fire after such an unheard-of bombardment as was being prepared; the French batteries destroyed or disorganized were no longer to be feared.
The German Attack and its Progress
On Feb. 21, at 07.15 hours (7:15 A.m.), on a cold dry day, the German bombardment began with great violence on both banks of the Meuse; it stretched over a front of 22 km. and was particularly intense on the northern front of the right bank.
Simultaneously, the destruction of the first and second positions was carried out by the medium calibre guns (150 mm.- 210 mm.) and the fortified works by the large calibre guns (280 mm., 305 mm., 380 mm. and 420 mm.). Six observation balloons and numerous aeroplanes directed the fire on this narrow zone. From 08.00 hours all telephonic communications were cut everywhere; many shelters fell in; the barbed wire disappeared; trenches and communication trenches were practically levelled out by the afternoon. The craters made by the huge shells gave to all the countryside an appearance like the surface of the moon.
At 16.00 hours the intensity of the bombardment reached its zenith. At 16.45 the German infantry left their trenches between the Hautmont wood and Herbebois, on a 4-km. front. Detachments of wire-cutters and pioneers, about 50 strong, preceded the successive waves which followed one another at a distance of 80 to 100 metres. The German officers had assured their men that they would penetrate the French positions with arms slung and without encountering resistance, as the artillery bombardment would have destroyed everything, both men and material obstacles. This assurance, however, had still to be realized. The French heavy artillery, although it had recently been reinforced, remained very inferior to that of the enemy and caused him little damage. The field artillery on the other hand opened fire at 13.00 hours, instead of commencing the bombardment in the morning as was laid down in the orders of the Army Group; it was increased at 16.00 hours and caused some losses when the attack was launched.
Some elements of the trenches were still in being with their defenders; groups came up out of the few shelters that were untouched, and they fought bravely, although scarcely under cover; here and there a machine-gun came into action and inflicted considerable losses on the massed enemy; on such a restricted front, these local resistances were sufficient to delay the German attack considerably, very feebly on the left, but a little more strongly on the right. On the evening of the 21st the first line trench was captured on the attack front, and the Germans gained a footing at certain points in the support trenches.
The following day, the 22nd, the German attack, led by the VII. Reserve Corps, the XVIII. and III. Active Corps, slowly followed up their success against the XXX. Corps under Chretien, when the 72nd Div. under Bafst lost the village of Hautmont and the Caures wood, where, after a heroic resistance, they lost Col. Driant and Maj. Renouard.
Of the 14 battalions which he had in reserve Gen. Chretien had used 8, and he received a brigade, which nearly made up his losses. His 51st Div. under Boullange lost a little ground, but its counter-attacks stopped the enemy.
However, on the 23rd the 72nd divisional commander, influenced by the loss of Hautmont which thereby threatened his rear, evacuated the village of Brabant, which remained isolated on the Meuse; he received the order to retake it but could not succeed; the 51st Div. lost the important position of Wavrille. The whole of the French first position was captured, and the line now ran through Samogneux, the Fosse wood and Ornes. It was really the second position, which was linked up with the first at Ornes.
The 24th witnessed the crumbling in of this line. Samogneux was taken before dawn, the Fosse wood during the day; Beaumont, taken and retaken several times during the day of the 24th, fell during the night; and it became necessary to evacuate Ornes, outflanked on all sides. Then the enemy reached the heights of Talon and approached Douaumont. The situation appeared so serious that Gen. Herr asked permission to evacuate the Woevre plain and to draw back his front eastward to the Meuse heights; Gen. de Langle de Cary, commanding the Army Group, insisted on obtaining the sanction of Gen. Joffre for this withdrawal; he hoped to hold on on the front - Talon heightsLouvemont - Douaumont - Vaux - long enough to enable him to evacuate the right bank, which he thought to be inevitable. He even stopped on the left bank the elements of the XX. Corps which were reinforcing the XXX. Corps under Chretien.
It was now a question of deciding on the abandonment of Verdun. Should it be held at all costs and risk a disaster, if the bridges over the Meuse should come under enemy fire before the troops and artillery would have the time to cross them? Three times during the course of this sanguinary battle the same question arose, and three times Gen. Joffre settled the matter with the same calm and imperturbable tenacity. He replied to Gen. de Langle de Cary: "I approve in advance of the decisions that you will take as regards the withdrawal to the heights of the Meuse of the troops dispersed in the Woevre, if you judge it to be indispensable; you are the sole judge of the necessities of the battle. But you must hold facing N. on the front between the Meuse and Woevre with all the means at your disposal. Use the whole of the XX. Corps without hesitation. To engage it is necessary in order to enable the reinforcing divisions to arrive; you must hasten their march to the Meuse." General de Castelnau, his chief-of-staff of the army groups, left during the night, and after his arrival at the headquarters of the Army Group he telephoned to Gen. Herr confirming the orders of the commander-in-chief. On the 25th Gen. Joffre telegraphed simultaneously to Gens. de Castelnau, Petain and Herr: "Yesterday, Feb. 24, gave the order to resist on the right bank of the Meuse to the N. of Verdun. Every commander, who, under these circumstances, gives an order to retreat, will be arraigned before a council of war." It is true that great is the glory of those who carried out this order, and who by their military prowess, their knowledge of their men and their personal action, won this great battle. The chief actor, who from the first act to the last scene of the drama never ceased in removing from others the heavy burden of responsibility - that chief actor was Gen. Joffre. History must not forget this.
General de Langle de Cary accordingly issued his orders: he laid down that on the right bank they should hold fast facing N.; the movement of the XX. Corps, provisionally suspended, was to be continued; he evacuated the Woevre, however, withdrawing to the fort of the Meuse heights.
General de Castelnau arrived at 7 A.M. at Gen. Herr's headquarters, and his presence alone brought calm and relief. The 37th and 153rd Divs. had been engaged as brigades and even as regiments; these reinforcements had been sufficient to limit the progress of an attack which had been carried out on too narrow a front.
During the 25th the XX. Corps under Balfouricr relieved the XXX. Corps under Chretien, whose two divisions had lost 61% of their effectives (16,000 out of 26,000). The 37th Div. under Bonneval, believing its right to be on the point of being outflanked, evacuated the height of Talon and that of Poivre and withdrew to the Belleville height, a withdrawal of seven kilometres. A fortunate initiative stopped the enemy by an artillery barrage, and enabled the 39th Div. to regain the great part of the ground which had been given up. But if the enemy had been able to fight desperately on that day he would have engaged untried reserves at a propitious moment; he would at least have reached the foot of the Belleville height, and this advance would have made the occupation of the right-hand exceedingly difficult. On the left bank the whole French line would have been taken in rear and forced to retreat. As the German attacks were limited between the Meuse and in the Woevre, the arrival of an adequate number of reinforcements was sufficient to close the breach.
In the centre fighting had been continued the whole day round Fort Douaumont; Number 155 turret had fired almost unceasingly for four days; the fort had no garrison except the crew of 23 gunners, who manned this work, and who, at the end of their tether, slept after the fall of night. A patrol of the 24th Brandenburgers, finding the drawbridge lowered, entered the fort and settled themselves there without firing a shot. Such was the result of a badly understood order, which converted entrenched camps into fortified regions; it was due, perhaps, to insufficient liaison between two units in the first line, who should have got into touch in Fort Douaumont instead of maintaining themselves, one to the E. and the other to the W. of the fort, which at the beginning of the battle found itself 8 km. within the French lines without a garrison of its own. It was for the local commander to occupy it; but the prejudice against permanent fortification was such that no one on the spot thought about it. On the evening of the 24th Gen. Chretien had, moreover, ordered his sector commanders to occupy all works. The important work of Hardaumont, which completed the defence of the Douaumont and Vaux forts, had no garrison, and was likewise abandoned to the enemy without the slightest resistance.
The day was a bad one. The capture of Douaumont was announced to the whole. world in a triumphal communique: " To the E. of the Meuse, in the presence of His Majesty the Emperor and King we have gained important successes. In a vigorous advance the Brandenburg regiments reached the fort and village of Douaumont, which they captured by assault." This glaring travesty of the truth made this name symbolic of a great victory; but when, taking up the challenge, the French were to retake Douaumont, the value which the Germans gave to its possession was to be the measure of their defeat.
General Joffre sent for Gen. Petain to come to Chantilly; the latter had been supervising in the rear the training of divisions sent back in succession to rest. After Joffre had given him his instructions he sent him to take over the command of the army in process of formation on the left bank of the Meuse, which was to intervene when the right moment arrived. General de Castelnau thought that the moment had already arrived when Gen. Petain appeared on the scene, as events were getting beyond the powers of the cadre of the fortified region, whose general staff was not adequate to direct operations of such importance.
General Petain took over command on Feb. 26. He brought the I. Corps under Guillaumat into line on the left of Balfourier's XX. Corps. The front was immediately put into a state of defence foot by foot, and vigorous counter-attacks were carried out. The front was divided into sectors; the heavy artillery which had arrived was assigned to each; the Bar-le-Duc - Verdun road (the sacred way) which was cracking up under the everincreasing weight of the motor lorries, was constantly repaired by gangs of territorial troops and doubled by lateral tracks.
The situation remained confused; it was the German communique which informed Gen. Petain of the capture of Douaumont, and then he was nervous about the forts of Vaux and Souville, nearer to Verdun and not yet threatened.
The struggle was very lively on the Douaumont summit. The French line went beyond the fort to the E. and to the W. and hemmed it in; it was round this point, now of first importance, that the battle raged. It was only on March 4 that the line became stabilized for some weeks at a distance of 200 metres from the fort. There is no doubt that the counter-attacks carried out rarely gained any appreciable ground, but they broke up the German offensive, which was disconcerted by this new feature of the defence. General Joffre reiterated the necessity of these counter-attacks; he wrote to Gen. Petain on Feb. 27: "At the present juncture of the battle, you feel as I do that the best method of checking the effort, which the enemy will make, is to attack in our turn." On March i he wrote: "You have now at your disposal forces outnumbering those opposed to you. .. above all it is necessary for you to take the initiative in offensive actions with definite objectives in view." The German attack now progressed on the right bank exceedingly slowly. All along the Meuse it was harassed by the fire of the defence, which caught it obliquely and even in rear.
At last the Crown Prince decided to broaden his attack fronts on the left bank of the Meuse, attempting too late to rectify the original error of his offensive.
On March 4 he asked his army groups to make a supreme effort to take Verdun, "the heart of France." After a bombardment lasting two days he attacked on March 6 with two divisions. The French, however, had been expecting it for 15 days; after a fair resistance they gave up the crossing of the Forges stream, and that part of their line which was under the fire of enemy guns from the right bank and which could no longer be held except by very strong outposts. The following day the Germans continued their advance, paying for their progress more and more dearly, and they were stopped in front of Mort Homme.
From the 8th - r rth the battle was extended simultaneously on both banks. Unimportant progress was made on the left bank, but Mort Homme held steadfastly, as did the Poivre height on the right bank. The Germans advanced to the outskirts of Fort Vaux, whose capture they announced in a new resounding communique: " Fort Vaux as well as the numerous adjoining fortifications has been captured in a brilliant night attack by the Posen reserve regiments.. .." One can only imagine that the German prisoners led into the fort must have been taken for victorious attack troops. The next day the communique had to be contradicted; the turretted fort had become "a heap of ruins" and had been evacuated.
The first communiqué could very well have been the result of a mistake, but the second was a lie. Evidence from both sides, and notably from soldiers' letters, testifies to the desperate character of the struggle during these days, and to the bravery displayed by friend and foe alike. The French troops particularly noticed the Bavarian troops among their enemies, whose blood was shed unsparingly by the Prussian command.
General Joffre thought that he had won the first trick in this terrible game. In historic words he thanked the soldiers of Verdun. "Germany hoped," he told them, "that the capture of Verdun would strengthen the courage of her allies and would convince neutral countries of her superiority. She had not reckoned with you. .. the struggle is not over, because the Germans must have a victory. You will take it out of their hands. _ Of you it will be said: they barred to the Germans the way to Verdun." The generalissimo dared then to tell his soldiers that the battle would continue; he took up the challenge of the enemy, who attached a moral importance to the capture of Verdun, for want of a strategical importance which it had not. The Germans had not obtained the rapid "break-through" which they had hoped for, and their objective was limited to the capture of forts on the right bank of the Meuse, purely a local rectification of front. They were reduced to give this objective an importance purely fictitious - "Verdun, the chief stronghold of our chief enemy, the head and heart of France," etc., etc.
General Joffre's victory was enhanced by these same declarations of the enemy. He frequently visited the front, for two or three days at a time. He kept Gen. Petain's second army under his own immediate command, thus relieving of responsibility the intermediary "group of armies," a formation often useless, sometimes harmful, always heavy and slow, unless under the command of a striking personality; as long as Verdun was to be the sole theatre of operations Gen. Joffre was to exert there his direct personal action. He was thus able to calculate exactly what forces he could employ there, because he had to keep in reserve effectives necessary for the French offensive which was being prepared on the Somme, according to the plan of operations decided upon in Dec. 1915, and the execution of which he was following through imperturbably. Sir Douglas Haig had been quite willing to extend his front so as to free the X. French Army, which force could then be employed as reinforcements for Verdun; the British general offered to contribute directly to the battle that was being fought; but Gen. Joffre declined his offer as he wished the whole of the British forces to be available for the forthcoming offensive.
On March 12 and 13 the German bombardment was renewed on both banks of the Meuse with great violence; on the 14th a small advance brought the attack line nearer to the Mort Homme, but it was stopped by some successful counter-attacks. On the 16th the village and fort of Vaux successfully resisted violent assaults repeated five times. On the loth, however, after a furious artillery bombardment, the Germans seized the Avocourt wood, poorly defended by troops, who apparently allowed themselves to be unduly influenced by jets of burning liquid used in great quantities. However, on the following days, the attackers attempted to debouch from the wood in vain; welldirected artillery fire stopped any advance.
Prepared at leisure, a French counter-attack retook this wood on the 29th; it created a salient in the lines and might serve as a base for an advance which would embarrass the whole position.
A violent struggle lasted four days for the possession of this ground, which finally remained in the hands of the French.
But against this the whole Malancourt salient fell into German hands; the French were obliged to evacuate Bethincourt and to fall back on the S. bank of the Forges stream; they even lost the summit of Mort Homme.
On the right bank the end of March witnessed the gradual advance of the Germans, slightly going beyond the village of Vaux. On April 2, descending the slopes of Douaumont, they seized the Caillette wood and crossed the Baril ravine; no defensive line, nor any reserve troops, separated them any longer from Fort Souville. They had even gone beyond the barrage fire of the French artillery.
At this moment the 5th Div. under Gen. Mangin came into line, and forestalling the hour for relief hurled in its first regiment to counter-attack. Uncertainty concerning the ground given up deprived the artillery of all accuracy in its fire, which was not able to support the counter-attacking line, but this uncertainty was the same for both sides. It was above all necessary to stop the enemy where he was, and then to drive him back. All arrangements were made during the night, and the fight was resumed on the 3rd with a first success of good omen.
On the following days the artillery was able to regulate its fire, the Caillette wood was recaptured completely, all the approaches to Souville and to the N. of Vaux were largely freed, in spite of German reinforcements. It was noticeable that this division had lost fewer men in recapturing the ground than the former division in losing it. The idea gained ground of continuing with the same troops so as to retake Douaumont.
The 5th Div. was sent back to rest, and the plan of attack, which anticipated an advance on the part of the division on its left, was drawn up. That division, however, lost ground instead of gaining it, and the objective now to be reached was altogether en fleche; as the adjoining divisions were not considered to be in a state to take part in the operation, the base of the attack became too narrow. Nevertheless it was launched on the 22nd about midday. After a fairly satisfactory artillery preparation, with magnificent dash it reached the fort in i i minutes and occupied the superstructure with the exception of the northwestern angle.
To right and left the objectives laid down were reached almost entirely. The enemy, however, held on to the interior of the fort, and the outside was soon swept by his artillery fire; the machineguns, in turrets which had not been knocked out, were soon augmented by others brought gradually into action.
The German reinforcements came up after the 23rd, because they were ready for this attack; the French reinforcements were too far back, and the officer in control of the attack did not have them under his orders. The struggle lasted two days, but the fort was lost again on the 28th.
Then the struggle broke out anew round Fort Vaux. The bombardment increased in intensity each day at the end of May; Damloup was taken on June 2 and the fort surrounded on three sides. The Germans finally occupied the superstructure, but Maj. Raynal continued the defence with steadfast heroism.
The fort fell on June 7. Its fall uncovered Fort Souville, already threatened by the German advance down the slopes from Douaumont; Thiaumont farm fell, the Caillette wood was retaken; and it seemed as if the heroism of the French soldiers was to be powerless in face of this advance, which appeared to be in some way mechanical.
General Petain had taken over command of the group of French armies in the centre, and Gen. Nivelle of the Verdun army. General Petain had already drawn the attention of Gen. Joffre to the gravity of the situation in May. He referred to it again on June 11, and insisted that the offensive to be undertaken on the Somme should take place as soon as possible. General Joffre replied the following day that he had made all his dispositions with this end in view, but that it was necessary to continue the struggle at all costs on the right bank, and even to risk the loss of batteries which could hardly be withdrawn.
The German advance, however, continued on the right bank, in spite of the energy of Gen. Nivelle, who repeatedly ordered counter-attacks, both immediate and instinctive.
The whole effort of the attacker was concentrated on this ground, an effort which amounted to a major operation having as its first objectives the work of Froide Terre, the village of Fleury and Fort Souville. Once that line was reached the old forts on the height St. Michel-Belleville would be easily seized, and the French would be hemmed in against the Meuse with its bridges under German artillery fire. Nineteen regiments belonging to seven different divisions were to be engaged; the reinforcements and reserves were brought up close to the front line in order to take advantage of the first successes, and to insure the strength and continuity of the effort. It was the most important and heaviest attack that Verdun had ever had to bear.
The artillery had been strongly reinforced, and began its preparation from June 20 with an intensity hitherto unheard of. On the morning of the 23rd the first-line trenches were literally ploughed up, and the German infantry hardly found a single defender at the beginning of the attack, which reached the Baril ravine, Fleury, the Thiaumont work, and even penetrated the moats or ditches of the Froide Terre work, where the advanced elements had been taken prisoner. The French counter-attacks, however, stopped the German attack. General Mangin, who commanded this section of defence, launched unceasing counterattacks. They hurled themselves against the German attacks but their advance at first was very slow; however, that of the enemy was stopped and his will was soon to be conquered. The stubbornness of the two adversaries was equal, and the course of the battle reached a dead-lock, but it was felt that the battle had already assumed another aspect.
However, on the evening of the 23rd the situation was serious, as the German wave was very near to beating against the Belleville height, the last stronghold to keep it from Verdun.
It reached the head of the ravines coming down from Froide Terre towards the Meuse, and the Poivre height was in danger of being submerged and its defenders taken in rear. General Nivelle, commanding the army, conferred with Gen. Mangin. Both were in agreement in thinking that it was necessary to counter-attack to the utmost; the threatened front was in a position of unstable equilibrium, and its only salvation was to be found in a movement forwards; Gen. Nivelle approved the orders issued in consequence. On his return to his headquarters he found Gen. Petain, who satisfied himself that all measures were ready for the evacuation of the right bank, prepared down to the last detail. The positions for withdrawal by echelons were fixed in advance, in such a way that this masterly retreat would not leave a single trophy of war to the enemy. There was to be found in Gen. Petain an admirable steadfastness of soul. With the exception of Gen. Nivelle not one of his subordinates suspected his fears. When he asked that opinion should be prepared for the retreat to the left bank he was thinking of those at home; to his soldiers and their officers he continued to show an impassive countenance, and he kept on saying, "We shall have them!" For the third time Gen. Petain pointed out the gravity of the situation to the commander-in-chief. A third of the French artillery was on the right bank and would be lost in case of a reverse if it was not withdrawn before the German artillery could fire on the bridges over the Meuse, and three days were needed to carry out this withdrawal; it would be wise to begin it.
General Joffre, however, was imperturbable. He replied on the 26th that the preparation for the Franco-British offensive had commenced, and repeated that Verdun should be defended on the right bank; should there be a loss of material as a result of this decision the commander-in-chief would assume the entire responsibility for it. When the telegram that he had ordered to be written to the above effect was handed to him by his chief-ofstaff, the latter drew his attention to this decision and to the responsibility which he was assuming thereby. "I have taken many others," said placidly the general as he signed. He explained the general situation to the Minister for War, who had invited him to hurry on the Franco-British attack; the launching of the offensive had been subordinated to the reinforcement of the British and Russian armies in men and material; the hour had struck, and the guns on the Somme made their thunder heard. The offensive, previously fixed for June 2g, was postponed till July r on account of bad weather, which hampered the artillery preparation. But it was on that date that it had been fixed by Gen. Joffre on Feb. 18, three days before the attack on Verdun, which had not succeeded in advancing or delaying it a single day.
The French Counter-offensive
The end of June had witnessed the arrest of the German advance by French counter-attacks. The ground, which had been won at one blow on the 23rd, was regained step by step; on the edges of the Thiaumont work the conflict always remained fierce enough; vibrations on the front decreased in magnitude, but its general tendency was towards the N. and to the detriment of the assailant. The work - or rather the small protuberance which marked the site of the work - was taken and retaken to such a degree that it changed hands 16 times during the summer; the slight advances which had carried the German line beyond the craters were gradually reduced, and from this side the initiative in attack belonged to the French.
On the other hand the German offensive continued to progress slightly in the direction of Fleury-Souville. The French had been almost completely thrown out of the village, which they had partly retaken on June 27.
The Crown Prince carried out anew a strong attack against Fort Souville. On July II, after a violent artillery preparation and a storm of asphyxiating shells which enveloped the attack zone, he hurled 13 regiments belonging to 5 different divisions in between the slopes E. of Thiaumont up to the Vaux-Chapitre wood. The attack made a little progress on the irth, very little on the 12th; a small detachment, however, was taken prisoner on the superstructure of Fort Souville. Certain counter-attacks organized unexpectedly had limited the gain of this strong offensive, very costly as it was in men, to a depth of 400 metres to the S. of Fleury on a front of Boo metres. By sheer tenacity a well-organized counter-attack led to the recapture of all the ground lost, resulting in the capture of many prisoners. After July 20 it was the French who attacked, in front of Souville as well as round Thiaumont. After the irth Mangin's command was increased on this sector, and this unity made possible the powerful concentrations of artillery fire. Local attacks could be preceded by preparation on a large front, and thus leave the enemy uncertain as to the precise point where the action would unfold itself. Often several attacks would be carried out at the same time several kilometres distant from one another.
These minor operations were organized in detail, and numerous prisoners were taken along the whole front. This had its influence on the strength of the German troops, on their moral and physical condition, and on the march of reliefs and bringing up of supplies, which presented targets to the harassing fire carried out at night. The trenches to be attacked were covered by the fire of the 7 5's, which put up a barrage behind and prevented the escape of the defenders; at the same time the heavy artillery pounded them, either killing or burying the defenders; before the attack it often happened that whole detachments came out and surrendered themselves, declaring the position to be untenable. The advance of the attack was preceded by artillery fire from field guns which moved on at the same pace as the attacking infantry; this was the "creeping barrage," which made its appearance after the end of June. The French thus obtained the maximum results with the minimum losses. During the months of July and Aug. they took 3,500 prisoners, and their advance was continued.
The village of Fleury, retaken and lost again at the beginning of Aug., remained in the hands of the French from Aug. 17 onwards. The whole of the Fleury-Thiaumont crater was French, and the outskirts of Souville were well cleared on the north-east. But the enemy now attacked Souville on the E., issuing from Fort Vaux. He gained about 1,200 metres, and the pressure was disturbing. The unity of command then made itself felt between the Meuse and the Woevre, and produced its full results; at the beginning of Sept. the enemy was thrown back from the positions which he had just taken, and confined to the outskirts of Fort Vaux, from the other side of a crater whose inner slopes provided a good position for the defence of Souville.
The French losses had been heavier than the German during the first period, but the proportion was now reversed. Hindenburg, who had just assumed command, proposed to the Kaiser that the attacks should be discontinued, and explained this decision as follows: "The battles which were fought in this region exhausted our strength as does a wound that will not heal. It was evident that this adventure did not leave us the least hope from whatever point of view, and its continuation cost us much more men than it did our enemy. Our advanced positions were exposed everywhere to the enemy's flanking fire; liaison with the front line was exceedingly difficult. The battlefield was a veritable hell, and the troops considered it rightly as such. To-day, after a retrospective study, I do not hesitate to say that from the purely military point of view, it would have been more to our advantage to improve our position in front of Verdun by voluntarily giving up the greater part of the ground taken. However, in the autumn of 1916, I thought it necessary to postpone that decision: we have sacrificed in this affair a great part of our best troops, and up to that time we allowed our people to hope that the struggle would terminate gloriously for us. Further, if we had withdrawn at that moment, it might have made the too facile impression that all our sacrifices had been in vain. I wished to avoid that strain on the moral of our population, which was already highly tried. In suspending our attacks on Verdun we counted on our adversaries themselves adopting, in this region, a purely defensive attitude; our hope was not realized. At the end of Oct. the French launched a counterattack on a large scale on the right bank of the Meuse; it was boldly carried out and overwhelmed us. We lost Douaumont and we had not the troops to retake this monument of German heroism." The conditions under which that action unfolded itself were as follows: In front of Souville and of the line of forts a stout barrier had been formed, which included several well-organized positions; the battle had died down on the right bank, and the French renewed the offensive from the Meuse to the Woevre, and regained their superiority over the enemy. On Sept. 13 the President of the French Republic came to bring to the martyr town the cross of the Legion of Honour and the decorations which the sovereigns of Allied countries had conferred upon it. From the casemates of the citadel, during a ceremony of moving simplicity, he pronounced an eloquent speech which consecrated the victory. But he had to keep all his fascination for the word which was at last to be spoken. Events had proved that every well-organized attack always commenced with success, and that it was exceedingly difficult to limit a victorious advance.
Now above all was it necessary to throw back the enemy from that barrier which had at last been remade. The hour had passed for those little attacks which aimed at the recapture of a few hundred metres; they had enabled them to get rid of successively the small or large pockets which the German line had dug into the French, but it was only by carrying the whole line forward at one bound that ground could be gained to advantage. An operation on a grand scale was called for.
General Nivelle entrusted Gen. Mangin with the study of this task. The latter considered the recapture of Douaumont as a possible consequence of success; this scheme was adopted after discussion, and the fort did not come into it except as one of the objectives of the attack. The same applied to Fort Vaux. The main object thus became the reconstitution in its integrity of the barrier of forts round Verdun.
General Mangin had all the necessary means at his disposal to bring this operation to a successful issue. He had a very powerful mass of artillery-289 field and mountain guns (calibre 65 to 96 mm.) and 314 heavy guns (ioo to 400 mm.); 3 divisions in the front line, with 2 Senegalese battalions and 1 Somali battalion; divisions under his immediate orders in the second line; while the adjoining divisions on the front of attack each placed a regiment in the line. The enemy opposed him with 7 divisions but they were very dispersed in depth: 16 battalions were in the first line; 6 in immediate support and in the zone to be taken; in near support, which were all to be engaged on the evening of the attack; 25 in reserve, who would later come up to fill in the gaps. The French had located 209 German batteries (about Boo guns) capable of coming into action when the offensive began. After three days of destructive bombardment they feigned a general attack. The ruse was completely successful, and 158 batteries were disclosed; these were under counterbattery fire the next day, the day of the attack, to such effect that only 90 batteries opened fire that day, and then only under unfavourable conditions. The initial artillery superiority of the Germans had then disappeared. This was foreseen in the scheme of attack; the French commander knew that the means at his disposal would be inferior at the beginning to those of the defence, but would become superior during the action.
The infantry strengths were almost equal on both sides. The disposal of the German divisions on very narrow fronts, and some what hemmed in, lent itself less to manoeuvre than did that of the French divisions, whose front was quite double, but above everything else the experience of former actions had shown the efficacy of the methods employed in this zone; a barrage of field guns falling behind the trenches nailed the defenders to them whilst the heavy artillery and the trench mortars made them indisposed for the fight. At the same time the fire of other heavy guns filled up the openings of the deep shelters, which in times of quiet served as strongholds for the defence; when the assault waves started, preceded by the creeping barrage from 70 to 80 metres in advance, they would not find more than rare local resistance, and would advance up to the deep shelters whose occupants would be taken prisoner. General Mangin was able to inform Gen. Joffre and Gen. Nivelle that two hours before the attack 22 German battalions had been almost completely wiped out. As far as the forts were concerned they were laid open; it was impossible to determine their capture with the same degree of certainty as that of the conquest of ground, but the occupation of the superstructure was certain and the capture of the whole appeared to be a matter of two to three days at the most.
If a success of this nature could be foreseen with such certainty, it was not due to an accumulation of material of war, since, at the beginning of the struggle the German artillery was undeniably much superior in numbers, in range, in rapidity of fire, and even in calibre (with the exception of a few French guns of 400 and 370 mm., whose fire was solely directed against the forts); nor was it due to the employment of masses of infantry which would overwhelm the enemy by sheer weight of numbers, since the density of the attack was thin so as not to expose more men to loss than those actually required to obtain the desired result. It was due to the use of logical methods, of well thought-out artillery bombardments, which gave them a superiority over the enemy and which compensated in large measure for inferiority in numbers and material; it was due, too, to the dash of the French troops and their confidence in their leaders. It was, however, further due to a perfect understanding in the command. The army commander provided his subordinate, who was in charge of the attack, with all the means at his disposal, and if they were not available he could ask for them from headquarters. Another factor was a thorough knowledge of the particular zone, and the experiences gained in this zone by the same leaders and the same staffs, who had been on the spot during a bitter struggle that had lasted several months. The result was assisted by the mistakes of the enemy, who had practically everywhere only one line of defence, in front of which he had been able to set up only elementary obstacles. These conditions were to be found again on the same field of battle two months later; but they were exceptional and weighed very heavily in favour of the French.
The artillery preparation, which commenced on the 10th and continued to the 24th with increasing intensity, produced its usual effects. The Germans gave themselves up singly or in little groups; a strayed carrier-pigeon brought in a message of distress from a battalion commander, who said that his troops were not in a state to fight. Finally, at 11.40, the artillery lengthened its fire and the French infantry left their assault trenches. A dense fog hid their advance from the enemy, who did not open fire till 12 minutes after zero time, when the two front waves had crossed his first trenches. The objective was reached in an hour, and it was consolidated very rapidly. In the first instructions the pause was to have been for half-an-hour; the commander of the groups of armies, considering it advisable to consolidate the position, the conquest of which was practically certain, had insisted that it should be much longer, and after discussion had finally fixed the pause for two hours. The bombardment, however, had been most thorough; a 420-mm. shell had brought about an explosion which was followed by a fire; one would have thought that it would have been a great advantage to hurry on and to profit by the confusion. Gen. Mangin, too, had fixed the time for consolidation as one hour.
The 38th Div. under Guyot de Salins formed the left wing. His colonial Moroccan regiment penetrated into Douaumont fort, which the Germans had evacuated the day before owing to the threat of explosion but were occupying again. They were putting their machine-guns into position, but the rising tide of the assailants overwhelmed them.
In the centre the dash of the 133rd Div., known as "La Gauloise," under Passaga, had overcome all obstacles; and it had established itself in the angle N.E. of Douaumont and by the pool at Vaux. On the right, in front of the 74th Div. under Lardemelle, the artillery preparation had been. insufficient against some centres of resistance, and the advance had been more difficult. More powerful artillery, which had become available, smashed the framework of the fort; long-range guns enfiladed the casemates (the surface which faced Verdun was covered with only ordinary masonry instead of being concreted); and finally the advance in the direction of Douaumont enabled field guns to be brought into action on the only position from which they could fire on the very steep slopes to the E. of the fort, whose communications were thus cut. The pressure of the infantry continued after the 9th Div. under Audlauer had relieved Lardemelle's division; the enemy evacuated the fort and Gen. Audlauer installed himself there on the 3rd. He occupied the villages of Vaux and Damloup.
The recapture of the Douaumont and Vaux forts was an important event, which consecrated the victory of Verdun in the eyes of the whole world; 6,000 prisoners emphasized it. This great success, however, called for its complement.
On Oct. 21 Gen. Mangin had pointed out to Gen. Nivelle the necessity which obtruded itself, after the capture of the objectives assigned for the operation on the 24th, of seizing the crater Douaumont-Hardaumont and the Poivre height, both of which had direct observation into the positions which were to be conquered, and of clearing the way round Fort Douaumont. General Nivelle then considered a combined operation, but he was very limited by the means at his disposal. The front of attack must not be beyond that of one for three divisions, but it might be possible to have a break of continuity in the centre. The ammunition would be only that which could be economized out of the daily allowances. General Mangin, however, insisted on the advantages of an attack from the Meuse to the Woevre, even should it be necessary to wait for the necessary troops and munitions. It was this scheme which the command finally agreed to. Before Mangin's group the German front was held by five divisions in the front line and by four in the second; the latter could intervene in one night, 247 batteries having been identified (960 guns approximately).
The French attack had 4 divisions available in the first line, 4 in the second, and 740 gulls. It was, accordingly, inferior to the defence, but it could count on the results obtained on Oct. 24. The artillery in actual fact rapidly established a superiority over the German artillery, thanks to deeper penetration; 13 German artillery officers were captured, whose evidence confirmed in detail this undoubted superiority. As far as the infantry is concerned the smashing in of the front trenches led to the complete destruction of the 13 battalions defending them, and to the partial destruction of the 13 battalions in support in the zone to be conquered, so that the attack could then meet the slight initial numerical inequality.
The enemy, forewarned by the experience of Oct. 24, had organized three lines of resistance defended by a network of barbed wire; further the distance of the final objective introduced a greater element of chance; it was, accordingly, necessary to have more elasticity in the mechanism of the creeping barrage and to vary its application. It was laid down in the attack orders of Mangin's group that: "Each objective must be seized at the first onset and with one bound - the pace to be 100 metres in four minutes. The infantry to be preceded at a distance of 70 to 80 metres by percussion shell and at 150 metres by shrapnel, time and percussion. Further, when circumstances demand it and when it is possible, owing to long-range observation, artillery fire will be carried out in conjunction with the advance of the infantry; general officers commanding divisions will organize, with this end in view, the closest possible liaison between infantry and artillery." The great obstacle to the organization of the attack was the state of the ground, which was frightfully cut up by 10 months of repeated fighting; in the slushy clay, where the water oozes out at any altitude, the shellholes, nearly touching one another, were at this time covered with ice. Without a complete fitting up of the ground every attack would come to grief in the mud. It was necessary to construct 25 km. of roads, several of which were planked with wood, 10 km. of Dreauville line, and a very great number of telepho
These files are public domain.
Chisholm, Hugh, General Editor. Entry for 'Battles of Verdun'. 1911 Encyclopedia Britanica. https://www.studylight.org/encyclopedias/eng/bri/b/battles-of-verdun.html. 1910.
