Bible Encyclopedias
Battles of the Frontiers

E I F

G A C violently attacked all along the line by the superior forces of the XIV. and XV. German Corps. It held its ground till nightfall, and counter-attacking drove back the enemy on Rixheim and the Ile Napoleon, but was eventually forced to break off the action under cover of darkness to avoid envelopment. The artillery got away in good order, and despite the difficulty of disengaging the infantry in the darkness and in the enclosed country the withdrawal westwards was successfully effected without interference from the enemy. On the 10th order was established in the units of the VII. Corps, which on the morrow took up a position on the frontier behind the St. Nicholas.

If the French general staff had acted very imprudently by taking such an early offensive in the Sundgau that it could not keep it up, the German general staff showed singular indecision in not profiting by their superior numbers to follow up and overwhelm the French corps, as early as Aug. 10, and to attack Belfort during the confusion following its defeat. It held strictly to its plan of operations, and, having prepared a massed attack on Luxemburg and Belgium, provided for a strict defensive between Switzerland and the Donon. The XIV. and XV. Corps rejoined the army of von Heeringen on the loth, and the defense of Upper Alsace was given over to Gen. von Gaede, who received for that purpose the command of four brigades of Landwehr. The organization of this detachment took time, and when the Landwehr at length undertook a tardy pursuit they had lost touch with the VII. Corps. Instead of marching towards the W. they advanced to the S., in the hope, doubtless, of being able to force the defile which formed the easiest approach to Belfort. But they had been forestalled in this direction by the garrison of Belfort (57th Div., Gen. Bernard), which on Aug. 13 checked their advance before Montreux-Vieux. Having lost during the day 1,800 to 2,000 men, the Germans suspended their counter-offensive, and fell back rapidly towards the E., abandoning arms, equipment, and munitions.

The Operations of the Army of Alsace

As early as Aug. 10, however, Gen. Joffre, wishing to react against the effects of the repulse of Mulhouse, had decided to form an Alsatian army in the vicinity of Belfort under the command of Gen. Pau, which was to renew the advance in greater strength. It had also the mission of covering the right flank of the I. Army, which under the orders of Gen. Dubail, was to operate in the direction of the Donon, and the Bruche valley.

The Army of Alsace comprised the 8th Cavalry Div., five detachments of Chasseurs Alpins, the VII. Army Corps, the 44 th Infantry Div. consisting of the troops from Africa, the 58th, 63rd and 66th Reserve Divs. from the centre and the S. of France, and the 57th Reserve Div. with two heavy batteries detached from the Belfort garrison.

Before all these formations had arrived the army took the offensive on the left; and the five battalions of Chasseurs crossing the passes of Bussang and Schlucht, which the Germans had abandoned at the beginning of August, descended towards Thann, Cernay and Colmar. The main body of the army advanced on the 16th, the advance being methodically executed with the idea first of cutting off the enemy's retreat to the N., then driving him back beyond Mulhouse, and either hemming him in against the Swiss frontier or forcing him back to the other side of the Rhine.

Disconcerted by a counter-offensive which they had not expected so soon, and by the superior numbers of their adversaries, the Germans under von Gaede fell back rapidly everywhere, offering little resistance. In three days all the territory to the S. of the Vosges was cleared, and at 10 A.M. on the 19th the main body of the Army of Alsace attacked the enemy forces concentrated before Mulhouse, their right at Lutterbach and Pfastatt, their centre at Dornach, their left towards Brunstatt. Fighting continued during the afternoon, being particularly severe around Dornach. The eventual capture of this village by the French decided the day, and the defeated Germans fell back towards the Harth and the Rhine, leaving behind them 24 guns and i,000 prisoners. At 4 P.M., for the second time in a fortnight, the victorious French entered Mulhouse. They were again warmly greeted by their brethren of Alsace, who were inspired by this rapid return to hope that this time they were definitely freed from the yoke of the oppressor. In the joy of triumph they refrained from further advance, and the conquered Germans were able to fall back unmolested when a vigorous pursuit might have turned their defeat into an irreparable rout.

A second battle, without any definite connexion with that of Dornach, took place on the same day, Aug. 19, some distance to the S. of Mulhouse. The 44th Div., which covered the right flank of the Army of Alsace, was attacked, between Leumschwiller and Tagsdorff, by a German division which had been brought over from the other side of the Rhine. This division was beaten off and obliged to beat a hasty retreat; but the French division, which had paid dearly for its victory, had to be withdrawn in order to refit. On the 21st it was relieved by the 57 th Div. which occupied Altkirch with advance posts on the right bank. The 14th Bde. of Dragoons, supported by two battalions at Hirsengen and Hirtzbach, extended the line to the right and completed the screen covering the Army of Alsace.

Fortune for the moment seemed to smile upon the French, but suddenly the situation underwent a change, and their hopes were dashed to the ground by the disasters of Sarrebourg, Morhauge and Charleroi. The withdrawal of the XI. Army had an immediate repercussion on the situation of the I. Army, which had to conform to the retreat of its left-hand neighbour. The Army of Alsace was in its turn affected by the general withdrawal, and by orders from G.H.Q. was broken up in order that its various elements might be allotted to other formations.

The 44th Div. was the first to leave on Aug. 22 to rejoin the I. Army. On Aug. 24 the 57th Div. was again placed at the disposal of the governor of Belfort, and had to abandon its position at Altkirch and fall back first to Dannemarie, and thence to the line Montreux-Vieux - Foursemagne - Fontaine. On the 25th Mulhouse was evacuated, and the VII. Corps together with the 63rd Div. was entrained in order to form the nucleus of the VI. Army, of which Gen. Maunoury was to take command. On the 26th, the 66th Div. was sent to Montbeliard with the 14th Bde. of Dragoons. The 58th Div. fell back to the Upper Thur valley, one of its brigades being left to occupy the mouth of the defile at Thann.

The Chasseurs battalions and the 8th Dragoon Bde. marched by Minster road to the crest of the Vosges. The bridges of Illfurth and of Aspach were destroyed, the canal sluices between the Rhone and the Rhine were blown up, and the two large viaducts on either side of Dannemarie station were cut. The disbandment of the Army of Alsace thus left the Sundgau once more clear of French troops, and abandoned to the mercy of the Germans. At the same time Belfort was left exposed and open to hostile attack.

Renewed Offensive of the Belfort Garrison

The role assigned to Belfort in the French defensive scheme was to support the right wing of the armies resting on the Swiss frontier, and to command the gap by which the enemy might endeavour to penetrate between the Vosges and the Jura, in order to gain a decisive advantage by taking the French armies in reverse. It was a vitally important role, since if the Germans once secured the gap they might penetrate into the heart of France 'by Besancon and Dijon.

A vast amount of work had been done in the last 40 years in constructing, on the basis of the small fortress of 1870, the great stronghold of 1914. Much, however, remained to be completed. The work necessitated by the invention of armour-piercing shells dragged on endlessly, hindered by the want of funds and by manufacturing delays in the workshops, to which must be added the alterations caused by the progress of armament leading to a constant modification of the plans. The result was thus a miscellaneous array of old works and new forts with others still in the course of construction.

The forts Roppe, Bessancourt, Veselois, Fourgerais, and Bois D'Oye were splendid modern or modernized works. On the other hand, the construction of the forts of Giromagny and Salbert had not even been begun; and La Chaux and Mont Vaudois, the reconstruction of which had just been undertaken, were half demolished and transformed into enormous building yards so that they were quite incapable for the moment of playing any part in the defence. As in all the French fortresses, there was not enough heavy artillery; the guns were good, but their mountings were out of date; and as these could only be fired from platforms which took a long time to erect, they had not the necessary mobility; the r,000 rounds apiece which was allowed them was totally insufficient, and the method of firing, as then practised, did not allow them to make full use of their range. Altogether, the defence of Belfort in 1914 presented grave deficiencies, and the command had no illusions as to its inconveniences or dangers, but there existed no means of remedying them save by hasty makeshifts and by special alertness. Nevertheless, confidence reigned in the fortress, everyone there knowing that will, energy, and moral courage are the first essentials for the defence of a besieged fortress.

Despite this confidence, the days which passed between July 26 and Aug. 2 1914 appeared painfully long to the Belfort garrison, helpless as it was in face of the German raids, owing to the order to remain at a distance of 10 km. from the frontier, which prevented them from taking even elementary measures of precaution. As elsewhere, mobilization at Belfort was only commenced on the morning of Sunday Aug. 2, and it was extremely complicated, involving as it did the mobilization of both reservists and territorials and their incorporation into their units, requisitioning, transport, supply of provisions, and placing of the fortress in a state of defence.

The mobilization had been well prepared and was carried out with singular regularity; but the fact of troops being diverted from Belfort for the operations which were immediately undertaken in Alsace rendered difficult the normal organization of the garrison. This was to have been composed of an actual brigade of infantry with five battalions of the 57th Res. Div. (12 battalions of infantry, three groups of field artillery, and a company of engineers, and two squadrons of dragoons), 19 battalions of territorial infantry, 15,000 artillery, and 3,000 sappers, together with detachments of custom-house officers, foresters, telegraphic and postal operators, hospital orderlies, clerks, and depot personnel of the various arms, altogether about 75,000 men. As a matter of fact, a half-mobilized brigade of the 57th Div. was called away as early as the 6th, to take part in the first offensive on Mulhouse, then the other brigade of the division was sent forward when barely completed, and it was to the 57th Div., thus formed in the face of the enemy, under the command of Gen. Bernard, that there fell the honour of checking the Germans at Montreux on Aug. 13, after the retreat of the VII. Corps. Without a moment's respite the division then took part in the operations of the Army of Alsace, and it was only on the 26th, after this army was broken up, that it returned to the vicinity of Foursemagne under the cannon of Belfort. While the reserve division was thus engaged, the active brigade took part in front of the fortress at Felon and Lagrange. The rest of the garrison had been assembled, and as soon as its various units were formed they were set to work, in conjunction with all the men from 15 to 60 years of age not subject to military service, to push on vtith the works laid down in the scheme of defence.

The completion of this task was necessarily impeded by the fighting in which a part of the garrison was engaged during August; but thanks to the willingness of all the workers, the enormous undertaking was achieved by the time that the Army of Alsace was dissolved. The armament of the forts had been completed, numerous batteries had been constructed and armed, and munition depots had been organized. Centres of resistance, united by continuous lines of trenches, which were again covered by accessory defences, had been erected around Roppe fort, the fort and the village of Bessancourt, Fort Meroux, the spur of Oye Wood, the work of the Bambois, and Salbert hill. Finally the organization of the principal zone of defence had been strengthened by large inundations on part of the front.

In front of this zone other works had been undertaken with a view to strengthening the fortress, and towards Frais, Chevre ment and Bourogne. The works of Mont Vaudois were pushed forward, and in the fortress of Chaux itself, the dismantling of which had left the road from Montreux to Montebeli ! ard open to attack, the parapets were rebuilt, concrete shelters constructed and every device utilized which could render the dilapidated work capable of effective action.

All this might have been reassuring, if the experience of a few weeks of warfare had not confirmed the insufficiency of French heavy artillery material, and the power of the German heavy artillery which had crushed the resistance of Liege, Namur and Longwy. On Aug. 25, there could be no possible doubt that if the enemy could approach near enough to Belfort to establish his guns 8 km. from the forts, the heart of the place would be bombarded and the forts themselves smashed before the artillery of the defence could fire a shot. Under the circumstances, at the very moment that the generalissimo was recommending a defensive based on the fortresses, it was manifestly unwise to uncover the most useful of them all by rapidly evacuating the Sundgau and breaking up the Army of Alsace instead of using a part of it to prepare, occupy, and defend strong defensive positions at important points. G.H.Q. might have need elsewhere of the VII. Corps, the 44th and 63rd Divs. and part of the cavalry, but it did not remove either the 57th Div. or the 58th or the 66th Divs., or the 14th Dragoon Bde., so that these formations together were in effective strength superior to the enemy, who had left in front of the Army of Alsace only Ersatz and Landwehr troops.

Instead of these troops being withdrawn, and dispersed over the area of Montbeliard - Foursemagne - Wesserling, they might well have been ordered to stand fast in the Sundgau. Even if Mulhouse appeared to be too distant, or too exposed a position to hold, a judicious use of field fortifications would at least have enabled them to cover Thann, and to establish between Altkirch and Heidwiller a strongly fortified centre, from which it would have been possible to control the road to Basle, the valley of the Ille, the railway and the canal, while the 14th Dragoon Bde. watched all the country in the direction of Ferrette, the Harth, Mulhouse and the Nonnenbruch.

Nothing of this kind was done, and von Gaede was thus able to reoccupy the Sundgau at his leisure. It was now to be feared - the bad news coming in from all sides appeared to justify all manner of fears - that the Germans would make a vigorous attack on Belfort, in order to destroy the pivot of the extensive withdrawal of the Anglo-French troops, which was now being carried out along the whole Swiss frontier to Belgium.

Under these conditions, knowing he had only his own resources to count upon for the defence of the gap, Gen. Thevenet, governor of Belfort, decided not to await the enemy's attack, but at once to assume the offensive, based on the fortress, so as to clear the immediate outskirts of the place and to maintain the initiative. His original plan was to push forward the active brigade and the 57th Res. Div. in front of the fortress, to carry out offensive reconnaissances on an increasing scale, to gain ground by infiltration, to organize the positions gained, and thus to establish, little by little, an effective barrier across the gap. To his mind, the advance should be sufficient to place Belfort beyond the range of the enemy's artillery, and to reduce the line to be held as much as possible by establishing it at the point where the Swiss frontier salient of Porrentuy reduced to a minimum breadth the practicable part of the gap-30 km. - between the Vosges and Switzerland. While this brigade and division were advancing, the governor proposed to employ the rest of the garrison on completing the defences of the fortress and the extension of its perimeter. He also proposed, while making the territorials cooperate with the available civilian labour in constructing these works, to carry on with their training so that they could be employed on the front when the occasion arose. This plan was immediately put into operation. The offensive reconnaissances in front of the fortress began as from Aug. 28 and from that date were pursued without interruption.

The 57th Div., moving forward from its position between Montreux and Fontaine, performed the role assigned to it with remarkable energy. Its first reconnaissances were carried out by detachments of cavalry, patrols of infantry, and numerous squads of cyclists mounted on bicycles bought from the local shops, who pushed forward in every direction and drove back the small enemy detachments encountered by them. After Sept. 2 these reconnaissances were extended. Small columns consisting of one or two battalions, one or two sections of artillery, a few cavalrymen, and cyclists, repulsed the enemy in a series of engagements which were practically without exception successful. They appeared simultaneously in the direction of Falckwiller, Waldighoffen, tiberkumen, Burnhaupt, Gildwiller, Sternemberg, Heimsprung, thus giving the illusion of a force very superior to that which the fortress of Belfort was in fact able to furnish. Thus covered, the 57th Div. was able to advance from village to village, organizing the localities as it occupied them, and on Sept. Io the advance guards were on the line Ballersdorff-Gommersdorff-Tranbach beyond Dannemarie.

The active brigade had also carried out reconnaissances well in advance of its front Felon-Lagrange; on Sept. 6 it established its connexion with Thann, the most advanced point held by the 58th Div., which, since the break-up of the army of Alsace, had been bottled up in the Thur valley by the Germans, holding Cernay and the Nonnenbruch forest. On the 9th it advanced to the heights of the left bank of the Doller; its artillery broke up an attack of the 55th Brigade of Landwehr against Vieux-Thann, and at the close of the day it occupied Michelbach, Aspach-lebas, and the important position of Kalberg, thus holding the highroad to Cernay, commanding the Nonnenbruch and overlooking the plain in the direction of Mulhouse.

After a day spent in massing strong forces at Cernay and in the Nonnenbruch, von Gaede on the nth carried out a new demonstration against Thann, preceded by a bombardment, and directed a very violent, heavy attack against the positions held by the Belfort brigade. Despite serious losses, the latter held its ground; but its commander, feeling his position to be too exposed, and fearing to be cut off from the fortress, fell back under cover of darkness and regained his cantonments behind La Chapelle sous Rougemont.

It was not long before the advance of the 58th Div. on his right allowed him to push his advance guards forward to the Soultzbach, from Mortzwiller to Dieffmatten, while on his left Massevaux was held by a detachment which was supported in its turn by a Territorial battalion occupying the Ballon of Alsace, and the upper valley of the Doller.

On Sept. 18, wishing to put an end to the raids which the enemy patrols were still carrying out on his right, the governor of Belfort occupied Chavannate, Suarce, Lepuy and Rechezy with strong posts of custom-house officers, who from that day assured the safety of these villages.

On this same day, Sept. 18, the H.Q. of the 57th Div., whose daily reconnaissances had been carried on uninterruptedly in advance of its front, was transferred from Foussemagne to Dannemarie. This transfer was, from the point of view of the garrison of Belfort, the affirmation of their possession of this place, and it was completed on the day following the Marne victory, with the express intention of marking out a new permanent line of defence; it thus made a great impression in France, as also in Alsace, and had all the importance of a victory. It was indeed a considerable success, for the occupation of Dannemarie had been carried out with such precision and solidity that it had now to become definite. From Sept. 18 1914 onwards, the tricolor flag never ceased to fly over the little Alsatian town thus reconquered. (F. T.) (2.) THE First Battles In Lorraine The first plan of the French High Command, as shown in the General Instruction No. 1, of Aug. 8, was of a purely offensive nature; it was a question of seeking a battle, with all forces concentrated, with the right of the army resting on the Rhine. In Lorraine there were two French armies, the I. and II.; the I. Army was to move against the German Army of Saarburg (the VII.) and endeavour to throw it back in the direction of Strassburg and Lower Alsace. One isolated corps (the VII.) was to make a diversion to the E. of the Vosges; the II. Army, throwing out a flank guard to face Metz, was to take the offensive in the general direction of Saarbriick, on the front DelmeChateau Salins-Dieuzes, keeping touch with the I. Army in the region of the lakes. It was to leave its two left corps at the disposal of the generalissimo, in the area Bermecourt-Rozieres en Haye (W. of the Moselle), with a view to their possible employment in the north.

In front of the I. and II. Armies were the VI. and VII. German Armies, the VI. (Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria) consisting at first of the I., II. and III. Bavarian, and I. Bavarian Reserve Corps and the XXI. Corps, together with two independent divisions and three cavalry divisions; the VII. (Gen. von Heernigen) of the XIV. and XV. Active and XIV. Reserve Corps and the 30th Reserve Division. Both armies were at first to remain on the defensive.

The extreme rapidity of the German invasion of Belgium, and the importance of this theatre, from the first moment induced the French High Command to hurry on the operations in Alsace and Lorraine in order to disengage the Belgian front. By Aug. 13 the VIII. and XIII. Corps were on the Meurthe, the XIII. in the triangle Baccarat-Raon l'Etape-Bazient, the VIII. in that of Fraimbois-Vathimenil-Gerbeviller. Gen. Dubail, commanding the I. Army, counted in addition on the cooperation of the two right corps of the II. Army 1 and on that of the XXI. Corps, descending from the Vosges on his right. On Aug. 16 the II. Cavalry Corps, with a division from the I. Army and two from the II., came under his orders.

It must be noted that the concentration, though completed as far as concerns the fighting troops, was to be entirely finished only on Aug. 18. However, the XIII. and VIII. Corps, commenced their movement on Aug. 14; the next day they entered Cirey and Blamont, driving back the I. Bavarian Corps, which, menaced with envelopment, retired on Saarburg. By the evening of Aug. 17 the two French corps had reached the line Vasperviller-Aspach-St. Georges, and the XXI. Corps was in line with them towards the Vosges. The II. Cavalry Corps had been ordered to lead the advance on Aug. 18 towards Saarburg, which fell into its hands after some fighting. The XXI. Corps pushed its advance guards north-eastwards to Walscheid; the XIII. held the heights N. and E. of Saarburg; the VIII. Corps, marching on Heming, seized the crossings over the MarneRhine canal and entered Saarburg. The II. Cavalry Corps bivouacked in the Diane Capelle area, in touch with the II. Army, which had reached the front Bisping-Château Salins on the left of the first. The Germans held strongly fortified positions facing the I. and II. Armies on a front of 37 m. from near Dommenheim to Biberkirch.

Both Gen. Dubail and his troops appeared full of confidence, as also did Gen. Joffre. It was decided that the I. Army should attack with its left N.W. of Saarburg, reposing its right and centre in view of the possibility of a German counter-attack in the Vosges, of which there were certain indications. The II. Cavalry Corps was to be directed on Saar Union and to operate to the S. of the Saar.

On Aug. 19 the left of the attack (VIII. Corps) commenced before daybreak, gained ground to the N.W. of Saarburg, despite the strength of the enemy's positions, and repulsed a counter-attack from the direction of Dolving. On Aug. 20 the advance was resumed, and early in the morning it became evident that the VIII. Corps would be unable to open the way for the II. Cavalry Corps. The 15th Div. could neither cross the Saar nor maintain its hold on Gosselming; counter-attacked from the N. it fell back on Kepprich and the wood to the E., then to the Marne-Rhine canal, after suffering severely from the fire of the German heavy artillery.

1 The I. Army comprised at the beginning of hostilities the Viii., Xiii., Xxi., and XIV. Corps, the 12th, 13th, 22nd, 28th and 30th groups of Alpine Chasseurs, and the 71st Reserve Division. The XIV. Corps, the Alpine groups and the 71st Div. remained at first in the Vosges or at Epinal.

In the centre and on the right the French fared better. On Aug. 19 the XXI. Corps had extended its front to the S.E. of Saarburg, in the direction of Plaine de Valsch-Walscheid, without encountering any resistance; the XIII. Corps, which was in army reserve, had not yet been engaged. Next day the XXI. Corps, violently assailed by the XIV. German Corps, inflicted on it a serious defeat near Walscheid; the XIII. Corps, coming at last into line, attacked N.E. of Saarburg, disengaging the 16th Div. (VIII. Corps), which held the town till nightfall. Gen. Dubail's intention was to entrench himself astride the Saar on the front Kerprich-Soldatenkopf, and thence to resume a methodical advance foot by foot. But the defeat of the II. Army induced Gen. Joffre to order, on the evening of Aug. 20, the withdrawal of both armies. On the morning of Aug. 21 Gen. Dubail ordered the I. Army to retire slowly as far as Blamont. The withdrawal was carried out at first without serious difficulty, but was soon accelerated by the rapidity of the II. Army's retreat and by various untoward and costly incidents. On the evening of Aug. 22 the army, which had been joined by the XIV. Corps and 71st Reserve Div. from the Vosges, held a line from N. of Moudon forest to the Bonhomme pass; on the evening of Aug. 23 it had fallen back a good deal further, and, pivoting on its right, had thrown back its left to Damas aux Bois. At this point Gen. Dubail gave orders to stop the retreat and prepare for the resumption of the offensive. After this series of unfortunate movements the weariness of the French troops was extreme, and the infantry had suffered heavy loss - indeed in the VIII. Corps it exceeded 50% of the total strength.

The parallel offensive of the II. Army had been even less fortunate. Its mission was twofold: at all costs it was to protect Nancy, mainly because of the moral effect of the loss of that city; it was also to prolong the attack of the I. Army to the W., on the front Dieuze-Château Salins, with a flank guard facing Metz. The army, under Gen. de Castelnau, at first comprised the Xviii., Ix., Xx., Xv., and XVI. Corps, three reserve divisions (59th, 68th and 70th) and two cavalry divisions. But in view of the necessity of parrying the German advance in Belgium by reinforcing the V. French Army, on the left of the line, the XVIII. Corps was sent north-westwards, on Aug. 13, to form Gen. Lanrezac's left. In the middle of the offensive, however, the greater part of the IX. Corps was sent off to reenforce the IV. Army. The two cavalry divisions were later incorporated into the II. Cavalry Corps and placed under the orders of the I. Army.

On Aug. 13, on the eve of the Lorraine offensive, the IX. Corps held the northern front of the Grand Couronne de Nancy,' with outposts on the Seille; the 70th Reserve Div. was towards Amance; the XX. Corps in the area Hueville-LaneuvevilleNancy, with forward troops on the Loutre Noire; the XV. Corps at Heraucourt, Drouville-Lerres-Courbessaux; the XIV. Corps at Luneville-Xermamenil; the S9th and 68th Reserve Divs. in second line at Laxose and Vendoeuvre, and four Chasseurs battalions at St. Nicholas.

The generalissimo having prescribed that the I. and II. Armies should take the offensive, Gen. de Castelnau ordered the XVI. and XV. and the greater part of the XX. Corps to advance on Aug. 14 on Avricourt, the XX. Corps covering the northern front with the rest of its forces. On the evening of Aug. 14 the army held a line between Vuvrecourt and Goudrexon, facing N.E.; only the XV. Corps had met with serious resistance and been held up at Moncourt. Next day the situation of this corps, after the losses it had suffered, still checked further progress; the XVI. Corps advanced to Igney-Avricourt, the XX. to Bexange-la-Petite, Xanrey, and the northern edge of the Bezange la Grande forest; the IX. from its position on the Grand Couronne sent out detachments to Nomeny, Benicourt and Clemery. On Aug. 16 the German withdrawal continued, and the French followed rapidly; the XVI. Corps reached Mondange-Rechicourt-La Garde; the XV. Donnelay 1 A group of steeply sloping hills forming a semicircle around Nancy, on the E. bank of the Moselle.

Maremont; the XX. Vic-Moyenvic, the hills N. and N.W. of Donnelay; the IX. retaining its position.

On Aug. 17 the right of the II. Army was to swing up to the N.W., with the object of reaching the line Delme-Château Salins-Dieuze, the first objective fixed by Gen. Joffre. The XVI. Corps pushed forward without difficulty to the region AngvillerBisping-Guerdemange; the XV. reached the Seille and occupied Marsal without resistance but failed to effect the passage of that river with its main body; the XX. Corps entered Château Salins and pushed reconnaissances northwards. The absence of the cavalry divisions was much felt at this time. Despite heavy night fighting at Rorbach, in which a fraction of the XVI. Corps was engaged, it was believed that the enemy was merely fighting rear-guard actions and that his main bodies were retiring, the I. Bavarian Corps on Saarburg, the XXI. and the left of the II. Bavarian Corps on Morhange.

Aug. 18 was to be given up to the crossing to the right bank of the Seille, but from the early morning the XVI. Corps encountered important hostile forces at the exits from the woods. On its right, the II. Cavalry Corps (I. Army) was not in position to support it, being itself held up at Dolving and Gosselming S. of the Saar. To the left the German heavy artillery pinned the XV. Corps to its ground on the Seille between Marsal and Zommange, preventing it even from occupying Dieuze. The XVI. Corps, being too far forward, was compelled to fall back on Angviller; only the XX. Corps advanced to the N. of Morville les Vic and Château Salins.

In spite of the departure of the IX. Corps, ordered on Aug. 18, to the IV. Army area, Gen. de Castelnau ordered on Aug. 19 that the offensive should be continued with the utmost energy, both to conform with the instructions of the generalissimo to hold fast as many as possible of the enemy in Lorraine, and in order to disengage the I. Army, now menaced by. strong hostile forces from the direction of Phalsburg and Obersteigen. The XVI. Corps, while still continuing to cover the II. Army to the eastwards on the canal of Houilleres, was to debouch from the region of the lakes to the N. of Loudrefing. The XV., operating to the E. of the Bride and Koeking forests, was to march on Bensdorf, and the XX. Corps, to the W. of these forests, on Morhange.

In order not to risk being taken in the flank by an attack from Metz, the II. Army was ordered for the moment not to cross the line of the Lower Albe below Bening Virming and Morhange. Thus the offensive of the right and not that of the left was limited, though the contrary was more natural.

On the morning of Aug. 19 the French right was checked by the enemy. As regards the XVI. Corps, the 31st Div. could not debouch to the N. of the Salines canal and had to be relieved by the 32nd; the XV. Corps captured Zommange and Vergaville, but could get no farther; only the XX. Corps made a considerable advance, reaching the northern edge of Château Salins forest, occupying Oron and pushing a brigade well forward on Morhange. The 68th Reserve Div., which had relieved the IX. Corps in its positions, covered the left flank of the XX. Corps very insufficiently at Fresnes en Saulnois-La Neuveville. The 70th Div., in the Scille around Manhoue, and the S9th on the Grand Couronne from Leyr to Ste. Genevieve, assured the immediate protection of Nancy. The enemy's intentions were still obscure.

In these circumstances Gen. de Castelnau deemed it advisable to clear the passages for the XVI. Corps over the Salines canal as soon as possible, and ordered that corps and the XV. to carry out a united attack on Aug. 20 against the line CuttingDomnom-Bassing, and to drive back the enemy as far as the Saarburg-Bensdorf railway. The XX. Corps consolidated its positions taken the previous day, and prepared either to continue its advance to the N. or to the N.E., or to face any possible attacks coming from Metz.

On the morning of Aug. 20 mist delayed the offensive of the XV. and XVI. Corps, which were in fact later violently attacked themselves and checked and even forced back. The XX. Corps had received from its commander, Gen. Foch, orders inspired, it would seem, rather by the doctrine of the resolute offensive then in favour in the French Army than by the orders of Gen. de Castelnau; they laid down that the heights of Baronville and Morhange, reached the previous evening, should be secured and that the right should then endeavour to disengage the XV. Corps and facilitate its attack.

On Aug. 20 the i r th Div. attacked the front MorhangeRacrange, in conjunction with the XV. Corps; to the left, the 39 th Div. the line Brehain - Baronville. About 6:30 A.M. Gen. de Castelnau stopped this offensive, which he considered inopportune, and ordered that the right of the XX. Corps should support the XV., while the left should hold and fortify the position then held by it and should even prepare a second position farther south. But these arrangements were upset by the enemy taking the offensive; the left of the XX. Corps (39th Div.), heavily assailed, had to retire on Château Salins, involving the withdrawal of the right (rith Div.), which fell back on Lidrequin, and of the 68th Reserve Div., which withdrew from Lenoncourt to its position of Aug. ig. The situation of the II. Army became so perilous that at 4 P.M. Gen. de Castelnau ordered the retreat. The corps were moved away that night, with the intention of re-forming their most sorely tried units farther south; rear guards facing N.E. from Maizieres to Fresnes en Saulnois were to cover the withdrawal.

These movements were carried out that evening and night, and during Aug. 21, under the protection of the XX. Corps and the 68th Reserve Div., which had orders to hold on to Château Salins as long as possible and to fall back thence on St. Nicolas. The remainder of the army reached the area Dombasle - Luneville, and were there reinforced by two reserve divisions, the 64th and 74th; the 73rd Reserve Div., forming part of the mobile garrison of Toul, moved to the N.W. of Nancy, and the II. Cavalry Corps (less the 6th Cavalry Div. which was left under the orders of Gen. Dubail) was on Aug. 22 transferred from the I. to the II. Army and was ordered to cover the latter's right. The enemy at first followed slowly, but soon violently attacked the XVI. Corps at Crion and Lionviller, and forced it back over Luneville, whence it went back to reform in the Xermamenil area. Finally, while the XX. Corps was waging a series of successful actions in the heights of Flainval, before retiring on St. Nicolas, the remainder established themselves on the W. bank of the Meurthe, the XVI. Corps holding the hills of Belchamps, the 74th Reserve Div. astride the Luneville - Bayon road, the XV. Corps at Haussonville and Ferrieres, and the 64th Reserve Div. in the Sappais plateau. The Grand Couronne was still held by the 18th Div. (IX. Corps), the dispatch of which to the S. had been delayed, and by the 59th and 68th Reserve Divisions. The offensive of the II. Army, as well as that of the I., had thus been a complete failure. Various factors contributed to this result, the most important being the French inferiority in material and the insufficient preparation of the attacks.

Meanwhile the I. Army also had stopped its retreat. On Aug. 23 Gen. Dubail laid down that its mission henceforward would be to forbid any new hostile advance and refit so as to be in a condition to resume the offensive in the near future; it was also to support the II. Army, which was being heavily attacked, on its left. This was the object of a three weeks' battle, the first act of which was to take place on the Mortagne. On Aug. 23 Gen. Dubail ordered the VIII. Corps, supported on its left by the cavalry division, to operate against the flank of the Germans then attacking the right of the II. Army. The VIII. and XIII. Corps, forming the I. Army's left wing, were holding the line Damas aux Bois - Anglemont.

On Aug. 24 the II. Army was attacked on the front Haussonville - Borville. The VIII. Corps was directed to take the offensive in the direction of Venezey - Moriviller, while the XIII. Corps, covering its right, moved to the vicinity of Menarmont, ready to face N. or E. according to circumstances. These movements, carried out on Aug. 24 and 25, were of considerable assistance to the II. Army, before which the enemy fell back on Aug. 26 to the north-east. Next day the VIII. Corps reached the Mortagne, but from Aug. 28 to Aug. 30 it could do no more than repulse the enemy's attacks, without itself getting forward. On Aug. 30 and 31 the Germans, entrenched to the E. of the river, on the heights of Domptail, held up the French advance, but were themselves unable to make any progress. The utility of the VIII. and XIII. Corps' action was all the greater, as at this time the II. Army was being heavily assailed, first in the direction from Luneville to Charmes, and then in the Grand Couronne. It appears, indeed, to have been the Germans' first intention to advance with the VI. Army along this former line, and with the VII. by Raon 1'Etape and Rambervillers on Charmes, their common effort being directed to forcing what is usually known as " the gap of Charmes." The I. Army was further weakened by the departure from its position on the right of the XIII. Corps, and of the XXI. Corps, which left to join the IV. Army in Champagne, arriving there in time to take part in the last days of the battle of the Marne.

From Sept. 5 to 7 the VIII. and XIII. Corps merely maintained their positions. On Sept. 6 the German VII. Army, which faced the French I. Army, was dissolved by order of the supreme command. Two of its corps joined the VI. Army, now left alone in Lorraine; the staff and one corps were sent W. to reenfotce the German right wing, heavily engaged with Maunoury (French VI. Army) on the Ourcq. On Sept. 7, as the enemy in front of the VIII. and XIII. Corps seemed to be weakening, an attempt was made to resume the French offensive; and on Sept. 9 the VIII. Corps was ordered to capture St. Pierremont and Magnieres by a night attack; the XIII. Corps and a provisional corps formed of troops already on the army front, and put into line in place of the XXI. Corps, were also to attack farther to the east.

The operation thus projected was a success only on the right and in the centre; the VIII. Corps attack failed. At this moment the I. Army was still further and more seriously weakened by the arrival of orders for the transfer of the XIII. Corps elsewhere. While it was being transported to the W. of the Oise, where it was to prolong the left of the VI. Army, the I. Army consolidated its recent gains. On Sept. 12 the VIII. Corps attacked towards Domptail and Azerailles, and the 71st Reserve Div., which had replaced the XIII. Corps, towards Baccarat, and the provisional corps towards Raon 1'Etape. By the evening the I. Army had reached the Meurthe; unfortunately the pursuit was stopped by another transfer, this time of the VIII. Corps on Sept. 13 to St. Mihiel on the Meuse, where another German offensive was being prepared. The left wing of the army (7 i st Reserve Div. and provisional corps) took up position along the Meurthe from Raon l'Etape to Azerailles. The fighting known as the battle of the Meurthe now came to an end.

Meanwhile the XXI. and XIV. Corps, on the right of the I. Army astride the Meurthe, had also attempted to carry out the mission assigned to them by Gen. Dubail, to stop the enemy's advance, and prepare for a resumption of the offensive. Their first efforts met with little success; in fact, up to Aug. 27 they had lost ground; and the 44th Div., which was being brought up from the Vosges to reenforce the I. Army's left, had to stop and support them (Aug. 25). On Aug. 26 the right of the XIV. Corps was driven back in the Ban de Sapt; next day, the enemy entered Ste. Die, and the withdrawal of the 58th Reserve Div. from Anozel pass uncovered the eastern flank of the XIV. Corps, which fell back from Nompatelize and then from La Bourgonce (Aug. 29). The Germans endeavoured to cut off the corps from the Vosges and menace the I. Army's right flank; and successful though costly counter-attacks by the XIV. Corps on Aug. 30 recovered both Nompatelize and La Bourgonce. On Aug. 31 and Sept. r its right maintained itself at Anozel; on Sept. 3 the corps held a line thence to Rougiville and the N. edge of the forest of Mortagne, but its situation remained anxious up to and including Sept. 6. Not till Sept. 7, when the army had consolidated its line in the Vosges, could the XIV. Corps make a little progress; it then accentuated its offensive, reoccupied Ste. Die on Sept. II and reached the Meurthe along its whole front, as the VIII. Corps, the 71st Reserve Div. and the provisional corps had done. By this time the " Vosges group " had got into definite touch with the right of the XIV. Corps from the Bonhomme pass. The I. Army had been successful in fixing important enemy forces on its own front, and in bringing considerable relief to the rest of the French line, despite the fact that many men had been withdrawn from it to reenforce those armies to whom decisive roles had been assigned.

The II. Army also had passed no less difficult days. On the morning of Aug. 21, after the defeat of Morhanges, Gen. Joffre wired, " The II. Army will endeavour to reconstitute and hold fast on the Grand Couronne and on the Meurthe and the Moselle." Gen. de Castelnau decided therefore to maintain at all costs the Grand Couronne and the line held by the XV. and XVI. Corps and the 64th and 74th Reserve Divs., while holding the rest of the army ready for a counter offensive in the area of Lenoncourt. But the situation rapidly changed, and it fell to Gen. de Castelnau's lot to prepare, not a counter-attack but an attack.

Early on Aug. 24 it was reported that at least two hostile corps were moving southwards, exposing their right flank to the II. Army. Gen. de Castelnau, seizing his opportunity, ordered an advance in the direction of Serres by one division of the XX. Corps and the available troops of the reserve divisions holding the Grand Couronne. The XVI. and XV. Corps, the 64th and 74th Reserve Divs. and the rest of the XX. Corps, were to contain the enemy in front, the II. Cavalry Corps covering their right. The VIII. Corps on the left of the I. Army was requested to cooperate by advancing on the front .Rozelieures - Vennezey, in a direction almost at right angles to the II. Army front. Thus ensued the battle of Aug. 25.

Gen. de Castelnau's objective was Arracourt - Einville, which appeared to be the enemy's line of communication from the north. The main attack was to be supported on the right by the XVI. and one division of the XV. Corps, in concert with the VIII. Corps. But it soon became clear that the last-named formation would not be able to debouch to the N. of Essey and St. Boingt, and it became necessary to make the action of the II. Army more prompt and more intense. The II. Cavalry Corps, the XVI. and one division of the XV. Corps, were pushed forward, driving the enemy back to the E. of Rozelieures; at nightfall the XVI. Corps was in possession of this village and the XV. of Lamath and Blainville, while the main body of the II. Cavalry Corps was moving on Deinvillers. On the French left, progress, rapid at first, had been checked by a strong counter-attack on Flainval; by evening, however, the XX. Corps held the heights of Sommerville, Flainval and Hudiviller with its i ith Div. and its 39th Div. remaining in the region of St. Nicolas. To the N., portions of the IX. Corps and the 68th Reserve Div. held the eastern edges of the forest of Champenois.

After the battle of Aug. 25 Gen. de Castelnau proposed to seize the passages over the Meurthe S. of Luneville, and then to advance on the Einville - Arracourt road by attacking between the Meurthe and the Sanon and by seizing the heights of Serres. The fatigue of the troops, who had been marching and fighting continuously since Aug. 14, was the first cause of difficulty; and since the left centre and right of the I. Army were violently attacked one after the other, the II. Army had to manoeuvre by its right, while refusing its left, and the offensive on Serres could not be carried out with the necessary vigour.

However, in the course of Aug. 21 the II. Army made some progress. The XVI. Corps reached Remenoville and the XV. occupied Mont sur Meurthe, but could get no farther. The XX. Corps got as far as the line Friscati (N.W. of Luneville)- Deuxville - Maixe, prolonged to the left by the 10th Reserve Div. which held Drouville. To the N. the z8th Div. (IX. Corps) maintained its positions in the area CourbessauxRemereville - Champenois.

On Aug. 27 the XVI. and XV. Corps, to which the 74th and 64th Reserve Divs. were attached, fought a series of successful actions at Xermamenil and Blainville. The rest of the army remained halted. On Aug. 28 its right undertook a general offensive, with the idea of reaching the Meurthe, but the XVI. Corps and the 74th Div. after capturing Gerbeviller were held up and finally driven out of the town and back to the Mortagne. The XV. Corps was checked at the St. Mansey wood, between the Mortagne and the Meurthe, and did not push its left towards Vitrimont forest, while the XX. Corps made little headway N. of the Meurthe.

On Aug. 29 the XVI. Corps retook Gerbeviller, but was then checked all day in frontal fighting, which also delayed the advance of the XV. Corps on the Meurthe. Aviation reports stated that the enemy was preparing a second line of defence, facing the French left, and was evacuating the first line, which seemed to indicate that he was growing weaker. Gen. de Castelnau therefore decided to attack on Aug. 30 between the Sanon and the Nancy - Château Salins railway, and to take and consolidate the Serres heights. However, in view of the violent hostile attacks against the I. Army, the plan had once more to be modified, and again the II. Army was driven to manoeuvre by its right in conjunction with the I. Army. On Aug. 30 the principal action took place around the clearing of Fraimbois, S. of Luneville, between the Meurthe and the Mortagne. The XVI. Corps and 74th Reserve Div., despite their losses, failed to take Fraimbois, but to the N. the XX. Corps occupied the signal of Frascati. On Aug. 31 the enemy's attacks on Rehainviller (S.W. of Luneville) were repulsed, and the French consolidated their positions.

It was not till Sept. i that Gen. de Castelnau could resume the manoeuvre originally planned for Aug. 30; he ordered that on this date the army should attack between the Meurthe and the Sanon, and take and hold the heights N. of Luneville. The XX. Corps was only partially successful in reaching its objective, and on the rest of the front the positions were unchanged.

The situation of the II. Army had by this time considerably changed. Gen. Joffre intended eventually to resume the offensive on the centre and left of the Allied armies, but did not believe that the opportunity would come as it actually did; he therefore deemed it necessary to withdraw troops to the fullest extent from his right-wing armies, which were not called on to play a decisive part in this manoeuvre. On Sept. i orders were issued for the westward move of a cavalry division and a Chasseur brigade; on Sept. 2 the 18th Div. (IX. Corps) and the XV. Corps were also sent off. In view of this additional weakening the II. Army seemed condemned to the defensive.

Moreover, at this moment, the fighting before Nancy necessitated new and great efforts on the part of that army. On Sept. 4 the enemy's activity became more intense on the Meurthe and in the Serres area, and towards evening they opened a bombardment on all the front between Vitrimont forest and Courbessaux. Emperor William II. had arrived from Metz with the intention of making a triumphal entry into Nancy in a few days' time. The Germans possessed an immensely powerful heavy artillery and did not hesi

Ads FreeProfile