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"BATTLES IN, 1914 MASURIA -5. - The district of East Prussia known as Masuria, which practically coincides with the sickle-shaped region of lakes that rules the geography of the province, was the scene of several great battles in 1914 and the first half of 1915. For the reasons discussed under Eastern European Front Campaigns (Part I.), the lake region was not so much a battle-ground itself as a barrier behind which the Germans could either resist with inferior numbers or manoeuvre for decisive battle at one or both extremities of it. In certain circumstances, the barrier itself could not only passively but actively contribute to the manoeuvre, owing to its having sallyports at Lotzen and elsewhere. Simple resistance was the function of the barrier only in Oct. and Nov. 1914, when the Germans in East Prussia had to gain time, by defence with minimum forces, for a decision to be fought out in Poland. In other circumstances it played its part in great offensive manoeuvres, and these German offensives - Tannenberg in Aug. 1914, the " Masurian Lakes " in Sept. 1914, and the " Masurian Winter Battle " in Feb. 1915 - form the subject of the present article.

I

Tannenberg As narrated under Eastern European Front Campaigns (Part II.), the indecisive battle of Gumbinnen, N. of the lakes, combined with the oncoming of the Russian II. Army W. of them, led to a crisis in which the evacuation of the entire province by the German VIII. Army was only prevented by the appointment of General-Oberst von Hindenburg, with Maj.-Geri. Ludendorff as his chief of staff, to retrieve the compromised situation by battle. The contemplated offensive had as its object the defeat of the Russian II. Army of Samsonov at or within the western extremity of the lakes, before the Russian I. Army of Rennenkampf, only momentarily checked at Gumbinnen, could pass beyond their northern extremity, isolate Konigsberg, and flood the interior of East Prussia, without further regard to the defensive barrier. It ended in a success that was all the more brilliant because of its unpromising beginnings, and all the more inspiring to German patriotism as the name and locality of the battle recalled the historic defeat of the Teuton by the Slav in 1410 (see 21.905). Thus, it was natural, not only that Hindenburg should become at once the national hero of Germany, but also that a host of legends should arise in connection with the battle.

The most picturesque and therefore most widespread of these legends is that of the Russians being driven into the lakes which Hindenburg had personally reconnoitred in peace-time, with a view to such an operation, but though it is difficult to find the seed of this legend in any incidents of the battle, the magnitude of the success and the apparently perfect precision with which the plan was carried into execution undoubtedly lent weight to the idea that the scheme was long premeditated. In one sense this was true. The idea of double envelopment had penetrated throughout the German army since von Schlieffen had set up "Cannae" as the model. The manoeuvre on interior lines behind the lake barrier was suggested, and even imposed, by geography. And in one at least of the numerous " war-games " in which the German general staff tried out the alternative types of defence against Russian invasion from the S., the map operations ran a course which was generally similar to that of the battle. It was not surprising, therefore, that the idea occurred both to Ludendorff on his way from the western front and to the staff officers on the spot before the new commander and chief of staff arrived. At any rate, the proposal was at once made by the former and accepted by the latter. But the difficulty lay in the execution, and in reality, as will be seen, the battle was a series of changing situations which demanded ever new dispositions on the part of the Germans. These dispositions were throughout inspired by the same idea - " Cannae " - and restricted by the same unknown factor - Rennenkampf.

On Aug. 23 General Samsonov's II. Army - consisting of the VI., Xiii., Xv., and XXIII. Corps, one rifle brigade and three cavalry divisions, to which a few days later was added the I. Corps - was within Prussian territory at and near the line Soldau-Neidenburg-Ortelsburg, with cavalry farther W. on the Lautenburg and Strassburg routes. To the E., the II. Corps, nominally of Samsonov's army, really acting in liaison with Rennenkampf, was advancing from Bobr by Grajevo to face the E. front of the lake barrier. Rennenkampf, for his part, was still on the Gumbinnen battlefield expecting a new battle on the line of the Angerapp and the northern lakes. Samsonov had disposed his four (five) corps in order from right to left, VI., Xiii., Xv., XXIII. (I.), with the right echeloned forward on Ortelsburg (in the hope of obtaining liaison with the II. Corps of Rennenkampf's command), and the left kept back (in the face of a German offensive from the Vistula). His advance was slow and methodical, averaging perhaps 5 m. a day, and at every halt a position was entrenched, as national temperament and the experiences of the Manchurian War dictated. Opposed to the three central corps (Xiii., Xv., XXIII.) was General von Scholtz with his XX. Corps and part of a force of Landwehr, Ersatz and Landsturm, which had been taken out of the fortresses of Graudenz and Thorn to watch the line of the frontier W. of Soldau. Opposite the Russian VI. Corps on the Ortelsburg side, and holding the lake barrier, there were other German forces of the same kind.

The first efforts of the German command were directed to forming an attack-mass on the basis of the XX. Corps. This mass would have to be taken from the forces confronting Rennenkampf, and released in succession according to the activity displayed from day to day by him. Meanwhile, Scholtz's mission was to maintain an intact front on the wings of which these other forces, of greater or less strength, would come up for the enveloping effort. On the right or W. wing these forces consisted of the I. Corps (von Francois), which, after Gumbinnen, had been entrained for stations near the Vistula but then had its transport switched to the region at and E. of Deutsch Eylau, and of such Landwehr and Ersatz as could be assembled at the E. end of the frontier cordon. On the other flank, there were successively drawn off from Rennenkampf's front the 3rd Res. Div., the I. Res. Corps (von Below), the XVII. Corps (von Mackensen), and the 6th Landwehr Bde. from the Lotzen area, the defence of Lotzen being left to its Landsturm garrison, the defence of Konigsberg to its mobile reserve posted on the Deime, and the observation of Rennenkampf's army to two cavalry brigades. But between Aug. 23-6, the dates at which the offensive was to begin, the 3rd Res. Div., part of the frontier Landwehr and Ersatz forces, and even the first units of the I. Corps which entrained, were involved in the fighting of the XX. Corps, which had to sustain the weight of Samsonov's attack, particularly at Orlau and Lahna on Aug. 23.

On the night of Aug. 25, Below (I. Res. Corps), after crosscountry movements imposed by the crowding of main roads with refugees, had reached Seeburg; the 6th Landwehr Bde., Lautern; Mackensen (in one long march), Bischofstein. Von Scholtz with his XX. Corps and attached formations held the line Kosten Forest (exclusive)-Gilgenburg-Hohenstein (inclusive); von Francois (I. Corps) was detraining at various stations around Deutsch Eylau and forming up on the line Tuschau-Kielpin; while Miihlmann's detachment of the Landwehr and Ersatz forces had driven hostile cavalry out of Strassburg and Lautenburg, and was ready to cooperate from Lautenburg eastward. In a day or two the catalogue of available German forces was to be completed by the arrival at Allenstein of von der Goltz's Landwehr div. from Schleswig-Holstein. On the Russian side, while the I. Corps hung back, as ordered, in echelon on the left, and the XXIII. and XV. swung up in pursuit of von Scholtz from the E.-W. line facing Gilgenburg-Lahna to a N.N.E. S.S.W. line facing Gilgenburg-Hohenstein, the XIII. Corps was advancing northward on Allenstein, and the right echelon (VI. Corps and 4th Ca y. Div.) from Ortelsburg had reached Bischofsburg. Rennenkampf meanwhile reached the line InsterburgAngerburg and his left corps was approaching the eastern lake harrier. But liaison between Rennenkampf and Samsonov, and their common superior Zhilinsky, was already, as it remained to the end, imperfect; and even within the II. Army itself the various corps maintained only intermittent touch with headquarters by wireless (sent en clair ), and casual communication by motor-car and aircraft.

On the morning of Aug. 26 the battle opened at all points. In the centre, the Russian XV. Corps drove the 3rd Res. Div. into the woods to the W. of Hohenstein, but von Unger's Landwehr and Ersatz were hurried up from the southern frontier guard and, posted behind the barrier of the Drewenz at Miihlen, prevented a roll-up of the XX. Corps' left, while the 3rd Res. Div. rallied under cover of the woods. Thus the XX. Corps was enabled not only to hold on in front of Tannenberg against the Russian XXIII. Corps and part of the I. Corps, but to open an attack which brought its centre to Ganshorn and Thurau. Farther S. the German I. Corps, the principal element on which the projected " Cannae " depended, had not made the progress expected by Hindenburg. Its detrainment was not complete, and von Francois attempted to obtain a postponement of the attack; after some discussion, Ludendorff insisted that the corps should begin its attack at noon, and it did so at i P.ia. But at that time it was too late to capture the heights of UsdauGross Tauersee as had been intended. Meantime Miihlmann, holding Strassburg and Lautenburg against the Russian 6th and 15th Ca y. Divs., - though he could not prevent an inroad, between these points, on the rear of von Francois's assembly area - pulled out his main body eastward to Heinrichsdorf, the capture of this point bringing him into line with von Francois.

In sum, the left of von Scholtz's forces was already bent back (though in no wise enveloped) by the Russians, and the German enveloping wing under von Francois was only at the beginning, instead of in the middle, of its task. From the point of view of Hindenburg's headquarters, this was not a satisfactory opening to a battle fought against time. But events on his left wing on Aug. 26 gave a new turn to affairs. The Russian XIII. Corps, approaching Allenstein, met with no opposition, and the VI. Corps, heading N. and seeking for liaison with Rennenkampf, suffered disaster. The latter had pushed its leading division as far N. as Gross B6ssau, where it halted and entrenched. In this position it was found and attacked by Mackensen's XVII. Corps, while the 6th Landwehr Bde. and part of the 36th Res. Div. of Below's I. Res. Corps, N. of Lake Lautern, came in upon its rear. At nightfall it was broken by a charge of the Landwehr, and fled in disorder, seriously impairing the moral of the following division. Meanwhile the remainder of the German I. Res. Corps moved on Wartenburg. Thus, the Russians' extreme right was in rapid retreat, while their centre was advancing northward, and the Germans saw that the opportunity of double envelopment was not gone by, but only maturing. Accordingly, on the evening of Aug. 26, von Francois was ordered to attack the Usdau-Gross Tauersee position at dawn with the utmost energy, Miihlmann to push on from Heinrichsdorf on Borchersdorf. This achieved, the I. Corps was to advance as rapidly as possible on Neidenburg, flank-guarded to the S. by Miihlmann. Von Scholtz was to continue the attack of his centre eastward so as to cut off all Russian troops north of Gross Gardienen, while his right intervened in the battle at Usdau and his left held on at Miihlen and on the Drewenz. Mackensen was to pursue the beaten Russians due S. on Ortelsburg, while the movements of Below (whose 1st Res. Div. was already due E. of Wartenburg) and of von der Goltz (whose Landwehr Div. was to begin detrainment Aug. 27, E. of Osterode) were apparently left to their own discretion, since headquarters intended to trust themselves on Aug. 27 entirely to von Francois and von Scholtz.

On Aug. 27 was fought the battle of Usdau. Here the German I. Corps, well in hand and complete, and aided on its left by the right of the XX. (Schmettau's detachment) and on its right by Miihimann, completely broke the Russian resistance. But whether through tactical accidents, or a misinterpretation of orders, or desire to obtain elbow-room to the southward, the I. Corps, instead of driving due eastward from the captured line, wheeled to its right, pushing the Russian I. Corps on to Soldau, and itself reaching at nightfall the E.-W. line HeinrichsdorfBorchersdorf-Schonwiese. The XX. Corps (less Schmettau's detachment) drove on in the centre, and reached a N.-S. line from the E. end of the Miihlen See to Skottau, facing a new Russian position at Waplitz, where their XXIII. Corps, and also part of the force defeated at Usdau, rallied. Meantime there had been critical fighting farther north. West of the line HohensteinPaulsgut the Landwehr and Ersatz of Unger and the 3rd Res. Div. were heavily attacked by the Russian XV. Corps, and Allenstein, undefended, was occupied by the Russian XIII. Corps. At the German headquarters it was rumoured that Unger's line had been broken, and the 37th Div. was hurriedly taken from von Scholtz's advancing line and put in on the Drewenz, to prevent a break-through towards Osterode.

Such a break-through with the aid of the fresh XIII. Corps from Allenstein (which could hardly be held up for long by von der Goltz's half-detrained division at Biesselen) was eminently possible, and could hardly fail to be disastrous to the Germans. Meantime 42 German divs., pursuing the relics of two Russian divs. southward, had advanced to the region N. of Passenheim and of Ortelsburg, so far separated from the main body of the VIII. Army that liaison was maintained by aeroplane. It seemed that they, like von Francois, were missing the moment of wheeling-in for envelopment, and drawing off eccentrically. And on this day news came that Rennenkampf was at last beginning to advance from Insterburg - Angerburg. Already his cavalry was ranging the country behind Mackensen and Below; the Russian II. Corps from Angerburg was moving on Gerdanen, with a detachment in advance, threatening Lotzen from the rear; the IV. Corps on Friedland and Allenburg, and two others on Konigsberg. Against such an advance as that of 4 ca y. divs. and 4 inf. divs. - to consider only the troops S. of the Pregel - the two ca y. bdes. of the German ist Ca y. Div. and the LOtzen Landsturm could not be expected to offer more than a trifling resistance. But if the situation of the Germans was critical, there was still the possibility, and even the necessity, of attempting the " Cannae " with the principal effort of encirclement made by the corps in the N. instead of by von Francois. The threatened westward movement of the Russian XIII. Corps could itself be taken in rear by bringing in the I. Res. Corps, while von Mackensen could close some, and von Francois, by an eastward extension of his left, others, of the routes behind Samsonov's XV. and XXIII. Corps. In any event some such movements were necessary if the two separated parts of the VIII. Army were to be got together, whether for offence or for defence. The crux of the problem lay in the direction to be given to von Mackensen - whether he was to continue southward and join hands with von Francois, forming the ring round the whole of Samsonov's army, or to bear up north-westward, behind the I. Res. Corps, and re-form N. or E. of Allenstein, ready either to cooperate in Below's envelopment of part of the Russians or to stave off Rennenkampf's advance on the Alle. In truth, this problem was too difficult for a definitive solution, and thus we find that Mackensen spent Aug. 28, first in marching from Passenheim to E. of Allenstein, and then in marching back, no doubt under successive instructions from headquarters.

The battle of Aug. 28, like that of Aug. 27, presented changing situations. As the Germans expected, the Russian XIII. Corps wheeled in from Allenstein, to cooperate with the XV. at Hohenstein, but, having been for days out of touch with the VI. Corps, and therefore ignorant of its rout, it assumed certain troops (Below's) seen to the N. of Wartenburg to be that corps moving on Allenstein. Thereupon, giving up the westerly direction to its supposed comrades, it turned sharp S.S.W. to assist the XIII. Corps more directly. If any particular moment can be fixed as the turning-point of the battle it is this, for it completed the confusion at Hohenstein. West of that point, on the morning of Aug. 28, Morgen's 3rd Res. Div. had advanced from the Jablonken Forest to the attack of the Russian XV. Corps without waiting for support from the 37th Div. on its left or Unger's men on the right. It had driven the defenders into the W. side of Hohenstein at the same time as von der Goltz's Landwehr Div., detrained on the previous day, entered it from the north. To right and left of Morgen, the 37th Div. and Unger were soon heavily engaged and advancing generally eastward. To the S. of the Miihlen See the German 41st Div., attacking alone on the front which had previously been that of the whole XX. Corps, was repulsed by the Russians posted at Waplitz and S. of it. The fight was already extremely involved when on the rear of von der Goltz came the leading bd°. of the Russian XIII. Corps. But, while for the German command there was nothing to do but to " wait for Below as Wellington waited for Blucher at Waterloo," - as a German staff officer has put it, - the Russian leaders were in reality in the worse position. They were out of touch with each other and with Samsonov. The commander of the XIII. Corps would not promise his companion of the XV. the arrival of his whole corps at Hohenstein in less than 24 hours, and the advanced brigade above mentioned, involved in fighting with the German 37th Div. as well as with von der Goltz, lost its way in the woods, units opening fire upon each other, and finally broke away in panic. In the evening, the perplexed commander of the XIII. Corps found Below on his flank and rear, and came to a standstill. The XV. Corps commander had already, after the ruin of the XIII. Corps, decided that he could not continue this offensive till the intervention of the rest of that corps next day, and made up his mind to retreat while his left was still protected by the Waplitz forces. And, late in the evening, both the XIII. and XV. Corps received orders from Samsonov to retreat at once. The German ring was now rapidly forming itself. Not only had Mackensen, when drawing off to the Alle as ordered, taken the precaution of leaving detachments at Passenheim and S. of Mensguth, but, above all, the German I. Corps had arrived at Neidenburg, and its advanced troops were well on the way to Willenberg.

At the outset of the battle before Soldau which von Francois had projected for Aug. 28, the Germans realized that little effort was necessary for the capture of that town; and Schmettau's detachment on the left of the southward-facing line was pushed westward on Neidenburg, preceded by cavalry, which, passing round Neidenburg by the S., made havoc amongst the trains and convoys of the enemy on the Willenberg - Chorzele road. Soldau was captured about to A.M., and leaving Muhlmann to guard it von Francois pushed his ist Div. after Schmettau. Shortly afterwards he received orders to move his 2nd Div. on Rontzgen to relieve pressure on the retiring 41st Div., and this order was soon supplemented by one of general pursuit in the Lahna direction. By evening the corps was beginning to reap a great harvest of prisoners, guns and trains.

Before these events were fully known at the headquarters of the VIII. Army, the German commander seems, for a moment, to have given up hope of bringing about a great encirclement. The Supreme Command was notified that the victory was won, but that it was improbable that the " boxing-in " (Einkesselung) of the two northern corps of the enemy would succeed, and army orders for Aug. 29, issued at 5:30 P.M. from Tannenberg, directed a general pursuit eastward by the troops of the XX. Corps and I. Corps, while Mackensen, instead of closing the avenues of escape, was again to march off to the Alle, which he was to occupy between Guttstadt and Allenstein. The 3rd Res. Div. and the two bodies of Landwehr fighting in the Hohenstein area were to fall out of the pursuit and assemble in readiness for other employment. For Rennenkampf, heralded by his cavalry, was at last really on the move. Later in the evening, however, it became apparent that the two northerly Russian corps had not yet made off. Below's divisions, swerving S.S.W. before reaching Allenstein, came upon rear-guards of the XIII. Corps at Zaszdrocz and Thomsdorf, and enforced a stand. The opportunity of boxing-in was seen to be still open; and, taking the risk of ignoring Rennenkampf for yet another day, Hindenburg and Ludendorff issued new instructions, bringing Mackensen's corps back again to the eastern gates of the Russian lines of retreat, and stimulating von Francois to a farther advance. Driving inward, the I. Corps, on Jedwabno and Willenberg, and the XVII., on Malga and Kannwiesen, were to attack both flanks of whatever forces were retiring through the forests S. of Passenheim, and, if possible, to join hands and to close the ring. Meantime the I. Res. and XX. Corps, von der Goltz, Morgen and Unger were to continue the now concentric effort against the Russians between Thomsdorf, Hohenstein, and Wuttrienen, and especially to master the lake defiles E.S.E. of Hohenstein. These orders did not reach their destinations till Aug. 29; but the corps commanders were already in substance carrying them out, and, in particular, Mackensen had not begun to draw away to the Alle.

In the battle of Aug. 29 the envelopment became definitely tactical. On three sides German regiments and battalions pressed the retreating and now greatly disordered Xiii., Xv. and XXIII. Corps in the dense country lying between Hohenstein and Passenheim. Von Francois posted part of his forces at the forest outlets about Muschaken and pressed on his westernmost troops towards Jedwabno and Willenberg. Mackensen barred the lake intervals S.W. of Passenheim and pushed his left to Malga. Meantime Ludendorff assembled all the German forces which were successively crowded out by the concentric advance, as the nucleus of a defence group to be posted along the lakes behind the Alle, at Allenstein and at Passenheim. But the next day severely tested the strength of the ring that had been formed round the Russians. Already on Aug. 2 9 a part of von Francois's Corps, which was barring the exit of the forest at Rettkowen, was hard pressed by the weight of the opposing forces that were seeking an outlet, and only the arrival of Mackensen's troops from Malga enabled the gate to be closed again. On Aug. 30, another gate, N. of Muschaken, was burst open from the inside, and the Germans holding it were made prisoners. Reenforcements, however, arrived on the German side, and the emerging columns were pushed back again into the forest. Finally, in the night of Aug. 30-I, a desperate attempt was made to break out by way of Kannwiesen and Puchalowken, but was repulsed. But it was at all times doubtful whether the gates would hold firm, for Mackensen had been ordered to keep the bulk of his forces about Passenheim ready for action toward Allenstein if required, and the southern and south-eastern parts of the ring were in some places no more than a chain of posts. Moreover, on Aug. 30, serious Russian threats were made from outside the ring. Not only did Rennenkampf advance to the line Preuss.-EylauBartenstein-Bischofsburg, with cavalry raiding nearly to Allenstein, and not only did attacks develop on Lotzen, but Ortelsburg, now in rear of Mackensen's corps, was threatened from the S.E. (no doubt, by a rallied portion of the Russian VI. Corps), and, above all, the Russian I. Corps and part of the XXIII., which had followed its retreat by Soldau, now resumed the offensive from Mlawa on Neidenburg, with the aid of parts of the newly arrived XVIII. Corps, while the Russian cavalry division. farther W. again broke in behind the German dispositions. To meet this, von Francois had to face S. with part of his corps, while the rest, facing N., maintained the ring of investment against heavy attempts to break through from the inside; and army headquarters had to place at von Francois's disposal the forces that it was collecting for the defence of the lakes behind Allenstein. In the event, the crisis was mastered by energetic frontal attack on the head of the Russian I. Corps column, combined with an audacious threat to its left by Miihlmann's Landwehr and Ersatz from Soldau. In fact, the Russian counteradvances were not pressed with any vigour. Rennenkampf certainly, and the Mlawa force probably, had received instructions to withdraw after demonstrating in aid of Samsonov, for the headquarters of the Russian "N.W. Front" (General Zhiii.nsky) had been informed by Samsonov on Aug. 29 of his decision to retreat, and was quite unaware of the fact that he needed assistance to enable him to do so.

On Aug. 31, all crises being past, it remained only for the Germans to complete the capture of what was left of the Russian Xiii., Xv., and XXIII. Corps. As on the two previous days, the resistance of the Russians was stubborn, but there was no common action or higher leadership. Entangled in the woods, artillery and trains constantly blocked the way to the infantry, which, after making its way past them, had to attack forces of all arms unaided. Outside the forest, the Germans cut off at their leisure the long columns of transport vehicles which had headed the retiring movement. Hindenburg's victory, doubtful even as late as the afternoon of Aug. 30, was complete by the evening of Aug. 31. The Russian losses in killed and in evacuated wounded are unknown, but 92,000 wounded and unwounded prisoners, 300 guns and immense numbers of vehicles and stores remained in the hands of the Germans. General Samsonov, after wandering in the forest in search of a way of escape, broke up his staff, and, left alone, shot himself.

II.-Battle Of The Masurian Lakes, Or Angerburg During the battle of Tannenberg the Russian I. Army had advanced to within a menacingly close distance. On Aug. 28, and again on Aug. 29, the German VIII. Army headquarters had almost given up the effort of encirclement in order to form a northward and north-eastward front against Rennenkampf; and as soon as the victory was complete, no time was lost preparing to take the offensive, both with the strategical object of gaining a free hand for a campaign into Poland in concert with the Austrians, and with the political object of freeing East Prussia from hostile occupation. Reinforced by two corps (Guard Res. and XI.) and a ca y. div. (8th Saxon) from the western theatre, Ludendorff planned to attack Rennenkampf as soon as the new corps had detrained and those engaged in the ring of Tannenberg had been sorted out. This process took some time. The defensive group that was being formed to face Rennenkampf on Aug. 29-30 had to be dissolved again so as to reinforce von Francois against the counter-attacks on Aug. 30 from the S., and to secure Mackensen's rear, threatened on that day at Ortelsburg. Thus, at the close of the battle of Tannenberg, the VIII. Army had to be completely regrouped before any part of it, except the I. Res. Corps, could engage Rennenkampf. But even on Aug. 31, before the end of the battle, there were indications that Rennenkampf's forward movement had been given up.

The Russian general had, in fact, advanced half his army against Konigsberg and only two corps and three ca y. divs. into the open country S.W. of Insterburg-Angerburg. One of these corps (the IV.) had advanced on a comparatively narrow front and reached Preuss.-Eylau and Bartenstein, while the other (the II.) from Angerburg had made a feeble attack on Lotzen with one brigade and advanced to the line Bartenstein-Bischof stein with the other three. The XX. Corps, on the Deime, N. of the Pregel, and the III. Corps on the lower Alle S. of it, had allowed themselves to be imposed on by local activity of the Konigsberg Landwehr and Ersatz forces. The three ca y. divs. working with the II. and IV. Corps had raided as far as Wormditt, nearly to Allenstein, and to Sensburg, but without doing serious damage to the road and railway system. Behind the front, res. divs. were coming up to set free the XX. and III. Corps, from the Konigsberg front, and eventually to besiege that fortress. Other forces, both active and reserve, were assembling at Grajevo, and skirmishing was in progress between Russian light forces in this region and a detachment of East Prussian Landsturm at Ruvezanny and Johannisburg under Col. Bacmeister, which, like the Lotzen force, had remained in its own area undisturbed during the Gumbinnen and Tannenberg operations. On Aug. 27 Rennenkampf was informed that troops hitherto in front of him had been identified at Gelgenburg and Bischofsburg and Soldau, and he was instructed to help Samsonov by pushing his left wing as near to Bartenstein as possible, his cavalry towards Bischofsburg and the II. Corps towards Passenheim. On Aug. 29 he was ordered to send two corps to meet Samsonov, who was heavily engaged (in reality, practically encircled), and cavalry to Allenstein. But almost immediately this last order was cancelled, as the II. Army was understood at Zhilinsky's headquarters to be retreating. Rennenkampf thereupon drew back on Aug. 3 0-I to the line Lower Alle-Allenburg-GerdanenDrengfurt. After some discussion between the chiefs of staff of the I. Army and of the N.W. front, Rennenkampf decided to make a stand on the line Wehlau-Deime-Ottenburg-GerdanenNordenburg-Lake Mauer, so as not to enhance still further the crushing moral effect of Tannenberg. But he had no intention of allowing himself to be cut off in this position; and to secure his left flank he ordered a considerable part of the II. Corps to attack Lotzen. This order, executed in the usual tardy fashion, led to nothing, but the forces thus gathered in front of Lotzen proved, as will be seen. a fatal obstacle to the full realization of the German _plan.

This plan was, in sum, a strong frontal attack by the left wing and centre of a long, deployed array, while the right wing broke out through the Masurian lakes at Lotzen, Arys and Johannisburg, against the left and rear of the Russians. The newly arrived Guard Res. and XI. Corps, and the I. Res. Corps, with the 6th Landwehr Bde., formed the left wing in the region N. of Allenstein, the XX. Corps the centre about Allenstein, the XVII. Corps and the I. Corps with the 3rd Res. Div. the right at Passenheim and Willenberg. On the extreme left, the Konigsberg mobile force was to cooperate from the Deime line. The ist and 8th Ca y. Divs. grouped themselves in front of the right centre. The Landwehr and Ersatz units which had fought at Tannenberg were formed as a corps under von der Goltz (Goltz's Division, the new 35th Res. Div. formed of Unger's and Miihlmann's troops, and the 10th Landwehr Bde.), with the mission of capturing Mlawa (which was accomplished on Sept. 4), defending the southern frontier in positions in advance of that point and of Willenberg, and prolonging the defence eastward as the battle progressed.

The German forces, inclusive of one division of von der Goltz's corps, consisted, apart from cavalry, of about 16 divs.; those of the Russians, including troops which came into action from Grajevo, 14-16 divs. (II., III., IV., XX., XXII. Corps and 4-6 res. divs.). As usual, the Russian divs. were superior in infantry; the German, in artillery strength.

The battle opened generally on Sept. 7. On that day and the two following days the frontal attack of the Germans made only slow progress, the Guard Res. Corps approaching Allenburg, the I. Res. Gerdanen, and the XX. Angerburg. One div. of the last named, originally kept back as army reserve to add weight to the decisive attack, had to be returned to the corps to enable it to progress in the Mauer See region. Farther to the S., the XVII. Corps, utilizing the gate of Lotzen, sought to debouch on Kruglanken, but the Russians, having intended to attack Lotzen, were in strength here, and the advance of this part of the German enveloping wing was arrested. Army headquarters now possessed no reserve, and to open the way for the XVII. Corps there was no alternative but to swing the greater part of the I. Corps sharply northward instead of northeastward. Thus delay was imposed on the striking wing of the attack; and when, on the night of Sept. 9-10, Rennenkampf decided to take down his line from right to left and retired eastward on Wirballen, Suwalki and Augustowo, it was already unlikely that the Germans would be able to place any important forces across the enemy's lines of retreat in time. Nevertheless, a great effort was made to achieve this result. The German I. Corps had advanced in three columns, the and Div. by Nikolaiken on Arys, the ist Div. by Johannisburg on Bialla, with the 3rd Res. Div. on its right moving in the same direction. Von der Goltz, like Mihlmann in the Tannenberg operations, drew out his troops eastward as the 3rd Res. Div. advanced, keeping a closed group (in that side and thinning the cordon at Mlawa and Willenberg. On Sept. 7 the German and Div., after passing the defile of Nikolaiken, had become engaged at Gurra, N.E. of Lake Spirding, with a strong force of the Russian II. Corps that was ranged in a semicircle, facing W. and S. in the Arys defile. To enable the and Div. to debouch, the ist Div., leaving the combat in the Bialla direction to the 3rd Res. Div., swung up to the N. to attack the S. face of the Russian semicircle at Arys. On Sept. 8 the Russian resistance was broken by the combined attack, and a brigade of the ist Ca y. Div. attached to the I. Corps struck out northeastward to Klaussen. Meanwhile the. 3rd Res. Div. had captured Bialla on Sept. 7th and pushed on to Drygallen on the Lyck road on Sept. 8, flankguarding towards Grajevo until the arrival of troops of von der Goltz's command enabled it to concentrate again.

On Sept. 9 the reunited I. Corps, master of the Arys defile, and joined by the two ca y. divs. of the army, continued its northward movement so as to take the opponents of the XVII. Corps in rear. These stood on the line Mauer See-Goldapgar SeeSoltmahner See-Gablick See, blocking the defiles between lake and lake. The pressure of the I. Corps from the S. and the XVII. Corps from the front, however, forced the evacuation of this position in the evening, especially as the two German ca y. divs. were working out into the more open country towards Goldap. The XVII. Corps was thus released, and the enveloping movements of the German right wing began on Sept. ro. But the frontal attacks had made little impression, and Rennenkampf's XX., III. and IV. Corps were not effectively held in the Angerburg-Gerdanen-Wehlau positions. On the night of Sept. 9-10 the order to take down the line was issued, and thereafter the German frontal attack became a general pursuit, sometimes interrupted by stubborn rearguard fighting. By Sept. i i the Guard Res. Corps had already fallen out of the scheme and was being grouped N.E. of Wehlau in reserve. The Konigsberg troops made for the E. side of Tilsit, to cut off the Russian force that had established itself there. But for the I. Res. Corps, the XI., the XX., and even for the XVII., the operation was a simple follow-up on the respective axes Insterburg-PillkallenSchirwind t; Nordenburg-Gumbinnen-Stalluponen; AngerburgDarkehmen-Walterkehmen-S talluponen; and Possessez nGawaiten-Wysztinice.

Ludendorff, while praising the achievement of the VIII. Army in covering 60 m. in four days against an enemy expert in rearguard tactics, criticizes the pursuit in general as over-eager and lacking in coordination of effort, especially on Sept. i i when the situation of the XI. Corps led army headquarters to deflect the pursuit of the XVII. and I. Corps northward during some critical hours. Eventually, the XI., XX. and XVII. Corps all converged on Stalluponen and Kibarty; while farther N. the I. Res. Corps, moving in the last stages nearly E., came to a standstill about Wladyslawow. From Sept. 9 the German effort against Rennenkampf's left and rear was carried out entirely by the I. Corps and the ca y. divs., while the 3rd Res. Div. and von der Goltz guarded the outer flank against intervention from Osowiec and Augustowo or Suwalki. On this wing the record of Sept. 10-3 is one of true manoeuvre.

According to the army orders for Sept. ro, the role of the I. Corps was to flankguard the XVII. in its attempt to strike in on Rennenkampf's rear E. of Angerburg, no general retreat of the Russians from Angerburg-Wehlau having yet begun. Accordingly, the two divs. of Francois's corps were directed on the line Lissen-Pillacken; while the 3rd. Res. Div., which had taken the Lyck road on Sept. 9 instead of swinging up with the others, was to drive in its Lyck opponents and then take the direction Marggrabowa-Filipowo. The ist and 8th Ca y. Divs., which had reached Goldap over night, were to make for Gumbinnen. But in the evening of Sept. ro it became clear at the German headquarters that the Russian retirement was in progress, and the positions of the German right wing just mentioned became the starting-points of an attempt to reach the enemy's lines of retreat. On Sept. II the I. Corps was to advance with its right pushed forward, to Goldap, and thence S. of the Rominten Heath on Mariampol; the XVII. Corps along the N. side of Rominten Heath, on Wistyniec; the ca y. divs. in advance against the Insterburg-Kovno routes. But at midday both corps were ordered to swerve inwards owing to difficulties in which the XI. Corps was supposed to have become involved near Darkehmen. As the right of the I. Corps was echeloned forward, this move in effect crowded out the XVII. Corps, as well as diverting the I. Von Francois, however, was unwilling to give up the attempted encirclement, and only wheeled up one of his divs. from Goldap on Gawaiten, while the other pushed N.E. along the N. side of Rominten Heath to Tollmingkehmen - the route originally assigned to the XVII. Corps. Later in the day, the alarm at the XI. Corps' front having proved to be baseless, the I. Corps was again directed N.E. towards Pilluponen and Wilkowiszki. But the amplitude of the army wheel had been diminished by a corps front. Wilkowiszki, instead of being the objective of the XVII. Corps, had become that of the I. Only the ca y. divs. were left to pursue the advance S. of Rominten Heath on Mariampol. Meantime the 3rd Res. Div. moved from Lyck on Marggrabowa, von der Goltz's Landwehr div. following on as a right echelon against interventions from the S.E. or E.

During Sept. r a the two parts of the I. Corps had heavy fighting at Gawaiten, Tollmingkehmen and Baubeln with the advanced and flank guards of various Russian columns which were retreating through the country S. of Darkehmen and Stalluponen. All these were checked and deflected northward, but none was cut off, though by evening the right of the Germans had extended up to Pilluponen. Von Francois, under cover of his ist Div.'s positions at Tollmingkehmen-Pilluponen, passed the whole and Div. through the Rominten Heath (having only small forces at Goldap and near Gawaiten), and thus prepared for a movement next day in force by Wistyniec and PillupOnen on Wilkowiszki. On Sept. 13 the corps carried out this movement, preceded and flanked by the 8th Ca y. Div. which had passed round the S. of Rominten Heath. The 3rd Res. Div. from Marggrabowa was turned eastward on Suwalki and, correspondingly, von der Goltz pushed forces up to Marggrabowa. On Sept. 13, indeed, the German army headquarters still hoped to cut off a considerable part of the Russian I. Army. But this hope was disappointed. Pushing his forces onward as fast as possible on Sept. 13, Francois was unable to do more than cannonade Russian columns which from time to time passed across his front. On Sept. 14 the Russians were found in force at Wilkowiszki, and both divs. of the German I. Corps had to be deployed to dislodge them. But they were a rear guard and not a flank guard, and since the pursuit thus became a frontal one for the I. Corps, as it already was for the rest, the battle of the Masurian Lakes as such came to an end.

Whether the direct follow-up should be continued to the Niemen or the operation closed down was a question of strategy, not of tactics. The latter alternative was chosen. On the night of Sept. 14 the German positions were: - XI., XX. and XVII. Corps in the area round Stallupenen and Kibarty; I. Res. Corps at Wladislawow, with advanced forces to the N.E.; I. Corps and the cavalry at Wilkowiszki, with advanced troops at Mariampol and Pilwiszki; 3rd Res. Div. at Suwalki; the Guard Res. Corps was in reserve probably between Insterburg and Wehlau and the Konigsberg force had reoccupied Tilsit. The protective forces under von der Goltz, to the right rear of the 3 rd Res. Div. and along the southern front, extended from Marggrabowa to the Vistula. The posts of this long, thin line were advanced considerably to the southward by frequent minor operations, of which the most important were a demonstration against, and bombardment of, the defences of Osowiec by von der Goltz in the last ten days of Sept.; combats of the 35th Res. Div. about Mlawa, Sonsk, Przasnysz, Chorzele and Janowo (Sept. 12-21); and an expedition of the Thorn garrison, which captured Wloclawek on Sept. 2 1.

The German gains in the battle of the Masurian Lakes, although less than they had hoped for and not comparable with those of Tannenberg, were considerable. Rennenkampf had been beaten and forced back, if not in dissolution at any rate in disorder, practically to the Niemen. Strategic freedom had been secured to the Germans for a considerable time. East Prussia was cleared of the invaders, 30,000 unwounded prisoners and 150 guns being added to the trophies of Tannenberg.

III.-THE Masurian Winter Battle During Oct., Nov. and Dec. 1914, while the centre of gravity of operations on the Eastern European Front had lain in Poland and West Galicia, the German VIII. Army, much reduced, had defended the E. front of East Prussia against the Russian X. Army (Gen. Sievers), while the S. front had been held, in advance of the political frontier, by bodies and posts of Landwehr, Ersatz and Landsturm. In order to drive the Germans as far away as possible from the sensitive region of Kovno-Grodno which they had approached in the battle of the Masurian Lakes, Sievers took the offensive in Oct. and Nov., and drove back the VIII. Army (commanded successively by von Schubert, von Francois, and. Otto von Below) to the line of the lakes, the Angerapp, and the Schoreller Forest, where the advance came to an end and both sides stabilized their positions.

In Jan. 1915 the German Higher Command decided to reenforce the E. front of East Prussia by the XXI. active and the newly formed Xxxviii., Xxxix. and XL. Res. Corps, and the S. front by various units drawn from Poland, in order to undertake a great offensive against the Russian lines of communication with Poland (of which the X. Army of Sievers was, substantially, a flank guard), while defending the southern front of E. Prussia against attack by the strong Russian XII. Army on the lower Narew. The strategic objects of this offensive are discussed under Eastern European Front Campaigns; and in the present article, which narrates the operations from the tactical point of view, it is sufficient to note that the envelopment of Sievers's right, combined with pressure on his front and the driving of a wedge into his left, was the immediate tactical idea, while the seizure of Osowiec and a bridgehead E. of the BobrNarew line for ulterior operations was the strategic object, which was to be attained in the act of driving this wedge, and secured by the double envelopment and destruction of the Russian X. Army. It was one of the most ambitious schemes attempted during the World War, and all the more so as it was to be carried out in midwinter.

The position of the Russian front line was as follows: Its right rested on the Szeszupa at the point where that river meets the frontier; thence it continued across the W. part of the Schoreller Forest to Spullen, where it turned due S., and, passing just E. of Gumbinnen and just W. of Goldap, followed thence a sinuous line amongst the lakes to Arys. From Arys southward it followed the E. edge of Lake Spirding and the line of the river Pissek (or Pissa) to the region of Lomzha. But S. of Lake Spirding, in advance of Johannisburg and Kolno, Russian light forces occupied most of the Johannisburg Heath, with a front E. of Rudczanny-Turoscheln-Friedrichshof, which, curving into the E.-W. direction, made contact with the line of the Russian forces facing the S. frontier. North of the right wing of the X. Army, i.e. of the lower Niemen or Memel river, were only small outposts of the minor Russian group based on Shavli.

In the last days of Jan. the German reenforcements assembled behind the screen formed by the VIII. Army. This screen, from right to left, consisted of Bacmeister's detachment (Landsturm) and the 3rd Ca y. Bde. in the Johannisburg Heath, the 2nd Div. with 5th Inf. Bde., nth Landwehr Div., Letzen garrison, ist Landwehr Div., 3rd Res. Div., 10th and Konigsberg Landwehr Divs., and ist Ca y. Div., with the 5th Guard Inf. Bde. as support. Of the reenforcements, three corps assembled behind the 1st Ca y. Div. screen, unobserved up to the last moment by the Russians, while the XL. Res. Corps joined the 2nd Div. behind Lake Spirding. The XX. Corps, brought from Poland to Ortelsburg, was to be pushed gradually by Myszyniec to the region between Johannisburg Heath and Lomzha, and so to broaden the wedge that it was to be the duty of the XL. Res. Corps and 2nd Div. to drive. In sum, a front line thinly and uniformly manned was secretly to be thickened at two points, on the right between Rudczanny and Kurwien, and on the left astride the Tilsit-Stallupanen railway. On the right, the " wedge " prepared behind the screen of Bacmeister's Landsturm consisted of 31- (eventually 5 to 5z) divs.; on the left, the enveloping force prepared under cover of the 1st Ca y. Div. consisted of 6 to 62 divisions. The allocation of ro young and homogeneous divisions, out of a total of 151 of all categories, to two attack sectors which together covered only 35 m. out of a 110-m. front, and the preparation of these masses behind a continuous line, mark the forthcoming battle, as compared with that of the Masurian Lakes, or even Lodz, as a first approximation to the typical World-War battle.

The VIII. Army and its reenforcements were formed into two armies, the VIII. (Otto von Below) having the front from the right to the Insterburg-Eydtkiihnen railway (its left unit being the 10th Landwehr Div.), and the X. (General-Oberst von Eichhorn) from that railway to the extreme left. GeneralField-Marshal von Hindenburg and his chief of staff, Lt.-Gen. Ludendorff, moved " General Headquarters, East " to Insterburg so as to direct operations on the spot. The instructions given to Below and Eichhorn in the directives of Jan. 28 and Feb. 5 indicated only the general tactical idea without (so far as known) any allusion to the ultimate strategic objective, and left the army commanders almost a free hand. This was, no doubt, inevitable, owing to the impossibility of regulating liaison in a rapid winter advance, but that very fact made it all the more desirable that the army commanders should be fully acquainted with the Higher Command's intentions. The sequel suggests that this was not the case. In sum, the directives laid it down that Eichhorn's left wing (from left to right, XXI., XXXIX.

Res. and XXXVIII. Res. Corps) should be the enveloping force, the right of its attack-mass of 6 divs. being directed on Kussen and the left " making a wide turning movement on or N. of the river Memel " with Wilkowiszki as its objective. Below's right (XL. Res. Corps and reenforced and Div.) was to attack from Kurwien and Rudczanny, with Kolno and Johannisburg as the first objectives. The intermediate forces (VIII. Army left, X. Army right, viz. the 3rd Res. Div. and the four Landwehr formations) were to bind their opponents by frontal activity. Below's attack was to begin on Feb. 7, Eichhorn's on the next day. Ludendorff himself has admitted that he " found it difficult to start the troops." Snowstorms blew from the E., deep snow and ice covered the ground and obliterated landmarks. Wheeled transport could scarcely move, yet the snow was often not firm enough for sledges. Shelter was rarely found in the advance, since the Russians burnt all villages and farms as they retired. In the later stages, thaw and rain converted the ice-hard ground into mud; the marshes which bordered the streams, great and small, became impassable for guns and transport.

The offensive of the right wing on Feb. 7, beginning in Johannisburg Heath, was delayed at first rather by the ground than by the enemy, but it encountered solid opposition on the line of the Pissek, and especially in front of Johannisburg itself, attacked frontally by the reenforced and Div. But in the night of Feb. 7-8, the left division (80th Res.) of the XL. Res. Corps forced a passage at Wrobeln, and next morning the right (79th Res.) div. did so at Gehsen. Both almost immediately drew up to the N.E. with the object of clearing the passage for the and Div. by threatening the Johannisburg defence in rear, the 79th Res. Div. meeting a Russian threat on its outer flank by putting out a temporary flank guard towards Kolno. Thus, from the outset, tactical incidents gave the offensive a north-eastward direction on Bialla and left Kolno out of its sweep. On the night of Feb. 8-9, after the stubborn defenders of Johannisburg had been enveloped and overcome, the attack reached Bialla and pushed out its 3rd Ca y. Bde. northward to Drygallen. On Feb. 9 another difficult march brought the three divisions up to Drygallen (2nd Div.), Bialla (80th Res.), S. of Rollken (79th Res.). Next day began a series of fierce combats about Lyck, which, like those before Lotzen and Arys in the Sept. battle, imposed a fatal delay upon the attempt to envelop the Russian left. In this case, as has been noted above, such an attempt really formed no part of Ludendorff's scheme, which intended a break-through eastward for the furtherance of an ulterior object, and the orders had indicated the role of Below as " attack " (angreifen ) in contradistinction to that given to Eichhorn, "envelopment " (umfassen). But in default of any expression in the directive of the intention of driving on to Osowiec, tactical instinct and training led the commanders. once they had found a flank, to wrap themselves round it.

On the northern flank, Eichhorn ignored the suggestion of a wide turning movement N. of the Niemen (Memel river), possibly because he distrusted the Russian roads, and massed his six attack divisions in front of the Schoreller Forest. In the days before the battle the Russian general seemed to have suspected the impending blow, for the cavalry screen of the Germans was several times tested by local attacks. But at the last moment the attention of the defence was drawn off by Below's attack; and when, on the morning of Feb. 8, the German XXI., XXXIX. and XXXVIII. Corps passed through the outposts, they met at first with little resistance. The Schoreller Forest was cleared on the first day. On Feb. 9 the Russian defensive and the state of the ground compelled the attack in general to slow up. But one bde. of the German XXI. Corps broke through, and pushed on in one long march of 29 hours to Wladislawow, which was carried by assault in the night of Feb. 9-io. Thereupon, finding even its defensive echelon turned, the Russian right wing fell back rapidly.

Sievers, in fact, followed the same general policy as Rennenkampf had done. His object in holding a forward line in East Prussia (moral and political considerations apart) was, firstly, to be in position to cooperate in the much larger offensive of the XII. Army contemplated on the southern front, and, secondly, to keep the Germans away from Kovno and Grodno. When, therefore, Hindenburg seized the initiative a month before the Russian XII. Army could be ready, Sievers began to take down his line from right to left as soon as his opponent's purpose became clear. This was on Feb. 9. Next day even the troops facing the Arys-LOtzen-Angerapp front began to withdraw, pivoting on the stubborn resistance of the III. Siberian Corps at Lyck.

Both retreat and advance were carried out with high speed, in spite of the ground and the weather. The six divisions of the German X. Army, soon joined on their right by the Konigsberg Landwehr Div., pressed on, ahead of supplies and liaison. On the night of Feb. io-i the XXXIX. Res. Corps surprised and overran a Russian div. in Eydtkiihnen and Wirballen; the XXI. Corps reached Wilkowiszki, and the XXXVIII. Res. Corps Stalluponen and Deeden. Eichhorn's army was already at right angles to Below's, and its right division (Konigsberg Landwehr) was crowded out as early as Feb. r r by the eastward advance of the VIII. Army's left. On the outer flank of the XXI. Corps, as it swung S. and intercepted the roads and railways leading to Kovno, protection against interference from that direction was provided, first by the ist Ca y. Div. and its attached infantry (5th Guard Inf. Bde.), and then by this Landwehr division sent across the rear of the line on Feb. 12-3. On the night of Feb. 12, the general line of the German X. Army and of the wheeling portion of the VIII. was: - XXI. Corps, Ludwinow and Kalwarja; XXXIX. Res. Corps, Lubowo; XXXVIII. Res. Corps, Wizajny-Szittkehmen-Rominten Heath; 10th Landwehr Div. in Rominten Heath (facing E.) and at Plautzkehmen; 3rd Res. Div., S.E. of Goldap; ist Landwehr Div., Altenbude. Half of the last-named div. was withdrawn from the ever-contracting line in readiness for service S. of Lake Spirding. Fighting on this day was especially sharp about Rominten Heath and Lake Wystiniec, where, at the angle of the line, the Russian forces had to gain time for the withdrawal of their congested trains.

Meanwhile, at the pivot of this rapid wheel-back, the III. Siberian Corps was still holding positions on both sides of Lyck against the 42 divs. of Below's right and centre. On Feb. To the German reenforced and Div. and advanced guard of the Both Res. Div. came up against an advanced position of the defence on the line of the villages of Karbowsken, Baitkowen and Miechowen. It was known to the XL. Res. Corps staff that Lyck would be stiffly defended, and the 79th Res. Div. had continued north-northeastward from Rollken in order to reach the left flank of the probable line of defence; and, to strengthen the effect of this movement, the remainder of the 80th Res. Div. was switched southward onto the same route as the 79th Res. On Feb. i r all attacks by the and Div., 5th Inf. Bde. and advanced guard 80th Res. Div. on the advanced position of Baitkowen failed, and the right column (reenforced 79th Res. Div.) only reached Prostken on the Lyck-Grajevo road, while on the other flank the firth Landwehr Div. (forming, with the ist and 10th Landwehr and the 3rd Res., a group under I. Corps headquarters) was brought to a standstill in front of the Russian positions along the northern half of a line of lakes which leaves the main Masurian Lake system at Widminnen and joins the Osowiec marshes at Rajgrod. On Feb. fi a a Russian counterattack on the left of the German and Div. at Thalussen was only checked by diverting to that field part of the firth Landwehr Div., which was seeking to force the lake defiles farther N. at Woszellen. But, fearing attack from Prostken, the Russians that night drew back to the line Bartossen-Neuendorf nearer to Lyck, still holding Woszellen with their right.

Feb. 13 was the critical day. The Germans pressed sharply against the new front before Lyck and forced the defile of Woszellen, while their S. column carried out a wide-ranging manoeuvre from Prostken. The remainder of the 80th Res. Div. was swung up N. astride the river Lyck, came into line with its advance guard (which, as noted above, had been eneaged in the frontal battle of Feb. 10-2), and, passing on beyond the flank of the defenders of Neuendorf, developed a threat on the rear of Lyck itself. Meanwhile the 79th Res. Div., with the 3rd Ca y. Bde., pushed eastward in the hone of seizing Rajgrod. There lay the left flank of the lake line, the gate to Augustowo, and the edge of the Osowiec marshes, and it was stubbornly defended. At this moment, when the 1st Landwehr, 2nd and 80th Res. Divs. were thoroughly involved in the Lyck battle, 1,nd the 79th Res. Div. was striving to break through at Rajgrod, Russian counter-attacks developed from the south.

The eastward driving of a wedge, originally intended, had become in fact a northward and northeastward attempt to envelop, with mere picketing of the southward-leading roads. Ludendorff, dissatisfied and anxious, had already begun to cut out parts of the converging line of battle in order to obtain forces which might even now provide a solid right face for a wedge, but these were not available on the spot when the crisis came. At first only the 4th Ca y. Div., freshly detrained from Poland, could be put in front of the Russians advancing from Grajevo; and the situation was so serious that the 80th Res. Div., already engaged in the flank of the defenders of Lyck, had to be counter-marched to assist the cavalry. Thus when, late on Feb. 14, the Russians finally gave up the defence of Lyck and fell back all along the line it was only their rear guard, and not the whole III. Siberian Corps, that was sacrificed. At that moment the corps had successfully transferred the weight of its defence to Rajgrod, where the German 79th Res. Div. was completely held up. Moreover, the 80th Res. Div. and 4th Ca y. Div. in front of Grajevo repulsed the counter-attack.

On this date, Feb. 14, the advance of Eichhorn and of the left of the VIII. Army had progressed day by day - the troops now far ahead of supplies but living on captures - till the rightangled line of Feb. 12 had become almost a semicircle. Already half of each of the 1st Landwehr and 3rd Res. Divs., and the 5th Inf. Bde. which had been working with the 2nd Div., were out of the line and available for other service, besides the Konigsberg Landwehr Div. already transferred to the E. flank. In the semicircle the 79th Res. Div. and 3rd Ca y. Bde. (shortly rejoined by the 80th Res. Div. from Grajevo) were before Rajgrod, the forces which had taken Lyck (2nd and parts of the r rth Landwehr Div.) at Sentken, the nth Landwehr Div. at Kleszowen, half the 1st Landwehr Div. at Willkassen, half the 3rd Res. Div. and part of the Toth Landwehr Div. at Raczki, and the rest of the latter before Poddubowek; while of the X. Army the XXXVIII. Res. Corps was before Suwalki, the XXXIX. Res. Corps before Tatarak and Krasnopol, and the XXI. Corps at Sejny and N. of Berzniki. In the later stages of the drive stubborn resistance had been met, for, as the parts of the Russian X. Army drew closer together and their trains became congested, more time had to be gained by rearguard fighting. But no real relief-attack had developed against Eichhorn's outer flank, either from Kovno or from Olita, and in spite of at least one favourable lake position (that of KalwarjaSimno - Sereje) there was no counterpart on this side to the resistance offered at Lyck. Thus the eastward-running lines of retreat had been successively lost, till only those leading to Grodno, and to Lipok, Krasnyboz and Sztabin on the upper Bobr, remained open; and the whole Russian X. Army (except on its left, which held out at Rajgrod) was herded, with its guns and transport, into the great forest of Augustowo.

Thenceforward the German operations, by force of circumstances, assumed the twofold form which the Higher Command had originally intended - the tactical encirclement of the Russian X. Army and the strategic penetration of the Bobr barrier. But for the latter it was already too late. Instead of being on the river itself, the Russian forces were well in advance of it, at Stowiski, at Grajevo and at Rajgrod, preventing a coup de main, and the thaw had reduced the marshes of Osowiec to a condition in which positions for siege artillery were not to be had.' Nor was the tactical envelopment of the Russians in Augustowo Forest achieved without an extremely hazardous manoeuvre. Between Feb. 15 and 18 the operations may be described as the battle of Augustowo. Few battle-stories are more complicated.

'Railway guns were in any case unavailable, owing to the break of gauge at the frontier.

Having been joined by the 80th Res. Div. and the 4th Cay. Div. the 79th Res. Div. renewed its attacks on Rajgrod on Feb. 15, this time successfully. The 3rd Ca y. Bde. on its right had already found its way round the S. side of Rajgrod and surprised the passage of the Augustowski canal S. of Augustowo; hither the 4th Ca y. Div. followed, and the four brigades together strove to reach and bar the roads running from Augustowo southward and southeastward. On the opposite flank of the semicircle, the 31st Div. of the XXI. Corps drove on southward from the region E. of Sejny, although its outer flank almost skirted the Niemen, and reached Sopockinie (Feb. 15), barring there the most northerly of the routes leading from the forest into Grodno, but exposing its own rear to any resolute sortie from that fortress. These were the first movements towards converting the semicircle into a ring, and both then and thereafter the ring was exposed to attack from outside, against which it could scarcely have stood. The other divisions of the XXI. Corps and the XXXVIII. and XXXIX. Res. Corps meanwhile entered the forest from the N., except the 77th Res. Div., which seems to have been hastily detached to Sereje as a flank guard; for the ist Ca y. Div., 5th Guard Inf. Bde. and Konigsberg Landwehr Div., already finding posts on the eastward routes at and N. of Simno, could do no more.

On Feb. 16 the battle W. and N. of Augustowo began. Here the Russians occupied a semicircular position between Bralobrzegi, on the canal to the S. of the town, and the village of Szczebra, on the marshy Bilzna stream to the N. of it. Augustowo itself, the most important road-centre of the region, lies in a defile formed by two E. - W. lake-chains. Behind the town, the routes to the N.E. and E. traverse this defile, then break with their respective directions over the lake-chains at the villages of Studzieniczna and Sajenek respectively. The position was attacked from the S.W. by the XL. Res. Corps from Rajgrod, the 2nd Div. on the Lyck road, and what was left of the 3rd Res. Div. and ist Landwehr Div. (the 11th Landwehr Div. being taken out of the line on Feb. 15) on the Raczki road, while half of the 10th Landwehr Div. approached Szczebra from the N.W., and the other half, crossing the front of the XXXVIII. Res. Corps of Eichhorn's army, came down on the same point from the north. But already on the evening of Feb. 15 a brigade of the XXI. Corps from the extreme left of Eichhorn's line, after traversing the forest diagonally from flank to flank, had reached Studzieniczna and Sajenek, and it now stood there, barring the roads immediately behind Augustowo but itself completely isolated.

This was the strangest of many strange episodes in the final phase of the Masurian winter battle. When, on Feb. 14, General von Eichhorn's army bordered the N. edge of the great forest, Fritz von Below, the commander of the XXI. Corps, sent his 31st Div., as already mentioned, to the S., and his 42n