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Bible Encyclopedias
Battles in Artois
1911 Encyclopedia Britannica
or "'BATTLES IN (1914-7) ARTOIS,' see Plates I., II., III. and IV. - First Battle Of Arras (Sept. 30-Oct. 8 1914). - After the stabilization of the battle front on the Aisne and to the E. of it, about Sept. 16, both the Allied and the German Higher Commands proceeded to despatch forces to their northern flanks, with the object of outflanking the hostile battle line. There thus ensued what is known as " the Race to the Sea," which ended about the middle o l l Oct. in the establishment of a continuous front from the Belgian coast to Switzerland. On this front, after a series of furious battles which raged until well into Nov., both sides settled down to trench warfare on the advent of winter.
The first attempt to outflank the German right N. of the Oise was entrusted to the French Second Army, under Gen. de Castelnau, which was transferred from Lorraine from Sept. io onwards. This army, consisting of the Xiii., Iv., Xiv., Xx., and XI. Corps, was eventually opposed by the German IX. Reserve, II., Xviii., Xxi., I. Ba y ., II. Ba y. and XIV. Reserve Corps, brought up from various parts of the line, and after heavy fighting, in which first one side and then the other held temporary and local advantages which proved impossible of exploitation, these forces were left facing each other on the general line Lassigny-Roye-Chaulnes-Albert-Hebuterne, on which they finally fortified themselves. The battle on the front of the French Second Army died down in this fashion about the middle of October. Before this date the further prosecution of the mutual attempt at envelopment by both sides had brought about an extension of the fighting to the neighbourhood of Arras and Lens.
Battle of the Tenth French Army around Arras, Sept. 29-Oct. ro. - The front of the Second Army was prolonged to the N. by the group of Territorial Divisions (the 81st, 82nd, 84th and 88th) under Brugere, which had been ordered on Sept. 29 to push forward detachments to cover the detrainment of reinforcements at Arras and Lens, and by the 1st Cavalry Corps (Conneau) (1st, 3rd, 5th and 10th Cavalry Divisions) which was holding the line of the Cojeul on the left of the territorials. On Sept. 30 Gen. de Maud'huy was given command of a " Detachment of the Second Army," consisting of the X. Corps, two divisions (the 10th and 77th) formed into a Provisional Corps under D'Urbal, and the ist Cavalry Corps; his orders were to concentrate in the region of Arras and to act against the right flank of the German corps facing the Second Army. It was believed that this flank would be found about Bapaume. Of the forces at Maud'huy's disposal the X. Corps was on this date marching from Amiens in the direction of Arras, being still some two days' march from the latter place, while the divisions of the Provisional Corps were commencing to detrain at Arras, covered by the ist Cavalry Corps in the line of the Cojeul and a mixed Territorial detachment at Douai.
The situation of the enemy on the front of the detachment, somewhat obscure on Sept. 30, became clearer on the following days. Strong hostile forces (the IV. German Corps) were reported as moving N. and halting for the night in the neighbourhood of Queant, with the evident intention of falling on the flank of the Second Army, at this time around Courcelles. The advanced guards of these columns had got into contact with the French cavalry on the line of the Sensee. Further to the N. other German troops (the I. Bavarian Reserve Corps) had driven the advanced troops of the Territorial detachment back to Douai.
Despite the fact that the battle showed as yet no signs of dying on the Second Army front, that the enemy were pressing hard against his centre, and that a shortage of munitions was beginning to make itself felt, Gen. de Castelnau adhered to his original intention of enveloping the hostile left with the detachment under Maud'huy on Oct. 2, and orders to this effect were sent to the latter on that evening; Maud'huy had already made his preparatory dispositions. The X. Corps was to be assembled around Ficheux, the divisions of the provisional corps N. of Neuville Vitasse and at Gavrelle, the Cavalry Corps N. of Monchy-le-Preux; all were to be in position by 6 A.M. The X. Corps and the 77th Division and the main body of the cavalry were to be ready to advance south-eastwards next morning against the flank of the enemy around Queant, while the 10th Div. at Gavrelle was in a position either to cooperate in this advance or to deal with any hostile forces advancing by Douai.
In continuance of these instructions, the X. Corps was directed early next morning to move eastwards to Mercatel, whence it was to advance against the line Ervillers-St. Leger, and thence in the general direction of Mory, as soon as orders were received from Gen. Maud'huy.
Before, however, the X. Corps had reached its area of concentration around Mercatel the 77th Div. on its left was assailed from the E. by newly arrived German troops (the IV. Corps), who forced it back from the Cojeul to the line GuemappeMonchy-le-Preux, while at the same time the I. Bavarian Reserve Corps, which had entered Douai on the evening of the 1st, was pushing its advance westwards to the north of the Scarpe - an advance which the 70th Div., delayed in its march from Lens, where it had detrained, to Gavrelle, was not yet available to oppose; the X. Corps was therefore ordered to change the direction of its proposed advance from S.E. to N.E., and assigned as its new line of attack the course of the Cojeul and as its objective the crest N. of Croisilles and W. of Heninel. The Corps would thus strike in flank the enemy advancing S. of the Scarpe, who by 2 P.M. had taken Monchy-le-Preux and driven back the 77th Div. to the line Neuville Vitasse-Feuchy Chapel. Meanwhile the 70th Div. on the N. bank of the Scarpe, advancing towards Gavrelle, had been held up and thrown on the defensive on the front Rouvroy-Izel-Bailleul, so that between it and the 70th Div. to the S. there existed a wide gap, which the ist Cavalry Corps was urgently ordered to fill to the best of its ability.
Owing to the change of direction which had been ordered the attack of the X. Corps was not delivered till the late afternoon, and made little headway against the IV. German Corps, so that at the end of the day a further gap in the French line was formed between the left of the X. Corps and the right of the 77th Div., which had to be filled by troops from the general reserve. Gen. de Maud'huy, despite the disappointment of the day, ordered that the X. Corps should be prepared to resume its attack next morning, the 3rd on the N. bank of the Cojeul in the direction of Monchy-le-Preux, while the remainder of the detachment was to maintain its positions of the previous day. The X. Corps, however, met with no better fortune on this day; the Germans maintained themselves in Neuville Vitasse after heavy to-and-fro fighting, and the retirement of the Territorial troops to the S., who were forced out of Courcelles by
the attacks of the German Guard Corps, compelled the X. Corps to throw back its right in conformity, under severe enemy pressure, as far as the line Ficheux-Mercatel. Both the 77th and 70th Divs., however, succeeded in repelling all the violent efforts of the enemy; the gap between these two divisions in the Scarpe valley was successfully closed by Conneau's ist Cavalry Corps; and reinforcements consisting of the XXI. Corps (Maistre), detraining at Armentieres, Merville and St. Pol, and the 2nd Cavalry Corps (4th and 5th Cavalry Div.) under De Mitry, then holding the front Benifontaine-Lens, were placed at the disposal of De Maud'huy. These forces were increased by the 45t h Div. detraining at Arras, which was assigned to D'Urbal's corps.
On the front of this corps fighting continued throughout the night, and the 10th Div. was forced to withdraw some three miles westwards to the line Vimy-Farbus-Bailleul, along the eastern slopes of the Vimy ridge. This retirement uncovered Lens, which fell into German hands early on the 4th. The situation of the detachment, which now found both its flanks in the air, was by no means an easy one; Maud'huy's orders for the 4th, however, were that the positions then occupied were to be held at all costs. The X. Corps was to maintain itself onthe line Tilloy-Beaurains-Mercatel, with its right flank thrown back if necessary to Ficheux, and to reestablish the connexion with the left of the Second Army which had been lost owing to the retreat of the Territorials. D'Urbal's corps was to hold its ground on the front Vimy-Bailleul-Athies-Feuchy Chapel, so as to allow time for the XXI. Corps to advance by La Bassee against the flank of the I. Bavarian Reserve Corps, which was attacking N. of the Scarpe. The 1st Cavalry Corps was to secure the left of D'Urbal around Givenchy-en-Gohelle. One brigade of the 45th Div. which had already been despatched to Arras was sent forward to reinforce the Provisional Corps, and the second was detrained at Beaumetz and passed on to Duisans in general reserve.
The German attacks continued without cessation throughout the 5th.
Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria, commanding the Sixth German Army, arrived at Douai and took command of the whole battle front between the Somme and the Lys. On the French side Gen. Foch was entrusted with the coordination of the front N. of the. Oise, and with the general control of the Second Army, the Territorial group, the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Corps and Maud'huy's command, which now became the Tenth Army; Foch moved his headquarters to Doullens on the 5th, Maud'huy's remaining at Aubigny.
During the greater part of the day the Tenth Army successfully held its ground, but in the evening its left was forced to retire still further W. by the vigorous attacks of the I. Bavarian Reserve Corps, to the N. of which the 2nd German Cavalry Corps of von der Marwitz was now coming into action. Givenchy fell into the hands of the Bavarians, and while their right advanced beyond it to Souchez their centre assaulted and carried the Vimy ridge as far S. as Thelus; the French cavalry were driven back to Villers au Bois and Mont St. Eloi, while the 10th Div., reinforced by all available troops of the 45th Div., again made head against the enemy on the line CarencyNeuville St. Vaast-Roclincourt-Athies. This was the situation reported to Gen. Maud'huy on the morning of the 5th; and shortly after this bad news had been received the X. Corps announced that its right had been forced back from Boisleux, where it had maintained itself throughout the previous day, to Ficheux; that hostile columns were reported moving round its flank by Blaireville; and that the stations of Beaumetz and Saulty on the Arras-Doullens railway were being bombarded.
This was about 10 A.M., and in view of the extreme gravity of the situation on both his flanks Gen. Maud'huy was already taking preparatory measures for the evacuation of Arras and for a withdrawal in the direction of St. Pol, should such become necessary as a result of further progress by the enemy, when Gen. Foch arrived at his headquarters and it was decided to make another effort to restore the position. The Germans had not pressed their advantage against the left of the army to the extent that had at first been feared; the Cavalry Corps was therefore ordered to advance against the right, which had pushed no further forward than Souchez, and disengage the left of the 77 th Division. D'Urbal's corps, which was about to fall back to the line Mont St. Eloi-Etrun-Warlus (W. of Arras), was directed to maintain its ground with its right and centre and cooperate with its left in the attack by the cavalry. Meanwhile reconnaissances had revealed the fact that neither the German IV. Corps nor the Guard had yet taken advantage of the gap between the X. Corps on the right of the Tenth Army and the Territorials on the left of the Second Army; the former was therefore instructed to maintain its line and echelon troops in rear of its right between Ficheux and Gouy. Accordingly on the evening of the 5th the X. Corps had established itself firmly on the front Beaurains-Riviere. The attacks of the Cavalry Corps and the 10th Div., however, made no headway, and their line was established at the end of the day at the western foot of the Vimy ridge on the front E. of Mont St. Eloi-S. of Neuville St. Vaast-Ecurye-Roclincourt-St. Laurent. Further S. the line was continued by the 77th Div., which had been drawn back .in conformity with the retirement of the formations on both its flanks to the second position prepared in rear, between Blangy and Tilloy.
The orders for the 76th were for a renewal of the attack on the left wing of the Tenth Army; it was to be carried out by the 43 r d Div. (of the XXI. Corps) which was assembling W. of Carency, the ist and 2nd Cavalry Corps which were to advance between Souchez and Lievin, and the XXI. Corps (less the 43rd Division) which was to envelop the enemy's right advancing by La Bassee and Lens on Vimy. Various untoward circumstances combined to thwart the execution of this plan. The attack of the Cavalry Corps began late and with invifficient forces, could make little impression on the strong front held by the enemy between Notre Dame de Lorette and Angres, and the 43rd Div. to the S. of it was also held up, while the enveloping attack of the XXI. Corps from La Bassee failed to develop. Elsewhere on the front the German attacks were repulsed, and by the evening the army held the line Beaumetz-Arras (X. Corps), Arras-W. of Neuville St. Vaast (Provisional Corps)-CarencyAix-Noulette (43rd Div. and Cavalry Corps)-S.E. of GrenayLoos (XXI. Corps) with cavalry towards Pont a Vendin and Carvin. Arras was being shelled by the enemy.
According to army orders the XXI. Corps commenced its attack early on the 7th against the enemy reported to be on the line Angres-Lievin-Lens, while the cavalry and the 43rd Div. continued their endeavours to press forward towards Notre Dame de Lorette and Souchez. The Germans, however, had strengthened their positions during the night, and little progress could be made. Moreover, it had become evident that the battle line must be extended yet further to the N. in order to meet a renewed German attempt to envelop the French left by the valley of the Lys. Accordingly the 1st and 2nd Cavalry Corps were withdrawn from the battle-front in the late afternoon preparatory to their despatch to the N., the 13th Div., then in the vicinity of Lille, being ordered S. to take their place in the Tenth Army. On the rest of that army's front the situation underwent no important change during the 7th.
From this date forward the fighting at Arras died gradually away. Renewed efforts by the XXI. Corps on the 8th and 9th ended in the recovery of Notre Dame de Lorette. On Oct. 20 further fighting E. of Arras resulted in an advance by the 10th Corps, and on the 22nd the 77th Div. was forced back N.E. of Arras by strong enemy forces, who were compelled next day to relinquish part of their gains.
These were but the dying flickers of the fire of battle which had long since shifted its main focus to the north.
Extension of the Battle to the Lys Valley, Oct. 3-12. - While the battle of Arras was still at its crisis, the German right wing was already being extended further to the N. into Flanders. On Oct. 3 a mixed detachment of Landwehr entered Tournai; the 4th Cavalry Corps (3rd, 6th and Bavarian Cavalry Divs.) had come into line on the right of the ist Cavalry Corps, which was then engaged with the French 2nd Cavalry Corps, with its right S. of La Bassee. The right of these fresh forces advanced on Lille, from Tournai and Orchies,. while its left advanced from Douai on La Bassee; by the 4th contact had been made with the French in the western outskirts of Lille.
To meet this new threat the French Higher Command had moved up the 2nd Cavalry Corps (4th, 5th and 6th Cavalry Divs.) under De Mitry to the area between Lens and Lille, and had garrisoned the latter city with the 13th Div. (of the XXI. Corps) which had detrained at Armentieres, covered by the 7th Cavalry Division. The first attacks of the German cavalry on the city were beaten off and the suburbs cleared; but, as has already been related, the 13th Div. was then called away to the S. to rejoin its corps, and left behind it only a weak detachment of six battalions and four squadrons to hold the city, and of these two further battalions were withdrawn on the 8th. Meanwhile to the S. between Lens and the Bethune-La Bassee canal the XIV. German Corps had come into line, forcing back the French cavalry to the W. of the Lens-La Bassee road to the line Vermelles-Cambrin; on this line heavy and continuous fighting took place from Oct. 10 onwards, where the position gradually became stable.
Further to the N. the German cavalry continued their advance, extending their right as far as and beyond the Lys and covering the whole country from La Bassee by Lille, Tourcoing and Wervicq to Ypres. The centre and left of De Mitry's cavalry fell back before them, pivoting back on their right from Neuve Chapelle by Estaires and Merville to Hazebrouck and Cassel; this line was reached about Oct. 9. The main body of the German cavalry appeared to be assembled around Bailleul and Steenvoorde, while behind it strong forces of infantry were advancing, the XIII. Corps to the S. and the XIX. to the N. of Lille. The garrison of the city, although reinforced on the 10th by a detachment, were unable to make head against these overwhelming forces, more especially as the presence of the German cavalry in all the area to the W. deprived it of all hope of succour; and after two days' bombardment Lille surrendered to the enemy with its garrison on Oct. 12.
The battle, however, was now about to enter on a new phase with the entry into action of the British army.
Operations of the British in the Lys Valley, Oct. zo-18
The transfer of the British from the Aisne to the left flank of the French army in Flanders had first been proposed by Sir John French on Sept. 29; the details were quickly arranged between him and Joffre, and the withdrawal from the line commenced on Oct. 1. The cavalry moved off first by road on the 2nd, and were followed by the infantry between the 8th and 12th. Sir John French, on his arrival at Abbeville on the 8th, had planned a general advance by the II. Corps, then detraining there, to the line Aire-Bethune, covered in front and to the left by the Cavalry Corps, and the detraining of the III. Corps to the N. at St. Omer. The IV. Corps and the 3rd Cavalry Div., under Gen. Rawlinson, which had been landed on the Belgian coast in order to assist the Belgians in the defence of Antwerp and had assisted in covering their retirement to the line of the Yser, had been holding the line of the Lys around Ghent on the firth, and were instructed to maintain themselves between that town and Courtrai for four or five days, if possible; it was intended to bring the rest of the army up on the right of the IV. Corps, so as to hold the Lys line from Ghent southwards. Rawlinson was authorized, however, in case he was attacked by strong hostile forces, to fall back in the direction of St. Omer, and as a matter of fact the retreat of the Belgians to the N. of him eventually necessitated his retirement by way of Thielt and Thourout to Roulers, where the IV. Corps arrived on Oct. 12, unmolested by the enemy.
On the 10th French visited Foch, and a plan for a combined Allied offensive for the 13th, to reach the line of the Lys from Lille-Courtrai, was then drawn up. The British were to advance with their right N. of Lille, to force the river Lys at Courtrai and join up with Rawlinson's IV. Corps below that town. The Belgians were also to cooperate in the north. In accordance with this plan, the British cavalry pushing forward on the rlth came into contact with the German IV. Cavalry Corps, operating before the right wing of the VI. Army, in the neighbourhood of Nieppe forest, and forced them back towards the Lys; the II. British Corps reached the line of the Aire-Bethune canal. By the 14th the cavalry had cleared the country to the E. as far as the Wytschaete-Messines ridge and pushed patrols forward to the crossings of the Lys; but the II. Corps, wheeling up its left in the direction of Merville, became heavily engaged with German infantry (the XIII. and XIX. Corps of the VI. Army), which prevented their making much headway. The III. British Corps, having completed its movement to Hazebrouck by the 13th, began its advance eastwards, to bring it level with the left of the II. Corps. This objective, however, was not attained without serious and sustained fighting; the Germans (XIX. Corps and IV. Cavalry Corps) stubbornly defended Bailleul, Meteren, Neuve Eglise, Sailly and Nieppe one after the other; by the 16th, however, the British were in possession of all these places. The II. Corps also had worked their way forward by dint of determined efforts to the line AubersGivenchy, and came into touch with the XXI. Corps on the left of the French X. Army, on the Bethune-La Bassee canal.
While the II. Corps, despite determined and unceasing attacks, found further progress impossible beyond the line GivenchyFestubert-N. of Aubers, which it reached on Oct. 18, the III. Corps entered Bois Grenier and Armentieres, and was able to establish itself on a line E. of these places, while the Cavalry Corps, guarding their Ieft, continued the line along the Lys to Menin. By the morrow the assembly of the British army in the N. was completed by the arrival of the I. Corps at Poperinghe, St. Omer and Cassel. The battle of the Lys now became merged in the greater battle of Ypres, in which the whole British force was engaged from Oct. 20 to Nov. 20, and the description of the fighting between these dates on the front of the British II. and III. Corps will be found under that head. It may be said, however, that neither the British nor the Germans, despite their utmost efforts, succeeded in bringing about any material change in the situation on the front between the Bethune-La Bassee canal about Givenchy and the Lys to the N. of Armentieres.
(B) French Offensives In Artois, 1915. - During the month of Oct. 1914 the western front had stabilized across Picardy and Artois, from the Oise to the neighbourhood of La Bassee. The line had not been chosen at the will of either party, but marked the points which each side had reached and held during the confused and rapid series of actions known as the " Race to the Sea." While there was still open country to the north it had been worth no one's while to attempt to dislodge an enemy present in any force. And when the sea had been reached and the German attacks upon the Yser repulsed, neither side retained the energy to advance. Both, therefore, had time to elaborate their defences in comparative peace, and thereby the sinuous and haphazard line already established became permanent.
About Arras the line bulged eastward, leaving Beaurains German but making St. Laurent-Blangy, Roclincourt, and Ecurie French. To the north was a westward bulge which gave the Germans Neuville-St. Vaast and La Targette, Carency and Ablain, Angres, Lievin, and La Fosse Calonne. North of Fosse Calonne the line ran straighter to the west of Loos, Hulluch, Haisnes, and La Bassee.
Artois is a chalk country. The surface soil is clay, with patches of sand unsuitable for cultivation and therefore wooded. The principal natural feature of the region is a long isolated ridge running from N.W. to S.E., which overlooks all the countryside. This ridge culminates at the chapel of Notre Dame de Lorette. East of the chapel there is a gap marked by the village of Souchez. East of Souchez again, the ridge continues as Vimy ridge and gradually dies away south of Vimy village.
The sector was of first-rate importance both for economic and for strategic reasons. North of the ridge ran the principal French and Belgian coal seam the axis of which in Artois is roughly the line Bethune-Lens. Although the public mind was naturally slow to grasp the fact, nevertheless as soon as it became clear that trench warfare would result in the postponement of a decision, first-class economic objectives, such as the coal-mines, began to increase in general military value and continued to do so until the decisive campaign of 1918.
Strategically, the German lines in Artois covered the LilleDouai-Cambrai railway, their main transversal line behind all this part of their front. Should this line be cut, were it even brought under effective artillery fire, their railway traffic would be compelled to use the inferior line Lille-Orchies-SomainCambrai.
Although the final elaboration of trench warfare was a matter of years, its general characteristics, especially the strain and hardship of remaining immobile and in close contact with the enemy, appeared at once. The possibility of manoeuvre disappeared and war became an affair of ever-increasing masses of material. In Artois, the importance of the sector and the nature of the soil made the fighting fierce and continuous and the hardships peculiarly bitter. The clay soil churned into a soft and sticky mud into which men sank deeply and sometimes even were lost. Everywhere the ground was humid; the Lorette ridge itself was honeycombed with springs so that trenches dug even on its summit were difficult to keep clear of water. Weapons often became unserviceable, and the men themselves looked like walking lumps of mud. Nevertheless, the fighting was not only savage but continuous. A major operation was merely a crescendo in a never-ending series of furious lesser combats, all centring about the commanding Lorette-Vimy ridges.
Throughout the first three years of trench fighting on the western front, in most of the minor operations, and in every major operation except Verdun, the Allies attacked. Save in that one case, the Germans held to their decision to stand upon the strategic defensive in France and Belgium, from Nov. 1914 to March 1918. In order to attempt a decision, it was, therefore, necessary to attack their entrenchments. The strength of the defensive in trench warfare, and the corresponding difficulty of the attack, were realized only with time.
Originally, the entire Lorette ridge was occupied by the Germans during the race to the sea; the French swept them off in a brilliant little attack. Then the Germans moved in again and took the chapel and all the eastern end of the ridge nearly to the wood of Buvigny, not by assault but because the place had been left entirely unguarded during the night of Oct. 7-8 in the course of a relief of the French troops in the sector - an incident altogether typical of the race to the sea. As regular trench warfare began, the Germans had the best of the artillery fighting. Their guns were both heavier and more numerous, and their fire control better suited to the new and unexpected sort of fighting. Their batteries were emplaced near Lievin and Angres, behind Vimy ridge, and behind the butte of Monchy-le-Preux. In Nov. they began to use hand grenades, the first of the typical trench weapons to appear, or rather to reappear. The French did not begin manufacturing grenades during the following winter, and were not able to issue them to the troops until March 1915. Nevertheless, despite the German heavy artillery and grenades, the month of Nov. saw such an improvement in the French defensive works that casualties became fewer, although it was not yet possible to put out continuous wire.
Early in Dec. the situation changed for the better with the arrival of several units of French heavy artillery, whose fire compelled the Germans on Lorette ridge to take cover in their deep dug-outs. The French Higher Command ordered the XXI. Corps, which had held the Lorette sector since its stabilization, to attack in the hope of a break-through. The Corps commander, Gen. Maistre, was doubtful of the success of the operation proposed, judging the means insufficient and the obstacles to be encountered too strong. Nevertheless, the attack took place on Dec. 17 at 1:10 P.M. on a front of a mile and a quarter, with diversions against Auchy-les-La Bassee, and Loos, and in front of St. Laurent-Blangy. Near Lorette the artillery preparation had not been sufficient to prevent the assaulting troops coming under heavy fire, especially from machine-guns, as they left the trenches. The German wire was strong and had been very little cut. Nevertheless, they struggled on through deep mud, and succeeded in taking some trenches. For four days the operation was persisted in. The artillery support was weak, partly because of the winding, irregular front line, partly through insufficient liaison with the infantry. Against such handicaps the infantry strove bravely but in vain. At last, after murderous losses which justified only too well Gen. Maistre's forebodings, the attack was broken off.
An unbroken series of minor operations took place throughout the winter and early spring. In the afternoon of Dec. 27 ten battalions of Chasseurs Alpins, commanded by Gen. Barbot, attacked the hamlet of La Targette, after two hours of artillery preparation. " No-man's-land " was here a quarter of a mile wide, quite flat and without cover save for a single sunken road. Hence losses were heavy and onl y half a mile of first-line trenches were taken.
As the winter went on, the sticky mud became even worse, and the heavy German trench-mortar projectiles added still more to the danger and discomfort of the trenches. On March 3, at dawn, after a short but violent preparation by heavy artillery and heavy trench mortars, an entire German division made a sudden attack along the crest of the ridge, and drove the French into Buvigny wood. Two days of counter-attacks recovered most of the ground lost, and throughout March and April a series of local attacks and counter-attacks slightly improved the French position at a cost in casualties disproportionately large in comparison with the ground gained. The dead were not all Frenchmen. Already the German troops were beginning to call the ridge " Totenhilgel," the Hill of Death.
In April the first French. 58-mm. trench mortars, few in number, were put in service. The French had already begun the use of hand grenades in March.
About May 1 the French Higher Command decided upon a general attack, and chose Artois as its sector. It was desirable that something be done on the western front in the hope of relieving the pressure upon the Russians, on whose front the great blow was about to fall. The British agreed to support the operation by a diversion in Flanders.
From the original formation of the French " Group of armies of the North," Gen. Foch had been in command. This command he still retained, and his was the decision as to the length of front to be attacked. Even at this early stage of trench warfare, he saw clearly that to estimate the possible width of an assault according to the number of infantry available was nonsense. He therefore insisted upon calculating the front to be attacked according to the available quantity of heavy artillery, insisting that a clear superiority in heavy pieces was necessary over the full width of the operation proposed. On the western front as a whole, the Germans still disposed of superior numbers in this particular arm, so that it seemed impossible to obtain a sufficient superiority of fire over a front of much more than six miles. As a result of Foch's insistence the width of the attacking front was limited accordingly. The right of the proposed assault was fixed in the neighbourhood of Roclincourt, the left on the northern slopes of Lorette ridge. At this stage of the war it was still believed that a violent effort, even on so restricted a front, stood a fair chance of breaking through the opposing trench system and restoring a war of movement.
From May 4, the German Higher Command was convinced that a considerable attack was to be expected. Nevertheless, so high ran their hopes of victory in the east that even Falkenhayn, usually so chary of reinforcements for that theatre, drew yet another division thither from France.' In Artois, the French order of battle was as follows: the left of the XVII. Corps was around Roclincourt. North of them stood the XX. Corps; its left facing La Targette and extending a little north of that village. North of the XX. came the XXXIII. Corps, commanded by Petain, the future commander-in-chief of the French armies on the western front. His extreme left faced Ablain. North again of the XXXIII. Corps, astride the Lorette ridge and on to the Arras-Bethune high road, stood the XXI. Corps which, always under Maistre, had held the sector from the beginning. The XX. and the XXXIII. Corps had three divisions each, the other corps two. All four corps formed part of the X. Army, now commanded by D'Urbal, who had relieved Maud'huy, the original army commander, in March. Foch shifted his headquarters from Cassel to Frevent on the Doullens-St. Pol road in order to follow the operation more closely. The troops were in high spirits at the prospect of quitting the foul and muddy trenches, and in the hope of fighting in the open thenceforward.
Opposite them, the German defences were formidable; indeed the painstaking German national character is well adapted to the construction of elaborate works. Each of the solidly built French villages was a complicated little citadel. North of Ecurie a huge tangle of trenches formed a strong point, known as the Labyrinth, covering more than half a square mile. A series of works, known to the French as the " Ouvrages Blancs," ran in a concave line from a hummock in front of La Targette to the western end of Carency. On the Lorette ridge itself, the ground favoured the defence. The southern slopes were precipitous and were, moreover, cut by deep ravines which the French likened to the grooves in a melon rind. Of the five spurs between these ravines, the Germans held the easternmost three, their front line running from a point a thousand yards west of the ruins of the chapel, across the summit of the third spur, and so to the western end of Ablain - a curious position which only the great strength of the modern defensive made possible. To the 1 Falkenhayn, Die Oberste Heeresleitung, p. 74. At this period, Falkenhayn says, the total German combatant strength in the western theatre was 1,900,000 against an Allied total of .2,450,000.
north the ground fell away gently in an even slope broken only by the unexpected Buval ravine. The entire German part of the ridge was covered with trenches and obstacles and swept by batteries (at ranges of two to four thousand yards) around Lievin and Angres and behind Vimy ridge.
The troops which held these defences belonged to the German VI. Army which held the front from south of Ypres to within io m. of Arras. It comprised 16 divs., at a combat strength of about 17,000 per division according to the reduced German divisional organization dating from the early winter of '14. This gave a little less than three men per yard of front considering the irregularities of the line. Crown Prince Rupprecht of Bavaria commanded the army, with Maj. Gen. Krafft von Dellmensingen for chief-of-staff, and headquarters at Lille.
The attack, originally ordered for May 7, was put off to the 8th and then to the 9th. Demolition fire was begun on the 7th and continued on the 8th, especially against the region of Neuville and the Labyrinth, but was hindered by the lack of all observation from the ground (no commanding points being in French hands), and by the serious imperfections of the aerial observation attempted by planes and dirigibles. The morning of the 9th dawned fair, with a light mist that soon cleared away. At six o'clock an intense bombardment was opened along the whole line from Loos to Arras, with heavy, divisional, and trench artillery. On the front of the XXI. Corps the 75's held their fire until eight o'clock, then began, and continued, at the rate of four shots per piece per minute. Amid the din of the bombardment, the French observers saw the German positions lost in vast clouds of smoke and dust sent up by the exploding shells. The German artillery replied energetically, searching for the French infantry assembled for the assault and occasionally hitting them with considerable effect. At io o'clock, precisely, the French artillery automatically increased the range and the infantry attack began.
The assaulting troops left their jumping-off trenches without signal. In a few moments it was clear that both wings were held up. The XVII. Corps could not gain a foot; the wire in front of them was still intact. The X. Corps, attempting a diversion east of Arras, uselessly lost 3,000 men in Do minutes from machine-gun fire. North of the XVII., the right of the XX. Corps was helpless in front of the wire of the Labyrinth. The left of the XX. was doing better, the wire in front of them having been cut by the bombardment. In spite of heavy losses from German machine-guns still in position, they slowly cleared La Targette, fighting hand to hand, and by z i :30 they had advanced a little over half a mile and reached the westernmost houses of Neuville. On the ridge, the XXI. Corps was advancing only very slowly, at a cost of murderous losses. Their attack was peculiarly difficult to organize for want of a single conspicuous object in their front to serve as reference point for the artillery, and upon which the infantry could align their advance. Their assaulting elements came under heavy machine-gun fire as soon as they showed themselves, so that the communication trenches were obstructed by numbers of wounded who blocked the reserves. Machine-guns firing northward from Ablain made advance impossible along the southern slope. On the plateau itself and the northern slope, swept though they were at short ranges by the German batteries around Angres and Lievin, there was a slow and painful advance of about half a mile, which took three successive lines of trenches and reached, at noon, the neighbourhood of the chapel and the land N.W. of it. Through the morning, the extreme left of Petain's Corps, the XXXIII., was fixed in front of Ablain. Other units, fighting every step of the way, were slowly working forward south of Carency.
Meanwhile, the right of the XXXIII. Corps had broken clear through the German line. Here, alone on the attacking front, the wooded hill of Berthonval had given good land observation by which to direct the bombardment. The wire had therefore been cleared and most of the machine-guns put out of action. Carrying conspicuous markers to enable the artillery to follow their march, the infantry swept forward without a check. In the intoxication of such an advance after a winter in the abominable trenches, they got out of hand and ran forward, cheering as they rushed the German elements that tried to resist them. They crossed the Bethune road, gained the crest of Vimy ridge, and looked down upon the rolling plain to the north and east, towards Lens and Douai, with no more German troops before them. Hundreds of prisoners had been taken, it was only i r :30, and they had advanced over two and a half miles.
Naturally, the German command was frightened. Partially, at least, they had been surprised, for they had assembled no reserves. Twenty miles away, in Lille, the Prince of Bavaria's staff began packing up, for if the gap could be widened the whole front would go. But naturally, the assaulting troops were completely exhausted. They had run and yelled too much and their water-bottles had been emptied too quickly. During the advance, officer casualties had been numerous. About a mile of the crest between '19 and 140 was occupied, and patrols were pushed forward to Souchez and Givenchy.
Everything now depended upon the arrival of reinforcements. With them everything might be hoped; without them it would be hard to hold the ground already gained, limited as it was by concentric machine-gun fire from Souchez, Neuville, and La Folie wood; and no reinforcements came. The advance had been faster than had been planned, and either the army staff work was slow and the necessary orders not issued in time, or else the units ordered forward failed to make good speed. Perhaps, after all, the thing was impossible. Certainly no good road ran east into the newly created salient. At all events the opportunity was lost.
On the German side, when the first moment of panic had passed, the reaction was rapid. Great and deserved credit was won by the staffs concerned. During the afternoon, enough battalions from the second line of the division near by were scraped together for a counter-attack (supported by artillery behind La Folie wood) which retook the crest. The French-African troops, with most of their officers gone, failed to do themselves justice. All this time Neuville and Carency were holding out, and the XXI. Corps could not clear the Lorette plateau. Towards evening the cemetery south of Souchez had to be abandoned. Through the night, third-line battalions from the neighbouring German Army Corps began to come up. The French maintained themselves with difficulty at the Cabaret Rouge and along the road from Souchez to Neuville. The golden moment had passed.
During the next three days, the French improved their positions in vigorous local operations, taking the debris of Lorette chapel, Carency, and most of Neuville. By June r Ablain, the sugar-works west of Souchez, and the south-eastern slopes of Lorette were cleared. June saw the Labyrinth painfully occupied, and a narrow and difficult salient (including a bit of Vimy crest) first thrust out eastward from the Cabaret Rouge and then withdrawn. About the same time the Germans were pushed off the north-eastern slopes of Lorette - their last foothold on that murderous ridge now thickly covered with the dead of both sides.
The diversions attempted meanwhile by the British had failed to affect the general situation.
Tactically, the spring offensive in the Artois had partially succeeded. Twenty-five square miles had been gained, the enemy's local resistances had been beaten down, for some hours his front had been pierced. But strategically, the operation had failed. The German front had been very slightly modified and the Russians had been helped in no way.
During the summer, the usual round of little fights went on, barren of results but endured always with the same spirit. In Aug. trench knives were issued to the French infantry for the first time.
In the autumn, another Entente offensive on the western front was decided upon. The French prepared to attack in Champagne and both French and British in Artois, the French from Neuville to north of Souchez, which large village was, by this time, laid almost level with the ground; the British from Haisnes to Loos - a far more ambitious effort than previous British trench-warfare operations. The main attack, however, was that in Champagne, Artois being only the scene of a diversion on a large scale.
The troops to be put in motion were Maistre's much-enduring XXI. Corps in front of Souchez, and on their right the XXXIII. Corps, now commanded by Fayolle, in front of La Folie. The French and German Higher Commands were the same, except that Maj. Gen. v. Kuhl was now chief-of-staff at Prince Rupprecht's headquarters.
Tactically, the operation was planned differently from that of May in that the attempt was made to crush the enemy by an intense bombardment prolonged throughout several days and that, therefore, no surprise could be hoped for. Objectives were to be strictly limited.
Accordingly on Sept. 20, with improved ground and air observation, and with guns and munitions available on a larger scale than ever before, there began a bombardment of the German works and rear areas, which continued day and night for five days. On the morning of the 25th the bombardment was intensified. At the same time the Germans began their counterpreparation and succeeded in inflicting some loss on the French infantry in their jumping-off trenches. The fine weather had turned to rain.
At 25 minutes past 12 the infantry attack began. The spirit of the German infantry had been broken by the bombardment so that there was little or no resistance, what little there was being due to imperfect "mopping-up."' Meanwhile, the German barrage had been laid down too late, and afterwards ignorance of the situation made their artillery afraid to fire. On the other hand, the rain and the muddy, shell-torn ground made the advance very slow. Not until 5:30 in the evening of Sept. 26 were the ruins of Souchez completely cleared and the line carried a quarter-mile to the eastward.
Meantime, unknown to the French, the German command was passing through a crisis of anxiety. Their reserves had not yet come up and the positions on Vimy ridge were almost without defenders and trains were run at short intervals on the DouaiMericourt-Rouvray line to simulate the arrival of reinforcements. But the bad weather, the abominable terrain, and the French policy of limited objectives saved the situation for the Germans. On the 27th their reserves arrived and the situation was reestablished. The action continued, but although the 28th saw the French lines advanced to include an important redoubt in front of Givenchy, the German front was no longer in danger of being broken, and after the 28th the French broke off the battle.
Early in 1916, British troops relieved the French in the sector, which had seen the longest, and (after Verdun) the most murderous battle of the entire war. The French are said to have had in Artois no less than 100,000 killed. The XXI. Corps alone, by Dec. 1915, lost 80,000 dead or wounded, 18,000 of whom fell in the six weeks from May 9 to June 20. (H. N.*) (C) Neuve Chapelle. - The objects with which Sir John French attacked the German lines in March 1915 were to obtain a more favourable position for his share in the major operations to be undertaken in conjunction with the French. The fighting of Oct. and Nov. 1914 had left the British right between the La Bassee canal and Armentieres in an indifferent position tactically. After gaining a foothold on the ridge which runs S.W. from Lille past Aubers they had been thrust off it into the more or less waterlogged low ground at its foot. To recover this ridge was essential if the German hold on the Lille-La Bassee line was to be effectively shaken and Sir John hoped, moreover, to stimulate his troops whose offensive spirit had found few 1 This process, called by the French " nettoyage " and by the British " mopping-up," was the clearance, by troops specially detailed for the purpose, of the enemy trenches that had been reached and passed by the leading troops of the attack but might - and in practice usually did - contain scattered but intact and dangerous groups of the enemy.
outlets in the cramping conditions of trench warfare in a swamp. The point he selected for his attack was on the front held by Sir Douglas Haig's I. Army, where the Germans' capture of the village of Neuve Chapelle (Oct. 27 1914) had driven a salient into the British lines. This portion of the British front had always been particularly difficult and costly to hold and a substantial success here might not only gain a footing on the Aubers ridge but render the German positions opposite Givenchy and Festubert untenable.
The attack delivered on March io by the 8th Div. (IV. Corps) on the left and the Meerut Div. (Indian Corps) on the right was successful in effecting a surprise. There had been no long preliminary bombardment to give warning of the attack, for the ammunition supply only sufficed for 35 minutes' shelling, and the infantry, finding the wire well cut except at the extreme ends of the line, stormed the positions with ease. The 25th Bde. of the 8th Div. carried Neuve Chapelle village and joined hands with the Gahrwal Bde., who had overrun the ground between the village and the cross-roads S. of it known as " Port Arthur." Many prisoners were taken, and. it seemed that reinforcements had only to push on to achieve a substantial advance. Unfortunately, the stubborn resistance of the Germans at the ends of the line absorbed the attention of the troops in immediate support. On the left, S. of the ruined farm known as " the Moated Grange," the 2nd Middlesex were held up by wire, which a fold of the ground had concealed from the artilleryobserving officers; on the right at Port Arthur a strong point held out for several hours, and was only carried when the 2nd Seaforths of the Dehra Dun Bde. reinforced the original assailants of the Gahrwal Brigade. Similarly, it was not till well past midday, and after heavy fighting, that the 23rd Bde.,improving the lodgment made by their right battalion, the 2nd Scottish Rifles, secured their second objective, and then only by utilizing two battalions of the 24th Bde. as well as their own supports, the 2nd Devons and 2nd West Yorkshires. Meanwhile the 25th Bde. had cleared Neuve Chapelle but found their left too much exposed to allow any advance beyond the village. More important still, the orders had been explicit that the reserves were not to be put in without sanction from the Corps, and the extreme difficulty of maintaining communications with the advanced troops prevented divisional and corps headquarters from keeping in touch with the progress of the attack and delayed the advance of the reserves. Not till the afternoon was well advanced did the leading troops of the 7th Div. pass through the 8th, and though the 21st Bde. then cleared a substantial area N. of Neuve Chapelle and made some progress down the German trenches beyond the Moated Grange, German reinforcements both of men and guns made their presence felt, and darkness stopped the advance before the road running N.W. from the Moulin du Pietre past Mauquissart had been crossed. On the right, meanwhile, two Gurkha battalions of the Dehra Dun Bde. pushed forward into the Bois de Biez, but their position was dangerously isolated and they had to be withdrawn E. of Riviere des Layes.
The chances of substantial progress on the second day, already diminished by the arrival of strong German reinforcements, were further reduced by weather conditions which made aerial direction of the British artillery fire impossible. This, combined with the interruption of telephone communications between the forward observing officers and their batteries, prevented the cooperation between artillery and infantry needed to reduce the numerous machine-gun posts furnished by the houses which studded the area N. of Neuve Chapelle. Groups of these, especially along the Moulin du Pietre-Mauquissart road, proved most formidable obstacles. Moreover, the Germans, besides throwing in all the local reserves of their VII. Corps, together with the 6th Bavarian Res. Div. which was resting near Lille, brought up much additional artillery, so that the 7th and Lahore Divs. came under heavy fire and suffered severely in crossing ground in rear of the advanced troops, sometimes without even reaching the front line. The 7th Div. beat back counter-attacks and added considerably to the tale of prisoners, but made no real progress; the 8th could do no more, but until the right of the 8th Div. could come forward to cover it the Indian Corps could not tackle the Bois de Biez.
On the next morning (March 12) violent counter-attacks against several points made it obvious that strong German reinforcements had come up. Advancing in mass against the Bareilly Bde. along the Rue du Bois and against the rest of the Meerut Div. N. of Port Arthur, the Germans were mown down in numbers without ever reaching the British line. Opposite the Moulin du Pietre another determined attack broke through the 24th Bde., to be thrown back by a prompt counter-stroke by the ist Worcesters; and in this quarter also very heavy losses were inflicted on the Germans. Further N. again the 21st Bde. lost some advanced trenches, but successfully maintained its main position and lent effective aid to the 2nd Scots Guards and 2nd Borderers of the 10th Bde., who carried a strong redoubt N.E. of the Moated Grange and took 300 prisoners of the VII. Corps. But still the Moulin du Pietre-Mauquissart road barred any advance, and the machine-guns in the fortified houses held up all attempts to get forward. Thus, though the 25th Bde. repulsed several attacks they could not carry the line forward from Neuve Chapelle; the Sirhind Bde. (Lahore Div.) made a little ground and took prisoners but could not cross the Riviere des Layes; and now that all advantages of surprise had gone Sir John French saw that little was to be gained by pressing the attack. March 13 therefore saw the fighting much diminished in intensity; gains were consolidated and the troops reorganized, but the attack was suspended.
The battle of Neuve Chapelle ended therefore somewhat disappointingly. The substantial advance which had at one moment seemed within reach had not been realized: the delay in pushing the British reserves had allowed the Germans to rush to the danger spot reinforcements sufficient to bar the road to the high ground of the Aubers ridge. Thus while the tactical position round Neuve Chapelle was much improved the strategical situation was unchanged. The losses, over 4,200 in the Indian Corps, nearly double that in the IV., had been heavy, while of three minor operations undertaken as diversions those at Givenchy (I. Corps) and Wytschaete (II. Corps) failed, only the III. Corps proving successful against l'Epinette (S.E. of Armentieres). Still, it would be wrong to class Neuve Chapelle among British defeats. The troops were undoubtedly encouraged by seeing that German positions could be stormed and the captured ground held against powerful counter-attacks. Nearly 1,700 prisoners had been taken and the German losses had exceeded the British. Rifles, artillery and machine-guns had found splendid targets, and the German battalions who had shown themselves in the open had been shot down in masses. It was felt that another attack in which .the lessons of the battle could be turned to good effect might lead to far-reaching results.
(D) Aubers Ridge And Festubert. - The part assigned to the British in the Allied offensive of May 1915 gave them as their immediate objective the S.W. end of the Aubers ridge. The IV. Corps was to attack at Rougebancs, N.E. of Neuve Chapelle, using the 8th Div. in the first assault and supporting it with the 7th, while S. W. of Neuve Chapelle the Meerut Div. (Indian Corps) and the 1st Div. (I. Corps) attacked from the line of the Rue du Bois which joins the Estaires-La Bassee road at the " Port Arthur " cross-roads. It was hoped that these divisions pushing forward in an easterly direction would establish touch behind the Bois de Biez with the IV. Corps advancing southward past Aubers. But whether successful or not in their immediate tasks, the British would materially assist the Allied operations if their attack diverted German guns and men from the crucial point N. of Arras where the French were attacking.
It was with the greatest confidence that the British forces looked forward to this attack. Neuve Chapelle had whetted their hopes; it was believed that at this second attempt the lessons of Neuve Chapelle would be turned to good effect, that the causes which had robbed that attack of greater success would be avoided, that the increased artillery and ammunition available would allow of a far more effective bombardment. Unfortunately, the delays in renewing the attack, due partly to weather conditions but even more to the insufficient ammunition supply, had given the Germans time to so strengthen their positions that only the heaviest artillery could produce any substantial effect upon them. Parapets, many feet in thickness and backed up by concrete, were proof against 18-pounders, and afforded complete protection against anything short of a direct hit to the machine-guns placed in pits sited at the ground level which swept the " no-man's-land " with a grazing fire. It was only the bitter experiences of May 9 which revealed how very formidable the German defences had become and what an increase in battering-power would be needed to reduce them.
The actual attack delivered early on 'May 9 met with modified success at Rougebancs, but with complete failure at. Rue du Bois. Here the infantry found the enemy's trenches strongly manned; the machine-guns from their pits at the ,base of the parapets maintained a deadly fire; scarcely any of the assailants managed to reach the enemy's parapets, and the few who did get into the German lines were promptly overwhelmed. Moreover, the German artillery at once opened a heavy counterbombardment, and the British supports and reserves, packed into crowded communication and assembly trenches, suffered severely, while the task of evacuating wounded and reorganizing the troops for a second attempt proved extremely difficult.
A second effort was, however, made by both the ist and Meerut Divs. about 7 A.M., though without success; and when in the course of the afternoon the Bareilly Bde. of the Meerut Div. and the ist Bde. of the ist Div. were put in, the same result followed. A handful of the ist Black Watch made a lodgment in the enemy's trenches, but so small a party was powerless and was speedily overwhelmed.
At Rougebancs the right brigade of the 8th Div., the 24th, failed except at one point to reach the enemy's trenches, and suffered very severe losses. On its left, however, the 2nd Rifle Bde. and ist Royal Irish Rifles of the 25th Bde. captured a considerable frontage, and lodgments were also made by the 2nd Lincolnshires and the 13th (Kensington) London Regiment. However, consolidation proved exceedingly difficult. Machineguns on the flanks, which could not be located or silenced, prevented the advance of reinforcements; efforts to dig communication trenches came under heavy shelling, and could not be, completed before German counter-attacks, vigorously pressed and well supplied with bombs, drove back those assailants who had penetrated beyond the front trenches and gradually forced the survivors out of the positions they had captured. The Rifle Bde. held on longest, keeping the Germans at bay till after midnight, but before the 7th Div. could push a battalion across to relieve them a renewed counter-attack .ousted them from the German trenches. The division's losses came to over 4,500, about the same as at Neuve Chapelle, but without the satisfaction of retaining any of the ground won. at the first assault. The ist Div. lost nearly 4,000 men, the Indian Corps had over 2,000 casualties, and the completeness of the failure was the more felt because of the high hopes so generally entertained.
However, though the French attacks had also fallen short of the success anticipated, they had gained some ground and were being continued. Sir John French therefore determined to renew his efforts to assist his allies, though on a less ambitious scale. North-east of the village of Festubert the German lines running northward from Givenchy turned N.E. at a sharp angle towards the Bois de Biez, making a salient which it was proposed to attack on two sides. On the night of May 15-16, therefore, the I. and Indian Corps renewed their attempt to advance from the Rue du Bois, using the Meerut and 2nd Divs., while the 7th Div., which had been transferred from the IV. to the I. Corps, attacked eastwardly from Festubert. The attack was preceded by an intermittent bombardment extending over several days, instead .of the short but intensive bombardment employed on March io and May 9. Over a large part of the front attacked the German wire was effectively cut, but opposite the Indian Corps the German parapets successfully defied the efforts of the British artillery and (on the left of the front attacked) the Meerut Div. and the left of the and Div. failed to carry the hostile trenches. The rest of the and Div. fared better; the 6th Bde. and part of the 5th stormed the front German line, and reinforced by their reserves began pushing on against the second line. At 3:15 A.M. on May 16 the 7th Div. attacked, while the Meerut Div. made a fresh attempt. Once again machine-guns sheltered behind Lille damaged parapets and shot down the Gahrwal Bde., and this failure affected the advance of the division, who had to establish a defensive flank on their left and to devote their main efforts to getting touch with the and Div. whose attack had met with considerable success, especially in the centre, where the and Scots Guards and 1st Royal Welsh Fusiliers had penetrated deep into the German positions. On their right also the and Queen's, after a temporary check, had got well in, and while they pushed on towards La Quinque Rue a bombing attack down the German front line, S. of the point of entry, led to the clearing of 700 yd. and the capture of 200 prisoners. But casualties had been heavy, and on the left the stubborn resistance of a strong point held up the left of the aoth Bde., which exposed the flank of the most advanced parties. These, out of touch with their supports, were forced back by counter-attacks. Similarly, the progress of the and Div. was retarded by the resistance of two fortified farms, Cour d'Avoue and Ferme du Bois. Until these strong points could be reduced substantial progress was impossible.
Next day (May 17) operations were continued, a special effort being made to close the gap between the and and 7th Divs., after which it was hoped to push on towards Rue d'Ouvert and Chapelle St. Roch. The first of these objects was effected, after about 700 Germans in the angle between the two attacks had left their trenches, apparently intending to surrender, but had been shelled by their own guns and almost wiped out. But the Ferme du Bois held up the and Div., which could only progress to some extent on its right. The 7th Div. started well and cleared the strong points which had checked the left of the aoth Bde., but could not get much further in the direction of Cour d'Avoue, while the efforts of the and Bedfords and 4th Camerons to push on against Rue d'Ouvert were not in the end successful. On May 18 the 4th (Guards) Bde. attacked Cour d'Avoue from the W., but could not carry it, and Canadian infantry, who on that day began relieving the 7th Div., did not succeed in doing more than master an orchard which had been reached (but lost again) on May 16 by some of the 7th Division. By this time the Germans had brought up considerable reinforcements and many machine-guns, and as the ammunition available was nearly exhausted all chance of substantial success seemed gone. For another week, however, severe fighting continued between La Quinque Rue and Givenchy, the brunt falling on the Canadians and on the 47th (London) Div. who were holding the Givenchy sector. These operations resulted in the capture of several hundred yards of trenches, including two formidable strong points, and the repulse of several German counter-attacks, but by May 25 Sir John French found it necessary to call a halt. It was now clear that though the great French effort further S. had won much valuable ground it had failed to break the enemy's line or to prove the decisive stroke that had been hoped for: the Allies had to resign themselves, therefore, to a suspension of active operations. Actually, it was not till the end of June that this became complete, and in the interval two minor attacks were made near Givenchy, one by the 7th and 51st (Highland Territorial) Divs., the other by the Canadians: neither, however, resulted in any appreciable gain of ground, and although on June 16 an attack by the 3rd Div., now in the V. Corps, carried so
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Chisholm, Hugh, General Editor. Entry for 'Battles in Artois'. 1911 Encyclopedia Britanica. https://www.studylight.org/encyclopedias/eng/bri/b/battles-in-artois.html. 1910.
