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Bible Encyclopedias
Battle of Meuse-Argonne
1911 Encyclopedia Britannica
or "BATTLE OF MEUSE-ARGONNE (Sept.-Nov. 1918). - The general idea of the Meuse-Argonne attack was agreed upon in a conference between Marshal Foch, Gen. Petain and Gen. Pershing at Bombon, on Sept. 2. What Foch really desired and had urged upon Pershing in a conference three days previous was to break up the American army, as an offensive force, immediately after the projected St. Mihiel attack, and to employ the best of its troops to reinforce the II. and IV. French Armies for a combined offensive along the front of these two armies. But Pershing firmly opposed the breaking-up of his army and insisted upon adherence to the original design of employing the main part of the American troops as an integral army unit. Foch finally acceded and gave Pershing his choice of the sector of the II. Army (from the Meuse to the Argonne, inclusive) or that of the IV. Army (from the Argonne, exclusive, to the Suippe). He chose the former.
Following this conference Foch issued a general directive for the attack, which Petain elaborated into precise orders for the two armies concerned, those of Pershing and Gouraud. The general objective named for the combined attack was Mezieres. The St. Mihiel operation was conceived as a preparatory phase (or Operation A.), to give a broader base and better communications for the later operations, notably by freeing for use the railway and roads leading to Verdun from the S. along the Meuse. The American army attack on the front Meuse-Argonne inclusive (Operation B.) and the French IV. Army attack extending from the Argonne W. to the Suippe (Operation C.) were to be simultaneous. Following some days later the French V. Army was to continue the attack W. from Reims to the Aisne (Operation D.).
The direction of attack given for Operation B. was BuzancyMezieres, but the first objectives named were the Hindenburg line on the front Brieulles-sur-Meuse-Romagne-sous-Montfaucon-Grandpre. In fact, the French higher leaders did not at that time conceive that the attack could be carried beyond that line before winter. The American army was to be reinforced for Operation B. by 180 French airplanes, 23 9 French tanks and a considerable force of French artillery (1,002 heavy guns, 456 light guns and 254 trench mortars). In addition a French cavalry division stood by to take advantage of a possible break through the German lines. The American attacking troops consisted of three army corps, having three divisions each in the front line and three divisions in reserve. Only one of these front-line divisions was composed of regular troops, while of the others three of the four National Guard and three of the four National Army divisions employed lacked any previous battle experience.
The newly formed American Army Staff had been a little apprehensive of the outcome of its initial attack at St. Mihiel (Operation A.), and had in consequence designated for that attack most of its better-trained and more experienced divisions, including four of the six available regular divisions. Further, more resistance, with consequently heavier losses, was anticipated in Operation A. than proved to be the case, and it had been considered that more time would be required for resting and recruiting the divisions engaged. The results of this policy in the light of after events, turned out to be most unfortunate. Operation A. was a simple attack which, as was expressly ordered by Foch, was not to be exploited even to the extent of attacking the reserve German position across the face of the salient. The Meuse-Argonne attack, on the contrary, was to be), British field-marshal (see 18.298), was born Sept. r 1845, joined the Scots Fusilier Guards in 5864, served in the Ashanti War of 1874, the Egyptian Expedition of 1882 and the Bechuanaland Expedition of 1884-5. As a major-general he served in the Indian Frontier War of 1897-8, shortly after which he was promoted lieutenant-general. On the outbreak of the South African War he went out in charge of the 1st Division, which he commanded at Belmont, Enslin, Modder river and Magers pushed to the limits of possible success. The fact that Operation B. followed so closely after Operation A., the restricted available road-net, and the need for secrecy, made it difficult to withdraw the better-trained troops from the new Woevre front and again put them in the front line.
The German position between the Meuse and the Argonne was naturally strong and had been strengthened by every possible artifice. Vauquois, a fortified hill E. of and overlooking the Aire valley, was regarded as an impregnable fortress, and Montfaucon, dominating the whole plateau, afforded not only a strong defensive position but observation and command posts which greatly aided in controlling the defence of the whole line. On the other hand the German troops in the line on the front of attack consisted of only five divisions, four of them of inferior quality, and the fifth, a Guard division, much worn from intensive fighting farther N. and sent to this supposedly quiet sector for rest. Among the German divisions immediately in rear in reserve there was only one rated first class. Thus the German infantry actually in line was outnumbered by the attackers about four to one, since the American divisions had twice the infantry strength of the German divisions, while the Americans, thanks to the reenforcing French artillery, had at the outset a decisive artillery superiority, and, altogether, 821 airplanes.
On Gen. Pershing's initiative, various feints and ruses with the employment of American tanks and reconnoitring parties E. of the Moselle as well as in and S. of the Vosges Mts., had served to distract the attention of the German High Command, and led it to expect an attack upon Metz itself or the line E. or S. of Metz rather than W. of the Meuse. The real attack had consequently the advantage of being an almost complete surprise.
Following an artillery preparation of three hours the attack was begun at dawn on Sept. 26. The first day the attack progressed well. The I. Corps, on the left, stormed Vauquois, advanced up the Aire valley to its objectives, and even made sensible progress in the Argonne forest. On the right the III. Corps crossed the difficult Forges brook with its marshy banks and also gained its objectives. But in the centre the V. Corps was held up in passing through the woods in its front, and was unable to take Montfaucon although the III. Corps had passed beyond it on its right. The second day Montfaucon was gained and the attack went forward, but not so far as had been planned.
The third day, Sept. 28, there was still less advance in the centre and not what was hoped for on the left. By this time the German reserves from outside the sector began to pour in and, by the fourth day, having nine divisions in the line, the Germans attempted powerful counter-attacks to regain some of their lost positions. The German artillery was also greatly augmented and, from the favourable flanking artillery positions on the heights E. of the Meuse and in the Argonne forest, greatly hampered the work of the American troops in what was now a pronounced salient in the American line on the plateau between the Meuse and the Aire rivers. The weather for the first three days had been favourable, but on the 28th drizzling rains set in which added to the difficulties of both the tactical handling of troops and of supply. The reconstruction of roads across noman's-land and traffic control had been found especially difficult on the front of the centre corps on account of the depth of the shell-battered zone created by years of intensive fighting. Friction in the railway supply, as was to be expected in a new staff, was not lacking. Under these trying conditions few gains were made on the last two days of Sept., and it became evident that the inexperienced and inadequately trained divisions which. had made the initial attack could accomplish little more in the way of further advance.
The difficulties in the way of supply were speedily smoothed out and the worn and tired troops soon replaced by fresh, but the disappointment in the hopes for a clean break through the German army in this its most strongly fortified and from now on most stubbornly defended sector, hopes which had been created by the striking success of the first day's attack, gave rise to exaggerated rumours of blundering in troop leadership at the front and of supply mismanagement in rear, rumours which finally so affected the French Government as to lead it and Foch to urge the substitution of a French commander and staff for the further conduct of Operation B. This was refused by Gen. Pershing on the ground that the honour of the American army was involved in this attack, and that, whether it finally fail or finally succeed, it must be carried through to the end as an American operation under an American commander and staff.
By Oct. 4 the I. Army line had been reorganized, and on that date the systematic renewal of the offensive was taken up. West of the Argonne the attack of the IV. French Army (Operation C.), also begun on Sept. 26, had not been successful in making any appreciable advance, and Pershing was called on to loan some of his all-too-few veteran divisions to attack the keypoint of the German Champagne position, Blanc Mont. He complied with this request, and all the more willingly since it was the failure of the French attack W. of the Argonne which made the position of the American troops in the forest itself so trying. With these picked troops the IV. French Army, attacking simultaneously with the I. American Army on Oct. 4, gained Blanc Mont, and the German commander, after vain counter-attacks, ordered a withdrawal beyond the Aisne. East of the Argonne the right of the I. Corps gained an advance of ro kilometres along the right bank of the Aire, an advance exploited three days later by bringing a flank attack on the Upper Argonne from the E., which, combined with the successful advance of the IV. Army of Gouraud, W. of the Argonne, resulted in the capture, by Oct ro, of the entire forest, and enabled the French and American armies to connect their flanks through the pass of Grandpre.
The failure of the American I. Army on Oct. 4 to gain its objectives on the eastern half of the Meuse-Aire plateau in its renewed attack of that date made it clear to Gen. Petain that a broader base was required to push the attack beyond the main Hindenburg line, and that the possession by the Germans of the heights E. of the Meuse afforded them too favourable artillery positions and observation posts to make possible an extended advance to the N.W. of the Meuse. Accordingly, on Oct. 5. Petain placed at the tactical disposition of the I. Army the XVII. French Corps, at the time passively holding the line E. of the Meuse, and directed that, reinforced by two or three American divisions, it should be called on to gain the line Dunsur-Meuse - Damvillers. This attack was made Oct. 7, coincidently with a renewed attack on the west. It was partially successful and gained an advance of 6 kilometres. By Oct. ro the I. Army was, in general, up to the rearmost carefully prepared positions of the German army in this region, known as the Kriemhilde Stellung. On Oct. r r Petain called for a renewal of the attack on both banks of the Meuse with the same objectives as before on the E. bank, but with the breaking of the Kriemhilde line and the capture of Buzancy as the objectives on the W. bank.
This attack was carried out on Oct. 14 and resulted in small but material gains, including the Cote Dame Marie, Cunel and Romagne-sous-Montfaucon. The troops by this time were well worn. There was no adequate replacement system and, notwithstanding the breaking-up of newly arriving divisions, it was impossible to keep units at full strength. For the remainder of the month the I. Army had of necessity to limit itself to local operations and to preparation for a systematic renewal of the offensive. On Oct. 12 the I. Army front, which had hitherto extended E. to the Moselle, was divided into two army sectors and, on the 16th, Gen. Pershing transferred the immediate command of the I. Army to Lt.-Gen. Liggett, and exercised supervision, as group commander, of both armies. On Oct. 21 Pershing ordered a renewal of the offensive with plans for a break-through for Oct. 28, but this attack was, on request, deferred until Nov. r to enable the IV. French Army to make plans for attacking simultaneously.
On the German side there was no lack of appreciation by either the opposing army commander or General Headquarters as to the threat which the American attack constituted. Von der Marwitz declared to his army, on Oct. r, after the first break through his lines: ". .. The heaviest part of the task will thus fall on the V. Army. .. in the coming weeks, and the safety of the Fatherland will be in its hands. It is on the firm resistance of the Verdun front that depends the fate of a great part of the Western Front, perhaps even of our nation.. .. " Hindenburg in his memoirs added on this subject: " It was plain that this situation could not last. Our armies were too weak and too tired. Moreover, the pressure which the American masses were putting upon our most sensitive point in the region of the Meuse was too strong." It is debatable whether a quicker perception on the part of German General Headquarters of the threat of the MeuseArgonne attack might not have led to a greater concentration of effort against it and a speedier evacuation of the French territory to the N., W. of the Meuse, and thus to a prolongation of the resistance of the German army. Hindenburg and Ludendorff appear, however, to have been at this time preoccupied with events in the Near East (the surrender of Bulgaria occurred on Sept. 29), and the home political situation in both Germany and Austria. In any case, without apparent forethought of consequences, the German strategic reserve of fresh divisions was doled out piecemeal by G.H.Q. until, by Nov. 1, it had ceased to exist. Thereafter troops could be neither relieved nor reinforced. The result was that the general, carefully prepared attack on Nov. i broke through the enemy's line at all points, and thenceforth it was a case of rapid pursuit with occasional rear-guard actions until the Armistice on Nov. i 1. The chief preoccupation on the Allied side during this pursuit was holding the troops in leash in their sectors and determining who should have the honour of first entering important towns such as Sedan. The main line of the Carignan-Sedan railway, the real objective of the Meuse-Argonne attack, was brought under artillery fire on Nov. 3 and reached, by the I. and V. Corps, on Nov. 7, while the III. Corps had, by the same date, forced the crossing of the Meuse and advanced io kilometres to the N. and E.
The I. Army, during the Meuse-Argonne operation, had employed 22 American divisions and 4 French divisions. Of the 22 American divisions 12 were engaged on other fronts during a part of the period (Sept. 26 to Nov. ii). On the German side, in addition to
the 5 divisions originally in the sector, 42 divisions had, in the course of the battle, been thrown into line. Thus, in all, one-fourth of the German army in the W. had been engaged and decisively beaten by the I. American Army, although occupying successively the numerous and strong defensive positions prepared long in advance. The strength of the American troops involved was, in the aggregate, about 750,000 men, their losses 117,000 killed and wounded, their captures 26,000 prisoners and 846 guns.
BIBLIOGRAPHY.-Final Report of General John Pershing (1920); F. Palmer, Our Greatest Battle (1919); A. W. Page, Our rro Days' Fighting (1920); de Chambrun and de Marenches, The American Army in the European Conflict (1919); The Literary Digest History of the World War, vol. vi. (1920). (A. L. C.)
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Chisholm, Hugh, General Editor. Entry for 'Battle of Meuse-Argonne'. 1911 Encyclopedia Britanica. https://www.studylight.org/encyclopedias/eng/bri/b/battle-of-meuse-argonne.html. 1910.
