| | Dr. ' | ar dr. | B C ' ' | Cr. | L.C ' | T.B. D. | British.. . | 28 | 0 | 9 | 8 | 22 | 82 | German.. . | 16 | 6 | 5 | o | II | 72 The following table gives the aggregate strength of the opposing forces: - Advanced Forces Main Body The total fleet on both sides may further be classified thus: - On a tonnage basis the British fleet had a superiority of about seven to four. Its superiority in heavy guns was equally marked. The British had a total of 344 heavy guns (48 15-in., IO 14-in., 142 13' 5-in., 144 12-in.) with a weight of discharge of 396,700 lb. The Germans had a total of 244 heavy guns (144 12 - in. and loo II-in.) with a weight of discharge of 189,940 lb. The British fleet was also considerably superior in speed. Its slowest battleship had a sea-going speed of 20 knots, its fastest (the Barham class) could do 25. The German Konigs, in spite of a current belief that they could do 23 knots, did little more than 21, and the six Deutschlands of the 2nd Squadron only 16. Neither submarine nor aircraft played any actual part in the battle. In spite of numerous reports to the contrary, there was not a single submarine with either fleet nor in the immediate vicinity. A single seaplane was flown from the " Engadine " (with Beatty's force) but its report never reached the " Lion." The Germans had five Zeppelins on reconnaissance work to the N.W. of Heligoland, but they saw nothing of the battle. At 2 P.M. the forces were in the position shown in fig. 1. Beatty bore S.S.E. from Jellicoe. Criticism has been directed against the distance at which he was operating from the main body. It may be said that, though the speed of the battle crui - sers and the presence of the 5th Battle Squadron greatly dimin - ished the danger of operating so far apart, there was no real advantage in it; and had the distance of the battle fleet been reduced to 30 m., the battle would have been joined an hour earlier. The wide separation of the two forces introduced a fur - ther complication. No arrangements had been made for main - taining visual touch, with the result that a discrepancy arose between the reckonings of the two forces, which led later to un - certainty as to the " Lion's " position and that of the enemy. Both Jellicoe and Beatty were behind time in reaching their positions. Jellicoe's fleet was in six columns disposed abeam 1 m. apart on a S. 50° E. course zigzagging at 15 knots, with the first C.S. and second C.S. some 6 m. ahead spread 4 m. apart. Hood and the 3rd B.C.S. were some 20 m. ahead of him on the port bow. At 2:15 Beatty had reached his rendezvous and turned to N.E. to join the main body. The four battle cruisers of the ist B.C.S. were in single line, led by the "Lion " and screened by the 13th Flotilla; the 5th B.S. was 5 m. off to the N.N.W. screened by the ist Flotilla; the 2nd B.C.S. was 3 m. E.N.E. of the " Lion." The 12 light cruisers of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd L.C.S. were spread on a line bearing E.N.E. 8 m. apart, with the centre of the screen bearing S.S.E. 8 m. from the " Lion." Meanwhile Hipper's force of 5 battle cruisers, 5 light cruisers and 33 de - stroyers was on a northerly course some 50 m. ahead of Scheer and about 50 m. E. of Beatty. His light cruisers, with a num - ber of attendant destroyers, were spread in a semicircle about 10 m. ahead. The German main fleet of 22 battleships, coming on behind him, was in line ahead, steering N. at 14 knots with the seven Konigs in the van, the Heligolands led by the " Friedrich der Grosse " in the centre and the Deutschlands in the rear. The battleships were 763 yd. and squadrons 3,800 yd. apart. The battle which followed may be divided conveniently into three principal phases: Phase I.: 2 :15 to 5 :40 P.M. - The battle-cruiser action between Beatty and Hipper. Hipper's junction with Scheer and the run to the north. Phase II.: 5 :40 to 9 P.M. - The junction with Jellicoe, the deployment of the British battle fleet at 6:15; Scheer's turn-away at 6 :35. Scheer's return and second turn-away at 7 :17 P.M. The British turn-away at 7:22 P.M. Beatty's engagement at 8 :17 P.M. Phase III.: 9 P.M. to 3 :30 A.M. - The British fleet steers south. Scheer shapes course to the S.S.E. across its stern, breaks through the British destroyer flotillas and reaches Horn's Reef. To return to the action impending between the battle cruisers. About 2:10 the " Elbing," on the left wing of Hipper's screen of light cruisers, sighted a neutral steamer and despatched a destroyer to examine it. The " Galatea " sighted the steamer and destroyer and proceeded to close them. The two forces were in touch and the light cruisers began to stream down to the point of contact, while Beatty altered course to S.S.E. at 2:32 P.M. to cut the enemy off from Horn's Reef. The 5th B.S. unfortunately did not immediately follow suit, but continued on its northerly course till 2:40 P.M., opening its distance from 5 to over 7 m. so that subsequently a considerable delay was caused in its coming into action. Hipper's light cruisers proceeded to chase the "Galatea" to the N.W., while the battle-cruiser forces, working up to full speed, came hurrying up to the support of their light cruisers. At 3:24 P.M. the smoke of Hipper's battle cruisers could be seen, and at 3:30 they came in sight of the " Lion " bearing N.E. and steering N.N.W. Beatty now increased to 25 knots, and ordered the 2nd B.C.S. to take station astern. The enemy were still some 23,000 yd. off. Everything augured well for the coming battle. The visibility was good, the sun was behind the British squadron and the wind southeast. At 3:45 Beatty made a signal to the battle cruisers to form on a line of bearing N.W. to clear the smoke; but he had hardly done so when, at 3:48 P.M., the "Liitzow" opened fire at 14,250 yd., and both squadrons turned to the S. to engage. Beatty's battle cruisers were now in single line ahead, Hipper's in starboard quarter line, and a fierce action ensued between the two squadrons, running to the S. on parallel courses at ranges varying from 14,500 to 20,000 yards. The action had hardly lasted a quarter of an hour when one of the " Lion's " turrets was hit by a shell which burst inside and put the turret out of action. Maj. Francis Hervey, R.M.A., the officer of the turret, though mortally wounded, ordered the magazine doors to be closed, a precaution which saved the ship from destruction and won him a V.C. in death. Almost at the same time a salvo from the " Von der Tann " struck the " Indefatigable " (Capt. C. F. Sowerby) by the after-turret at 4:2 P.M., and drove her out of line, sinking by the stern. As the fleet went on, another salvo struck her forward and she turned over and disappeared. The 5th B.S., which was some 7 m. behind Beatty when the action began, did not get within range till about 4:1r P.M.; it then opened fire at 19,000 yd. on the rear ship, the " Von der Tann." By 4 :16 the " Moltke " was also under its fire, but the light was becoming difficult and the enemy could not be clearly seen. Another disaster now befell the British battle cruisers. At 4:26 P.M. a salvo from the " Derfflinger " struck the " Queen Mary," causing an explosion in the forepart of the ship, and she sank by the bows with the stern high in the air. Then followed a terrific explosion, which rent the whole ship, and she disappeared in a dense pall of smoke. The " Tiger " and " New Zealand " passed through the dreadful cloud with a rain of debris falling on their decks. But the fire of the British battle cruisers, joined to that of the 5th B.S., was now telling heavily on the enemy; and at 4:30 P.M. Hipper turned abruptly four points to port and proceeded E., with the " Liitzow " on fire. The loss of these two British battle cruisers must be attributed to insufficient armour protection and defective turret construction, which allowed flash and flame to pass into the magazines. The Germans had profited by the lesson learnt at the Dogger Bank, when the turrets of the " Seydlitz " were burnt out, and their turrets had been equipped with suitable safeguards. As early as 4:15 P.M. the 13th Flotilla, on the " Lion's " starboard side, had been ordered to attack and, crossing the " Lion's" bows about 4:30 P.M., rushed to the S.E. to do so. The German destroyers came out to meet them, and a sharp destroyer action developed between the two lines. Two German boats were lost - V27 sunk by gunfire and V29 by a torpedo from the " Petard." The " Nestor" (Comdr. Hon. E. A. Bingham), Nomad " and " Nicator " pressed boldly on to the E. and pushed home their attack, but were badly hit, and the first two were left helpless between the lines, to be sunk by a tornado of fire from the German battle fleet as it came up. Their crews were saved by German destroyers, and Comdr. Bingham was awarded a V.C. No torpedoes got home on either side. It was now 4:33 P.M. The battle cruisers had run some 20 m. to the S. since the action commenced, when the " Southampton," 4 m. ahead of the " Lion," suddenly sighted the enemy's battle fleet to the S.E. for the first time during the war. The great opportunity so eagerly awaited in the British fleet seemed to have come at last. The German fleet was some 14 m. off, and at 4: 40 P.M. Beatty, still well beyond its range, turned to the N. to draw it back on Jellicoe and the battle fleet. The 5th B.S. was coming down from the N. and at 4:48 P.M. he signalled to them to turn. Unfortunately the rear-admiral delayed his turn till 4:56 and ran past the battle cruisers, perhaps with the intention of covering them, but with the result that the squadron came under a heavy fire from the leading division of Scheer's battle fleet, and the " Barham," " Warspite " and " Malaya " were severely hit. Scheer, on receiving information of the British battle cruisers at 3: 35, had closed his line to battle formation (ships 545 yd. and squadrons 1,090 yd. apart). At 4:5 P.M. he altered course N.W. and increased to 15 knots, and at 4:20 altered course to W., intending to catch Beatty between two fires. But hearing that five battleships had joined in the fight he thought better of it and turned to north. At 4:30 the British forces were in sight. The weather was clear, with a light breeze from north-west. At 4: 45 fire was opened by the Konigs in the van on the 5th B.S. Hipper, as he saw the battle fleet coming up, turned to starboard at 4:48 and took station 7 m. ahead of it. Now commenced a long rush to the N., wath Scheer some 10 m. on Beatty's starboard quarter and Hipper 9 m. or so to the eastward. At 4:45 P.M. Jellicoe was some 66 m. to the N.W., and Hood with the 3rd B.C.S. some 30 m. to the N.N.E., so that Scheer was approaching the mouth of a trap, with Jellicoe to the N.W., Hood to the N.E., and Beatty to the W. shepherding him in. Beatty's squadron had suffered severely, but if he could once bring Scheer within reach of the thunderbolt coming down on him from the N.W. his losses should be amply avenged. Jellicoe meanwhile, going S.E. by S. at 19 knots, had received news of the enemy battle cruisers at 3:40 P.M., and had increased to 20 knots at 3:59. Hood had been ordered to proceed to Beatty's support at 4:5 and had shaped course S.S.E. at 25 5 Hipper 0l ',`14N ' Battle Cruiser Action Mit. Knots, a course which turned out very happily in the end, and gave the enemy an entirely wrong idea of the tactical situation. The discrepancies in reckoning, in conjunction with mistakes arising from the clumsy form of latitude and longitude code in use at the time, made it difficult for the C.-in-C. to get a clear idea of the exact situation, but by 4:45 P.M. it was clear to him that the enemy's battle fleet was coming N. and he informed the Admiralty that a fleet action was imminent. The word ran down to the dockyards and started a bustle of preparation to meet the needs of the fleet. It is impossible to give in detail the events of Fig. 4. - Discrepancies in Reckonings (" Iron Duke " and " Lion "). the next crowded hour. It was of great importance for the C.-in-C. to get the correct bearing of the enemy battle fleet, but the wireless reports were confusing for the reasons mentioned above. The " Iron Duke " was actually some 4 or 5 m. to the S.E. of her reckoning and the " Lion " some 5 m. to W. of hers, which threw out their bearings and the estimated positions of the enemy. The 5th B.S., following some 3 m. astern of the " Lion," remained for some time within range of the enemy battle fleet, and its rear ship, the " Malaya," was being hit right up to 5:35 P.M. This gave rise to an erroneous idea that the enemy had a speed much in excess of 21 knots, but it was due to the 5th B.S. running on a convergent course and not to the enemy's speed, which never exceeded 21 knots. Between J:40 and 6 P.M. two actions developed. The action between Beatty and Hipper burst out afresh (5:40); the " Chester " (on the starboard beam of Hood's squadron), coming down from the N.E., struck the 2nd Scouting Group ahead of Hipper, got badly mauled and retired - leaving the British with the heroic picture of Boy Jack Cornwell winning the V.C. Hipper, whose fire was hampered by the setting sun, was heavily hit by Beatty and was forced to turn to the eastward (5:53). By this time Hood in the " Invincible " had arrived on the scene some 20 m. to the E. of Beatty; hearing the roar of the guns, he turned to the N. with the 3rd B.C.S. (5:57) and engaged the light cruisers of the 2nd S.G. to the W., which were chasing the " Chester " east. The sudden appearance of battle cruisers to the E. gave Boedicker's cruisers a severe shock. Hood's 12-in. shell forced them sharply to the S.E. (5:55), seriously damaging the " Pillau " and sending the " Wiesbaden " limping W. to her destruction. The " Shark's " little flotilla behind the 3rd B.C.S. saw the German light cruisers and pushed boldly out to the N.W. to attack them. Hipper, now coming E. behind Boedicker, heard the " Invincible's " guns ahead, thought they were those of the British battle fleet, took the " Shark " to be the head of a big destroyer attack, and turned right round to S.W. to close his own battle fleet (6:7). The German 9th Flotilla rushed out to screen their light cruisers, drove off the " Shark's " little flotilla and sank the " Shark"; the V48 was sunk at this time, and, close to where Jack Cornwell won his V.C., Comm. Loftus Jones, with his leg shot off and his ship sinking, won another. Hipper, after proceeding to the S.W. for five minutes, turned round again at 6:1 2 P.M., and as he came up on a N.E. course, the little " Acasta " (Lt.-Comdr. J. 0. Barron), which had been trying bravely to help the " Shark," sent a torpedo into the " Seydlitz." All this happened some io m. ahead of the British battle fleet, which was now close at hand to the north-west. Its deployment had been deferred too long, and it was still in divisions disposed abeam, with the " Marlborough " on the starboard wing. Mist had come down, reducing the visibility to 5 or 6 m., and it was difficult to get a correct idea of the situation, for the thunder of heavy guns could be heard from right ahead (Hood) almost to the starboard beam (Beatty). The " Lion " had been steering approximately N. by E. since 5:35 P.M., with the 5th Battle Squadron about 3 m. on her starboard quarter. The "Falmouth," ahead of the " Lion," was in touch with the " Black Prince " as early as S:30 P.M., but it was not till about 5:55 P.M. that Beatty's force could be clearly seen. By 6 P.M. the battle fleet was clearly in sight, and, finding himself converging on the " Marlborough," which was then some 3 m. N. by E., Beatty turned to the E. to take station ahead of her. Scheer had deployed at 5:42 P.M. and was now on a N.E. course led by the "KOnig," which at 6:14 P.M. was about 72 m. 27° on the " Marlborough's " starboard bow. At this moment two reports of the enemy battle fleet came in from the "Barham" and "Lion," the former placing it S.S.E., the latter S.S.W. The " Lion " was then a mile or two sharp on the " Iron Duke's " starboard bow, going hard to the E. and engaging the enemy. The " Barham " was some 3 m. off, before the " Iron Duke's" beam, drawing ahead of the " Marlborough " on a S.E. course. In conditions of low visibility, the C:-in-C. had prescribed a deployment on the wing next the enemy, and this is evidently what Beatty expected. But there seemed to be a risk of deployment into single line on the right wing, involving the " Marlborough " and her division in a premature action, and the C.-in-C. decided to deploy on the left wing. The signal, equal speed - pennant, C.L. - went up at 6:15 P.M. 1 Jellicoe 'Iron Hood ',Hipper Hipper ? Beatty Fig. 3 T With columns covering a front of 5 m., to deploy on the wing farthest from the enemy meant an increase of the range from about 8,50o to 13,000 yd., a serious matter when visibility was not much more than i i,000 yards. But in the mist and uncertainty one thing could be clearly seen. The " Lion " with Beatty's flag could be seen some 2 m. ahead of the "Benbow," steering E.S.E. and engaging the enemy. To bring the enemy within effective range, the C.-in-C. had only to follow in that direction, ordering the battle fleet to deploy on one of the centre columns led by the " Benbow " or " Iron Duke." Whether this course occurred to the C.-in-C. it is impossible to say (no mention of it appears in his own book). In any case, the deployment signal did not permit of deployment on a centre column or on any but a wing column. The deployment therefore began on the left wing. The " King George V." led out on a S.E. by E. course; the five leaders of divisions turned to N.E., their ships formed a long single line behind them and filed round behind the " King George V." The " Defence " ahead of the battle fleet had already engaged the 2nd S.G. about 5:50 P.M. and now saw the " Wiesbaden " returning. She pressed impatiently with the " Warrior " across the bows of the " Lion " to engage her, only to receive two crushing salvos from the " Liitzow " or " Friedrich der Grosse," and to blow up at 6:19 P.M. in a vast pall of smoke. The deployment on the left wing placed RearAdml. Evan-Thomas in a difficult position. The battle orders instructed him to take station in the van in the event of the enemy deploying away from Heligoland, but this meant fouling the range of the battle fleet, and he decided to turn up astern of the " Marlborough " and made a wide sweep to port to do so; here the " Warspite's " helm jammed (6:17), and she made a complete circle to starboard, passing right round the " Warrior," saving her from the fate of the " Defence." The deployment was completed by 6:40 P.M. When it started Scheer was coming up on a N.E. course. By 6:27 P.M. when the fleets engaged, his 1st and 3rd Squadrons were on an E.N.E. course, just visible in twos and threes at about 14,000 yards. Both fleets were now steering to the E. on approximately parallel courses. The " Iron Duke " opened fire at 6:30 P.M., and between 6:25 P.M. and 6:40 P.M.' the British, who had evidently much the better horizon, were able to inflict considerable punishment on the head of the German line, whose ships could see nothing but the flashes of the British guns. Meanwhile the " Invincible " had turned E. ahead of Beatty's squadron and come into action (6:23 P.M.) with Hipper as he came up again on a N.E. course. A fierce engagement ensued between them, running to the S.E. at about 10,000 yd. The mist cleared for a few minutes, and at 6:34 the " Derfflinger " sent a salvo into the " Invincible's " midship turret. A tremendous explosion followed, the masts collapsed, and the great ship disappeared beneath the waves, leaving her bow and stem standing as if to mark the place where an admiral lay. The "Konig " at the head of the German line had turned to S.E. at 6:33 P.M. Scheer was now fully alive to the fact that he was facing the entire British fleet. The whole northern horizon was aflame. He gave the order for a "battle turn" (Gefechtswendung). The whole line turned at 6:35 and drew off to westward. In the mist and smoke it was lost to view and Scheer obtained a much-needed respite. As the line turned, the German 3rd Flotilla darted out to attack the British line. It was recalled, but three boats (G88, V73, and S32) went on and, unopposed by any British flotillas, who were apparently too busy taking up their deployment positions to notice them, made two attacks on the British line, one of which was probably responsible for torpedoing the " Marlborough " at 6:54 P.M. At 6.55 P.M. the long British line turned to S., leaders together, bringing the fleet into divisions again with guides bearing south-east. The movement fulfilled no tactical purpose. It had taken half an hour to deploy the fleet, and no sooner was it deployed than it turned back into divisions in a formation unsuitable either for attack or defence. The " Marlborough's " division was left on the right wing, exposed to attack, uncovered by any of the destroyer flotillas, which remained clinging to the positions given them for deployment in single line. Beatty grasped the significance of the new formation, and, turning to allow the 3rd B.C.S. to take station behind him, shaped course to the S.W. right across the track of the advancing battle fleet and towards its exposed wing. Scheer was meanwhile making to the W. in a ragged sort of single line, with the battle cruisers in rear. The " Liitzow " was down by the bows and on fire, and Hipper left her to transfer his flag to the " Seydlitz," but, finding her full of water with her wireless out of action, went on to the " Moltke." But the battle cruisers had now turned to renew the action; the " Moltke " was under fire and could not stop, and it was 9 P.M. before Hipper could get on board. When Jellicoe turned to S. at 6:55 P.M. the German fleet was some 13 m. S.W. of him, making to the westward. Scheer's next movement was one which exposed him to a tremendous counterblow. He still had his whole fleet with him, and as it was too early to get into formation for the night he decided to turn and make a determined advance in the teeth of the foe. The motives actuating him are described by himself as follows. If the British were following him his move to the W. was nothing more than a retreat, which would involve the sacrifice of damaged ships and meant his tactics being dictated by the enemy. It was still less feasible to try and detach himself from the enemy, leaving the British C.-in-C. to choose where to engage him in the morning. The only way of preventing this seemed to be to force the British into a second battle by another determined advance. This would be bound to surprise the enemy and upset his plans for the rest of the day, and, if the blow fell heavily, would help the German fleet to liberate itself during the night. These arguments are grandiloquent but inconclusive, and it is more probable that Scheer intended to slip past the stern of the British fleet unobserved, but he had mistaken its position and ran right into it. In any case, the fact that Scheer did liberate himself must not obscure the fact that his movement was full of risk, and, had the British fleet been pursuing him, must have ended in disaster. As it was, it met with a considerable measure of success. The whole German line swung round together to the E. again (6:55 P.M.), with the battle cruisers ahead led by Capt. Hartog in the " Derffiinger. " The German destroyers attached to the battle cruisers attacked the "Marlborough's " division about 7 P.M., but were driven off by gunfire, after firing six or seven torpedoes without effect. At 7 :1 2 P.M. the British fleet coming S. saw the enemy battle cruisers returning through the mist. The Germans sighted them simultaneously and turned parallel to the British course at a range of under io,000 yards. The " Hercules " opened on the " Seydlitz," and the guns of most of the fleet, with Beatty's battle cruisers ahead of it, joined in. The " Derfflinger " and " Seydlitz," now came under a terrific fire. In the former two 151n. shells (probably from the " Revenge ") crashed into the afterturrets, igniting the charges and sending great pillars of flame Deploy Ent roaring skywards in which the crews of both turrets perished. The " Derfflinger " succeeded in getting two hits into the " Colossus," the only hits scored by the Germans on the battle fleet. Scheer, some 3 m. behind his battle cruisers, saw it was time to turn. The line swung round together to the W. again at 7:17 P.M., and the 6th and 9th Flotillas threw up a smoke cloud and rushed out to attack. As they approached, the British battle fleet turned away two points to port by signal at 7:22 P.M. and another two points at 7:26, making the " Iron Duke's " course south-east. This was the " turn-away " which has given rise to considerable controversy. Eleven torpedoes reached the lines of the 1st B.S. at 7:35 P.M. and were avoided by the use of helm. The British fleet was now going no more than 15 knots. The 5th B.S. (except the " Warspite," which had fallen out) was plodding along in rear at the same speed, wasting all the foresight, money and ingenuity expended in giving it a speed of 25 knots to pursue and encircle an enemy. But now the real counter to torpedo attack was found. The 4th L.C.S. and r 1th Flotilla were ordered to attack and were making W. towards the exposed wing of the battle fleet. The German 5th and 3rd Flotillas, which were advancing to attack, fled before them, and only one of their torpedoes reached the " Marlborough's " line. At 7:35 P.M. Adml. Jellicoe turned back from S.E. to S. by W. and re-formed single line on a S.W. course by 8 o'clock. The actual transfer to the E. of the original course in the case of the " Marlborough," caused by the turn-away, was little more than 1,250 yards. This in itself was no great distance, but the retention of the battle fleet on a south-easterly course, while the enemy was making W., opened a gap of several miles between the two fleets and made it difficult to renew the engagement before nightfall. The only movement of any real use at 6:55 P.M. and 7:22 P.M. was to follow the enemy and cut him off, as the battle cruisers attempted to do. From 6:55 P.M. the British fleet was meandering along to the S., when tactics of encirclement and pursuit were required to deal a decisive blow. Unfortunately Adml. Jellicoe considered the risk of submarine and torpedo too great for such tactics, though there were no submarines anywhere near the scene of action; and, after 7:36 P.M., as soon as the 4th L.C.S. and r 1th Flotillas gripped the situation, they never allowed the German flotillas to approach. Beatty's battle cruisers had meanwhile been making to the S. W. and were 5 or 6 m. ahead of the battle fleet. At 7:47 P.M. the enemy was still in sight from the "Lion," and Beatty, evidently fearing that night might fall without a decisive blow, sent a signal to the C.-in-C. asking that the van of the battle fleet might follow him in an attempt to cut them off. At 8 P.M. the battle fleet turned W. in divisions with guides bearing north east. Scheer was some 18 m. W.N.W. of it on a S. course, so that the fleets were again converging. At 8:10 P.M. the C.-in-C., in reply to Beatty's signal, ordered the 2nd Battle Squadron (Vice-Adml. Sir Thomas Jerram in the " King George V.") to follow the battle cruisers. But, apparently because Beatty was not actually in sight, - though the " Minotaur" (2nd C.S.) was in sight of both the " Lion " and " King George V." and could have given him the " Lion's " position as she gave the " Lion " that of the "King George V.," - he remained with the battle fleet and made no attempt to follow Beatty. At 8:15 P.M. the fleets again came into contact. The " Castor and iith Flotilla ahead of the British battle fleet sighted the German destroyers on Scheer's port bow, and, supported by the 4th L.C.S., drove them helter-skelter away. The " Calliope,"' " Comus " and " Constance " chased them right back to their battle fleet; and the " Calliope," making a torpedo attack on the " Westfalen," came under a heavy fire, and was hit five times, though not disabled. About 8:15, too, the "Falmouth" (3rd L. C.S.) and Beatty's battle cruisers, about 6 m. to S.W. of the battle fleet, sighted Hipper's squadron and the 2nd Squadron of Deutschlands on a S. course. A short sharp action developed at about io,000 yd. Hipper's ships were hit again, as well as the " Schlesien," " Schleswig-Holstein " and " Pommern." At 8:30 P.M. they turned away to the S.W., passing behind the 3rd and 1 st Squadrons. The British battle fleet heard the guns, and at 8:30 P.M. turned into single line again on a S.W. course. At 9 P.M. there could be no doubt that the enemy was some 6 or 7 m. to the N.W., but dusk was falling (sunset 8:7 P.M.), and the C.-in-C., having decided not to run the risk of a night action, turned S. in divisions. Half an hour later (9:27) the destroyers were ordered to take station astern 5 m. and took station in the following order from W. to E.: the 11th (next the enemy), 4th, 13th, 9th and 12th Flotillas. Unfortunately they were given no information as to the position of the enemy or of their own squadrons and flotillas or of the C.-in-C.'s intended movements, with the result that, instead of making organized attacks on the enemy fleet, the 4th Flotilla blundered into it during the night and was broken up or driven away. Scheer at 9 P.M. had ordered his fleet to proceed in on a course S.S.E. E. at 16 knots. The 2nd Scouting Group was on the port bow, the 4th Scouting Group just ahead. Then came the battle fleet in line ahead, the 1st Squadron in front (ships in re 2 d t t ? [[Jellicoe Fig.6 ' '7.22 ' '"Iron Dukes" Turn Away ' , Duke Iron]] .? . 26'. 2 ? 14th F1.4 7361 '11 L h /B. C. F. 42 /Lion/ /, %. Scheer S. 2"a X30 Fl. 11th /, FLI;. ? st.S.G.} s. G. .,5 t h FL 211_d S.G. - "S .32 ;sights L.C.S. sights 110 Fl. 4 t !' L.C. S.& 11th.FI: driving off enemy t.b.ds -'735 B Iron Duke Scheer 9p r' zy t Jellicoe; i 10 [[Midnight Scheer 3! Squadron]] ' 'rt [[Westfalen ' 'Mar ' .Borough]] ' 4m St B. S. sights enemy Vim Jellicoe COLOSSUS 4 t " B.S 4041 C ih 13th Black Prince blown up 40 Flotilla .. broken here, 12. l a m, ' .12th Flotilla ?Pbmmem Sunk ;'1B% m. 2 a. m. Ja.m., - ., 27% m. - 4.0 'ti Dl -34,,, 4a.m. '.2.am,; a.m. NO Mines Ostfrislond mined k245 + Lion "2.45 a.m. FIG.7 [[Scheer'S Return Home Br/71shmines Night May 31 T]]. Y versed order) with the " Westfalen " leading, and the 3rd and 2nd Squadrons behind. The "Derfflinger" and "Von der Tann" formed the rear guard. The " Liitzow " and " Seydlitz " had fallen out. The movements of the night can only be briefly described. The British fleet continued to steer south. The German fleet passed diagonally across its rear on a S.S.E. course, crashing through the British destroyer flotillas on its way. About Io:30 P.M. the 4th Scouting Group struck the 2nd L.C.S., then some 7 m. astern of the battle fleet. A short but fierce action ensued. The " Southampton " and " Dublin " were severely damaged, but the former, though she suffered severely, torpedoed the " Frauenlob," which had to be abandoned later. At 10:41 P.M. Adml. Jellicoe received Scheer's course from the Admiralty, which showed clearly that the latter was retiring towards Horn's Reef. To ensure meeting him next morning it was necessary to turn to a parallel course; Adml. Jellicoe did not do so, nor did he inform Beatty or anyone else of the enemy's course, and the fleet continued to steer south. At II :30 P.M. there commenced a series of actions behind the battle fleet, which, passing from W. to E. across its stern, pointed a great finger almost directly at Horn's Reef, leaving a trail of burning vessels to mark the course of the German fleet as surely as the compass in Scheer's flagship. They can only be briefly described. At 11:30 P.M. the 4th Flotilla was struck and the " Tipperary " left blazing. The gallant little " Spitfire," trying to help her, rammed the " Nassau," smashed the battleship's searchlights, had her own bridge and funnel blown away by an I I -in. shell, but got safely away with some 30 ft. of German plating on her bows. The " Rostock " was torpedoed in this encounter; the " Elbing " was rammed by the " Posen " and had to be abandoned, and sank. The 4th Flotilla turned away to the E., but, turning S. and ignorant of the German fleet's course, ran into it again at midnight, when the " Fortune " and " Ardent " were sunk. The " Black Prince," which had evidently been following the British fleet, was unlucky enough to run into the German fleet at this time, and, coming under a tornado of fire from the " Ostfriesland " and " Thuringen " at 1,600 yd., vanished in a terrific explosion. The " Marlborough's " division and the 5th B.S. had fallen behind the fleet and crossed only some 3 or 4 m. ahead of the enemy battle fleet, whose ships were seen (the " Westfalen " being even recognized), a situation which might have developed in a variety of ways. At 0:25 A.M. the 9th Flotilla was struck and the " Turbulent " sunk. The 13th Flotilla had made off to the eastward. At about 1:45 A.M. the 12th Flotilla sighted the enemy, but Capt. Anselm Stirling drew off and made an organized attack at about 2 :I 0 A.M., sinking the old battleship " Pommern." The 13th Flotilla sighted the enemy again at 3:30 A.M. and turned away, but the " Moresby " attacked and torpedoed the V4. It was now getting light. Not a moment was to be lost if the German fleet was to be cut off, but at 2:40 A.M. the C.-in-C., instead of steering E. by N. for Vyl Shoal or Horn's Reef, altered course to north. At 3:29 A.M. another important signal arrived from the Admiralty, giving the German position not far from Horn's Reef at 2:30 A.M. It was still possible to try to intercept their disabled ships. There were no German mine-fields, nor any information of any, N. of Heligoland, and the only mine-fields near Amrum were a couple of British ones laid in 1915, which were certainly extensive but whose position was known. The C.-in-C., however, did not proceed farther, but at 3:42 A.M. turned W. and reduced to 15 knots. It is impossible to see in the fleet's movements any intention of renewing the action. The reason given is that the fleet was too scattered, but it would not have been scattered if it had been told to be 15 m. from Horn's Reef at 2 :30 A.M. The destroyers would not have been scattered if they had not been left right in the path of an advancing enemy with no information as to his movements. Beatty would not have been 15 m. away to the S.W. of the battle fleet if he had known the German fleet was making for Horn's Reef. But he was not told. No one was told. The action ends here. The German fleet proceeded in. The Ostfriesland " struck a mine laid by the " Abdiel" on May 5. The "Seydlitz" did not pass the Reef till 4 A.M. Three British submarines were off Vyl Light, but they had been told nothing and saw nothing. The battle was not a decisive one, and the British battle fleet was never seriously under fire (its casualties were two men killed and five wounded). It must be admitted that the British C.-in-C.'s tactics were characterized by excessive caution. They were limited to the conception of a battle in single line at long ranges on a parallel course, and when Scheer turned away the British system of tactics did not permit of pursuit and fell to pieces. The C.-in-C.'s conception of tactics is to be found in a letter to the Admiralty of Oct. 30 1914 (Jutland Despatches, 601), which merits careful study, for (while it shows that he acted on a prearranged plan) it really constitutes a negation of the battleship and of battle-fleet tactics. Movements in battle were to be governed on this theory, not by the necessity of getting within effective range, but by the necessity of avoiding supposititious submarines. The principles formulated in that letter had, however, been endorsed by the Admiralty, and they were followed at Jutland, though a defence of these principles or of the tactics of the British fleet at Jutland must lead with stern and irrefutable logic to the proposition that the battleship is an instrument of the past. The British tactics were dominated by a fear of the submarine or torpedo. There were no submarines present in the vicinity, and after 7:36 P.M. one light cruiser squadron and a single flotilla of destroyers proved sufficient to drive off the enemy's destroyers. It has been argued that this caution was justified because Britain's naval strength was practically all concentrated in the Grand Fleet. The answer, from a naval point of view, is that it was concentrated in the Grand Fleet for the very purpose of dealing a decisive blow; and commerce defence, convoy and anti-submarine work had all been sacrificed to enable it to do so. The immediate result of the failure of Jellicoe to strike a decisive blow was that the German High Fleet remained intact, to be a bulwark to its submarines, and, by barring the Baltic, to hasten the disintegration of Russia. Measured in terms of size and serried steel, and of opportunity, the battle of Jutland must bulk large in naval history, but the actual results at the moment were small. If a battle is merely an incident or a move in a blockade it may possibly be regarded as won when the enemy retires to harbour. No further fleet action occurred during the war, and eventually the German fleet surrendered. From one point of view, therefore, it may be said that the result was successful. But if a battle represents in war the economy of the decisive blow; if the enemy's fleet can still play an important part in the campaign; if, as Foch said, there can be no victory without a battle; and if Nelson's teachings are sound - then the battle of Jutland, taken by itself, must rank merely as a great and unique opportunity for the British fleet, of which advantage was not sufficiently taken. Losses The British losses were 3 battle cruisers, 3 cruisers and 8 destroyers - namely, battle cruisers: " Indefatigable " (gunfire, 6 P.M.), " Queen Mary " (gunfire, 4:26 P.M.), " Invincible " (gunfire, 6:34 P.M.); cruisers: " Defence " (gunfire, 6:19 P.M.), Warrior " (gunfire and abandoned, 7:45 A.M.), " Black Prince " (gunfire, 0:25 A.M.); destroyers: " Nestor " and " Nomad " (5 :15 P.M.), " Shark " (6:5 P.M.), " Tipperary " (II :30 P.M.), " Ardent and " Fortune " (midnight), " Turbulent " (0:30 A.M.), " Sparrowhawk " (collision and abandoned, 9 :Io A.M.). | British German | Officers | Men | | Killed | ??o d und | Peon | Killed | W ou d nd- | Pe1s°"- | Total | 328 160 | 28 40 | 10 | 5,7 6 9 2,385 | 4 8 5 454 | 167 | 6,787 3,039 The German losses were one battleship, one battle cruiser, four light cruisers and five destroyers - namely, battleship: " Pommern " (torpedoed, 12th Flotilla, 2 :Io A.M.); battle cruiser " Liitzow" (gunfire, abandoned and sunk, I :45 A.M.); light cruisers: " Wiesbaden " (gunfire, 7 P.M.), " Frauenlob " (torpedoed, " Southampton," 10 :20 P.M.), " Elbing" (collision, I I :30 P.M.), " Rostock" (torpedoed, 4th Flotilla, II :30 P.M.); destroyers V27 (13th Flotilla, 4:40 P.M.), V29 (torpedoed by " Petard," 4:40 P.M.), V48 (about 6 :30 P.M.), S35 (gunfire, at 7 :25 P.M.), V4 (torpedoed by " Moresby," 2 :45 A.M). Casualties. - On the two sides these may be tabulated as follows: - (A. C. D.) Copyright Statement
These files are public domain. Bibliography Information
Chisholm, Hugh, General Editor. Entry for 'Battle of Jutland'. 1911 Encyclopedia Britanica. https://www.studylight.org/encyclopedias/eng/bri/b/battle-of-jutland.html. 1910.
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