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"ART AND LITERATURE, 1910-21 Art. - All the Austrian artists who had been most characteristic of the age of Francis Joseph died about the year 1890. They had built a new Vienna and transformed the large provincial towns. The keynote of their style might be described as Austrian imperial sentiment. This common quality was also true of the decadent period of this style, which reached its height in 1890; and even after the World War it still had its representatives. Notable in this class were, among architects, Karl KOnig (1841-1915); among sculptors, Karl Kundemann (1838-1919) and Kasper Zumbusch (1830-1915) in Vienna, and Josef Myslbek (b. 1848) in Prague; among painters the Czech Brozik (1851-1899), the Pole Jan Matejko (1838-1893), and the Viennese portrait-painters L. Horowitz (1843-1917) and Heinrich von Angell (b. 1840). Others, such as the painter Adalbert Hynais (b. 1854) of Prague, and the Viennese sculptor Eduard Hellmer (b. 1850), or the Viennese engraver Ferdinand Schmutzer (b. 1870), displayed symptoms of a transitional style, dominated by an international influence. Austrian artists now sought every kind of contact abroad; many studied and lived in Munich, Berlin and Paris. As examples may be cited the Czech painters Antonin Slavicek (1870-1910) and Max Svabinsky (b. 1873), the Pole Jacek Malczewski (b. 1855), and the artists who in 1897 founded the Viennese Independents ( Wiener Sezession). Evidence of their success in bringing new life to a dead tradition was given by the painter Rudolf Alt (1812-1905), who in " 1917 " " 1918 .

Up to the end of the World War the Vienna Burgtheater had still the ambition of ranking with the Comedic Francaise as the first theatre of the continent of Europe. The dialect drama, to which Raimund, Nestrey and Anzengruber had contributed, still had the reputation of being, as Platen said, a popular form of comedy which is more comic than the whole of the German theatre. In the meantime the Burgtheater lost its brilliant doyen Bernhard Baumeister (1828-1917), and its greatest master of declamation, the famous emotional actor, Josef Kainz (1858-1918). Finally Alexander Girardi (1850-1918) died too, the popular Viennese comedian, whose gift for music and improvisation showed him no unworthy representative of the Italian tradition.

See Albert Soergel, Dichtung and Dichter der Zeit (1916); Oscar F. Walzel, Die deutsche Dichtung seit Goethes Tod (1919); Alfred Maderno, Die deutsch-osterreichische Dichtung der Gegenwart (1920).

(A. B.) History. - During 1910-20 the influence of the work of Theodor von Sickel (1826-1908), and of the Austrian Institute for Historical Research, had been brought by him to a high pitch of excellence, was shown in a marked activity on the part of Austrian historical writers. In the footsteps of Sickel, and also of his great contemporary Julius von Ficker (1826-1902), came their disciples Engelbert Miihlbacher (1853-1903) and Emil von Oltenthal (b. 1855); Oswald Redlich (b. 1858), with his Rudolf von Habsburg; Alfons Dopsch (b. 1868), with his Wirtschaftliche Eutwicklung der Karolingerzeit (2. vols., 1912-3) and Wirtschaftliche and soziale Grundlagen der europaischen Kulturentwicklung (2 vols., 1918-9); Ludo Moritz Hartmann (b. 1865) with his Geschichte Italiens, etc.

A number of the historians who came from the school of Sickel turned to modern history, under the influence of Ottokar Lorenz (1832-1903). Distinguished among them by his gift for vivid exposition was Heinrich Friedjung (1851-1920), notable for his Der Kampf um die Vorherrschaft in Deutschland (2 vols., 11th ed. 1919), Oesterreich, 1848-1860 (2 vols., 4th ed. uncompleted), Das Zeitalter des Inzperialismus, 1884-1914 (vol. i., 1919), Gesammelte Azafsdtze (1919). A rich literary activity was displayed by August Fournier (1850-1920), whose biography of Napoleon (3rd ed., 1913, Eng. trans. 2nd ed. 1911) became widely known even beyond the sphere of the German-speaking public. From the pen of A. F. Pribram there appeared, among other works, the second volume of Die englisch-oesterreichischen Staatsvertrage (1913), and Die geheimen politischen Staatsvertrage Oesterreich-Ungirns 1879-1917 (1920; English trans. by A. C. Coolidge, 1920).

Worthy of note among the younger historians trained at the Institute were Hans Uebersberger (b. 1877), with Russlands Orientpolitik in den letzten Jahrhunderten (vol. i., 1913); H. R. von Srbik (b. 1878), with Wallenstein's Ende (1920); Wilhelm Bauer (b. 1877), with Die Offentliche Meinung auf historischer Grundlage (1917); Viktor Bibl (b. 1870), with Der Tod des Don Carlos (1919); H. Kretschmayer (b. 1870), with his Geschichte Venedigs (2nd vol. 1920). The methodical research into texts inaugurated in Austria by Sickel and Ficker produced valuable fruits in the sphere of German and Austrian legal and constitutional history. Prominent among the workers in this field were Arnold Luschin von Ebengreuth (b. 1841); H. von Voltelius (b. 1862) and Siegmund Adler (1813-1920).

Among historians unconnected with the above-mentioned movement, Josef Freiherr von Helfert (1820--1910) was distinguished by a rare devotion to work; a man of great talents, he crowned his life-work by a history in two volumes of the Austrian Revolution of 1848. Ludwig von Pastor (b. 1854) continued his widely read Geschichte der Papste (5th vol., 1920); Eugen Guglia (1855-1918) published a book on Maria Theresa (2 vols., 1917). In the sphere of Slavonic history the unfinished Geschichte Serbiens of J. Jirecek (1857-1918) is also worthy of note. As an economic historian Karl Greenberg (b. 1891) established his reputation during the decade.

The eminent Viennese professor of constitutional law, Josef Redlich (b. 1869), widely known abroad through his masterly works on English local government and English parliamentary procedure, published in 1920 the first volume of Das oesterreichische Staatsand Reichsproblem, a history of the internal policy of the Habsburg Monarchy from 1848 to the break-up of the empire. This first volume brings the account down to 1861.

F. PR.) Foreign Policy, 1909-181 Austro-Hungarian foreign policy in the crucial decade which, through the World War, led to the downfall of the empire, can only be understood by recalling the main historical problem that confronted the old monarchy.

Since the foundation of the German Empire and the kingdom of united Italy an extension of Austria-Hungary towards the S. and W. of Europe had become impossible. Only in the Rivalry S.E. could she still count on an expansion of her k territory and power. Thus from the seventies of the sia in the 19th century onwards the policy of the leading AustroHungarian statesmen had taken the direction indicated by geographical conditions. In this Austria had to reckon with the opposition of Russia, which, with the pressing back of Turkish influence, had become her great rival in S.E. Europe. In order to maintain herself as a Great Power, make her frontier secure against hostile attacks, and suffer no restriction on her further development, she could not allow another Great Power to command the Danube and its mouths, and arrogate to itself the hegemony of the Balkan peoples. This political and economic opposition between the Habsburg Monarchy and Russia was reinforced by opposition of an ethnical and cultural nature. In view of this struggle against a competitor far superior in population and military strength, Austrian statesmen had sought an alliance or understanding with those European states whose interests appeared to run parallel with their own. It was to the benevolent attitude of Germany and England that Austria had owed the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the right of maintaining garrisons in the Sanjak of Novibazar - the door to the Near East and the first step towards an expansion of AustriaHungary's sphere of influence in the Balkans, which promised rich prospects, but at the same time an increase in Russian hostility.

From the early eighties of the 19th century Andrassy's successors did indeed try to arrive at a modus vivendi with Russia, and were zealously seconded in this effort by Prince Bismarck, who wished to hold the balance between his two allies. Numerous crises were successfully overcome, but the conflict of interest remained, and was especially heightened after the RussoJapanese War (1904-5) had ended unfavourably for Russia. Russian statesmen renounced the policy, which they had followed for a time, of getting to the "warm ocean" in the Far East, and returned to the one which had been followed by Peter the Great and Catherine and never entirely given up, the goal of which had been the conquest of Constantinople and the command of the Dardanelles. The constantly increasing differences between Germany and the Western Powers, and the advances made by the latter towards friendship with the court of the Tsar, led in 1907-8 to a close entente between Russia and England, and hence to the development of the long-standing alliance between Russia and France into a Triple Entente.

Baron Aehrenthal, who from the autumn of 1906 had directed the foreign policy of the Habsburg Monarchy, recognized the threatening danger, which became greater and Aehren- greater as the internal affairs of the Turkish Empire assumed a more and more critical aspect. This policy. empire he wished to preserve, if it could by any means be done; but in the event of its final liquidation he was firmly determined to safeguard the interests of Austria-Hungary. It was above all necessary to make sure of the possession of the occupied prov e The article under Europe, written from a British historian's point of view, should be read for a somewhat different perspective of the European situation which resulted in the World War. See also Serbia. The account given here naturally reflects, in various aspects, the point of view of an Austrian historian. - (Ed. E. B.) (A.

inces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been under AustroHungarian government for 30 years past. The Young Turk Revolution, in July 1908, served as a pretext for carrying into effect the annexation of these territories, which had been planned long since. It happened opportunely that at this very time Russian statesmen wished to effect the realization of their designs on the Dardanelles. Isvolsky, who directed Russian foreign policy, knew indeed that it would not be easy to win over Great Britain to his plan. But since he believed himself sure of French support, he hoped to achieve at least his immediate aim, the opening of the straits to Russian ships-of-war, so soon as he had come to an understanding with the Central Powers, and especially with Austria-Hungary. During the negotiations entered upon, on Aehrenthal's initiative, between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg, Isvolsky expressed his consent to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the event of the Vienna Government's falling in with his plans as to the straits question. Aehrenthal seized upon this proposal, for he hoped that the annexation of these provinces would enable him to take active measures in face of the Greater Serbia movement.

At the beginning of July 1908 Isvolsky handed in at Vienna a memorandum which guaranteed to the Habsburg Monarchy, besides Bosnia and Herzegovina, the greater part of the Sanjak of Novibazar as well. Aehrenthal accepted Isvolsky's offer in so far as it applied to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; but he demanded the same right for the warships of Rumania and Bulgaria as for those of Russia, and in addition a guarantee against an attack on Constantinople by a Russian fleet entering the Bosporus. In return he was ready to give up the Sanjak and the rights appertaining to Austria-Hungary in Montenegro, and therefore the plan of an advance on Salonika, the seizure of which Andrassy had had in view as the next objective in AustriaHungary's policy of expansion in S.E. Europe. On Sept. 15 Aehrenthal met Isvolsky at the château of Buchlau in Moravia, informed him of the impending Austrian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and promised him in return a free hand in his proceedings with regard to the question of the Dardanelles. The two ministers promised each other mutual support; Aehrenthal renounced the Sanjak of Novibazar, as a set-off for which Isvolsky gave a promise that Russia would not take possession of Constantinople. A European conference was to give its sanction to their settlement. A binding written agreement was contemplated, but was not arrived at on this occasion.

When, however, at the beginning of Oct. 1908 Francis Joseph publicly announced the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a fait accompli, a storm of indignation burst forth in many quarters. It was insisted, especially in England, that agreements settled by international treaties could only be modified with the agreement of all the contracting Powers. Both in Paris and in London, where Isvolsky had betaken himself in order to obtain the consent of the Western Powers to the measures which he had concerted with Aehrenthal, he met with a decided refusal. Disappointed in his expectations, he now declared that he had been led astray by Aehrenthal.

Serbia lodged a protest against the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, demanded autonomy for these territories under the guarantee of the Great Powers, and a port on the the Inter- Adriatic for Serbia, with a strip of territory to connect national it with Serbia. Since Austria-Hungary showed no Situation. i ncl i nat i on to take these demands into consideration, Serbia now began to strengthen her military forces. At the same time a violent anti-Austrian movement began to make itself felt in Turkey. All goods coming from Austria-Hungary were boycotted, and Austro-Hungarian traders living in Turkey were subjected to annoyance. Bulgaria, whose prince, Ferdinand of Coburg, had assumed the royal crown on Oct. 5 1908, also took sides against Austria-Hungary. Aehrenthal had made himself personally offensive to that country, which now entered into negotiations with Russia and Serbia. In Italy, too, a hostile tendency towards Austria gained the upper hand. Victor Emanuel III. described the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a stab at the Treaty of Berlin, and Tittoni, who had spoken on Oct. 7 in terms favourable to the annexation, declared in his great speech in the Consulta at the beginning of Dec. 1908 - in contradiction with the tenor of a letter which he had addressed to Aehrenthal on Oct. 4 - that he had entered into no engagements with regard to it. The nationalist press and the irredentists fanned the flames, and in the Austrian Parliament the Sla y s, and above all the Czech leaders, raised loud complaints.

But Aehrenthal remained firm. He was convinced that Russia, which had not yet recovered from the defeat which she had suffered in the Russo-Japanese War, would not draw the sword, and that he would therefore succeed in achieving his ends without bloodshed. His own efforts were directed towards the preservation of peace. In this point of view he was at odds with a powerful party, led by Conrad von Hiitzendorff, chief of the AustroHungarian general staff, which was in favour of a decision by force of arms. In order to meet Russia's views Aehrenthal expressed his consent to the convening of a European conference, but insisted at the same time that he could only promise Serbia and Montenegro economic compensations, and made it a condition that the question of Austria-Hungary's sovereignty over Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be discussed at the conference, but only taken cognizance of by it. Aehrenthal's attitude aroused violent indignation in London and Paris. But since Germany resolutely took its stand on the side of the Habsburg Monarchy, France, with an eye to her Moroccan interests, only gave a lukewarm support to the Russian demands; and Isvolsky found himself compelled to beat a retreat. As early as Dec. 1908 he agreed that the conference should recognize the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina after a previous discussion of the matter had taken place between the several Cabinets. Meanwhile Sir Edward Grey, the English Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, advised the Turkish Government to give their consent to the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to be bought by a proportionate cash indemnity. Aehrenthal fell in with a suggestion in these terms, and on Feb. 26 1909 concluded an agreement with Turkey which secured to the Sultan, in return for his recognition of the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria-Hungary, a considerable sum of money in compensation for Ottoman State property in the annexed provinces. the course of the month of March the negotiations as to the form of consent to the annexation to be given by the Great Powers concerned were brought to a conclusion. It was to be effected by official declarations on their part, a European conference being avoided. On March 24 declarations in this sense were handed in at Berlin and Vienna by the Russian Government; those of England followed on March 28.

The danger of an Austro-Serbian war, which for some time had appeared inevitable, had fortunately passed by. Even after the settlement of the Austro-Turkish conflict the Serbs remained stubborn; Aehrenthal, however, wanted to avoid war, and now, as before, hoped to reach his goal Attitude of > > > P g Serbia. by calm firmness and conciliation. At the beginning of March 1909 he declared that Serbia, in order to avoid the humiliation of having her fate settled by the statesmen of Vienna, might submit to the decision of the Great Powers. But the Serbian Government declined, and continued to arm. The Cabinet of Vienna then decreed that the troops in the S.E. of the Monarchy should be reinforced. Isvolsky now saw that Francis Joseph was in earnest. Since he could not venture on war, he accepted the proposal of the German Imperial Chancellor, Billow, that Russia herself should use her influence over Serbia in the direction of moderation. On Great Britain's initiative negotiations were entered upon with the Government of Vienna, which led to the drafting of a note which should secure to AustriaHungary the satisfaction which she demanded.

After overcoming great difficulties it was possible to effect an agreement. On March 31 the Serbian Government handed in a note at Vienna in which it declared that Serbia had Submis- not suffered any injury to her rights through the sion of annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria- Serbia. Hungary, and promised to change the attitude which she had hitherto taken towards the Habsburg Monarchy, to maintain good neighbourly relations with the monarchy, and to reduce her army to the footing of the previous year (1908). In so doing Serbia submitted to the behest of the signatory Powers, but at the same time to the will of Austria-Hungary. Montenegro thereupon followed suit. The event was a victory for Aehrenthal, but a pyrrhic victory, in that through it was effected the cleavage of Europe into two hostile camps. Russia now broke definitely with Austria-Hungary and became increasingly hostile to German policy, while England recognized with increasing clearness the significance of the Southern Sla y s in the struggle against Germany, and especially of Serbia as a battering-ram against Germany's ally, the Habsburg Monarchy.

Two other events led to a further strengthening of the Triple Entente. One was the rapprochement between Russia and Italy, made manifest by Nicholas II.'s visit to Racconigi Triple En- (Oct. 24 1909); the other was the secret treaty con cluded in Dec. 1 o between Russia and Bulgaria, 9 9 g which ranged the latter in the Russian sphere of influence, and contained among other things the declaration that the realization of the ideals of the Slav peoples in the Balkan peninsula would only be possible after a favourable outcome of Russia's contest with Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Yet at this time these opposing tendencies did not come out into the open. The Central Powers sought rather to overcome 4 them. At the beginning of the year 1910 negotiations took place with Russia which were intended to further the establishment of better relations. After hopeful preliminaries they split on the irreconcilability of their conflicting interests. Aehrenthal's efforts at Rome seemed to meet with more success. He was able at the end of 1909 to arrive at an agreement with the Italian statesmen on the Albanian question, by which further friction between the two states, who were rivals in this quarter, should be avoided. In subsequent conversations which he held on frequent occasions in 1910 with the Italian Foreign Minister, San Giuliano, measures were considered which should smooth the way towards the establishment of friendly relations between the Cabinets of Vienna and Rome. In the years 1910 and 1911, moreover, Aehrenthal was eagerly striving to do everything for the maintenance of peace. He endeavoured to reconcile the differences which were forever cropping up anew between England and Germany. In order to win over Rumania and conciliate Serbia, commercial treaties were concluded with them. In the interest of peace, too, he placed no obstacle in the way of the assumption of the royal style by the Prince of Montenegro (Aug. 29 1910). Yet Aehrenthal kept his aim steadfastly in view: namely, the upholding of Austria-Hungary's interests in the Near East; and he left the Balkan peoples in no doubt that he would not be a peaceful spectator of the downfall of Turkey. He was in a difficult position when, in the autumn of 1911, Italy seized the opportunity for taking possession of Tripoli. A strong party, headed by the chief of the general staff, Conrad von HOtzendorff, held that the moment had arrived for coming to a reckoning with their faithless ally. In any case they wanted to use this favourable opportunity for assuring to Austria-Hungary the hegemony of the Balkans. But Aehrenthal, supported by Francis Joseph, stood up for the maintenance of the Triple Alliance. He even held that it was in the interest of the Habsburg Monarchy that Italy's imperialistic aspirations should find satisfaction on the south of the Mediterranean. He therefore asked Italy, in leaving her a free hand in Tripoli, not to interfere with the designs of the Vienna Cabinet in the Balkan peninsula. Also he requested the withdrawal of the Italian fleet from the coast of Albania, and protested against Italian designs on Salonika.

The fact that Aehrenthal gained his ends by these demands confirmed him in the idea that he had hit upon the right way, and increased his hopes of being able to guard Austria-. thal Suc- Hungary's interests in this difficult crisis without by resorting to arms. Aehrenthal 's death (Feb. 17 1912) was therefore a heavy loss to the Habsburg Monarchy, which made itself all the more felt since just at that time new dangers were arising for it in S.E. Europe. His successor as Austro-Hungarian foreign minister was Count Leopold Berchtold, who had formerly been ambassador at St. Petersburg.

The Italo-Turkish War, and especially the closing of the Dardanelles at the instance of the Turks, had done severe harm to Russian trade, and increased the desire of Russian statesmen to gain command of the Black Sea. It was widely held, too, that this was a favourable opportunity to bring about a Balkan alliance under Russian leader ship, which should make it possible for Russia, as protector of the Slav peoples of the Balkans, to take possession of Constantinople. Hartwig, the Russian minister in Belgrade, was particularly active in this direction. Other circles, led by Charykov, the Russian ambassador in Constantinople, thought it possible to attain the same end by other means. They wanted to preserve Turkey, but to make her Russia's vassal. She was to be admitted to the Balkan alliance and, in return, to allow the Russian fleet a free exit to the Mediterranean. But Charykov's efforts failed. Turkey refused; and in March 1912 Charykov had to leave Constantinople. The old plan of forming a Balkan alliance against Turkey was now taken up again. The greatest difficulty in its way was the jealousy between the Bulgarians, on the one hand, and the Serbs and Greeks on the other. Bulgaria would not hear of conceding to these peoples the extensions of territory which they claimed in Macedonia. It was not till March 1912, when the Russophil Gueshoff-Daneff Cabinet came into power in Sofia, that the Serbo-Bulgarian treaty was concluded, which was indeed aimed in the first place against Turkey, but also had the Habsburg Monarchy in view. Two military conventions (of May 12 and July 12 1912) further developed this Serbo-Bulgarian alliance. Bulgaria now undertook, in case Austria-Hungary occupied the Sanjak of Novibazar, to contribute 250,000 men towards a war with this Power. On May 29 Ferdinand of Bulgaria concluded a treaty with Greece against Turkey. But at the same time he handed in peaceful declarations at Vienna, Berlin and Constantinople, and let himself be feted in Vienna as a friend of the Habsburg Monarchy.

At the beginning of July 1912 the Tsar Nicholas II., at his meeting with the German Emperor at Baltiski Port (Port Baltic), in Esthonia, laid stress upon his pacific intentions. But as early as Aug. there began the longprepared conflict of the Christian peoples of the Balkans with Turkey, leading to bloody local struggles, in which there was no lack of atrocities on either side. In vain did the Central Powers endeavour to bring about an intervention of the Great Powers of Europe. On Sept. 30 1912 the order for mobilization was issued in Sofia, Belgrade and Athens. In order to have her hands free in this direction, Turkey thereupon determined to bring to an end the war against Italy by sacrificing Tripoli and Cyrenaica, and on Oct. 18 1912 the treaty of peace was signed at Lausanne. In the meantime the Balkan States had completed the last preparations for war. On Oct. 8 Montenegro declared war on Turkey, and soon after, on Oct. 17 and 18, Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece did likewise. To the astonishment of the European Great Powers they gained decisive victories over their opponent from the outset. The battle of Kirk Kilisse (Oct. 22) went in favour of the Bulgars, that of Kumanovo (Oct. 26) in favour of the Serbs. The Turkish troops, falling back rapidly, did indeed defend themselves successfully on the Chatalja lines against the oncoming Bulgarians, and thereby saved their threatened capital. But since none of the Great Powers would take active measures in their favour, they could not hope to reconquer the lost provinces. On Dec. 3 1912 an armistice was concluded between Turkey and Serbia, and between Turkey and Bulgaria. Greece took no part in it, but continued the struggle.

The success of the Balkan States against Turkey meant a marked weakening of the prestige of Austria-Hungary in the Balkans. The entry of the Greeks into Salonika (Nov. 8 1912) and the advance of the Serbian troops to the Adriatic produced a particularly painful im pression in Vienna. But consideration for the Slav Policy. peoples of the monarchy, who hailed with joy the victory of the Christian states of the Balkans over Turkey, and the dread of incurring the open enmity of Russia by an energetic intervention on behalf of the Sultan, held the Vienna Government back and disposed it, as early as the end of Oct. 1912, to modify its demands. Albania was to be allowed to develop freely; Serbian aspirations towards the Adriatic were to be rejected, and Rumania's claims to an extension of territory to be considered. Berchtold demanded no more than security for Austro-Hungarian economic interests in the Balkans. On this account he refused in the most decided terms to consent to the proposal of the French Government that Austria-Hungary, like all the other Great Powers, should express her desinteressement in the events taking place in the Balkan peninsula.

In so far as his plans concerned Albania and Serbia, Berchtold found Italian politicians in favour of them, since they saw in the spread of the Slav peoples to the Adriatic a danger to Italy, to oppose which in good time seemed to them Triple more important than any further check to the influence of the Habsburg Monarchy, divided as this was against itself. The common danger brought about a rapprochement between the two Cabinets, which was considerably strengthened by Italy's annoyance at the attitude of France at the time of the Libyan War. Thus it happened that as far back as Dec. 5 1912, in spite of violent opposition on the part of the nationalist deputies, of the more important section of the press, and of Italian public opinion, the Triple Alliance was renewed once more for another six to twelve years, the period being reckoned from 1914 onwards.

But the moderation displayed by Austria-Hungary in her Balkan policy did not produce the effect which had been hoped for at the Ballplatz. It weakened rather her credit

n the Balkans, disappointed the few partisans she had there, and encouraged the hopes of her many opponents. Paying no attention to Berchtold's declarations, the Serbs continued their efforts to extend their power to the Adriatic. On Nov. 10 1912 Serbian troops reached Alessio. At the same time Serbian politicians laboured to incite the other Balkan peoples against Austria-Hungary, since it was only at her expense they could hope to find compensation for the concessions which they had made in the March treaty with Bulgaria. In St. Petersburg, too, they left no stone unturned to create opinion against Austria-Hungary. And, in fact, in Nov. 1912 the Russian Cabinet declared itself in favour of the cession of an Adriatic port to Serbia, and was supported in this by France and England. The Russian trial mobilization increased the danger of a bloody collision. The Vienna Government on its side proceeded to prepare for war. The fact that Conrad von Hotzendorff was again entrusted with the position of chief of the general staff, which he had had to give up a year before because he had spoken in favour of an active military policy, showed that the war party had increased its influence at the Court of Vienna.
 

But the disinclination of the three emperors to conjure up a world war for the sake of Albania or Serbia, together with the influence of Great Britain, proved stronger than the urgency of the war parties either in Vienna or St. Petersburg. In opposition to Austria-Hungary, Bethmann Hollweg, the German imperial chancellor, and Kiderlen-Wachter, the German foreign minister, energetically upheld the point of view that a compromise with Russia was both desirable and possible. And in a like sense William II., when the Archduke Francis Ferdinand tried to convince him at Springe (Nov. 23 1912) of the necessity of an energetic course of action against the demands of the Serbs, insisted that, while he was in favour of using firm language, he was anxious to see all steps avoided which might lead to a rupture with Russia. In order that no doubt should arise as to the policy of the German Empire, Bethmann Hollweg, in announcing in the German Reichstag (at the beginning of Dec. 1912) the successful renewal of the Triple Alliance, added the remark that Germany must leave it to her Austrian ally to realize her aspirations alone, and would only join in a conflict in the case of a war of aggression against her, for the preservation of her own position in Europe and the defence of her own future and security.

Under the impression of these declarations Berchtold at the end of 1912 rejected Conrad's propositions, which aimed at the occupation of the Sanjak of Novibazar and ridding - Albania of Serbian troops, and he sought rather to serve the interests of the monarchy by diplomacy. In this connexion it stood him in good stead that a change had meanwhile come over affairs at the Court of St. Petersburg, not uninfluenced by external factors, and especially by England. The peace party had gained the upper hand. As late as Nov. 191 2 the Russian Government made a communication at Belgrade to the effect that it would offer no active opposition to the formation of an autonomous Albania, and requesting an attitude of reserve towards Austria-Hungary on the part of the Serbian Cabinet. Shortly afterwards, on the suggestion of Sir Edward Grey, a conference of ambassadors in London was decided upon, to take place at the same time as the peace negotiations which were being carried on there between Turkey and her opponents, with a view to finding a solution of the outstanding questions at issue between Russia and Austria-Hungary. After long hesitation Berchtold, under pressure from Germany and Italy, consented to the conference of ambassadors, but insisted that as a matter of principle Austria-Hungary should take no part in any discussion of the question as to whether Serbia should be permanently established on the Adriatic. Serbia thereupon declared her willingness to yield to the decision of the Great Powers. Yet the Austro-Hungarian and Russian troops remained under arms, and Serbian intrigues still went on. The negotiations of the London conference of ambassadors proceeded slowly. When the peace conference, which was sitting at the same time, came temporarily to an end on Jan. 7 1913, owing to Turkey's refusal of the demand of the Balkan States that she should cede the three fortresses of Adrianople, Scutari and Janina, which had not yet fallen, the conference of ambassadors presided over by Sir Edward Grey made efforts to prevent a resumption of hostilities; but these attempts were unsuccessful. On Feb. 3 1913 began the second Balkan War.

Meanwhile the deliberations dragged on in London as to the frontier of the new Albanian state which was to be set up. Russia in this matter presented the views of Serbia Austro- and Montenegro, but met with resolute opposition not only from the representatives of Austria-Hungary War but also from those of Italy. And it looked at last as if it would come to an armed conflict between Austria-Hungary and Russia. But at the last moment the danger was averted. Prince Gottfried zu Hohenlohe was sent on a special mission to St. Petersburg and succeeded in convincing Nicholas II. of Francis Joseph's pacific intentions. The negotiations now opened led in March to the cancelling of the mobilization on the frontiers which had been set on foot by both Powers. At the same time the Russian representative at the London conference of ambassadors announced his sovereign's readiness to consent to the allotment of Scutari to Albania in the event of AustriaHungary's acceding to the separation of Diakova, Ipek (Pee) and Prisren from Albania. On March 20 the representative of Austria-Hungary handed in a declaration in the same sense.

By now the war between the Balkan States and Turkey had taken its course, leading, in spite of the unexpectedly gallant defence of the Turks, to the fall of Janina (March 6) and Adrianople (March 26). On account of the wrangling which broke out between Bulgaria on the War81 one hand, and Serbia and Greece on the other, as to the partition of Macedonia, on April 16 1913 Ferdinand of Bulgaria concluded an armistice with Turkey. But there was no sign of the peace which was desired on all sides. Serbia, in defiance of the protests of the Vienna Cabinet, continued to occupy Northern Albania with Durazzo, and Montenegro continued to besiege Scutari, although the London conference of ambassadors had assigned it to the Albanian state; and the Great Powers decided on a naval demonstration against Montenegro, which was not, however, intended seriously by all the participants. The war party at Vienna, led by Conrad, wished to force the Montenegrins to raise the siege, if necessary by arms, Austria Hungary ' 'and Rumania. Effect of the Balkan Wars. Doubtful Attitude Rumania. rap- Policy of Austria= Hungary. ' 'and Be' e and Berlin. The" for ' Agree - meat. me'moire views in a second memorandum of July 8 and counselled moderation, laying stress on the danger of international complications. This view should have been reinforced by the report drawn up by Friedrich von Wiesner (b. 1871), who had been sent by the Vienna Ballplatz to Sarajevo, on the circumstances in which the murderous attack on the heir to the throne had taken place. This report established the fact that no direct connexion could be proved between the murderer and the Serbian Government. But this report failed of its effect. Authoritative circles in Vienna remained under the conviction that the Court and Government of Belgrade had for long lent their benevolent support to the Greater Serbian movement, and held to their determination of putting atr end to an unbearable situation. The dangers which might arise from drastic measures were indeed weighed; the possibility of a world war was even considered. But the opinion predominated that all must be staked on one card. " Better an end by fear than fear without end," ( "Lieber ein Ende mit Schrecken, als ein Schrecken ohne Ende" ) was the mot of a leading statesman. These circles were confirmed in their resolve to appeal to arms by the pronouncements of Conrad von Hdtzendorff, who, in reply to a question, summed up his judgment in the following sense: that the military prospects of the Central Powers in a world war (Great Britain's intervention on the side of the enemy not being yet reckoned with seriously) were no longer so favourable as in previous years, but were certainly more favourable than they would be in the near future. That decided it. On July 14 the decision was adopted of sending Serbia an ultimatum with a short timelimit. Tisza, after long vacillation, acquiesced, but with the condition that Austria-Hungary was to make a solemn declaration that - with the exception of necessary minor rectifications of the frontier - she sought no territorial gains at the expense of Serbia. By this means Tisza hoped to placate Russia and to deprive the Italians of any pretext for advancing any claim to compensations under Article VII. of the Treaty of the Triple Alliance. This request of Tisza's was indeed taken into account at the conference of ministers of July 19, but on the same occasion Berchtold declared that Serbia was,to be made smaller and the provinces taken from her were to be divided among some of the other Balkan States.

The note to Serbia, which had not found its final form till after repeated modification of its language,' was read out, and the time for its presentation to the Serbian Government appointed for the afternoon of July 23.

Its essential points ran as follows: - Since the Greater Serbian movement directed against Austria-Hungary has been proceeded with in recent years with the ultimate object of separating from the Habsburg Monarchy certain of its parts; and since the Serbian Government, in contradiction with the declarations handed in by it on March 31 1909, has not only done nothing towards its suppression, but has rather encouraged it, the Austro-Hungarian Government must formulate certain demands in order to put an end to this state of affairs. In these demands are included, amongst others, the condemnation of agitation having as its object the breaking away of portions of the monarchy and the admonition of the peoples against a continuance of this course: both to be accomplished through an announcement in the official press organ and through an army order on the part of the king; the suppression of the Greater Serbian agitation on Serbian soil; the dissolution of societies working for this object; the dismissal of the officials and teachers compromised; the participation of representatives of the Imperial and Royal Government in the measures which the Serbian Government should be under the obligation to undertake with a view to the suppression of the Greater Serbian movement.

The presentation of the note took place at the appointed time; on July 24 the world was informed of its contents. Only Germany approved unreservedly the demarche of the Vienna Government; the remaining Powers raised objections. Sazonov, the Russian foreign minister, broke into a violent outburst against Austria-Hungary, and declared. it to be a matter of international concern. Sir E. Grey described the note as " the 1 A prominent part in the drafting of the ultimatum was played by Count Johann Forgach (b. 1870) and Baron Alexander Musulin (h. 1866), who had also, as Berchtold's advisers, a decisive influence on the course of events generally at this time.

most formidable document " that one State had ever addressed to another. Negotiations began at once between the groups of Powers. They aimed at the extension of the time-limit of 48 hours which had been allowed to the Serbs. England and Russia were especially active in this sense. But Austria-Hungary refused any prolongation of the time-limit. On July 25, shortly before the expiry of the appointed interval, the Serbs handed in their answer. They declared themselves ready to comply with the majority of the demands of the Vienna Government, but with regard to certain points - for instance, where it was a question of the participation of the Austro-Hungarian representatives in the judicial enquiry to be held in the territory of the kingdom of Serbia, and of the dismissal of the officers and officials who were compromised - certain reservations were made; at the same time the Serbs emphasized their willingness to endeavour to reach a friendly solution of the conflict by referring the decision to the Hague Court of Arbitration, or to those Great Powers who had collaborated in the composition of the Serbian declaration of March 31 1909. But the AustroHungarian minister declared Serbia's answer to be unsatisfactory, and diplomatic relations were broken off between Vienna and Belgrade.

The Vienna Cabinet's harsh attitude nowhere met with approbation; the German Government itself did not approve it. The Emperor William indeed was of opinion that Austria-Hungary had gained a great moral victory, to g Y g g Y? Avert and that no cause of war remained. But neither his efforts, nor those of Sir Edward Grey, which were directed towards the mediation of the Great Powers not directly involved, met with success. On July 28 Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. The Great Powers now strove to localize the conflict. But all their attempts came to naught. Even the English proposal for direct negotiations with a view to an understanding between the Cabinets of Vienna and St. Petersburg led to no result. On the evening of July 29 the order was given for mobilization in the military area on the S.W. front of Russia situated on the border of Austria-Hungary. On July 31 the Russian order for a general mobilization was issued, and answered by similar measures on the part of Austria-Hungary and Germany. On Aug. 2 Germany declared war on Russia, and the day after on France; on Aug. 4 England and Belgium on Germany; on the 6th Austria-Hungary on Russia; other Powers followed suit. The World War, so long dreaded by the Great Powers of Europe, had broken out.

The Central Powers had now to make sure of the aid of their allies and to win new combatants to their side. But the efforts which they made towards this end brought them disappointment upon disappointment. The conversations which had taken place with Italy in July 1914 had made them realize that they could not reckon on an immediate participation of the Italian troops on the side of the Triple Alliance. As early as July 25, moreover, San Giuliano had announced that he would open the question of compensation for Italy in case of an Austro-Serbian war. This announcement he "repeated after the declaration of war, but made it clear at the same time that Austria-Hungary was not to expect active support from the Italians, since she had taken the offensive against Serbia. Under pressure from the German Government, which still cherished the hope of deciding Italy, by farreaching concessions, to take part in a world war on the side of the Central Powers, Berchtold declared himself ready in principle to recognize the Italian claims to compensation for every annexation made by Austria-Hungary in the Balkans, but in any case only on the assumption that Italy would observe a friendly attitude towards the Habsburg Monarchy in an AustroSerbian war, and in case of a world war fulfil her obligations as a member of the Triple Alliance. But as early as Aug. i San Giuliano insisted that the cases foederis had not arisen for Italy in the case of the Russians also; for the time being she would remain neutral; but cooperation with her allies at a later time was referred to as not excluded. It was in the same sense, though in the most cordial terms possible, that Victor Emmanuel answered the telegram in which Francis Joseph expressed his expectation of seeing the Italian troops fighting side by side with those of the Habsburg Monarchy.

Still less gratifying to Vienna were the reports which came in at the same time from Bucharest. The hopes which the Emperor William had built on King Charles's faith Attitude of f u lness to his treaty obligations were not realized. Rumania. Y g The Rumanian ruler evaded a decisive pronouncement as to his attitude in a world war; and Bratianu, the minister-president, did likewise. Czernin, the Austro-Hungarian minister at Bucharest, maintained that at first nothing but neutrality could be reckoned on on the part of Rumania, and insisted that the attitude of the Bulgarians and Turks, together with the course taken by the events of the war, would be decisive for any further action of the King and Government. It was significant that Bratianu spoke of the necessity of maintaining a balance in the Balkans, and at the same time pointed out the difficulties which would confront the King and the Government in consequence of the hostile attitude of influential Rumanian circles to the Magyars. It was in vain that Francis Joseph and William II. used their personal influence to try and persuade King Charles to take action in the sense they wished. No effect was produced even by the promise made by them to the King on Aug. 2 1914 that they would help Rumania to obtain possession of Bessarabia, after the war had come to a successful end, if she would join in the struggle on the side of the Triple Alliance Powers. The crown council held on Aug. 4 decided that Rumania could not admit that the casus foederis had arisen. The assurance given by Charles at the same time, that he would safeguard the Rumanian frontiers and apprise Bulgaria that she would have nothing to fear from Rumania if 'she ranged herself with the Central Powers, could be of no greater comfort to his disillusioned allies than his solemn declaration that he would never consent to Rumania taking the field against Austria-Hungary.

The Central Powers were rather more fortunate in their quest for new allies than in their attempts to persuade Italy and Rumania to fulfil their engagements. On Aug. r 1914 the representatives of Germany and Turkey Tith h ad signed a treaty by which they bound themselves to Turkey. g Y Y Y remain neutral in the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia; but the casus foederis would arise at the moment when Russia entered the war. In this event Germany promised Turkey military support, and guaranteed her existing territorial position as against the Russians. By identical .notes of Aug. i 1914 Austria-Hungary adhered to this treaty, which was to last till the end of 1918. But for the time being the Turks did not actively intervene, for their army was not yet properly equipped, and the influence of the friends of the Entente at Constantinople was still too strong. In order to strengthen the Government, which was friendly to the Central Powers, and to make it possible for them shortly to take an active part against the Entente, Germany promised them, as early as the first weeks of Aug. 1914, though only verbally, that in the event of a complete victory of Germany and her allies, their wishes should be furthered both in the matter of the abolition of the Capitulations and of final settlement with Bulgaria; that all Turkish provinces which might be occupied by the common enemy in the course of the war should be evacuated; a series of rectifications of the frontier to her advantage would be made, and they would receive a proportionate share in the war indemnity which was to be expected. Direct inquiries from the Turks were met by Berchtold with the same promises in the name of Austria-Hungary.

On the other hand, the efforts of the Central Powers to decide Bulgaria to an alliance broke down. At first, indeed, it looked as if the negotiations which had already Negotia- been conducted by Austria-Hungary at Sofia for a long time in this sense would speedily lead to a profitable result. Austria-Hungary showed herself inclined, in return for Bulgaria's adhesion to the Triple Alliance, to guarantee her existing territorial possessions, and, in the event of a favourable outcome of the impending conflicts, to gratify Ferdinand's aspirations towards the acquisition of " ethnicohistorical boundaries" against states which had not joined the Triple Alliance. By the early days of Aug. 1914 the negotiations had advanced so far that the signature of the treaties with Germany and Austria-Hungary seemed imminent. Berchtold and Bethmann Hollweg pressed for a decision, the latter more especially on the ground that he still hoped to win over Rumania definitely to the side of the Central Powers. If this could be achieved, then Bulgaria, assured against attacks from the Rumanian side, might be prompted to draw the sword against Serbia, and the majority of the Austro-Hungarian troops which were marching against Serbia could be diverted against Russia. But Ferdinand of Bulgaria refused to embark on a war against Serbia. He laid stress on the dangers which threatened his kingdom in such a case from Greece, Rumania and Turkey; he also alluded to the large offers which had been made him by Russia, and held that he could only come to a decision after his relations with Rumania and Turkey had been cleared up and the negotiations for a treaty with these Powers had been concluded. It was clear that Ferdinand of Bulgaria, too, did not wish to enter the war before the preponderance of the Central Powers over their opponents could be assumed with greater confidence. But successes in the field remained to seek in the Eastern theatre of war. After promising beginnings, the campaign of the Austro-Hungarian armies took an unsuccessful turn, and decided Ferdinand to be prudent. He declared that he would remain neutral, but for the present he could do no more.

But the ill success of the Austro-Hungarian armies did not produce an effect on the Bulgarian Government only. With the advance of the Russians and their approach to the Rumanian frontiers, the influence of the friends of the Entente at Bucharest increased. The news arriving at Berlin and Vienna at this time caused the worst to be feared. It was believed that an overthrow of the dynasty was imminent, together with an immediate alliance of Rumania with the enemy, and an advance of Rumanian troops into Transylvania. The most pressing advice reached Vienna from Berlin in favour of far-reaching concessions, even of a territorial nature. But, strongly influenced by Tisza, Berchtold refused any concessions in this direction. Under the advice of King Charles, who was already seriously ill, and was torn by a terrible conflict between personal honour and the wishes of his people, the Central Powers sought to work upon public opinion in Bucharest by a declaration that the defection of Rumania would be met by an immediate advance of troops into the country. But their threats remained ineffectual, for it was known in Bucharest that the troops necessary for such an enterprise were not forthcoming. In reality Germany was counselling Vienna not to oppose the march of Rumanian troops into Transylvania by force of arms, since for the moment a defence of the frontiers was impossible; but rather to tolerate the advance, and to announce that it had taken place in order to defend the territory from occupation by Russian troops. Berchtold refused, and Tisza, whose acrimony over the German proposals knew no bounds, declared that he would rather see the Russians than the Rumanians in Transylvania. Meanwhile the tide of warlike enthusiasm at Bucharest mounted higher and higher. The Government entered into a written agreement with Italy providing for common action on the part of both of them. A crown council was summoned for the early days of Oct., which was to come to a decision against the Central Powers. Only at the last moment was it possible to avert the danger. The crown council was cancelled, and Rumania for the time being remained neutral. A few days later, on Oct. ro 1914, King Charles of Rumania died. He had not fulfilled the engagements into which he had entered, but he had at least successfully prevented his troops from fighting against the Central Powers.

One of the chief reasons which had delayed the Rumanians in going over to the camp of the Entente was the fear enter Bulgaria. sacro egoismo, rapprochement In Equivocal Attitude o 2 21 with ing their enemies, as in that case she would have to reckon with Bulgaria, which had not forgiven the wounds inflicted by the provisions of the Treaty of Bucharest in 1913.

It was not an easy matter for the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin to win over the Bulgarians. Both the King and Radoslavov distrusted the Rumanians and Turks, and feared the Greeks and Russians. Moreover, the far-reaching offers of the Entente Powers were not without influence upon them. Their attitude in their dealings with the representatives of the Central Powers was guarded, and they kept increasing their demands. As early as the end of 1914 the Vienna Government, in view of the unfavourable military position in Serbia and Galicia, and in consequence of the pressure exerted upon it not only by the German politicians and military commanders, but also by Conrad, had declared its readiness to concede to the Bulgarians, in the event of their entry into the war on the side of the Central Powers, the possession of those Serbian territories to which they advanced historical and ethnographical claims; only, however, so far as they should occupy them with their own troops during the course of the war. The negotiations started at the beginning of 1915 on this basis were protracted by the Bulgarians, for in view of the unfavourable military situation of the Central Powers at the time, King Ferdinand and Radoslavov did not think it expedient to enter into permanent engagements. They therefore declared that they could promise only to remain neutral, but demanded in return considerable extensions of territory in Macedonia, increasing their claims in March and April under the impression of the Russian victories in the Carpathians and the danger threatening Turkey from the Western Powers. Burian, however, held firmly to the position that he could make territorial concessions only in return for active participation on Bulgaria's part. The breakthrough at Gorlitz and the subsequent victorious advance of the Germans and Austro-Hungarian troops also produced their effect in Sofia. The negotiations with the Central Powers were carried on with more zeal; but they failed to reach a settlement, since the demands of the Bulgarians continued to be out of all proportion to any services which they seemed disposed to offer in return. They declined to attack Serbia, refused a military convention proposed to them by the Central Powers, but at the same time increased the price of their continued neutrality. The entry of Italy into the war against the Central Powers, and the increasingly extensive offers on the part of the Entente, added to the difficulty of the negotiations between Vienna and Sofia. But gradually the conviction gained ground in Sofia that adherence to the Central Powers would serve the interests of Bulgaria better than an alliance with the Entente. For it would be easy for the former to concede the extensions of territory desired by Bulgaria in Macedonia at Serbia's expense, whereas the Entente Powers were bound to fear that similar concessions on their part would give offence to their faithful ally Serbia. The Triple Entente failed in their efforts to persuade the Serbs to consent to this sacrifice by promising them, in the event of ultimate victory, the possession of Bosnia, Herzegovina and Dalmatia, for Bulgaria demanded immediate possession of the Macedonian territories promised her, while Serbia wanted the transfer of these territories to be postponed until she herself should have secured the extension of territory promised to her by way of compensation.

It was only when the continued victorious advance of the Germans and Austro-Hungarians in Poland made the prospects of the ultimate victory of the Central Powers in the World War seem very favourable, that the advantage to be gained by joining them was definitely recognized at Sofia. From July 1915 onwards negotiations were energetically carried on. The Central Powers insisted on the signature of a military convention in addition, to the treaty of alliance, and that Bulgaria should at the same time conclude a treaty with the Turks. After innumerable difficulties had been surmounted, the treaties between Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria were signed on Sept. 6 1915. The most important article of one treaty contained a guarantee by Austria-Hungary of the independence and integrity of Bulgaria against any attack not provoked by Bulgaria herself, this guarantee to be valid for the duration of the alliance, i.e. till Dec. 31 1920, and after that for a year, and so on until the treaty should be denounced in proper form. Bulgaria, for her part, undertook to give AustriaHungary proportionate armed assistance in the event of the monarchy being attacked by a State bordering on Bulgaria, and demanding her aid. The second agreement, signed on the same day, contained a pledge from Bulgaria that she would take the offensive against Serbia, in return for which what is now Serbian Macedonia - the so-called "disputed" and "nondisputed" zones, as established by the Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of March 13 1912 - was promised to her. In the meantime it was agreed that, in the event of an attack by Rumania on Bulgaria or her allies - including the Turks - which should not have been provoked by Bulgaria, Austria-Hungary would consent to the recovery by Bulgaria of the territory ceded by her to Rumania by the Peace of Bucharest, and a rectification of the Rumano-Bulgarian frontier as defined by the Treaty of Berlin. A similar promise was made to Bulgaria, under the same conditions, with regard to the territory ceded by her to Greece by the Peace of Bucharest. The military convention signed on the same day settled the provisions for the carryingout of the impending joint offensive against Serbia. The negotiations between the Turks and Bulgarians, which had been going on for a year past, were also brought to a conclusion on Sept. 6, thanks to persistent pressure from the Central Powers. Turkey gave in on the essential point by agreeing to a rectification of the frontier in favour of Bulgaria on both banks of the Maritsa.

The significance of the adhesion of Bulgaria to the Central Powers lay in the facts that it secured their communications with Turkey, and also the possibility of a victorious campaign against Serbia. The campaign now began and proceeded according to programme. Though valiantly defended by the Serbs against overwhelming numbers, their country fell, towards the end of 1915, into the hands of the Central Powers and Bulgaria. Shortly afterwards Montenegro shared the same fate.

The year 1915 also brought " Congress Poland " into the possession of the Central Powers. After the fall of Warsaw (Aug. 5 1915) General Governments were set up on behalf of Germany at Warsaw and on behalf of Austria-Hungary at Lublin, to which all governmental powers were handed over. At first the Central Powers had not contemplated the permanent acquisition of " Congress Poland." It was merely considered as a pawn and an item for compensations at the end of the war. But after the fall of Warsaw, the Cabinets of Vienna and Berlin tried to arrive at an agreement as to the future destiny of Poland. The most diverse solutions were discussed, but no definitive agreement was arrived at by the end of the war. The idea of handing Poland back to Russia was indeed repeatedly advanced by Germany - both in the year 1915 and again very actively after July 1916 - when Stiirmer was at the head of foreign affairs in the empire of the Tsar. But since the condition of such a solution - namely a total separation of Russia from the Entente - could not be brought about, it was allowed to drop. The plan of dividing the whole of the conquered territory of Poland between AustriaHungary and Germany was also considered. But insuperable difficulties arose in the course of the negotiations, particularly with regard to the frontiers of the respective territories. It was also foreseen that the Poles would not voluntarily submit to a new partition of their country and that they would struggle for its reunion. It was feared, moreover, that far-reaching differences between the Allies would be revealed the moment economic and military questions should come under discussion. The idea of annexing " Congress Poland " to Germany, first ventilated by a section of public opinion and in military circles in Germany, was rejected not only by the Vienna Cabinet but also by the German Imperial Chancellor, since he feared the increase of Polish influence in Germany that would be bound to follow. The plan advocated for a time by Bethmann Hollweg, of founding an independent Polish buffer state, which should be in economic, political and military alliance with the Central Powers, also split upon the opposition of the Vienna Government. Thus the union of " Congress Poland " with the Habsburg Monarchy, which Burian had proposed in Aug. 1915, and which had been advocated by the writings of Count Andrassy among others, stood out more clearly as the only possible solution of the Polish question. But this, too, presented great difficulties on closer examination. There were adherents of the idea of a personal union and on the other hand of an actual union; among the latter were those who were in favour of a trialistic form for the new greater Austria-Hungary, and those who advocated the incorporation of Poland in the Austrian State.

Under the influence of the Hungarian Government, whose spokesman, Count Tisza, protested in the strongest terms against the organization of the monarchy on a trialistic basis, the idea now prevailed of annexing Poland to Austria-Hungary and granting to the united territory of Poland, with the addition of Galicia, a far-reaching autonomy. This had the further object of diminishing the damage to the interests of the GermanAustrians which was feared by wide circles in Austria and Germany. Since the autumn of 1915 negotiations were carried on between leading statesmen of Germany and Austria-Hungary on this basis. But the more deeply the question was gone into the greater were the difficulties which pre